Geographies of Embodiment in Early Modern England

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Edited by

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This book is dedicated to Gail Kern Paster

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Acknowledgements

CF.P1 The idea for this volume was generated some years ago over dinner during the Modern Language Association convention. Our objective was not only to recruit a group of exceptional scholars to consider the geography of embodiment, but also to produce a collection that would stand as a testament to the impact that Gail Kern Paster has had on early modern studies. As we approached would-be contributors, we were delighted with how quickly and eagerly they signed on, in itself a tribute to Gail. Working with this gracious cast of contributors has been an absolute pleasure; not only did they produce superb essays, they also accommodated us at every step (and lag) along the way. We are greatly indebted to them.

CF.P2 We also have individual debts that we would like to acknowledge.

CF.P3 *Mary*. I am very pleased to have this opportunity to recognize and honour Gail's brilliant and generative scholarship on embodiment and geography. It is impossible to enumerate all the ways that she has advanced the field of early modern literary studies, but we hope this volume functions as a small token of our esteem. I am most grateful to Garrett for inviting me to collaborate with him again: his admirable work ethic, generosity, critical acumen, and good humour make him an ideal co-editor. I also owe thanks to the participants in the Early Modern Literary Geographies Conference held at the Huntington Library in 2016, where I received enormously helpful feedback on an earlier version of my chapter. Much love to Lanis, Claude, and Maddie, who make my local habitation so bright and warm.

CF.P4 *Garrett*. I doubt I'm alone in thinking that, without Gail Paster, I would not have been able to do the work I do. Additionally, my life would be a little less joyful were Gail not in it; it's been a real pleasure working on this scholarly tribute to her. And it's been an even greater pleasure working on it with Mary, the only person with whom I could imagine taking this project on. I'm grateful for Mary's wisdom, her keen judgment, her amiability, and her unflappability. For their generous and illuminating feedback on earlier iterations of my chapter, I would like to thank audiences at the University of Bristol, the Huntington Library, the University of Manchester, and the University of Southern Queensland (site of the 2014 ANZSA conference). Lastly, I would like to send my love to my family: my father Garry and

step-mother Lorry; my siblings Tracy, Amy, Sheila, and Peirce; and especially my partner Marie. CSSOHTP!

CF.P5 Finally, we would both like to thank Julie Sanders and the anonymous readers for their support and crucial input as well as everyone at Oxford University Press who so ably shepherded us through the editorial and production processes. Special thanks to Ellie Collins for her expert guidance and unflagging enthusiasm for this project.

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C1

1
Introduction

Mary Floyd-Wilson and Garrett A. Sullivan, Jr

C1.P1 Over the last twenty years or so, a number of literary scholars focusing on the early modern body have taken up the geographic nature of embodiment without always being aware of it. Gail Kern Paster's work on the ecology of the passions has, as Julian Yates notes in this volume, shown that 'the body comes saturated at all points by a world only notionally "beyond" us'.[1] Michael Schoenfeldt's important discussion of the House of Alma in book 2 of the *Faerie Queene* not only examines an influential spatialization of the body-as-castle, it also demonstrates how subjectivity in Spenser's romance is constituted out of the dynamic interplay between body and environment.[2] Mary Floyd-Wilson's investigation of geohumoral thought in the work of Shakespeare, Marlowe, Jonson, and others attests that humoral complexion was inextricable from climate, and that particular forms of subjectivity were regionally inflected.[3] And, although we were scarcely conscious of it at the time of the volume's production, the geographic dimensions of embodiment are central to our earlier edited collection, *Environment and Embodiment in Early Modern England*.[4]

C1.P2 To stress the geographic nature of embodiment is not to point to a single thing; it is instead to corral under one heading a number of related critical approaches to, and contemporary and period understandings of, embodiment. What unites these understandings is a view of the body that emphasizes motion over stasis; that sees the microcosm–macrocosm relationship as interactive rather than mimetic; and that approaches a range of somatic

[1] See p. 00.

[2] Schoenfeldt, *Bodies and Selves in Early Modern England: Physiology and Inwardness in Spenser, Shakespeare, Herbert, and Milton* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

[3] Floyd-Wilson, *English Ethnicity and Race in Early Modern Drama* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

[4] Mary Floyd-Wilson and Garrett A. Sullivan, Jr, eds, *Environment and Embodiment in Early Modern England* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

Mary Floyd-Wilson and Garrett A. Sullivan, Jr, *Introduction* In: *Geographies of Embodiment in Early Modern England*. Edited by: Mary Floyd-Wilson and Garrett A. Sullivan, Oxford University Press (2020).

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practices—from inhalation and exhalation to sensory apprehension to action and affection to memory and cognition—as operating across both body and world, albeit at different speeds and with different degrees of individual agency or volition. Subjectivity is also bound up with the geography of embodiment, although hardly reducible to it. Moreover, while somatic processes occur across body and environment, they are also sometimes represented geographically, as in the aforementioned example of the House of Alma. To put it another way, to focus on the geographic nature of embodiment as the scholars in this volume do is to stress the transactional. It is to downplay reified, static conceptions of the *body* in favour of an analysis of *embodiment* as an ongoing process of engagement with (and in) the world.[5]

C1.P3 One of the driving forces behind this geographic turn in the literary study of embodiment has been the work of Gail Kern Paster. Yates offers a fine account of how Paster's thinking developed between her two landmark books, *The Body Embarrassed: Drama and the Disciplines of Shame in Early Modern England* (1993) and *Humoring the Body: Emotions and the Shakespearean Stage* (2004).[6] Whereas the former study focuses on the disciplining of a body understood as a 'semipermeable, irrigated container' (8), the latter work opens up that container more fully to the world in which it is immersed. This process of opening up has both informed and been informed by work on cognitive science, the history of emotion, and the supernatural and preternatural—work that in different ways highlights the geographic aspects of embodiment.

C1.P4 In the opening paragraphs of *Philosophy and Memory Traces: Descartes to Connectionism*, the historian of cognitive science John Sutton underscores

[5] The critical conversation centred on the geography of embodiment has developed largely independently of the rich and varied work that has been conducted in recent decades on literary and cultural geographies. Touchstones of that scholarship include the following: Bernhard Klein, *Maps and the Writing of Space in Early Modern England and Ireland* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001); Philip Schwyzer, *Archaeologies of English Renaissance Literature* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Andrew McRae, *Literature and Domestic Travel in Early Modern England* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Julie Sanders, *The Cultural Geography of Early Modern Drama, 1620–1650* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); and Alexandra Walsham, *The Reformation of the Landscape: Religion, Identity and Memory in Early Modern Britain and Ireland* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

[6] Paster, *The Body Embarrassed: Drama and the Disciplines of Shame in Early Modern England* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993); and *Humoring the Body: Emotions and the Shakespearean Stage* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004). It is worth noting that while Paster's first book did not centre upon embodiment, it did take up matters pertaining to urban geography: *The Idea of the City in the Age of Shakespeare* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1985).

the geographic dimension of early modern memory. The psychophysiology of memory, Sutton suggests, was conceptualized in terms of the operations of 'old fluids, animal spirits which meandered and rummaged through the pores of the brain. They held experience and history in bodies which were themselves porous, uncertainly coupled across tissues and skin with their air, their ethics, their land.'[7] Sutton's ambition in this study is 'to trace interactions between minds and their social surround, or between particular bodies and the worlds in which they grow' (3). In this regard, Sutton's work is of a piece with that of Andy Clark and David Chalmers in their seminal essay on the extended mind. Clark and Chalmers demonstrate that neither mental activity nor indeed the mind itself is delimited by 'the demarcations of skin and skull'.[8] This is so not only in such familiar but esoteric cases as that of the memory palace, in which cognitive matter is imaginatively placed in and retrieved from various *loci* within a recalled or invented architectural structure; more prosaic mental activities also occur within what Paster describes as 'rich, historically situated cognitive environment[s]'.[9]

C1.P5 Evelyn B. Tribble takes up place and memory within a particularly rich cognitive environment: that of the early modern playhouse. Tribble confronts the problem of the 'enormous mnemonic loads' borne by early modern players, who performed multiple plays every week and routinely worked in new ones on very short notice.[10] To address this problem, she draws upon research in the related fields of distributed and situated cognition, as well as extended mind theory, in order to show how, within the early modern theatre, the 'attentional and mnemonic demands of the enterprise [were off-loaded] onto technological and social structures' (8). More specifically, theatrical companies used plots, playbooks, and even stage doors in such a way as to minimize the cognitive demands made upon the players, allowing them to devote their energies to more demanding cognitive tasks. In this regard, the playhouse itself—by which we mean the building, the theatrical company inhabiting it, and the rich interplay between them—shapes and is shaped by the cognitive demands of performance.

[7] Sutton, *Philosophy and Memory Traces: Descartes to Connectionism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 1.

[8] Clark and Chalmers, 'The Extended Mind', *Analysis* 58, no. 1 (1998): 7–19, 7.

[9] Paster, 'Thinking with Skulls in Holbein, *Hamlet*, Vesalius, and Fuller', in 'Placing Michael Neill: Issues of Place in Shakespeare and Early Modern Culture', ed. Jonathan Gil Harris, special issue, *Shakespearean International Yearbook* 11 (2011): 41–60, 58. Sutton's essay in the present volume, which focuses on embodied place memory in early modern England, offers a clear case in point.

[10] Tribble, *Cognition in the Globe: Attention and Memory in Shakespeare's Theatre* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 1.

C1.P6 Recent scholarship has underscored the geographic dimensions not only of cognition, but also of affect. In *Humoring the Body*, Paster describes period conceptions of emotion as follows:

C1.P7 > [P]assion is a change of inner state knowable *as* and also *by means of* changes, defined as broadly as possible, in the outer world. In such governing beliefs [as there being a material connection between the winds and the passions] are constituted the link between psychology and the constitution of the world. In such beliefs lies the ecology of the passions.[11]

C1.P8 As used by Paster, the term *ecology* is designed to foreground the *interpenetrability* and the *transactionality* of body and environment.[12] It is not merely that, in their capacity to move us, the passions resemble the wind; it is instead that the figure of the wind has a shared material basis with our emotions. That figure captures the nature of those exchanges between humans and the world that are constitutive of passionate experience. This idea is developed further in the introduction to *Reading the Early Modern Passions*, an influential collection that Paster coedited with Floyd-Wilson and Katherine Rowe. The editors argue that

C1.P9 > the dominant 'metaphorical' link between humans and the world—the relation between microcosm and macrocosm—should be understood, simultaneously, as a rhetorical figure and the 'very substance' of creation. We are accustomed to viewing, for example, the meteorological analogy that likens sighs and tears to winds and storms as one-sided: human emotional expressions are analogous to the weather. But the correspondences ran both ways: the weather is correspondent with human emotions.[13]

C1.P10 That correspondence, moreover, is grounded in the shared materiality of body and world.

[11] Paster, *Humoring the Body*, 9.

[12] In this regard, the term 'ecology' figures very differently than it does within ecocritical thought. On the latter, see, among other recent works, Bruce Boehrer, *Environmental Degradation in Jacobean Drama* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Randall Martin, *Shakespeare and Ecology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); and Steve Mentz, *Shipwreck Modernity: Ecologies of Globalization, 1550–1719* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2015).

[13] Paster, Rowe, and Floyd-Wilson, introduction to *Reading the Early Modern Passions: Essays in the Cultural History of Emotion*, ed. Paster, Rowe, and Floyd-Wilson (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 1–20, 17–18.

C1.P11 The passions were not only *conceptualized* as geographic, of course. Passionate *experience* had a recognizably geographic dimension, a hint of which is still available to us in the notions of being 'swept away' or 'overwhelmed' by strong emotion.[14] Moreover, early modern literature sometimes registered that experience. In an analysis of Sir Philip Sidney's *The Old Arcadia*, Garrett A. Sullivan, Jr discusses the forest as an 'affective landscape' in which many of the characters are 'subsum[ed] into a passionate environment'.[15] Within this environment, the ethics of self-mastery—an ethics in which the subject works to regulate both internal and external forms of passionate influence—give way before 'a fantasy of the passions in which their sway is total'.[16] What is not fantastic about the Arcadian forest, however, is the way in which it figures the phenomenology of passionate influence, the experience of emotion as both internal and external to the self. Sullivan notes that the genre of romance 'flourishes where bodies succumb both to their (sometimes enchanted) environments and to corrupting pleasures or habits—lust, intoxication, indolence, immoderate sleep' (60). To put it another way, romance reveals, in an admittedly exaggerated fashion, the extent to which the passions were experienced as distributed or dispersed across individual bodies and the specific geographic fields—or affective landscapes—into which those bodies were embedded.

C1.P12 In *Occult Knowledge, Science, and Gender on the Shakespearean Stage*, Floyd-Wilson examines how the period's abiding discourses on the still-enchanted world shaped how early modern people understood the significance of emotion.[17] Floyd-Wilson contends that belief in sympathies and antipathies (unseen forces that were thought to course through the natural world) necessarily affected how people experienced the transactionality of the body and environment. Secret or hidden qualities in an animal, plant, or person could produce inexplicable attractions or repulsions in a person. The discourse on sympathies and antipathies underpinned explanations of action at a distance when, for example, an individual's distress or desire

[14] On the ancient origins of ideas about the externality of emotion, see the classic work by E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951). Paster, Rowe, and Floyd-Wilson observe that '[e]arly modern emotions resist the dualist categories that underwrite the formation of separate fields of study: literal and metaphorical, physiological and spiritual, *inner and outer*, passive and active, affect and affectation' (*Reading the Early Modern Passions*, 18, our emphasis).

[15] Sullivan, *Sleep, Romance and Human Embodiment: Vitality from Spenser to Milton* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 47.

[16] Ibid., 60.

[17] Floyd-Wilson, *Occult Knowledge, Science, and Gender on the Shakespearean Stage* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

could invisibly influence another person's body, as in the case of cruentation (when a corpse bleeds in the presence of the murderer) or of vapours emitted by an 'evil eye'. Drawing on the tenet that 'like draws like', many writers in the period argued that diseases spread when the sinful corruption in a person mysteriously attracted the corrupted qualities in the immediate environment. Unlike the humors, sympathies and antipathies sometimes proved to be at odds with the observable, elemental world.

C1.P13 Kristen Poole has identified in early modern literary scholarship a rationalist and sceptical resistance to recognizing that for Christopher Marlowe, William Shakespeare, and their contemporaries, supernatural experiences and phenomena were intrinsic to the environment. In *Supernatural Environments in Shakespeare's England*, Poole observes that early modern space was neither neutral nor inanimate but the 'habitat of God, angels, and demons'.[18] The transformation of religious belief, together with a new investment in geometry, shaped the period's thinking on the relationship between the self—or the body—and the environment. Competing epistemologies of space could clash in a single text: Poole shows, for example, how Shakespeare's *Macbeth* represents a 'spatial environment that is governed by both Calvin's providence and Hooker's law' (150). On the one hand, Macbeth longs for a world like the one Richard Hooker presents, 'a physical world of certainty and order', but is caught instead in an unstable cosmic environment where his 'fantasy of autonomy blinds him from accepting God's omnipotence' (160). Poole's work reminds us that when we consider the geographic dimensions of somatic processes, we need to recognize how early modern space presumes the presence of God and the devil.

C1.P14 As reviewed in the preceding paragraphs, work on the geography of embodiment encompasses both cognitive processes and cosmic environments; it examines depictions of inner emotional states but also of affective landscapes. Rather than always being territorialized onto individual bodies, ideas about early modern embodiment are varied both in their scope and in the terms of their representation. In this collection, we encounter analyses of meteorology's significance for conceptualizing unwilled somatic action; of the impact of Stoic physics on the poetic depiction, and phenomenological experience, of the self dissolving into the elements; and, contrastingly, of the grounding of selfhood in embodied place memory.

[18] Poole, *Supernatural Environments in Shakespeare's England: Spaces of Demonism, Divinity, and Drama* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 18.

C1.P15 We imagined a variety of ways to order the essays in this volume, and we recognize that different sequencing would produce new cross-currents and connections. The chapters are organized in pairs, which loosely share geographical coordinates: Michael Schoenfeldt and Jonathan Gil Harris investigate the pleasures and effects of paradisal environments; Valerie Traub and John Sutton consider the epistemologies of navigation and mapping; Mary Thomas Crane and Kristen Poole turn our attention to early modern cosmologies; Julian Yates and Elizabeth D. Harvey move us into urban settings; and Garrett A. Sullivan, Jr and Mary Floyd-Wilson situate us in enchanted realms.

C1.P16 Opening the volume with Michael Schoenfeldt's 'How Gardens Feel: The Natural History of Sensation in Spenser and Milton' acknowledges the central role that literary texts have played in our contributors' work on the geographic components of embodiment. Schoenfeldt compares Spenser and Milton to revelatory effect, focusing on their shared understanding of 'distributed personhood' and their distinct approaches to the sensation of pleasure. In Spenser's 'Bower of Bliss', the garden's pleasures threaten to absorb individuals, dissolving the boundary between self and environment. Spenser renders a world where illicit pleasures demand an ethical response. Individuals must guard against the environment's corrupting forces, or, in Guyon's case, destroy it to prevent the ruin of others. By contrast, in Milton's portrayal, humans are the agents of pollution after the Fall, contaminating an environment that God had blessed with natural and licit pleasures. For Milton, the delights of Eden ultimately become internalized as Adam and Eve look to each other, and within, for pleasure and happiness. In Schoenfeldt's perceptive reading, Milton's poem succeeds in refashioning the Christian valuation of pleasure and pain. Satan has displaced the temperate knight as the adversary of earthly pleasure. And with disciplined regulation, Milton suggests, humans can cultivate and reclaim a 'paradise within'.

C1.P17 Pleasure also informs Jonathan Gil Harris's reading of one man's experience of environmental transformation. In '*Hi Mho Ji Kudd*: The Transformation of Thomas Stephens in Goa', Harris tells the story of an Indian-language English predecessor of Milton, Father Thomas Stephens, and suggests that Stephens's 'sensuous interactions' with the landscape, language, and food of India refashioned his foreign flesh. As an English Jesuit priest living in Goa, India in the late sixteenth century, Stephens's non-English environment exercised an influence on his body and his habits that resonates with Milton's Eden or Spenser's Bower. By unpacking the phrase 'hi mho ji kudd',

a Konkani translation of 'hoc est corpus meum' (which is inscribed beneath the altar in the Bom Jesus Basilica, a Jesuit church in Goa), Harris provides an account of a more worldly transformation than the one offered by the Eucharist. As the author of the epic poem *Kristapurana* (Story of Christ), which he wrote in Marathi and Konkani, Stephens seems to have participated in the 'Jesuit tradition of inculturation'. And yet, as Harris shows, Stephens's love of the Marathi language 'Indianized' not only the Christianity he preached but also his own body. In particular, Stephens's poetic use of the *kalpataru*, the coconut tree, as Eden's Tree of Life, also invokes a daily experience of interacting with Goan coconuts: 'eating their flesh, drinking their water, burning their rind, plaiting their husk into rope'. This experience locates Stephens as 'part of a larger ecological and cultural network specific to the Konkan coast'. In this light, 'hi mho ji kudd' points to a recalibration of Stephens's flesh 'into something Indian'.

C1.P18 The geographic specificity of Stephens's story and legacy indicates how language, culture, and environment could refashion an early modern 'instrument of colonialism'—the Jesuit willingness to employ native languages in the service of Christian conversion—into a force of anti-imperialism. In contrast, Valerie Traub's 'Anatomy, Cartography, and the New World Body', traces how early modern maps, commonly recognized as colonial instruments, not only conceptualized the new world body but also 'heralded abstract universalism'. While Harris's localized history underscores the changeability of 'habit' and the potential fluidity of Stephens's ethnicity, Traub's global perspective describes a movement towards the 'hardening of racial designations'. Traub begins her far-reaching essay with a seemingly simple question: 'How is a body like a map?' As she shows, through visual and textual evidence, the analogical relationship between bodies and maps became interactive in the early modern period. Anatomical illustration, through the logic of the grid, offered a representative body, providing 'an abstract standard against which to measure all other' bodies. The epistemology of the anatomical illustration informed the work of early modern cartographers, who translated human diversity pictorially into the uniformity of standard types. Through the map's own 'logic of the grid', the world's 'diverse peoples were identified and differentiated, labelled and categorized, classified and compared'. As Traub reveals, these mapped images produced the 'cognitive possibility' of 'ever more precise techniques of classification and comparison', which cast and ordered the world's peoples as objects of knowledge. This emergent reasoning, which plotted bodies as coordinates

on maps, paved the way for the 'Enlightenment taxonomies that are still in the process of being claimed, contested, and deconstructed today'.

C1.P19 Traub and John Sutton share an investment in describing early modern ways of knowing that were informed by cartography, discovery, and navigational thinking. But when we transition from Traub's essay to Sutton's 'Place and Memory: History, Cognition, Phenomenology', we also shift back to more local considerations in Sutton's focus on the English practice of surveying, which relied on popular, communal memories that resisted the flattening effects of universalizing mapped grid described by Traub. In delineating the contours of 'place memory' in early modern England, Sutton points to the dynamic and interactive practices of local cartographers, whose collaboration with residents ensured that a community's vernacular and popular memories of land use and custom shaped the documentation of space. Sutton's interdisciplinary method synthesizes historical, cognitive, and phenomenological approaches to place and memory, thus providing new insights into the 'interactions between remembering, imagining, and perceiving'. Drawing on studies of 'embodied geographies', Sutton establishes place memory as not only dynamic, but also social, deriving from shared stories and activities that members of a community repeated over time in particular places. Moreover, since place memory takes shape through repeated physical activities, such as walking the boundaries or working the land, it is embodied. These physical interactions 'operated at a range of timescales, including those of season, calendar, and religious ritual'. Places functioned as 'archives of memory' and accrued natural and cultural meanings that 'exceed or resist any particular classification'. In turning to Adam Rzepka's discussion of Shakespeare's *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, Sutton observes that place memory depends on the very imaginative work Rzepka indicates has been neglected by scholars of distributed cognition. Sutton contends that imagination informs the perceptions and projections of place memory, an insight best supported by the work of poets and playwrights.

C1.P20 Mary Thomas Crane returns us to *A Midsummer Night's Dream* but directs the focus away from human agents and the landscape to the nonhuman environment of the sublunary atmosphere, comprising stars, winds, fog, and dew. The geography of Shakespeare's comedy shifts ground not only from Athens to the woods but also from the human world to fairy land, moves that lend themselves to inquiries about embodiment and environment, as is further confirmed by Mary Floyd-Wilson's essay in this volume. Crane's

chapter, 'Meteorology, Embodiment, and Environment in Shakespeare's *A Midsummer Night's Dream*', takes its cue from Jane Bennett's work on the vital materialism of the nonhuman world, which challenges our culture's dominant 'fantasies of human mastery'. Drawing on a rich archive of early modern meteorological sources, Crane identifies the fairies in Shakespeare's green comedy as the elemental forces of nature that regularly affected the impressionable minds and bodies of mortals. Fairy power tends to 'magnify the disorderly nature of the elements', as exemplified by the environmental disruptions of Oberon and Titania's quarrel. Moreover, the changeability of human desire or 'fancy' derives from the material correspondences between the humors and the elements. As the meteorological agents of *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, the fairies remind us that humans, despite their illusions of control, are subject to the vicissitudes of an animate environment.

C1.P21 The elemental transformations described in Crane's essay are recontextualized by Kristen Poole's chapter, which delineates a Stoic cosmology that identifies the objects and creatures of the world as a 'shifting continuum of matter'. In '"My Hand Would Dissolve, Or Seem to Melt": Poetic Dissolution and Stoic Cosmology', Poole finds evidence that early moderns experienced an animate environment, which she reads through the lens of Stoic physics, an epistemology that framed the world as metamorphic, shifting, and, in the works of some Stoic philosophers, precarious. In her extensive survey of early modern poetry and drama, Poole establishes that images of dissolving and melting, which appear everywhere, are expressions of a Stoic theory of cosmology and material physics that influenced the idea of the humoral body as well as the relationship between the human body and its environment. At the centre of Stoic physics is '*pneuma*, a fiery liquid that pervades the cosmos' as both the soul and 'substance of the world'. As Poole demonstrates, this perception of matter proves ubiquitous in the culture. From Hamlet's desire that his 'solid flesh would melt, | Thaw, and resolve itself into a dew', to the imagery of discandying in *Antony and Cleopatra*, Shakespeare and his contemporaries represented matter as 'continuous and transformative'. Acknowledging that early modern conceptions of the body and the environment were not monolithic, Poole also cites our current historical moment to suggest that future scholarship might consider potential correspondences between 'diverse early modern concepts of physics' and particular political or theological viewpoints.

C1.P22 Much like the essays by Crane and Poole, Julian Yates's 'Passions of the Flock' calls into question the 'primacy of the human subject', not by invoking an underexamined cosmology but by recognizing the 'human' as a

mixed or multispecies being. He also reorients us, again, to more local ground, placing these mixed beings in the space of the London theatre. How, he asks, does a multispecies perspective inform our interpretation of early modern passions as well as the affective technology of the theatre? The public theatre may have functioned, Yates suggests, as a place to 'shepherd' and manage the 'affective contours' of its audiences. Here he takes his inspiration from Gail Kern Paster's reading of the Catholic divine Thomas Wright's discussion of the 'eleven primary emotions experienced by the wolf and the sheep as they recognize each other as objects of fear and desire'. But Yates directs our attention to the sheep, shepherd, and dogs to redescribe the scene as one of pastoral care, reminding readers of their own hybrid sheep-human role in relation to the divine. In Thomas Nashe's assertion that theatre can function as a virtuous distraction and an affective tool for the idle, Yates finds 'suspended or incomplete zoographic metaphors' that underscore the audience's position as a 'docile flock'. Translated to the theatre, the pastoral metaphor makes way for the emergence of biopolitical forms of government.

C1.P23 Elizabeth D. Harvey's 'Speaking (of) Faces: The Gestural Body in *Measure for Measure*' also focuses on an urban environment to contend that forms of government—both Vienna's municipal authorities and the practice of self-government—discernably direct, restrain, and generate expressions of affect in Shakespeare's *Measure for Measure*. For Harvey, the comedy repeatedly stages the failure of reason, government, and law to restrain the erotic energies of the city's population. She explores how the play's enclosed spaces (palace, convent, brothel, garden, and prison) amplify 'psychic states and social interaction'. Corporeal 'urgencies of desire and generation' circulate through Vienna's spaces and through the characters' bodies with 'transgressive, unpredictable force'. While hidden desires erupt in uncontainable ways, the play, as well as the culture, gives special attention to the face as a 'map for the passions and the mobility of shifting affects'. Focusing on John Bulwer's *Pathomyotomia*, Harvey suggests that this treatise establishes an 'implicit theory of affect' based on the power of reason and the imposition of the will. However, even Bulwer must concede that certain mental states, such as heightened passions, sleep, and madness, escape the will's control. As Harvey shows, the bed trick, set in the time and place of sleep, epitomizes the failure of the will to restrain immoderate passions. Desire repeatedly erupts in 'language and gesture in somatic symptoms, parapraxes, and puns'. Shakespeare's comedy explores the cultural tendency to read the face and body as affective maps, only to demonstrate that affective displays always express much more than the will intends.

C1.P24 Garrett A. Sullivan, Jr's 'Sleeping in Error in Spenser's *Faerie Queene*, Book 1' echoes the concerns articulated in Harvey's discussion of John Bulwer, who worries that sleep renders a subject vulnerable to her strong imagination and unwitting motions. Sullivan, however, takes us out of the city into Spenser's allegorical fairy realm, where body and environment 'exist in reciprocal and generative relation to one another'. Here sleep is a state of daemonic agency. While Spenser draws on Virgil's depiction of slumber as a strange power that seizes and transforms its subjects, the English poet also associates daemonic sleep with Catholicism and timely rest with the proper faith of Protestantism. Sleep's daemonism provides the poet with the means to represent the cognitive errors of Catholicism, 'of what it is to perceive and think like a Catholic, passionately in love with falsehood'. But, as Sullivan shows, this distinction proves difficult to sustain, for a false dream may seem a prophetic vision, and the 'affective and cognitive transformations that tend toward error' may also lead towards truth. Ultimately, the difficulty of distinguishing timely rest from its daemonic counterpart lies not only in the strangeness of the human body but also in the 'troubling unknowability of what comes after the sleep of death'.

C1.P25 With Mary Floyd-Wilson's 'The Habitation of Airy Nothings in *A Midsummer Night's Dream*', we remain in the fairy realm to further explore how the intrusive threat of demonic entities shaped the early modern understanding of embodiment and geography. Like Crane in her essay, Floyd-Wilson recognizes *A Midsummer Night's Dream* as a play that stages the influence of an animate environment on cognition and affect. In Floyd-Wilson's reading, however, the fairies are neither metaphorical nor elemental but part of an extensive unseen spirit world—nonhuman but conscious agents who sway the embodied minds of mortals. She considers how Shakespeare's comedy investigates a number of questions posed by contemporary demonologists and natural philosophers: Do intrusive spirits have the power to transform the human body? If spirits are absolutely incorporeal, and removed from the physical world, how do they interact with humans? When faced with preternatural illusions, can humans rely on their physical senses to distinguish fantasy from truth? When we account for the preternatural force of spirits, we must rethink the distribution of cognitive and affective processes across 'brain, body, and world'. Not only do passions and thought extend the human mind into the environment, but an animated and surprisingly motivated environment also extends itself through the human brain and body.

C1.P26 This collection concludes with an afterword by Gail Kern Paster. As we have already suggested, Paster's work has been generative of what we have dubbed a geographic turn in the literary and cultural study of embodiment. Consequently, there is no one better suited to comment upon the essays in this volume. What we have not yet mentioned is that *The Geography of Embodiment* was conceptualized as a tribute to Gail. The essays in this volume would not have been possible without her brilliantly insightful and imaginative scholarship. However, the debt we owe to Gail is not merely an intellectual one. Like most if not all of the contributors to this volume, we feel both lucky and honoured to have benefited not only from her formidable intellect, but even more so from her mentorship and her warm and generous friendship.

C2

2

How Gardens Feel

The Natural History of Sensation in Spenser and Milton

Michael Schoenfeldt

C2.P1 I am what is around me.

C2.P2 —Wallace Stevens, 'Theory'

C2.P3 In this essay, I want to think about the role of the environment in the ways that Edmund Spenser and John Milton approach the sensation of pleasure. I find it absolutely fascinating that the two greatest epic poets of early modern England—Spenser and Milton—repeatedly focus much of their work on the scrupulous ethical calibration of sensations with a range of environmental textures and structures. This allows them to imagine the most private impressions in terms of external habitat, producing profoundly objective correlatives of inner experience. I want here to focus on pleasure and, to a lesser degree, pain, because these sensations are invariably the product of particular kinds of osmotic interaction between the individual and the environment.[1] They were also the subject of heightened ethical and religious attention in early modern England. Spenser, I hope to show, offers a lush topography of corporeal temptation; he is primarily concerned with how environments can pollute individuals. Milton, by contrast, is more concerned with how individuals pollute environments. His great epic depicts, among many other things, the first example of human-induced climate change. In both poets, the sensations of pain and pleasure entail particularly rich and complex transactions between body and environment.

C2.P4 My somewhat strange title is a play on *How Forests Think*, by Eduardo Kohn, an anthropological study that explores the various ways that

[1] For more on soma, sensation, and the interrelationship of embodiment and environment, see Jonathan Gil Harris's essay in this volume (Chapter 3).

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Amazonians interact with one of the world's most complex ecosystems.[2] I want to emphasize the ambiguity implicit in *feel*, indicating both how environments spur sensations in those who inhabit them, and how environments are disturbed by those who inhabit them. Like so much work in the last twenty years, this essay began by engaging with the innovative and inspiring scholarship of Gail Kern Paster.[3] In a formidable essay on Spenser, Paster charts an 'ecology of the passions', aptly characterizing the collusion of environment and appetite that produces Spenser's epic interiority.[4] 'Desire', she argues, 'not only was present in the bodies of humans and animals but also was distributed in chains of sympathy and antipathy throughout the natural world' (139). Paster correctly calls attention to the 'reciprocal absorption of body by landscape and landscape by body' (142).

C2.P5 But I would argue that this absorption, at least as imagined by Spenser and Milton, is not inevitable. In Spenser's world, the external landscape is at best something to be endured or resisted. Individuals, in turn, are at least in part responsible for setting the thermostat of their inner meteorology. The individual and her environment commingle but don't amalgamate, at least not without the emulsion of sin. And in Milton, who deliberately adapts Spenser's romance landscape to biblical materials, the situation is even more ethically complicated: although the environment is initially charged with urgent opportunities for prelapsarian human pleasure, the postlapsarian world is suffused with harsh, painful sensations, which correspond to the roiled interior state of its fallen human inhabitants. Whereas Paster assumes a material relationship between individual and environment that is automatic, unbidden, and uncontrollable, I would argue that this assumption obviates the very possibility of the ethics that Spenser and Milton view as a central thrust of their epic projects. I concentrate instead on the ways that Spenser and Milton depict the processes—albeit partial and flawed, but all the more necessary—by which individuals navigate surroundings that are

[2] Kohn, *How Forests Think: Toward an Anthropology beyond the Human* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013). Kohn brilliantly and rigorously questions the distinction between human and other life forms in the complex ecosystem of the Amazon.

[3] See Paster, *The Body Embarrassed: Drama and the Disciplines of Shame* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993); and *Humoring the Body: Emotions and the Shakespearean Stage* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014). Together, these books offered field-changing paradigms based on the importance of humoral physiology.

[4] Paster, 'Becoming the Landscape: The Ecology of the Passions in the Land of Temperance', in *Environment and Embodiment in Early Modern England*, ed. Mary Floyd-Wilson and Garrett A. Sullivan, Jr(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 137–52, 137.

literally captivating. Steeped in sensuous stimuli, the landscapes of Spenser and Milton challenge individuals to manage their responses to environmental influence.

C2.P6 Spenser and Milton, then, are poets who shamelessly pursue what John Ruskin would call 'the pathetic fallacy'.[5] This orientation of self and environment is enabled in part by the commonplace early modern idea that the human body is a microcosm of the universe. It was for early modern writers a way of describing the tacit relations between inner selves and external environments. William Vaughan, for example, asserts:

C2.P7 > the body of man is not without good reason accounted *a little world*: for even as clouds, vapours, and exhalations, are carried up from the earth, to the high and middle regions of the ayre, and from thence doe use their naturall power; so excrementall Meteors, or moyst humours, are drawne up from the stomacke, as vapours and exhalations, there gathered by the bloud and nourishment of the body, to the head.[6]

C2.P8 This remarkable portrait of our inner microclimates demonstrates how the filaments of influence extend in both directions. Such passages allow us to see the vigour with which the common idea of the 'little world of man' was prosecuted. Purportedly inexplicable phenomena could be understood by recourse to the conveniently flexible fictions of humoral excess, astral influence, demonic invasion, or climatological infiltration. But instead of alleviating anxiety, these fictions only engendered a deeper anxiety about the vulnerability of the individual, lodged in a permeable body invariably subject to various environmental hazards. The so-called 'non-naturals' (things not controlled by human nature) from Galenic medicine are primarily about the individual's interaction with the environment: these include air, food and drink, exercise and rest, sleep and wakefulness, excretion and retention, and the passions (or emotions) of the soul. Galen proposed that these factors should be controlled as much as possible, since too much or too little would put the body in imbalance and lead to disease or madness. By rendering cognitive and spiritual issues in largely material terms, then, early modern writers placed immense pressure on how selves interact with

[5] Ruskin coined the term 'pathetic fallacy' to attack the lyric sentimentality of contemporary poetry. See 'Of the Pathetic Fallacy', in *Modern Painters*, vol. 3 (London, 1856), 157–72.

[6] Vaughan, *Naturall and Artificial Directions for Health deriued from the best Philosophers* (London, 1626), 58–9.

the world. This medical theory makes clear how entirely necessary, but potentially dangerous, that interaction can be. The senses become sources of particular anxiety, since they function inevitably as thresholds to worlds of torrential stimulation and toxic contamination.

C2.P9 An astute reader of Spenser, Milton considers the earlier writer a poetic model and teacher. Milton's famous passage on Spenser in the *Areopagitica* (1644) carefully parses the relationship between personal ethics and environmental pollution. For Milton, the Fall is a moment when the individual is contaminated by, and in turn contaminates, the surrounding environment: 'It was from the rinde of one apple tasted, that the knowledge of good and evill as two twins cleaving together leapt forth into the World.' A disobedient act of human ingestion invites pollution into the unfallen world and the human subject. As a result, Milton argues, humans need temptation in order to manifest virtue:

C2.P10 > He that can apprehend and consider vice with all her baits and seeming pleasures, and yet abstain, and yet distinguish, and yet prefer that which is truly better, he is the true wayfaring Christian. I cannot praise a fugitive and cloister'd vertue, unexercis'd and unbreath'd, that never sallies out and sees her adversary, but slinks out of the race, where that immortall garland is to be run for, not without dust and heat. Assuredly we bring not innocence into the world, we bring impurity much rather: that which purifies us is triall, and triall is by what is contrary. That vertue therefore which is but a youngling in the contemplation of evill, and knows not the utmost that vice promises to her followers, and rejects it, is but a blank vertue, not a pure; her whiteness is but an excremental whitenesse; Which was the reason why our sage and serious Poet Spencer, whom I dare be known to think a better teacher then Scotus or Aquinas, describing true temperance under the person of Guion, brings him in with his palmer through the cave of Mammon, and the bowr of earthly blisse that he might see and know, and yet abstain.[7]

C2.P11 The Fall, according to Milton, is a moment when cognition is altered radically by consumption. Adam and Eve are transformed not so much by the precise substance they allow into their bodies, though, as by their decision to ingest a forbidden substance against the express commandment of God.

[7] Milton, *Areopagitica*, in *John Milton: Prose; Major Writings on Liberty, Politics, Religion, and Education*, ed. David Loewenstein (Oxford: Blackwell, 2013), 181–213, 193.

Once fallen, humans are more a threat to their environment than their environment is to them; we bring impurity into a world we have made impure by imbibing its forbidden product. The only thing that can purify us, according to Milton, is trial, and trial is achieved through our exposure to the potentially toxic environment of acute temptation. That is why the professed virtue of the cloister is for Milton at best an empty, even 'excremental' (meaning primarily 'superficial', but other more scurrilous meanings are intended as well) virtue; the subject who feels no ethical pressure cannot exercise virtue. Milton admires Spenser because his knights are continually surrounded by robust, pervasive temptation. As the Milton of *Areopagitica* asserts, Spenser's poem is in large part a test of how its characters and readers respond to various temptations.

C2.P12 There is, though, a significant difference between Milton and Spenser here. Whereas Spenser's landscapes tempt with illicit pleasure and destructive perspectives, Milton's gratify with licit indulgence in various corporeal pleasures. Both Spenser and Milton worry about whether the ethical self is as biodegradable as the body it inhabits, and both idealize a kind of ethical homeostasis, whereby the proper virtuous response to various environmental sensations restores balance and order, internally and externally. And for both, the improper response can pollute the landscape or the person. Spenser is particularly interested in the relationship between sensation and temptation. If, as Spenser says in the letter to Walter Ralegh, 'The generall end therefore of all the booke is to fashion a gentleman or noble person in vertuous and gentle discipline', Spenser wants to show his heroes exerting the virtue of self-discipline in the face of sensuous temptation.[8] Both Spenser and Milton are concerned with demonstrating the effects of pain and pleasure on their protagonists, and view these sensations as central to the ethical formation of the subject. It is telling that neither author completely demeans pleasure, or entirely endorses pain, as so much Christian writing from the period does by default. Even though the knight who is the hero of book 1 of the *Faerie Queene* bears the name and emblem of Christian suffering—Redcrosse—Spenser in fact worries about the dangers of both pain and pleasure, and sees both as occasions to 'fall': 'The strong through pleasure soonest falles, the weake through smart' (2.1.57). But the lion's share of attention in *The Faerie Queene* is devoted to the challenges presented

[8] Spenser, *The Faerie Queene*, ed. A. C. Hamilton et al. (London: Routledge, 2013), 714–15. All citations from *The Faerie Queene* refer to this edition and will appear parenthetically in the text.

by pleasure; as Spenser announces, it a 'harder lesson, to learne Continence | In ioyous pleasure, then in grieuous paine' (2.6.1).[9] Milton will completely reverse the standard Christian account of pain and pleasure, making Satan experience the first sensation of agony in the universe; as a result, Satan will become the nemesis of the 'Enormous bliss' (5.297) that God has lavished on creation. In the rest of this essay, I will first discuss Spenser's account of the ethics demanded by the sensuous interaction of landscapes and bodies. I will then explore Milton's distinctive account of the relationships of humans to their environment, before and after the Fall.

C2.P13 *The Faerie Queene* is fascinated by the behaviour of bodies in space. The poem famously begins with a particular character engaged in a specific activity amid a distinct topography: 'A Gentle Knight was pricking on the plaine.'[10] There are of course many memorable topographies in *The Faerie Queene*, far more than I can explore in detail. But I do want to focus on two central moments whereby environment is suffused with goads to pleasure: the Bower of Bliss and the Garden of Adonis. I have elsewhere explored the Castle of Alma, which entails a remarkable but highly conventional imagination of the self as a castle, an architectural structure in constant need of maintenance, and perpetually threatened from the outside.[11] I will not look at the Cave of Mammon, which is more of an endurance contest than a sensual temptation.

C2.P14 As Milton suggests, Spenser continually subjects his protagonists to a deeply metabolic landscape which stirs their inner desire. Although all the senses are vulnerable, vision is in Spenser frequently the sensory medium of initial contagion, as if even the most mundane ocular interaction with the world is morally and physically hazardous. That is why the first verb that Milton uses to praise Spenser's representation of temptation is visual: to 'see

[9] On pain in Spenser, see Joseph Campana, *The Pain of Reformation: Spenser, Vulnerability, and the Ethics of Masculinity* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2012). On the hazards of sympathy, see also Cynthia Nazarian, 'Sympathy Wounds, Rivers of Blood: The Politics of Fellow Feeling in Spenser's *Faerie Queene* and *A View of the State of Ireland*', *Modern Philology* 113, no. 3 (2016): 331–52.

[10] Chris Barrett makes the interesting claim that 'the terrestrial plain occupies a peculiar status as the feature of landscape that defies the protocols of representation, eluding description' ('Allegraphy and *The Faerie Queene*'s Significantly Unsignifying Ecology', *SEL Studies in English Literature 1500–1900* 56, no. 1 (2016): 1–21, 12). Plains, though, are not necessarily empty of meaning, especially when contrasted with higher ground, as they are in *The Faerie Queene* and *Paradise Lost*.

[11] See Michael Schoenfeldt, 'Fortifying Inwardness: Spenser's Castle of Moral Health', in *Bodies and Selves in Early Modern England: Physiology and Inwardness in Spenser, Shakespeare, Herbert, and Milton* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), chap. 2, 40–73.

and know and yet abstain'. Without a muscular effort of moral resistance, body and mind could be polluted through the apprehension of alluring visual phenomena.

C2.P15 The point of the poem is in part to keep 'pricking', that is, to keep moving through the many seductive topographies the poem presents. As we read on in the first stanza, we learn that Redcrosse's 'angrie steede did chide his foming bitt, | As much disdaining to the curbe to yield' (1.1.1). This is in essence the ethical challenge of Spenser's epic: even as the knight must apply the spur to the beast whose power carries him, he must also curb the dynamic anger of that beast. As Spenser's neighbour in Ireland, Lodowick Bryskett, writes, people should 'strive in all their actions to master themselves . . . to bridle such desires as they find most to molest them'.[12] There is throughout the poem a powerful tension between spur and curb, between kinesis and discipline. Desire is at once an external force that molests the human subject and an internal drive that makes movement through temptation possible.

C2.P16 Spenser, of course, is no twenty-first-century ecologist; he is far more worried about how environments pollute subjects than about how subjects pollute environment. Spenser, moreover, deliberately makes the Bower of Bliss—the epitome of his seductive landscapes—a deeply appealing place, troubling our response to its ardent pleasures as well as to its ultimate destruction. Paradoxically, the climate of this garden dedicated to intemperate activity is temperate:

C2.P17 Thereto the heavens alwayes joviall,
Lookte on them lovely, still in stedfast state,
Ne suffred storme nor frost on them to fall,
Their tender buds or leaves to violate,
Nor scorching heat, nor cold intemperate,
T' afflict the creatures which therein did dwell,
But the milde ayre with season moderate
Gently attempred, and disposd so well,
That still it breathed forth sweet spirit and holesome smell.
C2.P18 (2.12.51)

[12] Bryskett, *A Discourse of Civill Life* (1606), ed. Thomas E. Wright (Northridge, CA: San Fernando Valley State College, 1970), 106.

C2.P19 We are ethically disoriented by Spenser's diction here: 'sweet' and 'holesome' are not words we expect to cluster around the Bower of Bliss. But that is precisely the point.[13]

C2.P20 In order to understand the environmental hazard presented unexpectedly by the temperate climate of the Bower, we need to invoke the notion of geohumoralism, best articulated by Mary Floyd-Wilson.[14] Geohumoralism suggests that body and character are formed in response to the environment. The interaction between climate and the individual, though, is complicated. Indeed, a temperate climate threatens the temperance of its inhabitants by encouraging relaxation, while a harsh climate inures the ethical subject, just as the extremes of hot and cold temper steel. Spenser forcibly articulates the moral utility of arduous weather:

C2.P21 Where ease abounds, yt's eath to do amis:
But who his limbs with labours, and his mind
Behaves with cares, cannot so easie mis.

C2.P22 (2.3.40.5–8)

C2.P23 Environment seasons ethics. Indeed, if pastoral depicts ideal harmonies between the subject and nature, this epic poem offers a kind of counterpastoral, whereby subjects must remain perpetually on guard against myriad environmental temptations.[15]

C2.P24 It is telling that the gate of the Bower is not designed to exclude; instead, the gate is 'wrought of substaunce light, | Rather for pleasure, then for battery or fight' (2.12.43.8–9). The Bower of Bliss is deliberately permeable—this is one of the many traits it will share with Milton's Eden. The Bower, moreover, is depicted as 'The most daintie paradise on ground', a place 'In which all pleasures plenteously abownd, | And none does others happinesse envye' (2.12.58.1, 3–4). The fact that this seductive place is free from envy attests to the challenging proximity of virtue and vice. To Guyon and to the reader, moreover, the Bower appears at first as a paradisal landscape: 'A large

[13] Spenser imagines the Bower to have, in Wendy Hyman's inimitable phrase, a 'microclimate of eternal spring'; see 'Seizing Flowers in Spenser's Garden and Bower', *English Literary Renaissance* 37, no. 2 (2007): 193–214, 201.

[14] Floyd-Wilson, *English Ethnicity and Race in Early Modern Drama* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), usefully coins the term 'geohumoralism' to describe the ways that humoral disposition is shaped by climate and region.

[15] Chris Fitter rightly describes 'the open Spenserian landscape of the active life' and contrasts that with 'the Cavalier landscapes of pleasured withdrawal' (*Poetry, Space, Landscape: Toward a New Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 306).

and spacious plaine, on euery side | Strowed with pleasauns, whose fayre grassy grownd | Mantled with greene, and goodly beautifide | With all the ornaments of Floraes pride' (2.12.50.2–5). The Bower is explicitly compared to Eden three times (stanzas 51, 58, and 70).

C2.P25 But unlike Eden, whose sensual indulgences are divinely sanctioned, the Bower contains a series of temptations to be abjured. As Stephen Greenblatt points out in his electrifying reading of Spenser, the danger presented by the Bower is the prospect of being absorbed into its luxurious pleasures.[16] Even to get to the Bower, Guyon and the Palmer must pass by an environmental hazard, a 'greedy' gulf which threatens 'gaping wide, to swallow them alyve' (2.12.5.3, 7). In a potent contrast to the disciplined metabolic processes of the Castle of Alma, the Gulf of Greediness 'swallow[s] up excessively' whatever it can and then rudely 'belcheth forth his superfluity' (2.12.3.6, 8).[17]

C2.P26 The dangers of environmental osmosis, moreover, work both ways. Guyon is initially taken with 'the fayre aspect | Of that sweet place', but demonstrates a steely determination not to be seduced; he 'suffred no delight | To sincke into his sence, nor mind affect' (2.12.53.1–3). Even the verb Spenser uses here—'sink into'—suggests the way that external phenomena penetrate the human subject through the medium of sensation as surely as any sword. These are pleasures that literally get under one's skin. As the Palmer tells Guyon, Temperance is an incombustible virtue; it allows one 'Neither to melt in pleasures whot desire, | Nor fry in hartlesse griefe and dolefull teene' (2.1.58.3–4). One of the maidens offers Guyon 'all, that might his melting hart entise | To her delights' (2.12.66.7–8). The liquefaction of the impassioned heart is the first stage of the incorporation that Spenser's knights are supposed to resist. And as Acrasia leans over a young knight, she consumes a being that has dissolved into its overheated desires:

C2.P27 And through his humid eyes did sucke his spright,
Quite molten into lust and pleasure lewd.
C2.P28 (2.12.73.7–8)

C2.P29 Pleasure, then, is dangerous because it dissolves the wall between self and environment. While ideas of extended cognition may help us understand

[16] See Greenblatt's powerful reading of Spenser, 'To Fashion a Gentleman: Spenser and the Destruction of the Bower of Bliss', in *Renaissance Self-Fashioning: From More to Shakespeare* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 157–92.

[17] In Schoenfeldt, *Bodies and Selves*, 53–67, I explore the discipline exhibited in the various technologies of assimilation in the Castle of Alma.

the cognitive functions of the allegories of landscape, we perhaps also need to think about something like extended desire, which threatens the subject at once with subcutaneous infiltration and environmental absorption.[18]

C2.P30 Guyon's ultimate response to the Bower resembles Satan's attitude towards Paradise: feeling the unsettling force of its pleasures makes him yearn to destroy it.

C2.P31 But all those pleasaunt bowres and Pallace braue,
Guyon broke downe, with rigour pittilesse;
Ne ought their goodly workmanship might saue
Them from the tempest of his wrathfulnesse,
But that their blisse he turn'd to balefulnesse:
Their groues he feld, their gardins did deface,
Their arbers spoyle, their Cabinets suppresse,
Their banket houses burne, their buildings race,
And of the fayrest late, now made the fowlest place.

C2.P32 (2.12.83)

C2.P33 We are rightly troubled by this moment of profound environmental destruction, as we too have been made to feel its succulent attractions and their unsettling proximity to unquestioned virtues. But the very seductiveness of the topographic temptation dictates that in this ethical and epistemological framework, a violent act of environmental destruction comes to epitomize the virtue of temperance. In the erroneous but compelling logic of the work, the Bower must be destroyed because it looks so much like virtue. Indeed, how else could Guyon have put down this riot of the senses? Acrasia is finally caught in a net, but it is hard to imagine the Bower ever cleansed of its toxic pollutions.

C2.P34 The Garden of Adonis in book 3 is frequently described as the ethically positive and environmentally benign version of all this erotic energy, but Spenser deliberately makes Garden and Bower very hard to keep apart. Indeed, while the Bower is infused with a vocabulary of licit pleasure, the

[18] See Andy Clark and David Chalmers, 'The Extended Mind', *Analysis* 58, no. 1 (1998): 7–19, which explores the role of the environment in cognition; Robert Wilson and Clark, 'How to Situate Cognition: Letting Nature Take Its Course', in *The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition*, ed. Philip Robbins and Murat Aydede (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 55–77; and the various essays collected in *Embodied Cognition and Shakespeare's Theatre: The Early Modern Body-Mind*, ed. Laurie Johnson, John Sutton, and Evelyn Tribble (London: Routledge, 2014). For more on extended cognition in Spenser's *Faerie Queene*, see Garrett A. Sullivan, Jr's essay in this volume (Chapter 10).

Garden repeatedly courts salaciousness. The Garden is a place where 'all plenty, and all pleasure flowes' (3.6.41.4). The liquefaction threatened in the Bower is here just a mark of sumptuous pleasure. The tableau of Venus and Adonis at the centre of the Garden invokes just the kind of sensual indulgence that the Bower encourages:

C2.P35 There wont fayre Venus often to enjoy
Her deare Adonis ioyous company,
And reape sweet pleasure of the wanton boy.
C2.P36 (3.6.46.3–5)

C2.P37 It is difficult to read this overt sensual indulgence as morally positive, just as it is morally challenging to condemn the luscious pleasures of the Bower. Venus, moreover, indulges at will in full carnal relations with Adonis: 'But she her selfe, when ever that she will, | Posseseth him, and of his sweetness takes her fill' (3.6.46.8–9). Spenser here demonstrates the positive and procreative aspects of pleasure in precisely the vocabulary that is frequently deployed to condemn it. The Garden, moreover, becomes the setting for the reconciliation of Cupid and Psyche, whose progeny is Pleasure.[19] As Joe Moshenska aptly remarks, 'the denigration of feeling pleasures in Book II [is not allowed to] define their value throughout the poem'.[20]

C2.P38 The Garden of Adonis is suffused with the mystery of eros, leaving us to calculate what the figure of Time is doing in this Garden dedicated to eternity:

C2.P39 Great enimy to it, and to all the rest,
That in the Gardin of Adonis springs,
Is wicked Tyme, who with his scyth addrest,
Does mow the flowring herbes an goodly things,
And all their glory to the ground downe flings,
Where they do wither, and are fowly mard:
He flyes about, and with his flaggy winges
Beates down both leaues and buds without regard,
Ne [e]ver pitty may relent his malice hard.
C2.P40 (3.6.39)

[19] At the end of *Comus*, that deeply Spenserian work, Milton also looks to the marriage of Cupid and Psyche, but attributes two children, Youth and Joy, to the union of the couple.

[20] Moshenska, *Feeling Pleasures: The Sense of Touch in Renaissance England* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 122.

C2.P41 This description recalls Guyon's own destructive handiwork in the Bower. There, Guyon 'turn'd to balefulness', 'did deface', and 'spoyle' the Bower; here, 'Time does mow', 'to the ground downe flings' and 'beats down'. Both Guyon and Time act destructively and pitilessly. Time, though, is as necessary to Spenser's larger ecological imagination as Guyon is to Spenser's ethical imagination. If 'Time their troubler' were not there, no one would ever leave the Garden, and Spenser's mythology of the conservation of matter through recycling would fail. Spenser indeed imagines that all terrestrial matter and spirit cycles through the Garden and is renewed there, ready for a return to earth. Time is as ecologically crucial as the decomposing of dead matter (the absence of which is a problem in Milton's unfallen Paradise); its periodic destructions ensure a continual renewal of living substance.

C2.P42 As Milton shows, Spenser's epic achieves its highest moral purpose in making its protagonists, and its readers, feel profoundly the pull of sensual temptation, and in depicting the dangerous proximities of licit and illicit pleasure. Like the Garden of Adonis, Milton's Eden is a place of licit, luscious pleasures. Both Spenser and Milton find pleasure intrinsically creative if also dangerously misleading. As we turn to Milton's remarkable account of the origin of pain and pleasure, though, we must recalibrate our moral compass. Here we have a Garden suffused with pleasure that is created and blessed by God. This Garden is invaded, and its pleasures disrupted, by an outsider. The invader is not a knight representing temperance but rather Satan, the adversary.

C2.P43 Just as Spenser challenges us by strategically placing morally positive traits in his Bower dedicated to sinful indulgence, Milton assays the reader's moral compass by charging Paradise and heaven with attributes that in other contexts would be marks of misconduct. Where Spenser aptly puts the figure of Excess at the gate of a Bower dedicated to sinful temptation, Milton surprisingly locates luxurious excess amid the sumptuous meals of heaven:

C2.P44
> Tables are set, and on a sudden piled
> With Angels food, and rubied nectar flows
> In pearl, in diamond, and massy gold,
> Fruit of delicious vines, the growth of Heaven.
> On flowers reposed, and with fresh flowerets crowned,
> They eat, they drink, and in communion sweet
> Quaff immortality and joy, secure
> Of surfeit, where full measure only bounds

> Excess, before the all-bounteous King, who showered
> With copious hand, rejoicing in their joy.[21]

C2.P45 An unexpected conjunction of joy and excess epitomizes the quotidian feasts of heaven. Milton, moreover, describes the habitat of the first humans as a 'blissful bower', inviting his readers to consider just how similar its pleasures are to those of the Bower of Bliss composed by 'our sage and serious poet' (4.690).[22]

C2.P46 The sensuous pursuit of eating is the first activity in which we find Adam and Eve: They work to make 'ease | More easy, wholesome thirst and appetite | More grateful, to their supper fruits they fell' (4.329–31). As the verb Milton uses suggests, eating is at once a profoundly pleasurable act of companionship and a potentially hazardous transgressing of boundaries. Watching their profuse pleasure in sensuous consumption, Satan registers acutely the immense differences between Edenic indulgence and Hellish despair:

C2.P47
> Sight hateful, sight tormenting! thus these two
> Imparadis't in one anothers arms
> The happier *Eden*, shall enjoy thir fill
> Of bliss on bliss, while I to Hell am thrust,
> Where neither joy nor love, but fierce desire,
> Among our other torments not the least,
> Still unfulfill'd with pain of longing pines.

C2.P48 (4.505–11)

C2.P49 Milton brilliantly reimagines Hell not as a torture chamber but rather as an internal state of raging, insatiable desire. Milton, moreover, allows Satan to articulate acutely the environmental and internal pleasures of Paradise. He suggests that for Adam and Eve, the Garden is indeed delicious, but their consummate pleasure in each other's fully embodied company takes on the characteristics of the Garden; they are 'Imparadis't in one anothers arms', a physical location that is 'the happier Eden'. The pleasures of the Garden are internalized as states of sensation.

[21] Milton, *Paradise Lost*, ed. Barbara Lewalski (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 5.632–41. All citations of *Paradise Lost* refer to this edition and will appear parenthetically in the text.

[22] Garrett A. Sullivan, Jr, *Sleep, Romance and Human Embodiment: Vitality from Spenser to Milton* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 125.

C2.P50 What we see here is not so much a process of extended cognition as a deliberate internalizing of environmental settings, which results in a robust environmental affinity among Adam, Eve, and the Garden.[23] The other significant habitat in *Paradise Lost* is Hell, which is, unsurprisingly, 'a Dungeon horrible', a place of 'torture without end', surrounded by 'Regions of sorrow' (1.61–7). Our very first account of Satan links him to the sensation that marks this place: 'now the thought | Both of lost happiness and lasting pain | Torments him' (1.54–6). It is ultimately internal sensation rather than environmental agony that tortures Satan, and anguished despondency will remain his abiding sensation, whatever space he physically inhabits. With apparent ease Satan escapes Hell, even as his fellow fallen angels will convert this conventional Hell from a dungeon of horrors into an urbane space that seems to combine the best of Rome, Athens, and Paris. Escaping the topography of Hell, Satan will never elude his pain.

C2.P51 But this deep responsiveness between humans and their environment is easily threatened. God places a wall around Paradise that is disturbingly ineffective at protecting Adam and Eve. Although Paradise is enclosed by a 'verdurous wall of Paradise' (4.143), and 'enclosure green' (4.133), when Satan approaches the gate of Paradise:

C2.P52 Due entrance he disdaind, and in contempt,
At one slight bound high over leap'd all bound
Of Hill or highest Wall, and sheer within
Lights on his feet.

C2.P53 (4.180–3)

C2.P54 Satan is in fact shocked to learn that Paradise was 'ill fenced for heaven to keep out such a foe | As now is entered' (4.372–3). Even the angelic guard in 'warlike parade' around the Garden cannot keep Satan out (4.780). The ease with which Satan leaps the Walls of Paradise indicates that the Garden will not exhibit the cloistered virtue that Milton scorned in *Areopagitica*, but rather will be a semipermeable space subject to the forces of good and ill surrounding it. Even Uriel concedes the difficulty of building a wall that could keep a largely spiritual being out: 'hard thou knowst to exclude | Spiritual

[23] Steven M. Fallon, *Milton among the Philosophers: Poetry and Materialism in Seventeenth-Century England* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007) 80–1, gives a philosophical background to this phenomenon, suggesting that the Garden is suffused with a kind of 'animate materialism' by which 'mental activity is distributed throughout organic nature'.

substance with corporeal bar' (4.584–5). It is telling that after the Fall, Adam and Eve are banished to 'a fenceless world' (10.303), with none of the faulty walls of Paradise to generate even the fiction of protection. Fallen humans must see and know before they can abstain.

C2.P55 Once inside the wall of Paradise, Satan then enters the subconscious mind of the first woman as she sleeps. But he must first abase himself, 'squat like a toad', in a posture he had refused in heaven.[24] 'Close at the ear of Eve', Satan's 'Devilish art' manages 'to reach | The Organs of her Fancie' (4.800–2). 'Inspiring venom' (4.804), Satan becomes a demonic version of the 'nightly visitation unimplored' that Milton claims is the inspiration of his poem (9.22). We see here the terrifying vulnerability of the human body, particularly the sleeping body, even before the Fall. Skin is less a protective surface than an affective threshold, marking boundaries it cannot police. In Milton's universe, there is no fully bounded self; all humans can do is manage the inevitable environmental osmosis that both threatens and sustains them, doing as little harm to our selves and our environments as possible in the process.[25]

C2.P56 Different subjects, moreover, have profoundly divergent responses to the same environment, and this response is an index of their moral state. While Adam and Eve frolic in blithe pleasure in the Garden, Satan discovers that being in the Garden of paradisal delights only increases his agony:

C2.P57 But the hot Hell that always in him burns,
Though in mid Heaven, soon ended his delight,
And tortures him now more, the more he sees
Of pleasure, not for him ordained.

C2.P58 (9.467–70)

C2.P59 Despite millennia of Christian writings linking pleasure to the devil, Milton throughout *Paradise Lost* brilliantly refashions the conventional channel

[24] On Satan's posture and its relation to Milton's rejection of postures of deference, see Michael Schoenfeldt, '"Among Unequals What Society": Strategic Courtesy and Christian Humility in *Paradise Lost*', *Milton Studies* 28 (1992): 69–90; and Richard Strier, 'Milton Against Humility', in *The Unrepentant Renaissance: From Petrarch to Shakespeare to Milton* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 248–93.

[25] See Stuart Clark, *Thinking with Demons: The Idea of Witchcraft in Early Modern Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). According to Clark, the devil 'suggests ideas to the imagination which induce love or hatred or other mental disturbances' (187). On the influence of demons on human conduct, see also Mary Floyd-Wilson, *Occult Knowledge, Science, and Gender on the Renaissance Stage* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); and her essay in this collection (Chapter 11).

between pleasure and sin. Milton, that is, makes Satan the avowed enemy of terrestrial pleasure. Satan's first vision of Adam and Eve's 'youthful dalliance' (4.338) exposes him to the fresh hell of acute envy. Because others' pleasure is for him a particular source of torment, he wants, like a rigid moralist, to extinguish all opportunities for pleasure.

C2.P60 If Spenser is the poet laureate of foreplay, Milton is the great poet of consummation. As Milton ushers Adam and Eve into their blissful bower where they will have sex, Milton continues his bold reconciliation of pleasure and sanctity, suggesting that only 'Hypocrites austerely talk | Of puritie and place and innocence, | Defaming as impure what God declares | Pure' (4.744–7). He then audaciously rotates the axis of religious virtue and sexual pleasure, announcing that 'Our Maker bids increase, who bids abstain | But our Destroyer, foe to God and man' (4.748–9). Milton here allies virginity, idealized for centuries by the Catholic church as the highest human state, with Satan, in order to praise 'wedded Love' as the 'mysterious Law, true source | Of human offspring' (4.750–1). And when Adam and Eve have sex, it seems that the earth really does move, as the entire created world participates in their pleasure:

C2.P61 all Heav'n,
And happie Constellations on that houre
Shed thir selectest influence; the Earth
Gave sign of gratulation, and each Hill;
Joyous the Birds; fresh Gales and gentle Aires
Whisper'd it to the Woods, and from thir wings
Flung Rose, flung Odours from the spicie Shrub,
Disporting, till the amorous Bird of Night
Sung Spousal, and bid haste the Eevning Starr
On his Hill top, to light the bridal Lamp.
C2.P62 (8.511–20)

C2.P63 The porous membranes between inner and outer enable the natural world to share fully in the monumental pleasure of their carnal union.[26]

[26] This should perhaps come as no surprise since, as James Grantham Turner has argued, 'The fruits, the flowers, the liquid "sweets", and above all the fragrances of Eden … provide an exact counterpart to the movement of the spirits in love'; see *One Flesh: Paradisal Marriage and Sexual Relations in the Age of Milton* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 240.

C2.P64 Despite the fact that *Paradise Lost* is dedicated to the origins of human and demonic suffering, then, the poem articulates a remarkable investment in the deeply religious importance of human pleasure. Throughout the epic, Milton radically reorients the relative importance of pleasure and pain in the Christian dispensation. Comparatively uninterested in the ethics of physical suffering, which had been at the centre of so much Christian thinking, Milton positions temperate but fulsome pleasure, not colossal suffering, as the essence of Christianity.[27]

C2.P65 Milton's thoroughly charismatic Satan is at his most repulsive when he determines to interrupt human bliss. The originator of so much of postlapsarian emotional life, Satan is not only the first being to undergo pain in Milton's universe but also the first to experience something like *schadenfreude*.[28] He watches Adam and Eve's connubial joy with 'jealous leer malign' and mistakenly thinks he can ease his own fierce agony by breaking them up (4.503). In Milton's imagination, then, the Fall is the product of a demonic effort to destroy earthly pleasure, and in the process savage the environment that nourishes that pleasure. Determined to denounce the pleasures of the flesh that are no longer available to him, Satan shares an unexpected but uncanny resemblance to Spenser's protagonist of the virtue of Temperance. As Barbara Lewalski suggests, Satan is in many ways a 'perverse Guyon' who 'destroys in Eden not a wantonly sinful but a joyously innocent Bower of Bliss and Love'.[29]

C2.P66 If prelapsarian intercourse entails a cosmic celebration, Milton portrays the Fall as an environmental disaster. When the first humans disobey the one easy injunction they need to follow, the earth is disturbed. As Eve eats the fruit, 'Earth felt the wound, and Nature from her seat | Sighing through all her works gave signs of woe, | That all was lost' (9.782–4). As Milton

[27] On the Passion and Protestant devotion, see Michael Schoenfeldt, '"That Spectacle of Too Much Weight": The Poetics of Sacrifice in Donne, Herbert, and Milton', *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies* 31, no. 3 (2001): 561–84; and Joseph R. Teller, 'Why Crashaw Was Not Catholic: The Passion and Popular Protestant Devotion', *English Literary Renaissance* 43, no. 2 (2013): 239–67. As Gordon Teskey argues, Milton was not 'particularly moved' by 'the two most important images of Christianity, which are images of helplessness…the infant in its mother's arms and the naked man hanging on the cross' (*The Poetry of John Milton* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), 9).

[28] Adam Potkay suggests that 'According to Milton, the devils' party invents schadenfreude (joy in another's damage)' (*The Story of Joy: From the Bible to Late Romanticism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 9).

[29] Lewalski, *Paradise Lost and the Rhetoric of Literary Forms* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), 71.

describes it, the Fall inaugurates the anthropocene.[30] And human sinfulness will remain intimately tied to scenarios of environmental disaster throughout human history. Of course, God's anger at the human turn 'To luxurie and riot' will result in the global climatological disaster known as the Flood:

C2.P67 now the thick'nd Skie
Like a dark Ceeling stood; down rush'd the Rain
Impetuous, and continu'd till the Earth
No more was seen.
C2.P68 (11.742–5)

C2.P69 The Flood turns the earth into 'that watrie Desert', a wonderful oxymoron that describes the dearth of terrestrial life produced by too much water (11.779).

C2.P70 The altered climate of the Fall produces new ecological niches. Like a discerning scavenger, Death notices the different scents from fallen earth:

[30] There is a vast and growing literature on ecology and ecocriticism in Renaissance literature; see Rebecca Bushnell, *Green Desire* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003); Robert N. Watson, *Back to Nature: The Green and the Real in the Late Renaissance* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006); Gabriel Egan, *Green Shakespeare: From Ecopolitics to Ecocriticism* (London: Routledge, 2006); Egan, *Shakespeare and Ecocritical Theory* (London: Bloomsbury, 2015); Karen Raber, 'Recent Ecocritical Studies of Renaissance Literature', *English Literary Renaissance* 37, no. 1 (2007): 151–71; Bruce Smith, *The Key of Green: Passion and Perception in Renaissance Culture* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008); Leah Knight, *Of Books and Botany in Early Modern England: Sixteenth-Century Plants and Print Culture* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009); Simon C. Estok, *Ecocriticism and Shakespeare* (New York: Palgrave, 2011); Todd Borlik, *Ecocriticism and Early Modern English Literature: Green Pastures* (London: Routledge, 2011); Amy Tigner, *Literature and the Renaissance Garden from Elizabeth I to Charles II* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012); and Vin Nardizzi, *Wooden Os: Shakespeare's Theatres and England's Trees* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013).

Milton studies have been particularly alert to spatial and ecocritical issues. See Richard J. DuRocher, 'The Wounded Earth in *Paradise Lost*', *Studies in Philology* 93, no. 1 (1996): 93–115; John R. Knott, 'Milton's Wild Garden', *Studies in Philology* 102, no. 1 (2005): 66–82; Diane Kelsey McColley, *Poetry and Ecology in the Age of Milton and Marvell* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2007); John Gillies, 'Space and Place in *Paradise Lost*', *ELH* 74, no. 1 (2007): 27–57; Maura Brady, 'Space and the Persistence of Place in *Paradise Lost*', *Milton Quarterly* 41, no. 3 (2007): 167–82; Andrew Mattison, *Milton's Uncertain Eden: Understanding Place in Paradise Lost* (London: Routledge, 2007); and Ken Hiltner, *Renaissance Ecology: Imagining Eden in Milton's England* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press 2008), and *Milton and Ecology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

For a riveting account of the way that climate change influenced global conduct in the seventeenth century, see Geoffrey Parker, *Global Crisis: War, Climate Change and Catastrophe in the Seventeenth Century* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013). In *Environmental Degradation in Jacobean Drama* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), Bruce Boehrer argues that environmental contamination has significant repercussions in seventeenth-century England. *Anthropocene* is a term increasingly used to denote the current geological age as the period during which human activity has been the dominant influence on climate and the environment.

'with delight he snuff'd the smell | Of mortal change on Earth' (10.272–3). Sin, moreover, tells her son Death that she will render from the created world a sumptuous banquet for him:

C2.P71 Thou therefore on these Herbs, and Fruits, and Flours
Feed first, on each Beast next, and Fish, and Fowle,
No homely morsels, and whatever thing
The Sithe of Time mowes down, devour unspar'd,
Till I in Man residing through the Race,
His thoughts, his looks, words, actions all infect,
And season him thy last and sweetest prey.
C2.P72 (10.603–9)

C2.P73 The ecology of the planet changes radically with the Fall. While Sin and Death triumphantly contemplate their feast, God reveals their true function; they are 'My Hell-hounds', who 'lick up the draff and filth | Which mans polluting Sin with taint hath shed | On what was pure' (10.630–2). God, it seems, is very concerned with properly disposing of the polluted matter that his disobedient creatures release into creation.

C2.P74 Indeed, God argues that Adam and Eve must now leave Paradise because a peculiar law of Nature demands that impure beings be purged from pure environments:

C2.P75 But longer in that Paradise to dwell,
The Law I gave to Nature him forbids:
Those pure immortal Elements that know
No gross, no unharmoneous mixture foule,
Eject him tainted now, and purge him off
As a distemper, gross to aire as gross,
And mortal food, as may dispose him best
For dissolution wrought by Sin, that first
Distemperd all things, and of incorrupt
Corrupted.
C2.P76 (11.48–57)

C2.P77 The first humans are now a disease to the Garden that had participated fully in their joy. Adam and Eve, moreover, have become emotionally and physically attached to the Garden, and their responses to the news that they must leave are heartrending. Eve sees banishment as an 'unexpected

stroke, worse then of Death' (11.268). She already pines for 'these happie walks and shades' and particularly the 'flours, | That never will in other Climate grow' (11.270–4).[31] Adam will long for those places marked by his relationship to God:

C2.P78 here I could frequent,
With worship, place by place where he voutsaf'd
Presence Divine, and to my Sons relate;
On this Mount he appeerd, under this Tree
Stood visible, among these Pines his voice
I heard, here with him at this Fountain talk'd.
C2.P79 (11.317–22)

C2.P80 Adam would at these spots rear 'grateful Altars…Of grassie Terfe' (11.323–4). But God's larger plan for the universe seems designed to defeat this human impulse to imagine some places as locations of intensified holiness. Michael tells Adam that in the climatological catastrophe that is the great flood, 'this Mount | Of Paradise' shall:

C2.P81 be moovd
Out of his place, pushd by the horned floud,
With all his verdure spoil'd, and Trees adrift
Down the great River to the op'ning Gulf,
And there take root an Iland salt and bare,
The haunt of Seales and Orcs, and Sea-mews clang.
C2.P82 (11.829–35)

C2.P83 In a brilliant bit of irony, the mount of Paradise becomes one of those many islands that European explorers would regularly compare to Paradise. And we learn that God does this not just out of spite, but rather for a particular pedagogical reason:

C2.P84 To teach thee that God attributes to place
No sanctitie, if none be thither brought
By Men who there frequent, or therein dwell.
C2.P85 (11.836–8)

[31] McColley, *Poetry and Ecology*, 213–14, is particularly good on these lines.

C2.P86 Milton's abiding belief in God's monist presence—the idea that there is no essential difference between body and soul, and that God is equally present everywhere in creation—makes all places equal. As Michael instructs Adam, God's 'Omnipresence fills | Land, Sea, and Aire, and every kinde that lives' (11.336–7). The decidedly egalitarian omnipresence of Milton's God defies the special sanctity of any single locale. Because God is equally everywhere, humans should never allow a particular place (like Rome, perhaps, or Canterbury) to mediate or define their relationship to God.[32]

C2.P87 And just as Milton imagines the Fall to damage irreparably the environment of Paradise, so does he envision a corollary disturbance in the internal meteorology of the first humans. As the postlapsarian Adam and Eve 'sate them down to weep', their inner emotions assume a far more roiled and malignant form than anything they have known:

C2.P88 nor onely Teares
Raind at thir Eyes, but high Winds worse within
Began to rise, high Passions, Anger, Hate,
Mistrust, Suspicion, Discord, and shook sore
Thir inward State of Mind, calm Region once
And full of Peace, now tost and turbulent.
C2.P89 (9.1121–6)

C2.P90 The ethical act of disobedience has profound climatological effects, internally and externally. The Fall alters both the outer domain and the inner thermostat of humanity.

C2.P91 But despite Nature's sigh of devastating grief, all is not lost, at least not for our species. The continuing capacity for true if diminished pleasure on the part of the first two humans, despite Satan's efforts to break them up, becomes one aspect of God's ultimate victory over Satan. It is certainly no accident that the first thing Adam and Eve do after the Fall is have sex. Even though the sex is very different from the sex they have before the Fall—it is, for example, salted with the language of contemporaneous pornography—it is still pleasurable, and still an act of the wedded love that Milton celebrates. Garrett Sullivan argues that 'The Fall turns the Garden of Eden from a

[32] On the political vision of Milton's theological monism, see David Loewenstein, *Milton and the Drama of History: Historical Vision, Iconoclasm, and the Literary Imagination* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Steven Fallon, *Milton among the Philosophers*; and John Rogers, *The Matter of Revolution: Science, Poetry, and Politics in the Age of Milton* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).

"blissful bower" (4.690) into the Bower of Bliss, and it does so through the alteration of Adam and Eve's sexual relations.'[33] While their sexual relations do change profoundly, though, I would argue that they are still a long way from the illicit activity suffusing Spenser's Bower of Bliss. Indeed, it is only through the fact that Adam and Eve sustain their relationship, and continue to make lesser but still glorious love, that the species is sustained. And it is only through the continuation of the species that God will ultimately defeat Satan through the Son, as Michael explains to Adam.

C2.P92 Pain, of course, becomes a central component in the array of sensations available to postlapsarian humanity. Instead of grazing freely on paradisal fecundity, Adam must onerously work the barren ground for food: 'In the sweat of thy Face', God tells him, 'shalt thou eat Bread' (10.205). And Eve's specific punishment includes a different kind of labour; her pain in childbirth will be a direct result of the diminished pleasure of postlapsarian heterosexual relations: 'Children thou shalt bring | In sorrow forth' (10.194–5). Nevertheless, licit pleasure is not completely banished from postlapsarian experience. If Satan is indeed the inveterate enemy of human pleasure and its concomitant fertility, then pleasure, not suffering, delivers the consummate victory over Satan. Despite centuries of Christian commentary to the contrary, pleasure, not pain, will ultimately redeem us.

C2.P93 Satan's desire, by contrast, will remain eternally, torturously unfulfilled. But as Michael admonishes Adam at the end of the poem, even postlapsarian humanity can retain something of that paradisal Garden in our measured conduct. Michael promises that if humans will only

C2.P94
> add
> Deeds to thy knowledge answerable; add faith,
> Add virtue, patience, temperance; add love,
> By name to come called charity, the soul
> Of all the rest: then wilt thou not be loth
> To leave this Paradise, but shalt possess
> A Paradise within thee, happier far.

C2.P95 (12.581–7)

C2.P96 This interior self demands much more careful cultivation than the Garden, but it also holds out the prospect of an emotional state that contains the

[33] Sullivan, *Sleep, Romance and Human Embodiment*, 123.

essence of the Garden from which Adam and Eve are banished. It is even possible that this 'Paradise within' will be 'happier far' than what they knew in that Garden. Although sleeping while Michael gives Adam the vision of future history, Eve in her last speech brilliantly redefines Paradise in ways that extend Michael's promise from mere obedience to joyous sociality:

C2.P97 with thee to go,
Is to stay here; without thee here to stay,
Is to go hence unwilling.
C2.P98 (12.615–17)

C2.P99 While for Michael Paradise is an individual moral state, for Eve Paradise is an intimate relationship with another. Both depict the interior space of the human subject in environmental terms, and both suggest ways in which the first humans might be able to retain in their interior habitats the essence of the Garden that they are forced to leave. Milton's process of internalization actually both heightens and diminishes the importance of the environment. For Milton, you can be in Hell when in Paradise, or still have something of Paradise in you even after being ejected from it. Jean-Paul Sartre may have argued that Hell is other people, but Milton suggests that we regain something of our lost paradise through our intimate relations with others.

C2.P100 One of the most remarkable things about this singular epic, then, is the astonishingly crucial role that pleasure, and particularly social pleasure, assumes in God's overall plans for humanity. For Milton, the God who died in extreme pain at the hand of his creatures reveals his unearthly mercy in his willingness to license the experience of immense pleasure on the part of those creatures, and to offer it as a way of regaining the paradise we have lost. In Milton's universe, pleasure is not allied with Satan but rather instrumental in his defeat. But pleasure must always be subject to discipline after the Fall. Michael tells Adam he must follow 'The rule of not too much, by temperance taught | In what thou eatst and drinkst' (11.531–2). And when Adam misreads a lesson from his vision of the future, Michael reminds Adam that he should 'Judg not what is best | By pleasure, though to Nature seeming meet' (11.603–4). According to Milton, then, it is not just suffering that will redeem humanity but rather a series of challenging ethical choices revolving around the various available sensations of pleasure.

C2.P101 It is appropriate that Milton settles on just the virtue—temperance—to which his great predecessor had devoted an entire book of his very different epic. Temperance is in part an effort to regulate one's necessary and

inevitable osmosis with the environment. While for Spenser, the virtue ultimately demands environmental destruction, for Milton it is the essence of environmental reclamation. In these two epics, we glimpse the hidden life of gardens, and of the people who pass through them. Both poets depict complex feedback loops which circulate between subjects and environments, showing how gardens feel, and how humans feel when they pass through gardens. In both poets, we observe a dense web of connectivity and mutual interdependence between humans and their environments.

C2.P102 Milton learned from Spenser the ability to create landscapes that put ethical pressure on his protagonists. Milton's Garden of Eden is a Bower of utterly licit bliss. Of course, the Bower and the Garden are different in many crucial ways. Whereas the Bower is suffused with sensual temptation, the sensuous Garden has only one source of temptation—the Tree of Knowledge. And for all the superficial resemblances in their response to environments of pleasure, Guyon and Satan are entirely different ethical beings, serving profoundly different ethical purposes. Although both function as agents of environmental destruction, Guyon does so in the effort to eradicate a place that contaminated human subjects, while Satan does so in the effort to pollute a pristine and pleasurable environment. At our own moment of burgeoning ecological awareness, it is fascinating to think that in some ways, the original sin for Milton is not just disobedience but rather environmental destruction.

C2.P103 At the very end of *Paradise Lost*, Adam and Eve are forced to leave the lush mountain Garden of Paradise for 'the subjected Plaine' (12.640). Tellingly, it is the same geography on which Redcrosse sets out at the beginning of *The Faerie Queene*. Again, environment communicates something powerful about the emotional state of its human inhabitants. Alfred Gell argues that humans exhibit what he calls 'distributed personhood', in which we 'are present, not just in our singular bodies, but in everything in our surroundings which bears witness to our existence, our attributes, and our agency'.[34] Such personhood is both a blessing and a curse. It is a blessing because it makes possible a remarkable harmony between individuals and their environments; it is a curse because it means that dismayingly vulnerable individuals must ceaselessly police the sensations that mediate between subcutaneous and external experience. Spenser attempts to deal with this dilemma by creating a wonderfully seductive garden that must be fiercely

[34] Gell, *Art and Agency: An Anthropological Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 103.

razed by a knight representing the virtue of temperance. Milton, by contrast, argues that if humans can manage to behave temperately, they might erect within themselves the infrastructure of paradise. Both epic poets dramatize an alarming vulnerability to environmental influence. And both writers emphasize the immense importance of vigilance in response to the torrent of sensations that mediate between environment and embodiment. For both, finally, disciplined self-regulation becomes the ultimate ecological operation; and for Milton, scrupulously cultivating the interior landscapes of the self even reclaims territory tragically lost at the Fall.[35]

[35] I would like here to offer my profound thanks to Andrew Bozio, David Hillman, John Knott, Joe Moshenska, Valerie Traub, and audiences at Bangor University, the Free University of Amsterdam, and the London Renaissance Seminar, as well as the editors of this volume, for very helpful comments on earlier drafts of this essay.

C3

3

Hi Mho Ji Kudd

The Transformation of Thomas Stephens in Goa

Jonathan Gil Harris

C3.P1 What does it mean to say 'this is my body'? And what does it mean to say 'this is my body' when 'my body' has migrated from England to India, lived there for forty years, and changed greatly from the body it used to be? How might 'my body' have changed not just in its appearance but also its skills, its pleasures, and its relations to the local environment? Is it still 'my body' at all? These are the questions posed by the extraordinary story of Father Thomas Stephens (1549–1619), also known as Tomás Estêvão, also known as Pâtri Guru.

C3.P2 Stephens may have been among the first priests to frequent the Bom Jesus Basilica, a grand Jesuit cathedral in Goa, India. The cathedral, consecrated in 1605, is most famous for housing the mortal remains of Saint Francis Xavier, which are contained in a silver casket to the right of the cathedral altar. Although saints' bodies are supposed to be impervious to decay, the custom of displaying Saint Francis Xavier's remains every ten years was stopped in 1994, as the condition of his body had deteriorated dramatically and what remained of his head and limbs had transformed beyond recognition. Indeed, everything about the Bom Jesus Basilica is testimony to the inevitability of bodily transformation.

C3.P3 In recent years, a prominent inscription—*HI MHO JI KUDD*—has been placed beneath the altar. The inscription is a Konkani translation of the Latin 'hoc est corpus meum' ('this is my body'), the ritual formula of the Eucharist spoken by the priest as part of the Roman Catholic Mass. In its more familiar Western guises, whether Latin or English, the words spoken by the priest as he holds aloft the Host or communion wafer supposedly induce the miracle of transubstantiation, in which the inert wafer is translated into the living flesh of Jesus. This first translation enables a second.

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Once the priest has placed the wafer in the mouth of the Christian believer, she receives the grace of God and becomes part of the spiritual body of Jesus. The transformative power of the Eucharist is, in other words, a doubly oral one. The act of speaking translates dead matter into living flesh; the act of eating living flesh translates an individual into a member of a spiritual community. Both acts have been performed for over 400 years in the Bom Jesus Basilica.

C3.P4 The power of the Eucharist, however, doesn't quite capture all the resonances of 'hi mho ji kudd'. The Konkani inscription on the Bom Jesus Basilica altar performs a rather different kind of translation, one that has little to do with the translation of a wafer into the body of Christ or an individual into a member of a larger spiritual community. The inscription also translates something Western into an Indian form: most obviously, the Latin 'hoc est corpus meum' is rendered into Konkani. In the case of Thomas Stephens—a lifelong advocate for making Christian ideas available in Indian tongues—the linguistic translation performed by 'hi mho ji kudd' also mirrors the more complex bodily translation of an Englishman into a Konkani *kavi* or poet.

C3.P5 As we will see, this second kind of translation again entails the transformative power of language and eating. But unlike the transcendent movement away from the flesh implicit in the conventional Eucharistic formula of 'this is my body', the translation suggested by 'hi mho ji kudd' hints at an altogether more worldly transformation—the foreign body that has morphed, through its everyday oral activity on the Konkan Coast, into something Indian. There is no assurance of transcendence here, no redemptive spiritual endpoint; instead there is simply an ongoing process of fleshly alteration. This process is the story of Stephens's foreign flesh. It is also a story of the transformative power of nonhuman flesh: the flesh of the coconut.

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C3.P6 Like most Westerners for whom his name is at all familiar, I first encountered Father Thomas Stephens as a passing reference in a well-known sixteenth-century travel narrative about India and South East Asia. This narrative is often treated as the opening chapter in the history of British colonialism in the Orient, with its author lauded—or damned—as the 'pioneer' of English travel to India. The narrative chronicles the admittedly extraordinary adventures in Asia over a period of eight years, from 1583 to 1591, of Ralph Fitch, a gentleman merchant of London.[1] The sections about

[1] Fitch, 'The voyage of M. *Ralph Fitch* marchant of London by the way of Tripolis in Syria, to Ormus, and so to Goa in the East India, to Cambaia, and all the kingdome of Zelabdim

India include accounts of Portuguese Goa; the sultanate of Golconda; Akbar's court in Fatehpur Sikri; a journey down the Yamuna River to Allahabad with a convoy of boats carrying salt, carpets, and opium; and subsequent voyages down the Ganges to Benares, Patna, Hooghly, and Chittagong. Fitch had travelled to Asia as a representative of the English Levant Company, some of whose directors were later to become primary shareholders in the East India Company, chartered in 1600; his travel narrative about India and the East, much read in the 1590s, helped attract investors to the new company. Yet Fitch's journey came perilously close to ending before it had even started. Stephens played a crucial role in averting the disaster that befell Fitch upon his arrival in India.

C3.P7 In 1583, Fitch and four other Englishmen—two merchants named John Eldred and John Newberry, a jeweller named William Leeds, and a painter named James Story—had sailed from England to Aleppo on a ship called the *Tiger*, with a plan to travel overland to Basra and then by sea to India. It was the beginning of a journey that seems to have captured the imagination of Fitch's countrymen. Even twenty years later Shakespeare remembered it in *Macbeth*: one of the witches talks of a 'sailor's wife' whose 'husband's to Aleppo gone, master o' the Tiger'. [2] Shakespeare's decision to give these lines to a witch hints at how Fitch's Asian journey may have been regarded by some of his countrypeople as something dangerous, even sinister. Indeed, no matter how much Fitch presented his travels as fuelled by a simple wish to 'see the countries of the East India', he obviously had more clandestine motives. He and his companions had set their sights on breaking into Portugal's lucrative trade with the Orient; in particular, they almost certainly had an eye on the illicit export of Indian precious stones, a practice outlawed by the Mughals and heavily policed by the Portuguese Estado da Índia in Goa. This might explain why Leeds, a jeweller rather than a merchant, was among the travellers. The Portuguese authorities certainly smelled a rat.

Echebar the great Mogor, to the mighty river Ganges, and downe to Bengala, to Bacola, and Chonderi, to Pegu, to Imahay in the kingdome of Siam, and backe to Pegu, and from thence to Malacca, Zeilan, Cochin, and all the coast of the East India: begunne in the yeere of our Lorde 1583, and ended 1591, wherein the strange rites, maners, and customes of those people, and the exceeding rich trade and commodities of those countries are faithfully set downe and diligently described, by the aforesaid M. Ralph Fitch', in *Principal Navigations, Voyages, Traffiques and Discoveries of the English Nation*, ed. Richard Hakluyt, vol. 5 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1904), 465–504.

[2] *Macbeth*, 1.3.6. Shakespeare seems to remember details of Fitch's eastward journey, or at least of the name of his ship and landing point.

Eldred had left the party at Basra, but when his four companions proceeded to Ormuz—a Persian Gulf island captured and fortified by Afonso de Albuquerque in 1507 for use as an Indian staging post—they were arrested by the Portuguese, deported to Goa, and imprisoned on suspicion of commercial espionage.

C3.P8 Things looked grim for the four Englishmen. But after what Eldred describes as a 'long and cruel imprisonment', though it amounted to only a couple of weeks, they were suddenly released on 22 December 1583.[3] Their good fortune was due almost entirely to the intervention of two Jesuit priests—Thomas Stephens, and Father Marco, a Fleming—both of whom bought the canard that Stephens's erstwhile countrymen were good Catholics in need of succour. The two Jesuits had generously posted a bond of 2,000 ducats as assurance that the Englishmen would not flee Goa. Despite the priests' efforts, Fitch, Leeds, and Newberry stole away from the Portuguese colony. (Story, the painter, opted to stay in the Jesuit College of Saint Paul, where he briefly painted religious murals before decamping to marry a half-Indian woman.) The three English escapees went to Golconda, the site of the diamond mines, and then eventually made their way to the Mughal courts of Agra and Fatehpur Sikri, where Leeds proceeded to find employment with Emperor Akbar; we do not know what became of him after that. Newberry left for Lahore, after which he too disappears from the record, quite likely the victim of a robbery-murder in Punjab. Fitch, now alone, embarked on his river journeys to Bihar, Bengal, Burma, and beyond before returning to England, via Goa, in 1591.

C3.P9 The alleged English 'pioneer' in India tells us next to nothing about his Jesuit countryman who had reached Goa five years before him, and whose intervention saved him from prison and possibly worse. In his travel narrative, Fitch mentions only that Stephens was 'an English Jesuit'; in a private letter written from Goa in January 1584, he reveals a fraction more, saying that Stephens and Marco 'did sue for us unto the Viceroy and other officers', and 'if they had not stuck to us, if we had escaped with our lives yet we had long imprisonment'.[4] Fitch's relative terseness about his Good Samaritan may have been born of either Protestant animosity or bad conscience, as Stephens's credit in Goa was in all likelihood somewhat compromised by

[3] John Eldred's letter about Fitch and company's 'long and cruel imprisonment' is reproduced in J. Courtenay Locke, ed., *The First Englishmen in India* (London: George Routledge and Sons, 1930), 59.

[4] Fitch's letter, with its reference to Stephens, is also reproduced in Locke, ed., *First Englishmen in India*, 89.

Fitch and his colleagues' escape. Even if Stephens's motive for helping Fitch was less altruistic than it might seem—a Dutchman living in Goa at the time, Jan Hughen van Linschoten, claims that the Jesuits were interested in Fitch and his companions because they hoped to make money off them—it's hard to imagine Stephens not feeling burned by Fitch's default on a bond for which he had stood as surety.[5] If not for the man whom Fitch characterizes curtly as the 'English Jesuit', however, it is conceivable that the East India Company wouldn't have come into being, for without Stephens's aid Fitch couldn't have finished the journey and written the travel narrative that prompted the company's founding.

C3.P10 Yet Stephens's full story reveals him as less a foundational hero than a troubler of India's subsequent colonial history. And this is because his story crosses borders of language and culture in ways that complicate Fitch's reference to him as 'English'. Although Stephens appears only as a single passing reference in Fitch's narrative, we can still piece together his biography from shreds and fragments written in three different languages: English, Latin, and Portuguese. And we can supplement these with the evidence of a remarkable text in a fourth and a fifth language, written by Stephens himself.

C3.P11 Arguably the greatest work of English literature in the seventeenth century is *Paradise Lost* (1667–74), John Milton's epic twelve-book poem about the revolt of Satan and the other fallen angels, Adam and Eve's disobedience in the Garden of Eden, and the prophesied coming of Christ.[6] The poem, in spite of its Christian theme, is a brilliant and unconventional meditation on political authority, free will, and rebellion in which Satan, who curiously has to journey through the East Indies and Bengal to reach Paradise, assumes many of the qualities of an epic hero. Some sixty years before the publication of *Paradise Lost*, Stephens wrote an equally long poem on a similar subject—the Christian history of the world from Creation to the coming of Christ—with similarly unorthodox nuances. And like Milton's epic, Stephens's poem derives much of its force from its association, autobiographical in this instance, with a dissident traveller in an Indian Paradise. Stephens ought to be regarded as one of the great Renaissance English poets. But his accomplishment is more or less completely unsung, for one simple reason: he wrote his poem not in English, but in Marathi and Konkani.

[5] Van Linschoten's report is likewise reproduced in Locke, ed., *First Englishmen in India*, 89–90.

[6] For more on *Paradise Lost*, especially in relation to the topic of bodily transformation, see Michael Schoenfeldt's essay in this volume (Chapter 2).

C3.P12 So who was this Indian-language English predecessor of Milton?

* * *

C3.P13 Stephens was born into a merchant family in the small hamlet of Bushton in Wiltshire, about 150 kilometres west of London, in 1550.[7] We know little about his parents. His father, also named Thomas, was assessed in 1576 for personal goods worth £15, which suggests he was reasonably yet not exorbitantly well off. We know even less about the family's religious faith, although it is apparent from Stephens's later correspondence with his brother Richard that the latter was also an observant Catholic. Whether the brothers were brought up Catholic, or whether they came to the faith later, is unclear. Like many people during this volatile time when England's official state religion lurched repeatedly between Catholicism and Protestantism, Stephens's parents may have hedged their bets, at least publicly. But it is safe to conclude that Stephens's adult religious convictions were forged in the crucible of England's mid-century sectarian tensions, over the course of which Catholicism shifted from the nation's traditional religion into a vigorously suppressed species of heresy.

C3.P14 Stephens was educated at Winchester College, one of England's most venerable public schools, where he was elected fellow in 1564.[8] It was founded in 1382 by the Bishop of Winchester, William of Wykeham, as a preparatory school for students at Oxford's New College, also founded three years earlier by Wykeham. At Winchester, Stephens would have received a thorough education in Greek and Latin; he would also have enjoyed an unusually good training in poetry. Christopher Johnson, who was appointed master of the college in 1560 and almost certainly taught Stephens, was a gifted scholar of rhetoric as well as a Latin poet of some acclaim.[9] Johnson's skills in Latin verse would have opened Stephens up to the arts of prosody—how to use rhyme and how to construct a metrically pleasant line on the model of Plautus,

[7] My biographical information about Stephens derives from the following sources: Joseph L. Saldanha, introduction to *The Christian Puranna of Father Thomas Stephens of the Society of Jesus*, ed. Saldanha (Mangalore: Simon Alvares, 1907); Georg Schurhammer, 'Thomas Stephens 1549–1619', *The Month* 13, no. 199/1052 (1955): 197–210; Brijraj Singh, 'The First Englishman in India: Thomas Stephens (1547–1619)', *Journal of South Asian Literature* 30, no. 1/2 (1995): 146–61; and James Southwood, 'Thomas Stephens, S. J., the First Englishman in India', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies* 3, no. 2 (1924): 231–40.

[8] On the history of Winchester College, see Roger Custance, ed., *Winchester College: Sixth Centenary Essays* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981).

[9] For information about Stephens's master Christopher Johnson, see Ian Green, *Humanism and Protestantism in Early Modern English Education* (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2009), 234.

Horace, and Virgil. Johnson's classes would also have made Stephens feel more at home in the language of the Roman Church. While Winchester may not have been a seething hotbed of Catholic activity during Stephens's time there, the Protestant authorities had moved to ban the college from teaching Latin graces, now considered too Catholic a ritual. Perhaps there was still a hint of the old faith in the air when Stephens was at Winchester: the college produced an unusual number of students who went on to become militant Catholics dedicated to overthrowing the Protestant Queen Elizabeth, including the Gunpowder Plot conspirator Henry Garnett and the polemicist priest Nicholas Sander.

C3.P15 Like many of his fellow Winchester College graduates, Stephens was groomed to study at New College in Oxford. Robert Parsons, a Jesuit dissident who came to know him some years later in Rome, claimed that Stephens had not only studied at New College but was also on very close terms with the famous Catholic martyr Edmund Campion, who took his master's degree there in 1564 and taught at Oxford until 1569. We cannot be sure, however, of the truth of Parsons's claim. Campion was ten years older than Stephens, so hardly university-friend material. And Campion was at that time not yet a Jesuit, or even a confirmed Catholic; indeed, in 1564 he received holy orders as a deacon in the Church of England. Further complicating Parsons's claim is the fact that Stephens's name does not appear in any of the Oxford University records from the 1560s. He himself states elsewhere that he only ever studied humanities privately. Still, if Stephens did indeed go to Oxford, and was already a devout Catholic at that time, it would have been very hard for him to continue his studies there: in a show of conformity with the avowedly Protestant Queen Elizabeth upon her accession to the throne in 1559, Oxford University had vigorously purged itself of Catholics. Perhaps Stephens had gone up to Oxford in the mid-1560s as a closet Catholic of only mild conviction, but felt forced to leave and commence private studies as his faith grew stronger and the purges became more insistent. Yet for Stephens, as for many of his Catholic peers, Campion must have seemed a glamorous role model after his dramatic resignation from Oxford in 1569. It is quite conceivable that the charismatic Campion's post-Oxford career inspired some of his former fellows and pupils—perhaps Stephens among them—to follow his path into Jesuit orders.

C3.P16 In about 1572, Stephens became attached to Thomas Pounde, a nephew of the Earl of Southampton and, like Stephens, a graduate of Winchester College. Pounde had been a favourite of Queen Elizabeth's at court but had

been expelled in 1571, quite possibly for dissolute behaviour.[10] After licking his wounds for some time at his family estate, he became religious and became an underground proselytizer for Roman Catholicism. Stephens reportedly travelled throughout England with Pounde for two years disguised as Pounde's servant, helping him to cultivate a secret Catholic network. Together they drifted towards the Jesuit path in which Campion had already begun to take an interest. Pounde in particular had become excited by letters from India about Francis Xavier and the Jesuit mission's success in converting Hindus. Together, Pounde and Stephens seem to have hatched a mad dream of going together to Goa to join the mission and continue its work.

C3.P17 But the dream turned to dust in 1574, when Pounde was abruptly arrested and imprisoned. He was to spend thirty years in jail as a religious dissident. Immediately after Pounde's capture, Stephens fled to Rome—we don't know how—and enrolled as a novitiate in the Society of Jesus. One of the other students was his fellow Winchester graduate and the later-to-be-notorious Gunpowder Plot martyr Henry Garnett. Stephens did not forget Pounde. He wrote a petition on behalf of his friend to the Society of Jesus, requesting that Pounde be formally admitted to the society as a layman; in the petition, which was granted in 1578, he praised Pounde for his asceticism, saying that 'for most of the time in which I lived with him he led a most austere life and used no bed, but slept on the ground'.[11] And Stephens continued to nurse Pounde's dream of India. In 1579, the society finally granted him permission to go to Goa to aid the Jesuit mission there. Stephens travelled first to Lisbon, from where he set sail with twelve other Jesuit missionaries as part of a fleet of five ships on 4 April 1579. The fleet voyaged around the Cape of Good Hope and arrived in Goa on 24 October.

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C3.P18 Seventeen days after Stephens's arrival in India, he wrote a letter to his father describing the long sea journey.[12] It is a fascinating document, not least because it is the only surviving piece of writing by Stephens in his native English. Surprisingly, given the religious zeal that had prompted his relocation, there is little in the letter that sounds like it comes from the pen of a dissident Jesuit missionary. There are occasional mentions of the providence

[10] Stephens's time with Thomas Pounde, and his later praise of him, is related in some detail in Schurhammer, 'Thomas Stephens'.

[11] Quoted in Schurhammer, 'Thomas Stephens', 200.

[12] Stephens's letter to his father is reproduced in Saldanha, ed., *Christian Puranna of Father Thomas Stephens*, xxvi–xxx.

of God with regard to Stephens's health and the good winds that propelled the ship to India. But these are perfunctory *inshallahs*, and no more zealous than anything we'd expect even from a mainstream English Protestant. Stephens begins the letter by giving commendations to his mother; his tone of filial obligation trumps all religious piety, suggesting that perhaps his parents were not thrilled by his mission—or, perhaps more likely, that he was watchful about what he wrote back to a country where Catholics in general, and Jesuits in particular, were now regarded as seditious enemies of the state.

C3.P19 Foregoing any display of missionary zeal, then, the letter cleaves more closely to another genre: the fabulous travelogue. Much of Stephens's letter is devoted to detailed descriptions of exotic marvels that he saw during his sea voyage around Africa and the Cape of Good Hope—the stuff of John Mandeville and other medieval travellers' tales. He tells his father about his sighting of what seems to be a Portuguese man o' war or medusa jellyfish, which he characterizes as 'a thing swimming upon the water like a cock's comb . . . almost like the swimmer of a fish in colour and bigness, and beareth underneath in the water strings which save it from turning over'; he describes 'strange kinds of fowls . . . some of them so great that their wings, being opened, from one point to the other contained seven spans'; and he talks of a miraculous fish 'as big, almost as a herring, which hath wings and flieth, and they are together in great number' (xxvi–xxvii). In all these instances, Stephens effaces himself; invisible in the marvellous scenes he describes, he offers each as an occasion 'to glorify Almighty God in His wonderful works and such variety in His creatures' (xxviii).

C3.P20 Even as Stephens steps out of frame throughout this slideshow of exotic marvels, we can see another tendency lurking in the background of his letter. He also observes how the journey to India pathologically transforms the flesh of sea voyagers: Stephens explains, in what seems to be a description of the symptoms of scurvy, that those who undertake such a long journey are likely to 'fall into sundry diseases, their gums grow great and swell, and they are fain to cut them away, their legs swell, and all the body becometh sore and so benumbed, that they cannot stir hand or foot, and so they die for weakness' (xxviii). And he talks also of the experience of crossing into the 'burning zone' near the equator, where sea voyagers suffer 'so many inconveniences of heats and lack of winds that they think themselves happy when they have passed it' (xxvii). In other words, Stephens had begun to note the transformation of *firangi* bodies in foreign environments. He was not simply watching a marvellous spectacle of a new world: he recognized that this new

world was, more accurately, an environment that had permeated his body, in the form of disease and heat.

C3.P21 Early modern European travellers' encounters with torrid Indian climates repeatedly made them aware of how their bodies were not unchanging, self-contained entities, but protean nodes in thermodynamic ecosystems. No matter how strong their cultural differences, Portuguese as much as English travellers to India had a common experience of exposure to a completely alien heat. And this exposure transformed their flesh. As the Portuguese priest Sebastien Manrique noted in 1640, to travel in India was to be 'heated by ague or by the heat which the titanic and glowing Planet causes'.[13] According to the humoral understanding of their bodies that most European travellers brought with them to India, moreover, heat was not just a matter of the climate. It was also a property of certain types of food. The Italian traveller Pietro della Valle notes of four Carmelite monks he met in Goa: 'They came almost all sick, having suffered much in the Deserts of Arabia and other places of the journey, where they had felt great scarcity; and for all this they would needs observe their Lent and Fasts by the way, sustaining themselves almost solely with Dates, which is a very hot food; and withal the alteration of the air, both very hot, and unusual to them in the height of Summer, was the occasion of their being all sick.'[14]

C3.P22 By contrast, Stephens claims to have arrived in Goa in good health, 'contrary to the expectation of many'. In his letter to his father he voices the hope that 'God send me my health so well in the land, if it may be to His honour and service' (xxx). Here we can see him nursing the hope that his identity, along with his health, might remain stable in the new environment: he believed that, unlike the other sick travellers, he might pull off the feat of arriving in India without India's pathogenic matter arriving in him. But his hope was quickly dashed. In a letter he wrote in Latin to his brother Richard in 1583, Stephens notes that he was 'tried by a serious illness' shortly after he reached India.[15] We do not know what illness it was—quite possibly dysentery, the plague of many a new arrival—but it obviously felled him with particular force, given that he could still recall its gravity

[13] Sebastian Manrique's experience of Indian heat—so similar to Stephens's—is chronicled in Michael H. Fisher, ed., *Beyond the Three Seas: Travellers' Tales of Mughal India* (New Delhi: Random House India, 2007), 103.

[14] Edward Grey, ed., *The Travels of Pietro della Valle in India: From the Old English Translation of 1664, by G. Havers*, 2 vols (London, 1892), 1:172.

[15] This letter is also reproduced in Saldanha, ed., *Christian Puranna of Father Thomas Stephens*, xxx–xxxiv.

four years later. This was but the first of many bodily transformations he was to undergo in Goa.

C3.P23 Stephens's letter to his brother makes clear that he had absorbed, upon arrival, Goa's bacteria or viruses. But his letter to his father, so sparse on detail about his Indian destination (he seems to have gotten exhausted describing the events of the journey), does show that his attention had already been arrested by another form of Indian matter he took into his body—a new plant he had not seen before: the coconut. He writes at the very end of the letter that 'the drink of this country is good water, or wine of the palm tree, or a fruit called cocoas' (xxx). Stephens had clearly already sampled coconut water, a powerful antidote to the loss of bodily salts caused by sweating in India's extreme heat. As we will see, this was the beginning of a long and profound relationship that transformed his body and its habits. Stephens's passage to India entailed the passage of India's physical elements through his flesh. And in the process his dissident Catholicism directed him, via Marathi and Konkani, towards a specifically Goan cultural syncretism that we might describe as Christo-Hindu.

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C3.P24 The Goa in which Stephens landed in 1579 was a somewhat different city from what it had been in the first half of the sixteenth century.[16] After three decades of relative religious tolerance following Portugal's conquest of the city from the Bijapur sultanate in 1510, it had become an increasingly bellicose beacon of Christianity. The Inquisition had been set up in 1560 partly at the request of Saint Francis Xavier, the Jesuit priest whose name is now commemorated by a thousand schools and colleges in India. Thanks to Francis Xavier's aggressive work in converting Konkani Hindus—especially Brahmins—after he came to India in 1542, the Jesuit mission in Goa became a major force in shaping the culture of the region.[17] Francis Xavier bequeathed to the mission a distinctive legacy of intolerance. Horrified by what he regarded as the idolatrousness of Goa's Hindus, Francis Xavier took little care to study their customs or learn their languages; his aim was to

[16] My discussion of pre-Portuguese and early colonial Goa is indebted to Teotonio R. de Souza, ed., *Goa through the Ages*, vol. 2, *An Economic History* (New Delhi: Concept Publishing, 1990); Donald F. Lach, *Asia in the Making of Europe*, vol. 1, *The Century of Discovery* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 381–91; and Sanjay Subrahmanyam, *The Portuguese Empire in Asia, 1500–1700: A Political and Economic History* (Harlow, Essex: Longman, 1993), 80–5.

[17] Georg Schurhammer offers an extensive if somewhat reverential biography of Francis Xavier in India in *Francis Xavier: His Life, His Times*, vol. 2, *India, 1541–1544* (Chicago: Loyola Press, 1982).

save souls. If Hindu temples needed to be destroyed to bring the word of God to the infidels, that was simply a grim necessity.

C3.P25 Stephens initially fitted in well with the mission. Despite the serious illness to which he succumbed in his first year, he moved smoothly to ordination as a priest six months after his arrival. His Jesuit masters, expecting him to take a prominent role in guiding native heathen souls to the light of the gospel, promptly dispatched him to the frontier parish of Salcete, south of the island of Goa and at the border with the Bijapur sultanate. Salcete was at that time ground zero in the Jesuit conversion drive. When the Jesuits first arrived there in 1560, they encountered a land of fifty-five villages ruled largely by Brahmins. Among a population of more than 80,000, there were just one hundred Christians; the overwhelming majority worshipped the local deity Shantadurga (or Shanteri). Most of the Salcete Christians lived in or next to the fortress of Rachol, which had been wrested from the sultan of Bijapur in 1520 by the Portuguese in league with the Vijayanagar Hindu king, Krishnadevaraya. Despite this Portuguese–Hindu partnership, the Jesuits advocated a more aggressive stance against local religious practices. In 1569, with the full support of the Jesuits, the Portuguese razed a Brahmin temple in Rachol and more than 300 other temples throughout the rest of Salcete. The sultan of Bijapur, spying an opportunity to get back at the Portuguese, retaliated by burning down the Jesuit college and hospital in Margão, the main town in the parish. The Jesuits quickly rebuilt, however, adding for good measure a new seminary in Rachol with a beautiful baroque church, still functional today. They also persuaded the viceroy to ban all idolatrous practices in Salcete, including worship of the cobra goddess.

C3.P26 By 1580, the year Stephens reached the parish, the Jesuits had succeeded in growing the local Christian community eight hundredfold to 8,000, most of them converted Brahmins. The Jesuit missionaries seem to have felt that, because of the Brahmins' priestly culture, they were proto-Christians, riper for indoctrination than the Bijapuri Muslims, who were deemed to be infidels and idolaters beyond the pale. Even as the Portuguese razed Hindu temples and banned local religious practices, they also allowed Brahmin converts to retain the signs of their caste, including the *yajnopavita* or sacred thread, provided these were blessed by a Catholic priest. Indeed, Goan Catholics descended from Brahmins are to this day still known as Bamonns. The Christianization of caste identity is symptomatic of a lethal distinction the Portuguese drew between good and bad Indians, one that played out in the religious violence that followed Stephens's arrival in Salcete. The ban on all idolatry in the parish led locals to make a formal

appeal to the Spanish King Phillip II, the widower of Mary Tudor who was also now ruler of Portugal; when the appeal was denied, tensions were further inflamed. After a Jesuit priest slaughtered a cow outside a temple, a number of missionaries were killed in retaliation.

C3.P27 The incident happened just before Stephens received news from his brother Richard of Edmund Campion's execution in England. Stephens's reply, composed in Latin, glorifies both the missionaries and Campion as martyrs, citing a fellow Jesuit who averred 'how beautiful it is to lay down one's life for the Faith' (xxxiii). But far more striking than his admiration for the gory deaths of his fellow missionaries, which he passes over quickly, is his delight in the behaviour of a Brahmin convert named Bernardo, whose story he tells at great length. This Bernardo had been entrusted to Stephens's care; he had made good progress in Latin and was sent from Salcete to Goa to continue his studies, but was kidnapped en route by his Brahmin family. Despite their best attempts to bring him back to the Brahmin fold, he heroically resisted. Eventually he escaped and returned to the Jesuits by running through dense forest and finding a boat that allowed him to cross the river to the Rachol seminary, where Stephens was based. To row the boat, Bernardo fashioned an oar from the leaf of a local tree of particular interest to Stephens, one that he already associated with deliverance from adversity: the coconut.

C3.P28 Stephens's story so far is entirely of a piece with Francis Xavier's mission to rescue Hindus from idolatry. But one can detect in it a hint of another disposition. In his letter, he notes how Bernardo's family was approached by an 'apostate' who had relapsed into Brahminism. Bernardo's brother and mother had resorted to violence in the hope of bringing the boy back to idolatry. According to Stephens, however, the apostate warned them against such a strategy, pointing out that 'gradually were we won over to the Christian religion and gradually did we leave it. This is not to be wondered at, seeing as the Fathers themselves do not prevail upon one the very first day, but attract people little by little… if you do him violence, you will only make him more obstinate' (xxxiv). The apostate failed to persuade the exemplarily devout Bernardo. But one can glimpse here an intriguing act of ventriloquism on Stephens's part, one that entails an unexpected identification with the apostate. Rather than the violent programme of suppression authorized by Francis Xavier, Stephens implicitly advocates a moderate incrementalism, a tactic that he has the apostate attribute to 'the Fathers' (xxxiii).

C3.P29 This hints at how Stephens approached the Jesuit mission rather differently from Francis Xavier. Unlike the latter, Stephens took considerable pains to learn local customs and tongues in the hope of attracting his largely

Brahmin target constituency 'little by little'. Clearly a gifted linguist—he quickly became conversant in Portuguese, and was known in Goa by the Portuguese version of his name, Tomás *Estêvão*—he also acquired Konkani, the local language of both Goa and the northern Malabar Coast. In the densely forested frontier village of Rachol, where he lived for most of his four decades in India before his death in 1619, speaking Konkani was a necessity; even as rector of Rachol, a position to which he was appointed in 1610, he preached and took confession in the local vernacular. Indeed, he became so fluent that he wrote the first Konkani grammar book, the *Arte da lingoa Canarim*, which was published posthumously in 1640.[18] We do not know who his teachers were, but he evidently spent considerable time in the company of Konkani speakers.

C3.P30 Just as impressively, he devoted himself to learning Marathi, the language of 'high' literature among the Brahmins. It was in Marathi, sprinkled with some Konkani, that Stephens composed—probably after his appointment as rector of Rachol—his epic 11,018-line poem about the history of the world from Creation to the coming of Christ. He called the poem the *Kristapurana* (Story of Christ); in it, he styled himself as 'Pâtri Guru', seemingly Marathi for 'Father Teacher'. His narrative reworks tales from the Old and New Testaments, as well as some apocryphal stories; it also includes a dialogue between Pâtri Guru and a Brahmin. The *Kristapurana* was first printed in 1616 on a press at the Rachol seminary. Although printed in Roman type, it became enormously popular with the local community of Brahmin converts and, subsequently, with Malabari Christians and even Marathi-speaking non-Christians.

C3.P31 Does Stephens's ability to write Christian literature in an Indian language (or two) make him a compellingly unconventional figure or a lethally effective colonist? It's hard not to assume the latter. Stephens adopted many predictably colonialist positions: he supported the conversion of Indians, and his writings are only ever obliquely critical of Portuguese violence against Hindus. Moreover, learning native languages to better disseminate the Word of God was increasingly part of an official Jesuit policy called *accommodatio*, or inculturation.[19] The New Christian Portuguese Jesuit Henrique

[18] See the facsimile edition of *Arte de Lingoa Canarim* (Margao, Goa: Cinnamon Teal, 2012).

[19] Stephens's attempts at inculturation in Rachol were part of a larger global Jesuit strategy widely discussed by scholars of ethnography and theology. The best analysis of Jesuit attempts at inculturation in India—including those by Henrique Henriques, Roberto de Nobili, and Constanzo Giuseppe Beschi or Veeramamunivar—is Ines G. Županov, *Missionary Tropics:*

Henriques, something of a role model for Stephens, had written and published Christian doctrine and catechisms in Tamil in the 1560s. The Italian Jesuit Roberto de Nobili continued Henriques's efforts, also composing catechisms in Tamil; during his nearly fifty years in Madurai in the first half of the 1600s, de Nobili went further than Henriques by adopting local customs such as shaving his head, wearing a thread across his bare torso, and sporting a *dhoti* around his waist. Similarly, the Italian Jesuit Constanzo Giuseppe Beschi—also known as Veeramamunivar—went native in the early 1700s, living as a *sanyasi* or holy man and writing Tamil poetry. Yet Beschi remained a fiercely dogmatic Catholic all his life. Stephens may have been influenced too by the example of Jerome Xavier, a Jesuit priest in Lahore who in the 1590s wrote a Persian 'life of Christ' called the *Dastan-i-Masih.* Stephens's *Kristapurana* was arguably part of this Jesuit tradition of inculturation.

C3.P32 But it's important to remember that even if the Jesuits initially worked with the sanction of the Portuguese colonial state, they weren't identical to it. Although King João III had appointed Francis Xavier as his Apostolic Nuncio in Portuguese India in 1541, the Jesuits didn't operate straightforwardly within the machinery of colonialism and empire. Stephens's mission to translate the Word of God into local vernaculars may have not fallen afoul of state law in his lifetime, but it did later, as did the Jesuit order in general. After several years of sustained pressure, the colonial authorities banned the use of vernacular languages in 1684 and declared Portuguese the sole official language. Stephens's *Kristapurana* suddenly became a problematic text. The poem went even further underground with the (temporary) suspension of the Jesuit order in 1773, as a result of which many texts associated with the Society of Jesus were destroyed. This might be the reason why not a single copy of the first three editions of the *Kristapurana* survives today.[20] But in the wake of the vernacular language ban and the suspension of the Jesuits, the *Kristapurana* survived in largely secretive oral form among Goan and Malabari Christians. In the process, it became a powerful rallying point for anti-colonial sentiment; it was still recited with

The Catholic Frontier in India (16th–17th Centuries) (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005).

[20] Original editions of the *Kristapurana* do not survive, so I have worked with Joseph L. Saldanha's 1907 Marathi edition.

pride by Marathi-speaking Indian freedom fighters at the height of Gandhi's Quit India Movement in the 1940s.[21]

C3.P33 As an instance of the Jesuit policy of inculturation, the *Kristapurana* arguably achieved its quasi-colonial end—bringing Christian lore to the locals. But its subsequent history makes clear how the *Kristapurana* also became a venerated text in communities that did not coincide with, let alone submit to, the colonial project. It is tempting to see the poem's anti-colonial history as stemming from Stephens's unusual and fractured identity; as a dissident Catholic who had gone underground in his native country, he was used to operating outside the strictures of official authority, and he continued to do so in Rachol. Although he assumed the name of Tomás Estêvão, he repeatedly showed a willingness to move beyond the bounds of the Portuguese national, religious, and linguistic community. In addition to helping out Ralph Fitch and his English Protestant countrymen, Stephens was most comfortable living in the Indian-majority hinterland of eastern Salcete, and he evidently chafed at the Portuguese colonial authorities' refusal to create movable typeface in Devanagari characters so that the *Kristapurana* could be printed—as he had recommended—in the native Marathi script. But the anti-colonial history of the *Kristapurana* also has much to do with the power of translation to transform what is being translated. Stephens didn't simply dress up Jesuit Christian doctrine in workmanlike Marathi. He also demonstrably fell in love with the language, in a way that Indianized both the Christianity he sought to preach and his own body.

* * *

C3.P34 In his letter to his brother, Stephens expresses his admiration for the linguistic structure of local languages, which to his ear is 'allied to that of Greek and Latin' (xxxi). On the one hand, Stephens maps Indian languages back on to familiar authoritative European models that he first learned at Winchester. On the other, he opens up to the nuances of their unfamiliar sounds. As he remarks to his brother, 'Their pronunciation is not disagreeable.... The phrases and constructions are of a wonderful kind. The letters in the syllables have their value, and are varied as many times as the consonants can be combined with the vowels and the mutes with the liquids' (xxxi). Note the sensory pleasure Stephens takes in the complex acoustic

[21] This anecdote about freedom fighters reciting Stephens's praise of Marathi comes to me from Vibha Kamat.

textures of the local languages: his is not just an intellectual appreciation but also an embodied delight. Clearly he loved how Marathi felt in his mouth.

C3.P35 This delight is apparent in the best-known section of the *Kristapurana*, in which Stephens praises the beauty of Marathi:

C3.P36
Zaissy puspã mazi puspa mogary
Qui parimallã mazi casturi
Taissy bhassã mazi saziry
Maratthiya
Paqhiã madhe maioru
Vruqhiã madhe calpataru
Bhassã madhe manu thoru
Maratthiyessi
(As the mogra among flowers
As musk among perfumes
So among languages is the beauty
Of Marathi

C3.P37
As among birds the peacock
As among trees the kalpataru
So among languages is
Marathi)[22]

C3.P38 We might read this passage as a strategic tour de force. Stephens's praise of Marathi is judiciously pitched at the Indian reader or listener with images that evoke the local landscape. He thus brings Christian lore to his Indian readers in not just a language but also images that recognizably belong to their world. Yet Stephens's use of Marathi is not simply a means to a Christian end. As this passage suggests, he did far more than simply drape a Western theological message in a rough-cut indigenous fabric. To become a Marathi *kavi*, Stephens also had to master the intricacies of the language's highly sophisticated literary forms.

C3.P39 Christopher Johnson's classes on Plautus and Virgil at Winchester College doubtless provided Stephens with a solid platform for his poetic labours in India, including an intuitive sense of prosody and rhetoric—the sound of a well-honed line, the evocative power of a well-chosen image. But there is

[22] Saldanha, ed., *Christian Puranna of Father Thomas Stephens*, 6 (auasuari 1, ovis 123–4). Quotations from the *Kristapurana* are from this edition, but all English translations are mine, with considerable help from Vibha Kamat and Suresh Walawalikar.

little that is Latinate about the form of poetry he uses in the *Kristapurana*. Again, we don't know who his Marathi teachers were. But they must have been highly conversant with literary Marathi. Stephens had carefully studied not just the medieval Marathi Puranas—epic stories of creation, gods, and kings—but also appropriated one of Marathi's most distinctive poetic forms. He had become adept in the use of the ovi stanza, which consists of three longer rhyming lines of between eight and fifteen syllables followed by a short unrhymed line. The ovi, a little like the haiku, allows for the exfoliation of an idea through a kaleidoscopic sequence of diverse images: it lends a distinctive musical and visual power to otherwise abstract religious concepts.

C3.P40 For example, the ovi is used to particularly strong effect in the *Dnyaneshwari*, a thirteenth-century Marathi commentary on the Bhagavad Gita by the legendary poet Dnyaneshwar.[23] He expanded the 700 *slokas* of the Gita into 9,999 ovis with the intention of making spiritual ideas accessible to readers and listeners unfamiliar with Sanskrit. The ovi is also the poetic form favoured by the Brahmin Marathi poet-saint Eknath (1533–99), a contemporary of Stephens who became renowned in western India for his attempt to revive Marathi literature in general and Dnyaneshwar in particular at a time of Muslim rule in the region.[24] Eknath journeyed though much of what is now Maharashtra reciting *bhajans* and other religious poems in public; he also critiqued the caste system, embracing Dalits and bathing in water reserved for them. As a result, the ovi became associated with a kind of evangelical Marathi Brahminism that was at one and the same time literary yet popular, spiritual yet worldly, traditional yet glamorously anti-establishment. In other words, it represented everything to which Stephens's brand of Indian Catholicism aspired.

C3.P41 Stephens doubtless heard of the exploits of Eknath; he probably closely studied his ovis before writing the *Kristapurana*. He may even have regarded him as a potential source of competition for his Brahmin constituency. But in appropriating Eknath's distinctive style, he wasn't simply speaking to people in the language and the poetic form of the region. He was also lending voice to powerful personal experiences of his attachment to his new home. He may or may not have known about Eknath imparting his touch to

[23] Stephens's debts to Dnyaneshwar are discussed by Hans Staffner, 'Fr. Stephens' *Christa Puranna* (Reflections on the Coming Devangari Edition)', *The Examiner (Bombay)* 107, no. 14 (1956): 177–8; and Claude Silva, 'Thomas Stephens, S. J.', *The Examiner (Bombay)* 107, no. 27 (1956): 341–2.

[24] Stephens's relation to Eknath is scrutinized in Staffner, 'Fr. Stephens' *Christa Puranna*'; and Silva, 'Thomas Stephens'.

that which was deemed untouchable. But with his ovis, Stephens too opened up his body to the touch of a world supposedly alien to him. For the landscape Stephens describes in his praise of Marathi isn't designed simply to hook his Indian readers; it also bears the imprint of his own sensuous interactions with it. Here, if briefly, we can glimpse Stephens's own delighted body in Goa, smelling mogra flowers, hearing the cry of the peacock, gazing upon the kalpataru tree. And this body is the missing point of connection between landscape and language, a language that seems to have induced in him a similar delight. Which is to say: speaking Marathi changed Stephens.

C3.P42 First and foremost, it changed Stephens's bodily habits. Pronouncing Marathi's different consonants and vowels, and what he calls its 'liquids' and its 'mutes', would have required him to transform how he used his facial and labial muscles. His eccentric yet systematic romanized spelling of Marathi in the *Kristapurana*—with its use of italicization and diacritical marks to distinguish between different vowel sounds and its meticulous distinction between different dental consonants that sound identical to most English speakers (*d, dd, dh, ddh, t, tt, th, tth*)—shows how much attention Stephens had paid to the nuances of Marathi pronunciation and to getting these right. But speaking Marathi also changed the Christianity he attempted to bring to his readers. The *Kristapurana* retells stories from the Old and New Testaments. Yet the Christianity he explains is one that has been adapted to Indian, and even Hindu, concepts. He calls Jesus, for example, a swami. But the Hinduization of Stephens's Christianity is perhaps most clear from one word choice in the above passage: *calpataru*, or kalpataru tree.

* * *

C3.P43 Throughout the *Kristapurana*, Stephens invokes the *calpataru*. This represents an ingenious exercise in inculturation. Here he adapts a traditional Hindu motif for Christian purposes: the kalpataru is, in Sanskrit mythology, a divine tree that has the power to grant all wishes, as a result of which Indra the god-king takes it with him to Paradise. Consequently, *calpataru* provides Stephens with a powerful translation for the Tree of Life in the Garden of Eden, which is how he uses the word at the poem's beginning. This typifies how Stephens gravitated towards Hindu concepts. He probably did so less out of a deep sympathy than a pragmatic sense of the main constituency for his poem, Brahmin Hindus who had converted to Catholicism.

C3.P44 There was another shrewd calculation behind Stephens's adaptation of the kalpataru. As his paean to Marathi suggests, his use of the word serves to localize the Edenic tree in Goa. Throughout the subcontinent, the

kalpataru was identified with local trees. In Uttarakhand, locals venerate a mulberry tree as the kalpavriksha, another term for kalaptaru. In Bengal and elsewhere, the kalpataru is the banyan tree. But the inhabitants of the Konkan Coast equate it with the coconut tree, because of its ability to provide for a wide spectrum of human needs.

C3.P45 This was a tradition with which Stephens was evidently familiar. In the letter he wrote to his brother, he remarks of the coconut tree that:

C3.P46 > It gives oil, liquor (*vinum*), toddy (*lac*), syrup (*mel*) sugar and vinegar. Coir-rope is also made from it to tie with, and its branches are used to protect huts from rain. It gives fruit all the year round, which are rather nuts than dates, resembling a man's head. When the exterior rind has been removed, they rival the size of two fists. Inside, the fruit contains water like light beer and good to quench one's thirst. It is so plentiful that, after drinking from one fruit, you would not look for another. In the interior of the nut is a kernel lining it all over like a covering and forming a prized article of food. The shell furnishes the blacksmith with charcoal. Those that live near the sea not only load their boats with the tree, but also utilise it for making ropes and sails. You will find hardly any piece of writing except on its leaves. (xxxii–xxxiii)

C3.P47 Here we can see Stephens not so much describing the Goan kalpataru as rehearsing an oft-repeated local narrative about it. Yet it is clear that, like his relation to spoken Marathi, his relation to the kalpataru was embodied as much as it was conceptual. As we have seen, the long letter Stephens wrote to his father in 1579 referred to the 'drink of this country' derived from palm trees: here he invoked either coconut water or toddy, the zesty alcoholic brew he mentions in his letter to his brother. Each drink has a significant impact on the body. Coconut water is an excellent guard against dehydration; electrolyte-rich, it has a cooling effect in the heat. And its alcoholic derivative toddy is a fine protector against the cold. It is difficult to imagine Stephens having done without either drink during his four decades in India. In the last three years of his life before his death in 1619, most of them spent in the infirmary next to the Bom Jesus Basilica, he struggled to take food because of a chronic stomach problem; it's likely that coconut water would have been a regular part of his sickbed diet. It is likewise difficult to imagine Stephens earlier in his life avoiding the multiple uses of the coconut in its many other forms. Eating the coconut's white flesh by itself or mixed into tasty dishes such as the kishmur fish curry that is so plentiful in the region; using its husk as coir for rope; employing it as charcoal for

cooking; sheltering under its leaves in the monsoon; even writing on it as a substitute for paper (indeed, it is tempting to imagine drafts of the *Kristapurana* written on the leaves of kalpataru)—Stephens must have been familiar with all of these.

C3.P48 In other words, Stephens's *calpataru* is not simply a Marathi term that translates a Christian concept. It is the catalyst for an entirely new ensemble of bodily habits, habits that differ from how Stephens had used his body in England or Rome. If Stephens imbues the kalpataru with miraculous properties in the *Kristapurana*, it is partly because the coconut also helped transform him from Thomas Stephens the English religious dissident into Tomás Estêvão the Goan migrant and Pâtri Guru the Marathi poet. The coconut was for Stephens the secular version of a consecrated communion wafer: it was the agent by means of which he could not only say 'this is my body' in Konkani but also experience his body as a Konkani body—that is, as part of a larger ecological and cultural network specific to the Konkan Coast. After all, 'hi mho ji kudd' is a phrase that would come most naturally only to someone habituated to interacting with Goan coconuts in a variety of ways—eating their flesh, drinking their water, burning their rind, plaiting their husk into rope, using their leaves as a shelter from the rain or a writing surface or even an oar with which to row a boat.

C3.P49 The coconut may have provided Stephens with an illustration of the workings of divine providence and the principle that God makes everything for some use—or, in the case of the kalpataru, for potentially infinite uses. That is certainly how the coconut was regarded back in England by the great seventeenth-century religious poet, George Herbert: 'The Indian nut alone | Is clothing, meat and trencher, drink and kan, | Boast, cable, sail and needle, all one'.[25] Yet the coconut does not always function in such straightforwardly theological fashion in the *Kristapurana*. When Stephens invokes it, he doesn't do so simply to translate key concepts of Christian doctrine for his Marathi-speaking readers. He also localizes these concepts, displacing and transforming them in ways that vividly conjure the details of the Salcete landscape. When, for example, Stephens describes the rebuilding of Jerusalem, he writes that:

C3.P50 Draqhe vely puspa taru bhina zahale
Zuna taddamadda bhumy paddale

[25] Herbert, 'Providence', in *The Temple* (Cambridge, 1633), lines 126–8. I have used C. A. Patrides's Everyman edition of *The English Poems of George Herbert* (London: J. M. Dent and Sons, 1974), p. 132.

Teanche tthai vruqhe vaddhale
Apaisse
(Grape vines, flowers and trees fell apart
Old high coconut and palm trees fell to the ground
In their place trees grew
Naturally)[26]

C3.P51 Here Stephens imagines a Jerusalem that has fallen from its former glory, a glory associated not just with vines and flowers but also with the coconut tree. However, his term for the latter in this passage is not the heavenly kalpataru of Sanskrit mythology. Instead he uses the memorable word *taddamadda*—a local Konkani term that, describing the soaring height of mixed groves of coconut and palmyra trees, helps Stephens reimagine the original Jerusalem as a version of the contemporary Konkan Coast. As a result, the paradise that Christian doctrine associates with a lost past is subtly outsourced to Stephens and his readers' Indian present. We may have lost Jerusalem, Stephens seems to say, but we have gained Salcete now. Or, rather, Salcete has gained us—and transforms us with its marvellous coconuts.

C3.P52 Describing the animals afflicted by the waters of the Great Flood, Stephens again evokes the local coconut-rich landscape with a word that points to neither Christian doctrine nor Hindu mythology but an actual experience of a Salcete coconut tree:

C3.P53 Veagra bocaddiyã saue põuaty
Zalli siha sardhalla craddaty
Zallachare manuxanssi mellaty
Nariyelli vari
(The tigers swim with the sheep
In the water the lions play with smaller cats
Those living in the water meet men
Atop the coconut tree)[27]

C3.P54 Stephens here describes the devastation wrought by the biblical Flood as an inversion of cosmic order: its water levels the hierarchical distinctions between species and between heights, placing mighty and weak animals,

[26] Saldanha, ed., *Christian Puranna of Father Thomas Stephens*, 179 (auasuari 33, ovi 16).
[27] Ibid., 42 (auasuari 7, ovi 77).

treetop and submarine seascape, in unexpected proximity. For modern readers, this might sound less like an account of the Flood as conceived in the Bible than a description of the tsunami that crashed into India's coconut-lined Coromandel Coast in 2004. But the stanza has a more specifically Goan resonance. Stephens's concluding line invokes the *nariyelli*, a commonplace Marathi term for the coconut; the image he conjures with the *nariyelli*, of men atop the coconut tree, is a powerful one in Goa even today. For the coconut trees of the region are scaled daily by agile men who tap the fruit for water and toddy. During his forty years in India, Stephens may not have adapted his body to clamber up coconut trees in search of libations. The *nariyelli*, however, was the agent of numerous other recalibrations of his body and its flesh.

C3.P55 Indeed, the Marathi name that Stephens assumed in the *Kristapurana* suggests as much. 'Pâtri Guru' means 'Father Teacher'. But *patri* also means, in Sanskrit, both 'letter' and 'leaf of a palm tree'. It is hard to imagine that Stephens, so adroit with languages, was not aware of this pun. Was his choice of name a subtle homage to the coconut leaves on which he most likely wrote—an homage, indeed, to the tree that was in so many ways his guru? Pâtri Guru is the man who teaches from palm tree leaves, with palm tree leaves, from the vantage point of palm tree leaves. In this name, then, we might see Stephens recalibrating his flesh not simply *with*, but also *as*, the Konkan coconut tree.[28]

* * *

C3.P56 These recalibrations of the flesh are why we cannot dismiss Stephens as simply an instrument of European colonial power. He certainly operated at the confluence of two of the strongest currents of pre-British colonialism in India: the Portuguese Estado da *Índia* and the Jesuit mission. But even within that confluence, we find eddies and countercurrents that do not flow in predictable directions.

C3.P57 It would be a mistake to assume that the coconut alone could generate those countercurrents. Countless firangi settlers up to Independence had their bodies transformed by *naariyal paani* (coconut water), but in ways that reinforced rather than undermined the stark asymmetry of colonial power relations. A Bengali friend tells me about how a family from her well-to-do south Calcutta neighbourhood had a servant, Ramani, who had

[28] See Julian Yates's essay in this volume on the human as a multispecies being (Chapter 8).

served in the home of a British family in the city before independence.[29] This Ramani was a great raconteur. One of his stories was about how his British masters would call out for him—the *khansamas* (cook) or 'Johnny'—and offer him one penny if he could crack open a coconut for them: 'Johnny Johnny, one penny', was their refrain. And when the water was extracted, the white sahibs would drink it and say 'good water, good water'. Ramani's story about the British officer calling for a coconut and assuming the willingness of Indians to cut it for him speaks volumes. No matter how much the coconut may have transformed the officer's body, it was delivered to him courtesy of a colonial economy in which the British were served by menial Indian labourers. A similar situation may have obtained for Stephens. If he did not himself clamber up coconut trees to retrieve coconuts, who did? Who cracked his coconuts for him? Who laboured to safeguard his health? In telling the story of the miraculous powers of the *naariyal*, it is perhaps too easy to forget the stubborn power of an economy in which labour was divided in entirely colonialist ways. Stephens was doubtless the beneficiary of an early version of this economy—which is to say, like Ramani's British officer of Calcutta, he was a *gora sahib* (white master) served by Indian peons.

C3.P58 Yet there were other economies at work in Stephens's career, in which power was not organized in quite so predictable a fashion. From whom did he learn local languages, including vernacular Konkani and high Marathi? From whom did he learn the complexities of the ovi form? From whom did he learn about Eknath? He immersed himself in local literary tradition in a way that few other Jesuit practitioners of inculturation did and, as a result, mastered Konkani, Marathi, and their poetic forms. But his education would have demanded that he submit to other local masters. And Stephens certainly had to submit to Indian teachers, and in ways that would have recreated something of the relation he had with Christopher Johnson, his master at Winchester College. How much did he have to submit, not just intellectually, but also physically, to his Indian gurus? How, for example, did he sit during his Marathi lessons? How did he turn the pages of Marathi Puranas—perhaps inscribed on coconut leaves—such as Eknath's? How, in short, might his body have adapted not only to the plant life but also to the classrooms of the Konkan Coast? How did his body change in ways that not

[29] The story about Ramani was related to me by Subha Mukherjee.

only served the ends of the Portuguese colonial state but also traced the outlines of rather different modes of contact between foreigner and local?

C3.59 If we look aslant at the Konkani phrase on the altar of the ancient Bom Jesus Basilica in Old Goa, we might see another subtle story of transformation that no longer points in the same spiritual direction as the Eucharist's miracle of transubstantiation. For 'hi mho ji kudd' not only translates the formula of the Catholic Mass—'this is my body'—it also transforms it. The romanized Konkani phrase is part of Thomas Stephens's native-language Christian legacy to Goan Indians: to this day, his name is associated with the flowering of Konkani as a literary language, thanks to the Thomas Stephens Konknni Kendr in the Goan parish of Bardez, which houses an extraordinary archive of Konkani texts by Stephens and other non-Portuguese Goan writers of the past four centuries. He has also recently become a figurehead for the indigenous Romi Konknni movement, whose objective is to have roman-script Konkani declared one of the official languages of Goa. And Stephens has additionally served as a standard-bearer for Goa's other indigenous languages: in the mid-twentieth century, at the height of the Quit India movement, his praise of Marathi from the *Kristapurana* was posted widely in non-Christian venues throughout Goa, such as the Saraswat Brahman Samaj Library in Margão.[30] The phrase 'hi mho ji kudd', then, hints at the transformations that have accompanied and complicated Stephens's legacy. In particular, it gestures towards the work performed by Indian agents, human and nonhuman, in refashioning Christian orthodoxy into something anti-establishment, an instrument of colonialism into something anti-imperialist, and foreign flesh into something Indian.[31]

[30] The story about the posting of Stephens's stanzas about Marathi in the Saraswat Brahman Samaj Library in Margão during the Quit India movement comes from Vibha Kamat.

[31] Earlier versions of this essay appeared in *postmedieval* 4 (2013): 491–502; and in my book, *The First Firangis: Remarkable Stories of Heroes, Healers, Charlatans, Courtesans and Other Foreigners Who Became Indian* (Delhi: Aleph Book Company, 2015), chap. 3, 47–70. I am grateful to Palgrave Macmillan and the Aleph Book Company for permission to reproduce parts of those earlier publications in this essay.

C4

4

Anatomy, Cartography, and the New World Body

Valerie Traub

C4.P1 Above the entrance of the original Leiden University anatomy theatre hung an engraved map of the city of Leiden. So much, at least, is suggested by an extant engraving, one of two celebrating the university's newly opened facility. The first, published in 1609, shows a theatre crammed full of spectators, with a dissection in full swing (see Figure 4.1), while the second, published a year later, shows a few men and a gentlewoman observing the dissected corpse.

C4.P2 Designed by Pieter Pauw, master of public dissections, the Leiden amphitheatre opened to the public in 1593. Both engravings show anatomical specimens displayed on a central table, while human and animal skeletons cavort along the tiered balustrades of the circular benches, supporting themselves with staffs or holding banners with moralizing mottos such as 'NOS[C]E TE IPSUM' (Know thyself) and 'NASCENTES MORIMUR' (Whoever is born must die). In the 1609 engraving, Pauw lectures over a corpse before spectators jockeying for space amid the clutter. Hovering above the assembled crowd is the Leiden panorama.

C4.P3 Whether this map was part of the facility's original furnishings, we don't know—university inventories suggest that if it did not hang in the theatre at the time, it may have been copied from an existing map in the university's holdings. We do know, however, that in 1618, Pauw's successor, Otho Heurnius, purchased four continent maps by the prolific Dutch cartographer Willem Janszoon Blaeu, mounted them on wood, and displayed them around the circular walls.[1] Indeed, the presence of maps in

[1] Pieter Pauw (also Paaw) was Leiden university anatomist from 1589–1617, and Heurnius from 1618–50. On the Leiden theatre, see Tim Huisman, *The Finger of God: Anatomical Practice in Seventeenth-Century Leiden* (Leiden: Primavera Pers, 2009); and *A Theatre for Anatomy: The Leiden Theatrum Anatomicum, 1594–1821* (Leiden: Museum Boerhaave, 2002).

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

C4.F1 **Figure 4.1** 'Amphitheatrum Anatomicum Lugduno Batavorum', *c.*1609, engraving by W. Swanenburg, after a drawing by Bartholomeus Willemsz. Dolendo, after Jan Cornelisz. van't Woudt (Woudanus)
Courtesy of Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam.

the Leiden hall was not unusual among seventeenth-century dissecting theatres. When the polymath Olof Rudbeck designed the first Swedish anatomy theatre in 1662, he modelled his tiered, circular amphitheatre on that of Leiden, his alma mater. But rather than simply hang a panorama of Uppsala, where his Gustavianum was located, Rudbeck adorned its walls with several large maps, including a double-hemisphere map of the world (see Figure 4.2).

C4.P4 What accounts for the presence of maps in theatres dedicated to exploring the interior of the human body and comparing it to other forms of God's creation? In what way was cartographic representation implicated in the pursuit of anatomical knowledge, and vice versa, in the early modern period? To the cursory extent that scholars have acknowledged the presence of maps in anatomy theatres, they have gestured towards



C4.F2 **Figure 4.2** 'Anatomiska teatern i Gustavianum' (Tab. 36, Fig. 136), in 'Atlas of Atlantica', a folio of illustrations accompanying Olof Rudbeck, *Atland eller Manheim* (*Atlantica*), Uppsala, 1679; drawing probably by Petrus Törnewall, engraving probably by Johann Christopher Höijer
Courtesy of Uppsala University Library.

civic pride, the theological and humanist interest in comparing the microcosm to the macrocosm, the role of overseas ventures in the provision of comparative specimens, and a common discourse of discovery—a trope capacious enough to encompass both the interior workings of the human organism and newly surveyed terrestrial and celestial worlds. While these attitudes and activities undoubtedly are salient, the premise of my essay is that the presence of maps in anatomy theatres gestures towards an even more consequential style of reasoning shared and developed by anatomy and cartography—an epistemological orientation that produced complex if indirect effects on knowledge and cognition, with far-reaching ramifications for the 'geography of embodiment' that would last well into modernity.

C4.S1

4.1. Body, Land, Map

C4.P5 To construct a genealogy of this epistemological orientation, we first need to ask: How is a body like a map? More particularly, how is the representation of the world, continents, and countries like that of a dissected cadaver? Accustomed as we are to disciplinary divisions between fields of scientific endeavour—not to mention a division between 'objective' science and the subjective arts of interpretation—a once-living body and a facsimile of the world may appear to have nothing in common. Nonetheless, if the analogy between corpse and map seems counter-intuitive or unseemly today, it was, as several scholars have noted, pervasive throughout the early modern period. As is clear from the frontispiece of Giulio Casseri's anatomy—where a globe, turned to display the continent of America, overlooks five anatomists posed around a dissected cadaver—the anatomical body alluded to an entirely new world (see figure 4.3).

C4.P6 Geographically charting the body was a commonly used rhetorical device in medical discourse. In modelling the structure of his planned anatomical treatise on Ptolemy, Leonardo da Vinci writes:

C4.P7 There will be revealed to you in fifteen entire figures the cosmography of this *minor mundo* in the same order as was used by Ptolemy before me in his *Cosmographia*. And therefore I shall divide the members of this body as he divided the whole world into provinces, and then I shall define the

C4.F3 **Figure 4.3** Giulio Casseri, *Anatomische tafeln Berdeütscher* (Frankfurt, 1656) Courtesy of National Library of Medicine.

> function of the parts in every direction, placing before your eyes the perception of the whole figure.[2]

C4.P8 Helkiah Crooke's best-selling *Mikrokosmographia: A Description of the Body of Man* (1615), deploys tropes of far-off continents, shores, and native

[2] Cited in Ayesha Ramachandran, *The Worldmakers: Global Imagining in Early Modern Europe* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015), 53.

inhabitants to indicate the broad extent of his investigations, as he describes his compendium as an 'Anatomicall Peregrination'.[3] So, too, Walter Charleton analogizes the parts of the body to the parts of the world:

C4.P9 > There are yet, alas! Terrae incognitae in the lesser world, as well as the greater, the Island of the Brain, the Isthmus of the Spleen, the streights of the Renes and…some other Glanduls, the North-East passage of the drink from the Stomach to the Kidnies, and many other things, remain to be further enquir'd into by us, and perhaps by posterity also.[4]

C4.P10 And Thomas Browne employs the analogy to measure the vast uncharted expanse of the human mind: 'We carry with us the wonders we seek without us; there is all Africa, and all her prodigies in us.'[5] The frontispiece of Rudbeck's *Atland eller Manheim* (*Atlantica)* visually exploits this analogy as his anatomist-geographer dissects a globe (see Figure 4.4).

C4.P11 So pervasive and enticing is the association of anatomy and cartography that a number of scholars and curators across disciplines have adopted it as their own. K. B. Roberts titled his exhibition catalogue of anatomical illustration *Maps of the Body*.[6] Emphasizing the problem of two-dimensionality in anatomical illustration, Andrea Carlino notes that 'Renaissance fugitive sheets constitute…one solution to the problem posed by the need to represent visually data which are intrinsically topographical: the body is a map.'[7] Jonathan Sawday treats the first burst of European anatomical activity before 1640 as a period of geographical discovery, noting the propensity of early anatomists to confer their names on the organs and structures they discovered—Eustachius the ear, Fallopius the female reproductive organs; Sawday compares them to 'the Columbian explorers' dotting 'their names, like place-names on a map, over the terrain they encountered'.[8] Michael Sappol shifts the focus of the analogy from the early moderns to the present day: 'Even if we haven't formally studied it, even if we don't know all the

[3] Cited in Michael Neill, *Issues of Death: Mortality and Identity in English Renaissance Tragedy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 129.

[4] Charleton, *Enquiries into Human Nature, in VI. Anatomic Praelections* (London: 1680), sig. E; quoted in Jonathan Sawday, *The Body Emblazoned: Dissection and the Human Body in Renaissance Culture* (London: Routledge, 1995), 28.

[5] Browne, *Religio Medici* (London, 1642), 26.

[6] Roberts, *Maps of the Body: Anatomical Illustration through Five Centuries* (St Johns: Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1981).

[7] Carlino, *Paper Bodies: A Catalogue of Anatomical Fugitive Sheets, 1538–1687*, trans. Noga Arikha (London: Wellcome Institute, 1999), 74.

[8] Sawday, *The Body Emblazoned*, 23.

C4.F4 **Figure 4.4** 'Olof Rudbeck d.ä. i kretsen av antika grekiska lärde', engraving by Dionysius Padt-Brugge, in Olof Rudbeck, *Atland eller Manheim* (*Atlantica*) (Uppsala, 1679)
Courtesy of Uppsala University Library.

details, we carry around with us an anatomical image of self, a pocket map that divides us into regions and territories, with internal place names and borders and topographical features.'[9]

C4.P12 Just as writers of medical treatises employed the language of cartography, cartographers exploited the idiom of anatomy. Observing this phenomenon in seventeenth-century atlases of 'exotic geography', Benjamin Schmidt argues that 'Dutch geography, in its relentless recourse to pictures and forms of mimetic representation, provided a visual spectacle as well as a lesson in observation, and it resembled in this way both the popular spectacle of the anatomy theatre and the graphic illustrations of the post-Vesalian anatomy book'.[10] It is not only the Dutch, however, who mined this association. In his text accompanying the map of the British Isles in his *Theatre of the Empire of Great Britaine* (1611), the cartographer John Speed maintains that 'we will (by example of best Anatomists) propose to the view the *whole Body*, and *Monarchie* intire…and after will dissect and lay open the particular Members, Veines, and Ioints (I mean the Shires, Riuers, Cities, and Townes) with such things as shal occurre most worthy our regard, and most behouefull for our vse'.[11] This conceit apparently was so apt that it was repeated, with more pointed political reference during this era of English attempts to subdue the Irish, by Sir John Davies in his commendatory poem prefacing Speed's *Theatre*: 'The faire *Hibernia* that Westerne Isle likewise, | In every *Member*, *Artire*, *Nerve*, and *Veine* | Thou by thine *Arte* dost so Anatomize, | That all may see each parcell without paine'.[12]

C4.P13 The analogies of dead and dissected bodies with maps and globes drew much of their energy from an even more pervasive set of associations among maps, globes, and living, breathing bodies. The trope of the breast as a globe was perennially popular, with Christopher Marlowe's 'Hero and Leander' showing how far the conceit could extend: 'For through the rising iv'ry mount he scal'd, | Which is with azure circling lines empal'd, | Much like a globe (a globe may I term this, | By which love sails to regions full of

[9] Sappol, *Dream Anatomy* (Bethesda, MD: US Department of Health and Human Services, 2006), 3–6.

[10] Schmidt, *Inventing Exoticism: Geography, Globalism, and Europe's Early Modern World* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), 86.

[11] John Speed, *Theatre of the Empire of Great Britaine* (London, 1612), 1; quoted in Christopher Ivic, 'Mapping British Identities: Speed's *Theatre of the Empire of Great Britaine*', in *British Identities and English Renaissance Literature*, ed. David J. Baker and Willy Maley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 135–55, 142.

[12] Speed, *Theatre of the Empire of Great Britaine*, ¶2; quoted in Ivic, 'Mapping British Identities', 145.

bliss)'.[13] An illustration from Charles Sorel's *Le berger extravagant* explicitly literalizes this analogy in order to satirize the bodily inventory of the poetic blazon (see Figure 4.5).

C4.P14 In Sorel's parody of pastoral fiction, a shepherd sings the praises of his beloved to a painter, who then allegedly paints this bizarre portrait—her breasts are globes, her eyes suns, and her cheeks flowers, while hearts dangle off hooks from her hair—to mock the shepherd's hyperbole. Mockery of women accompanies mockery of the cartographic impulse in a speech by Shakespeare's Dromio of Syracuse, who famously itemizes the body parts of Nell, the kitchen maid in *The Comedy of Errors*, anxiously noting that 'She is spherical, like a globe. I could find out countries in her.'[14] Dromio's geographical survey of Nell's body extends from the outer reaches of Western Europe (the 'uncivilized' bogs or 'buttucks' of Ireland) to the furthest part of the known world (the richly embellished jewelled nose of the Americas and the Indies), and then back again to the 'low' countries, the 'Netherlands', which mark the endpoint of his imaginative excursus (117–41). His cartographic abjection of Nell not incidentally crosshatches racial and ethnic discourses with those of gender and sexuality—a tropological practice continued in Shakespeare's *The Merry Wives of Windsor* when Falstaff imagines Mistress Page, whom he plans to seduce and fleece, as a foreign country waiting to be plundered: 'She is a region in Guiana, all gold and bounty.' Considering the attractions of Mistress Page alongside that of Mistress Ford, Falstaff vows, 'I will be cheaters to them both, and they shall be exchequers to me. They shall be my East and West Indies, and I will trade to them both' (1.3.59–61).

C4.P15 Such literary analogies were reinvigorated by the discourse of discovery reverberating throughout Western Europe, and thus in related essays and travel narratives that regularly deployed body–map analogies. Michel Montaigne often invoked the body of the world in his effort to spatialize the process of human self-discovery.[15] In the preface to the second edition of

[13] Marlowe, 'Hero and Leander', 2.273–6.

[14] William Shakespeare, *The Comedy of Errors*, in *The Norton Shakespeare*, ed. Stephen Greenblatt et al. (New York: Norton, 2016), 3.2.115–16. Subsequent references to Shakespeare's works are from this edition and cited parenthetically in the text. For an overview of Shakespeare's relationship to maps and globes, see Valerie Traub, 'Cartography', in *The Cambridge Guide to the Worlds of Shakespeare*, vol. 1, *Shakespeare's World, 1500–1600*, ed. Bruce R. Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 265–76.

[15] Ramachandran, *The Worldmakers*, chap. 2.

C4.F5 **Figure 4.5** Charles Sorel, *The Extravagant Shepherd, Or, the History of the Shepherd Lysis. An Anti-romance; Written originally in French, and Now Made English* (London, 1654). Translation of *Le berger extravagant* (Paris, 1628)
Courtesy of the Folger Shakespeare Library.

his *Principal Navigations* (1598), Richard Hakluyt describes his intention in bringing together various travel narratives:

C4.P16 > to gather . . . and as it were to incorporate into one body the torne and scattered limmes [limbs] of our ancient and late Navigations by Sea, our voyages by land, and traffiques of merchandise by both: and having (so much as in me lieth) restored ech particular member, being before displaced, to their true joynts and ligaments.[16]

C4.P17 Indeed, anatomical and cartographical compendiums were both described as atlases, and the visual idiom of the anatomical theatre of dissection was mimicked in the cartographical theatre of the world. Lest we think that this analogy operated solely as a metaphor, Francis Bacon, who deployed tropes of dissection and cartography in his polemic against the use of metaphor in science, makes clear that in the practice of the new science, he intends the link to be material: in an effort to convince readers of the need for mechanical instruments, he compares the profitable use of 'spheres, globes, astrolabes, maps' to 'the use of dead bodies for anatomies'.[17] Later in the century, the Danish anatomist-geologist Nicolaus Steno admonished that 'to tackle the physics of medicine without geometry is to sail over the ocean without compass'.[18]

C4.P18 Although mercantile and colonial ventures undoubtedly prompted an increase in such associations, their pedigree can be traced to a classical analogy between bodies and land. Beginning with the *Geography* of Strabo (*c.*64 BC–AD 21)—which compared procedures for bodily amputation to sectioning geography into proper parts[19]—this analogy gained prestige through Ptolemy's (*c.*AD 90–168) distinction between chorography (the narrative description of people and places) and geography (the schematic or graphic representation of space). Ptolemy described 'the task of Geography' as surveying 'the whole in its just proportion, as one would the entire head', whereas chorography provides a description of the parts 'as if one were to paint only the eye or the ear by itself'[20]—as is given graphic representation in Peter Apian's influential *Cosmographia* (see Figure 4.6).

[16] Hakluyt, 'A Preface to the Reader', in *The Principal Navigations* (London: 1598), 1: xxxix.

[17] Bacon, *The Advancement of Learning*, ed. G. W. Kitchen (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1915), 65.

[18] Cited in Nuria Valverde, 'Small Parts; Chrisóstomo Martínez (1638-1694), Bone Histology, and the Visual Making of Body Wholeness', *Isis* 100 (2009): 505–36; citation 527.

[19] Horace Leonard Jones, trans., *The Geography of Strabo*, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1917), 2.1.29–30, p. 315.

[20] Edward Luther Stevenson, trans. and ed., *Geography of Claudius Ptolemy* (New York: New York Public Library, 1932), 25–6.



C4.F6 **Figure 4.6** Peter Apian, *Cosmographia* (Landshut, 1539)
Courtesy of the Clements Library, University of Michigan.

C4.P19 The analogy between body and land informed the allegorical aims of the medieval *mappae mundi*, wherein Christ's body figures the circumference of the world, his head, hands, and feet marking the four cardinal directions, and the kingdom of heaven and earth encompassed within his bodily embrace.

C4.P20 In the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, anthropomorphic cartography became popular: Dutch and German engravings of 'Europa regina' as a female-shaped landmass literalized the classical personification ascribed to the continents,[21] while the body of the Apostle Paul displaced Christ on a map depicting the earthly conformation of Christendom.[22] Such applications of the body–land analogy to matters of territorial rule were employed not only for religious but political purposes, wherein the medieval association of the monarch's body with the body politic authorized the display of earthly power through cartographic tropes. Perhaps most familiar are images of Queen Elizabeth sitting in state on the title page of Christopher Saxton's *Atlas of England and Wales* (1579), standing atop Saxton's map of her realm in the Ditchley portrait, or resting her hand atop a globe in portraits that celebrate the defeat of the Spanish Armada.[23] Publishers found in such images a welcome imprimatur and marketing device well into the seventeenth century, as evinced by the image of King James and his son Charles posing in front of a scrolled map of Scotland and England on the title page of Samuel Purchas's collection of travel narratives (see Figure 4.7).

C4.P21 Motivated by a variety of goals, the analogies that drew together body, corpse, or monarch on the one hand, with map, land, or body politic on the other, traverse the discursive domains of literature and science, narratives of exploration and state portraiture, and religious and political representation; they run the tonal spectrum from coarse comedy to regal gravity.

C4.P22 The utility and influence of these analogies, however, were not limited to the imperatives of science, religion, gender ideologies, nation building, or empire—at least, not as narrowly construed. To better comprehend the extent of their epistemological efficacy, we need to trace how the discursive relationship between anatomy and cartography morphed from an analogical into an interactive one. And to do this, we must situate anatomy and

[21] 'Europa regina' (*Europa in forma virginis*), after Johan Putsch, is analysed by Rhonda Lemke Sanford, *Maps and Memory in Early Modern England: A Sense of Place* (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 53–74.

[22] 'Pauluskarte' or 'Aspice Pauliani Pauli sub imagene gente', from an atlas of the archbishopric of Cologne, Johannes Michael Gigas (a.k.a. Riese), *Prodromus geographicus* (Cologne, 1620).

[23] 'Ditchley' portrait, Marcus Gheeraerts the Younger, *c.*1592, National Portrait Gallery, London; 'Armada' Portrait, George Gower, *c.*1588, Woburn Abby.

C4.F7 **Figure 4.7** Samuel Purchas, *Hakluytus Posthumus or Purchas His Pilgrimes* (London, 1625)

Courtesy of the Clements Library, University of Michigan.

cartography within the material conditions that defined them as 'modern' discourses of discovery. Different as they were in their intended purposes and modes of production, both anatomy and cartography were committed to empirical tools of investigation and a new 'science of describing'.[24] Both were particularly intent upon parsing relations of part to whole. Both relied on the expertise of draftsmen and engravers as well as a burgeoning publishing industry to translate their investigations into print, and both profited from the shift of knowledge production from Italy to the Netherlands around the turn of the century. Woodblock and copperplate engraving, in particular, enabled anatomists and cartographers not only to disseminate their images to an avid consumer market across Western Europe, but also to exploit print technology as a powerful tool for cognition and argumentation.[25] It is to this conceptual process—which enabled a new epistemology—that I now turn.

C4.S2

4.2. Anatomy Lessons

C4.P23 This conceptual process begins not with Andreas Vesalius (1514–64), the author of *De humani corporis fabrica* and generally thought of as the progenitor of modern anatomy,[26] but with a series of anatomical figures prepared by his contemporary, Bartholomaeus Eustachius, with assistance from Pier Matteo Pini. The forty-seven plates produced by Eustachius and Pini and etched by Giulio de Musi were completed by 1552, but most of them were not published until 1714.[27] Each of their figures is placed within

[24] Brian W. Ogilvie, *The Science of Describing: Natural History in Renaissance Europe* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006).

[25] See Susan Dackerman, ed., *Prints and the Pursuit of Knowledge in Early Modern Europe* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011); and Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, *Objectivity* (New York: Zone Books, 2007).

[26] For my purposes, 'modern' anatomy refers to a practice that is based on the dissection of human (rather than animal) cadavers; privileges direct observation; is pursued for investigative rather than merely didactic purposes; and depends decisively on the contributions of visual images to research and pedagogy. It does not imply a particular position regarding Galenism, nor necessitate a physician/professor (rather than barber-surgeon or artist) performing the dissection. For continuities between ancient, medieval, and early modern attitudes and procedures, as well as the temporal lag in changes in institutional practices, see Andrea Carlino, *Books of the Body: Anatomical Ritual and Renaissance Learning*, trans. John Tedeschi and Anne C. Tedeschi (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999); for the importance of visual culture, see Carlino's *Paper Bodies*.

[27] The first eight plates (of the kidneys and renal circulation) were published in Bartholomaeus Eustachius's *Opuscula anatomica* (Venice, 1563/4). In the eighteenth century,

an empty rectangular frame, the edges of which are marked off in measurements of five degrees (see Figures 4.8–4.10). These scales of measurement or 'rules' are used within the written text to indicate the location of body parts, providing, in the manner of a grid, 'coordinates (latitude and longitude) for locating details in the illustrations'.[28]

C4.P24 Immediately popular upon their publication, these human figures were reproduced both with and without their gridded borders throughout the eighteenth century. Other anatomists adopted the grid-plate convention for their own anatomical studies, although this method was eventually superseded by alternative modes of integrating captions into anatomical engravings. Despite their delayed publication, Eustachius's gridded plates, I suggest, hold a graphic key to the conceptual logic governing early modern anatomical illustration.

C4.P25 The project of anatomy involves, first, the dismemberment of a cadaver—an action that Renaissance anatomists described as 'lifting the veil of nature'—and then the corpse's imagined recomposition through retrospective visual schematization and the production of plates that serially parse discrete body parts (the bones, the muscles, the organs, the veins) into systems. But anatomy was also dedicated to depicting *the* human body, in all of its singular and optimal typicality. By recomposing a *representative* body, anatomical illustration sought to provide an abstract standard against which to measure all others. As Vesalius wrote in his *Fabrica*: 'It is desirable that the body employed for public dissection be as intermediate in nature as possible according to its sex and of medium age, so that you may compare other bodies to it, as if to the statue of Policleus.'[29] Referring to Polykleitos, the antique sculptor who developed a canon of human proportions, Vesalius proposed as the purpose of anatomy the humanist revelation of an ideal measure, and his widely noted use of antique statuary for anatomical models is a logical result of this aim (see Figure 4.11).

the remaining thirty-nine plates were rediscovered; all forty-seven were published by Giovanni Maria Lancisi as the *Tabulae anatomicae clarissimi viri Bartholomaei Eustachii* (Rome, 1714).

[28] Rumy Hilloowala, *The Anatomical Waxes of La Specola* (Florence: Arnaud, 1995), 17. Roberts also employs this cartographic analogy in *Maps of the Body*, 46.

[29] 'Corpus itaque publicae sectioni adhiberi convenit, in suo sexu quam temperatissimum, et aetatis mediae, ut ad hoc tanquam ad Policleti statua alia corpora possis coferre'. Andreas Vesalius, *De humani corporis fabrica libri septem* (Basel: 1543). The translation is taken from the excerpts published as an appendix to C. D. O'Malley, *Andreas Vesalius of Brussels, 1514–1564* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), 343, with my modification of the translation of 'quam temperatissimum' from *normal* to the less anachronistic *intermediate in nature*. I thank Cathy Sanok and Basil Duffalo for help with the Latin.



C4.F8 **Figure 4.8** Bartholomaeus Eustachius, Tabulae XXV, *Tabulae anatomicae clarissimi viri Bartholomaei Eustachii quas est tenebris tandem vindicates*, originally engraved in 1552 with assistance from Pier Matteo Pini and engraver Giulio de Musi; published by Giovanni Lancisi (Rome, 1714) as *Tabulae anatomicae clarissimi*
Courtesy of the Folger Shakespeare Library.



C4.F9 **Figure 4.9** Bartholomaeus Eustachius, Tabulae XX, *Tabulae anatomicae clarissimi viri Bartholomaei Eustachii quas est tenebris tandem vindicates*, originally engraved in 1552 with assistance from Pier Matteo Pini and engraver Giulio de Musi; published by Giovanni Lancisi (Rome, 1714) as *Tabulae anatomicae clarissimi*
Courtesy of the Folger Shakespeare Library.



C4.F10 **Figure 4.10** Bartholomaeus Eustachius, Tabulae XXX, *Tabulae anatomicae clarissimi viri Bartholomaei Eustachii quas est tenebris tandem vindicates*, originally engraved in 1552 with assistance from Pier Matteo Pini and engraver Giulio de Musi; published by Giovanni Lancisi (Rome, 1714) as *Tabulae anatomicae clarissimi*
Courtesy of the Folger Shakespeare Library.



C4.F11 **Figure 4.11** Andreas Vesalius, 'Vigesima quinta quinti libri figura', *De humani corporis fabrica* (Basel: 1543/55); engraving
Courtesy of the Eskind Biomedical Library, Vanderbilt University Medical Center.

C4.P26 Thus, while anatomists recognized in the corpses they dissected considerable variations due to age, size, gender, ethnicity, dietary habits, and bodily infirmity, they negotiated the tension between the untidiness of a dissected corpse and the desire for an ideal type by composing, in the words of medical historian Nancy G. Sirasi, 'a generalised human body, essentially uniform in its fundamental framework'.[30] Whether as a so-called 'muscle-man' surrounded by a minimalist antique landscape or reduced to a broken piece of classical statuary, the corporeal schema codified by Vesalius is fantastically devoid of disease, irregularity, morbidity, or the marks made on the flesh through the processes of living, labour, and dying (see Figure 4.12).

C4.P27 Despite the different aesthetic styles pursued by early modern anatomists, their depictions all aim to create not only a uniform model but a serviceable ratio, a standard for comparison. For all their empirical attention to detail, anatomical illustrations necessarily privilege abstraction over context, general applicability over particularity. In tension with whatever degree of specificity comes to the fore in the actual practice of dissection or instruction, as a baseline conceit, an investment in universal applicability governs the epistemology of anatomical illustration.

C4.P28 The commitment to a graphic schema of abstraction, uniformity, and generality is a first-level ordering of anatomy's goal. We can adduce an additional, second-level ordering if we turn our gaze from the interior depths of the body to its exterior surface. Many, if not most, early modern anatomical treatises include depictions of human surface anatomy. The wildly popular 'fugitive' anatomical sheets, intended for a vernacular audience, that hit the Italian and German markets in 1538 and then spread to Flanders, France, Italy, and England by the 1550s,[31] likewise represent the frontal surface of the body; it is only by lifting a flap on their nude male and female pairs that the interior is exposed. The primary graphic strategy of these illustrations' second-level ordering is to isolate a figure, typically posed against a minimalist or blank background, either seated, as was common for flap anatomies, or standing, as was given canonical shape in Vesalius's depictions of anterior surface anatomy published in his *Epitome*, a twelve-page synthesis of his *Fabrica* dominated by visual images (see Figure 4.13).

C4.P29 Vesalius's male *memento mori* and his female Venus *pudica* were immediately and continuously pirated; as early as 1545, they were united in Thomas

[30] Sirasi, 'Vesalius and Human Diversity in *De humani corporis fabrica*', *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 57 (1994): 60–88, 62.

[31] Carlino, *Paper Bodies*.



C4.F12 **Figure 4.12** Andreas Vesalius, 'Secundo musculo', *De humani corporis fabrica* (Basel: 1543/55); engraving
Courtesy of the Alfred Taubman Medical Library, University of Michigan.



C4.F13 **Figure 4.13** Andreas Vesalius, *De Humani Corporis Fabrica Epitome* (Basel, 1543); engraving
Courtesy of the Alfred Taubman Medical Library, University of Michigan

Geminus's English *Anatomie*, with the skull of the original image supplemented with a serpent and apple, signifiers of the Fall. Almost upon their first appearance, such surface figures were associated with 'Adam' and 'Eve', and their religious iconography persisted until the late seventeenth century.[32]

C4.P30 Despite the undoubted popularity of 'Adam' and 'Eve' in their own time, contemporary scholars tend to read past them in their haste to get to the more dramatic, visceral matter of dissection.[33] Given the allegedly

[32] Mimi Cazort, 'Eve's Anatomy', *Descant: The Anatomy Theatre and the Theatre of the Body 103* 29, no. 4 (1998): 63–83.
[33] Carlino's *Paper Bodies* is an important exception.

controversial nature of the practice of dissection in the early modern period (both institutionalized and extra-institutional), it is understandable that scholars have focused on penetration of the bodily *interior*: on fragmented torsos with their guts spilling out and disturbing tropes of stripping and flaying. Particularly because Renaissance anatomy often depicts exquisitely animated corpses, analyses of early modern anatomy tend to privilege a conceptual rubric implicitly organized by considerations of depth, volume, boundary, and interiority.[34] I would suggest, however, that the epistemological purview of anatomical representation extends outward as well as inward. Reading anatomical plates through a principle of surface and formal placement rather than depth, we can apprehend that anatomical representation is as much about spatial relations of scale, point of view, perspective, proportion, and the relation of foreground to background as it is about piercing, penetrating, stripping, and unveiling.

C4.P31 From the beginnings of modern anatomy, illustrators revealed a commitment to representing both surface and dissected views. Jacopo Berengario da Carpi's images of generic man in anterior, posterior, and lateral positions rendered visually explicit the importance of conveying multiple perspectives (see Figure 4.14).[35]

C4.P32 As anatomical illustrations became more complex, anterior, posterior, and lateral perspectives were combined, as in Crisóstomo Martínez's (initially unpublished) plates from the late seventeenth century, the culmination of which is a depiction of muscles combined with proportional studies and perspectival diagrams (hence the concentric circles—see Figure 4.15).

C4.P33 Taking our cue from Eustachius, we can see that the graphic representation of the anatomical body depends implicitly, if in most cases invisibly, on a conceptual grid.[36] By *grid*, I mean a spatial system of measured

[34] Ludwig Choulant, *History and Bibliography of Anatomic Illustration in Its Relation to Anatomic Science and the Graphic Arts* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1920); Huisman, *The Finger of God*; Carlino, *Books of the Body*; Sawday, *The Body Emblazoned*; Richard Sugg, *Murder After Death: Literature and Anatomy in Early Modern England* (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 2007); and David Hillman, 'Visceral Knowledge', in *The Body in Parts: Fantasies of Corporeality in Early Modern Europe*, ed. Carla Mazzio and David Hillman (New York: Routledge), 81–105.

[35] Mimi Cazort, Monique Kornell, and K. B. Roberts, eds, *The Ingenious Machine of Nature: Four Centuries of Art and Anatomy* (Ottawa: National Gallery of Canada, 1996) observe that 'the rotational or multiple point of view became, after Leonardo, a standard technique for maximizing information in anatomical illustrations' (24).

[36] It is precisely to defend Vesalian anatomy from this grid-like quality that K. B. Roberts and J. D. W. Tomlinson, in *The Fabric of the Body: European Traditions of Anatomical*



C4.F14 **Figure 4.14** Jacopo Berengario da Carpi, *Isagoge Breves* (Bologna, 1522/3)
Courtesy of the National Library of Medicine, Washington, DC.

coordinates or graticules—a formal, blank, lateral system of signification upon which the body can be imaginatively laid out and cognitively processed. In some instances, the anatomical grid was explicitly material. For instance, some editions of Eustachius apparently came equipped with a ruler attached by a string (see Figure 4.16).

C4.P34 Martínez's mycological and proportional study (Figure 4.15) foregrounded its reliance on gridded scales. Other anatomists have left traces of their dependence on grids. To produce one of the most influential anatomical atlases of the eighteenth century, anatomist Bernard Siegfried Albinus and artist Jan Wandelaar placed two successively smaller string grids or 'diopters' at intervals between the artist and the dissected specimen to enable the copying of organs, veins, and musculature through the resulting mesh.[37] Suggested by Albinus's Leiden colleague, the natural philosopher

Illustration (Oxford, 1992), discount the republished plates of Eustachius as '*maps* of human anatomy, not representations from a single viewpoint' (191). In *Murder After Death*, Sugg concurs with this view, and errors in suggesting that this quality of mapping, which he refers to as 'rigid' and 'abstract', is a post-Vesalian phenomenon (10).

[37] Tim Huisman, 'Squares and Diopters: The Drawing System of a Famous Anatomical Atlas', *Tractrix: Yearbook for the History of Science, Medicine, Technology and Mathematics*, no. 4 (1992): 1–11.



C4.F15 **Figure 4.15** Crisóstomo Martínez, Plate XIX, 'Myological and Proportional Studies' (Paris, originally engraved *c.*1687–9; published 1792)
Courtesy of Archivo Histórico Municipal, Valencia.

Willem 's Gravesande,[38] the team's technical recourse to 'gridwork' is a striking attribute of Wandelaar's original drawings (see Figure 4.17).

C4.P35 The fact that in 1744 Albinus and Wandelaar published an edition of Eustachius's plates, both with the original grids and with matching outline plates with letters of their own design, may account for their adoption of his technique.

[38] Daston and Galison, *Objectivity*, 73.



C4.F16 **Figure 4.16** Bartholomaeus Eustachius, *Opuscula anatomica*, 2nd ed. (Leiden, 1707)
Photo courtesy of Roger Gaskell.



C4.F17 **Figure 4.17** Jan Wandelaar, 'Male Skeleton in a Landscape, Front View', *c.*1726, study for Bernard Siegfried Albinus, *Tabulae sceletet musculorum corporis humani* (Leiden, 1747)
Courtesy of Leiden University Library.

C4.P36 The function of grids in artistic production has most often been addressed as a self-evident aid in drawing or in terms of their theoretical contribution to understandings of vision and perspective.[39] In shifting the analytic focus to the grid's epistemological function, I suggest that the spatial infrastructure of gridding (accompanied by the consistent use of scale, stable orientation, multiple points of view, minimal backgrounds, and strategies for labelling body parts) enables any given anatomical specimen to be conceptualized as a *representative* body: one whose individuality, particularity, and difference, while sometimes present in facial expression and modes of animation, are subordinated to the fiction of a universal standard of embodiment. It is by means of a spatial infrastructure that enables

[39] Lyle Massey, *Picturing Space, Displacing Bodies: Anamorphosis in Early Modern Theories of Perspective* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007).

abstraction that anatomical investigation creates a representative human with whom all other humans can be compared.

C4.S3

4.3. Voyage Illustrations and Costume Books

C4.P37 The visual conventions of anatomical illustrations seem to have influenced the graphic strategies of early modern cartographers who, for a variety of motives, included human figures on their maps.[40] The impact of anatomy made itself felt, however, not directly, but through the mediating influence of both costume books and voyage illustrations, which themselves were informed by natural history drawing.[41] When personnel involved in mercantile trade, expeditions of discovery, diplomatic missions, or colonial settlement recorded their impressions of foreign territory, they were tasked to include information about plants, animals, inhabitants, and cultural practices. Because accurate, detailed description was crucial to commerce, diplomacy, and colonialism, affecting the prospects of future investment by stockholders and the state, naturalists and artists often accompanied sailors and soldiers on their journeys. In 1582, for example, the draftsman Thomas Bavin was instructed to 'Drawe the figures and shapes of men and women in their apparel as also of their manner of wepons in every place as you shall find them differing', prior to his aborted expedition to America.[42]

C4.P38 John White is perhaps the most famous artist-naturalist to provide images of indigenous peoples. While serving as governor of Roanoke, he merged in his watercolours the spatial conventions of anatomy with those of natural history drawing: the use of consistent scale, stable orientation, and the isolation of a single or double 'specimen' in a static pose against a relatively blank background (see Figure 4.18). Many such illustrations depict

[40] For more on cartographers' use of human figures, see Traub, 'Cartography'; and 'Mapping the Global Body', in *Early Modern Visual Culture: Representation, Race, and Empire in Renaissance England*, ed. Peter Erickson and Clark Hulse (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000), 44–97. In an analysis compatible with mine, Ramachandran, *The Worldmakers*, argues that '[t]he gradual transition from the cosmography to the atlas marks the shift from an accumulative, compendious style of structuring global knowledge to an analytical, anatomizing style that sought to reveal the ideal form of the whole' (53).

[41] Limitations of space prevent discussion of the impact of these genres on cartographic representation, but are discussed in my work-in-progress. Paula Findlen, 'Anatomy Theaters, Botanical Gardens, and Natural History Collections', in *The Cambridge History of Science,* vol. 3, *Early Modern Science*, ed. Katharine Park and Lorraine Daston (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 272–89, correlates the rise of these three modes of knowledge production.

[42] Quoted in Karen Ordahl Kupperman, *Indians and English: Facing Off in Early America* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), 43.

C4.F18 **Figure 4.18** John White, watercolour, 'A Chiefe Herowan', Virginia, *c*.1585
Courtesy of the British Museum.

native peoples as self-demonstrating subjects who, seemingly complicit with their own exhibition, offer their bodies for view in a manner subtly reminiscent of Vesalian 'musclemen'.

C4.P39 The uptake of such images for printed compendiums of travel narratives was immediate. For his best-selling *Grand Voyages* (1590–1634), Theodor de Bry's publishing workshop maximized the potential of White's watercolours by rotating the specimen to create a doubled point of view, positioning

C4.F19 **Figure 4.19** Theodore de Bry, 'A cheiff Lorde of Roanoac', *India occidentalis*, *Grande Voyages*, vol. 1 (Frankfort, 1590)
Courtesy of the Clements Library, University of Michigan.

it in front of a relatively unencumbered landscape, and supplementing the visual information with a textual caption (see Figure 4.19).[43]

C4.P40 Appearing to float in space and time, such figures are often located and identified only by the legends and captions that proclaim their representative status. Although details of costume and weaponry highlight their subjects' unique physical characteristics, such engravings do so in order to render them representative of a larger corporate body: a tribe, a nation, a people. In presenting the native subject as a standard type, these illustrations and the engravings based on them translate European colonists' experiences of human diversity into an orderly, systematized uniformity. At the same time, specificity and individuality are subsumed by the same appeal to representativeness that subtends anatomy.

[43] For comparisons of de Bry's engravings to White's originals, see Paul Hulton and David Beers Quinn, *The American Drawings of John White 1577–1590* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964).

C4.P41 Not all of the images that made their way onto maps were drawn from life; indeed, many illustrations were based loosely on interpretations of narratives in travel journals or expedition logs.[44] Furthermore, many images that appear on maps initially appeared as plates depicting fashions in vernacular costume books, which, like cartography, capitalized on a market eager for images of both the local and the 'exotic'.[45] Indeed, the origins, appropriations, and circulations of such images within the proliferating world of print, where piracy was an everyday occurrence, are enormously complex. But whether deriving in the first instance from those interested in fashion or exploration, whether drawn from life or from text, whether reasonably accurate or a product of fantasy, these illustrations were united in their commitment to a particular presentational idiom that invites comparison and contrast. It is this visual idiom, I suggest, that informs the spatialization of human figures—many of them the very same figures—when they are resituated on maps.

C4.S4

4.4. Ethnographic Maps

C4.P42 Along with the increased publication of natural history illustration and costume books, the late sixteenth century witnessed a phenomenal increase in the production of maps and atlases throughout Western Europe. Prompted by new geographical 'discoveries', new technologies for surveying the land, new mathematical formulas for rendering the curvature of the earth in two-dimensional space, and new commercial and colonial opportunities, the boom in the map trade was of an order of which publishers of anatomy treatises could only dream.[46] Whether in the form of survey maps of local

[44] See Schmidt, *Inventing Exoticism*.

[45] Abraham de Bruyn's *Omnium pene Europae, Asiae, Aphricae atque Americae gentium habitus* (1577) and Cesare Vecellio's *Habiti antichi et moderni di tutto il mondo* (1590) were particularly influential sources of cartographic figures.

[46] Because of the prohibitive expense of an illustrated folio anatomical atlas, medical students could not afford them; to aid memorization and surgery, students and barbers typically took recourse in Latin or vernacular fugitive anatomical sheets. The commercial success of such flap anatomies provides an apt comparison to maps, which typically were produced as single, affordable sheets before they were assembled into atlases. Despite their expense, however, by the 1630s atlases 'had become commonplace among the upper middle class' (Cornelis Koeman, Günter Schilder, Marco van Egmond, and Peter van der Krogt, 'Commercial Cartography and Map Production in the Low Countries, 1500–ca. 1672', in *The History of*

provinces; city maps detailing military fortifications; maps of nations, kingdoms, and empires; or maps of continents and the entire known world, accurate geographical information was avidly sought and just as avidly consumed. Whereas mapping the topography and coastlines of Europe, Asia, and Africa had long been a project of European cartographers, and trade, especially with the East, had motivated the creation of some extremely important maps, the exploration and colonization of the Americas provided an unprecedented economic and political impetus to the enterprise of mapping the entire globe. Augmenting the manuscript portolan maps still used for navigation, printed maps circulated in a variety of forms, from relatively cheap single sheets and pocket-size itineraries to costly wall maps and collections of folio atlases. As the hub of map production shifted from Italy, Spain, Portugal, France, and Germany to the thriving ports of Antwerp and then Amsterdam, publishers benefited from the talents of artists of the Dutch 'golden age' to frame, augment, animate, and decorate their maps' prefatory, geographical, and navigational information.

C4.P43 And they did so, often, by means of human figures. Whereas many maps in this period contain no human figures (or include only mythological or monarchical figures), ethnographic images of the world's peoples became one of the primary ways that cartographers ornamented their atlas title pages as well as their country, continent, and world maps. Drawing on the classical tradition of allegorizing the continents, atlas title pages were often populated with four to six personifications identified by their clothing and so-called 'attributes', including flora and fauna. First offered by Abraham Ortelius in 1570 and thereafter imitated by Matthias Quad, Jodocus Hondius, Jan Janszoon, Willem Blaeu, and Matthäus Merian, such images became standard issue throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Most importantly for my purposes, they set the stage for what would come to be called the *cartes à figures*, or maps with figures.

C4.P44 In 1594, Petrus Plancius, soon to be appointed official cartographer of the Dutch East India Company, issued a double-hemisphere world map whose interstices were filled with continental personifications (see Figure 4.20).

C4.P45 Whether on title pages or on world or continent maps, such personifications and their iconographic 'attributes' conspicuously index, from a

Cartography, vol. 3, *Cartography in the European Renaissance*, ed. David Woodward (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), part 2, 1296–383, 1328).

C4.F20 **Figure 4.20** Petrus Plancius, 'Orbis Terrarum Typus de Integro Multi in Locis Emendatus' (Amsterdam, 1594), engravings by Jan van Doetechum the younger
Courtesy of the Clements Library, University of Michigan.

Western European perspective, commodities to be traded and resources to be exploited. With their often-times obvious ideological juxtapositions and hierarchies (generally conveyed through contrasts of sumptuousness and nudity), these are the images that have understandably generated attention in scholarship on early modern race, colonialism, exoticism, and ethnocentric 'othering'.[47]

C4.P46 Such symbolic personifications exist in complex relation to the more 'realistic' representations that also began to circulate in the final years of the sixteenth century—thus raising the stakes on how the relationship between allegory and ethnography is historically represented and understood.

C4.P47 The idea for including representations of the regional populace originated on a map of England by Jodocus Hondius. While in exile in London

[47] Although cartography was deeply implicated in the ongoing colonial and imperial violence of early modernity, the hierarchies represented on atlas title pages and maps are sometimes more dynamic, mobile, and ideologically incoherent than is generally assumed. My work-in-progress explores the changing relationship between allegorical personification and ethnographic personation, particularly in terms of race.

from the war raging in the Netherlands, Hondius produced a map of his adopted home adorned with a portrait of Queen Elizabeth, a nobleman, his wife, a London citizen, and his wife (see Figure 4.21).

C4.P48 Hondius carried on with a similarly ornamented map of the Low Countries, probably published in 1590, and a map of France released in 1591. Upon returning to Amsterdam, Hondius and his brother-in-law, Pieter van den Keere, issued in 1595 a wall map of Europe on fifteen sheets decorated with ethnographic borders.[48] The interest sparked by the *cartes à figures* set off a wave of competition, spearheaded by Willem Blaeu, the official cartographer to the Dutch East India Company, who added ethnographic borders to a wall map of the world (see Figure 4.22), and the four continent maps he ultimately collected for his best-selling atlas, *Theatre du monde* (see Figure 4.23).

C4.P49 In 1611 John Speed followed the Flemish and the Dutch, using Hondius's format not only for his *Theatre of the Empire of Great Britain,* but also for his subsequent global atlas, *Prospect of the Most Famous Parts of the World*, whose continent and nation maps included borders depicting indigenous inhabitants (see Figures 4.24 and 4.25).

C4.P50 The uptake of this idiom to the western edges of Europe is attested by the fact that in 1619 Peter Aretin of Ehrenfeld included on his map of Bohemia borders of costumed figures engraved by Paul Bayard (see Figure 4.26).

C4.P51 Lest the presence of ethnographic detail be thought to preclude cartographic import, Hondius's 'Typus Angliae' was used for barter with the indigenous inhabitants on Novaya Zemlya in 1596,[49] while Aretin's 'Bohemia', celebrated as the first map to politically divide Bohemia into fifteen regions, was, in its second edition of 1623, used for military purposes during the Thirty Years' War.[50]

C4.P52 From the beginning until the latter half of the seventeenth century, continent, national, and regional printed maps favoured three graphic strategies to depict ethnographic information. First, cartographers often presented self-contained vignettes of human figures gesturing, walking, or

[48] Günter Schilder, 'Jodocus Hondius, Creator of the Decorative Map Border', *Map Collector* 32 (1985): 40–3.

[49] Schilder, 'Jodocus Hondius', 40.

[50] The first two editions of Aretin's map (1619 and 1623) included figures engraved by Paul Bayard, but without captions; the third edition, engraved by Daniel Vusín in 1665, added the captions seen here.



C4.F21 **Figure 4.21** Jodocus Hondius, 'Typus Angliae' (London, 1590)
Courtesy of the British Museum.

C4.F22 **Figure 4.22** Willem Blaeu, 'Nova Universi Terrarum Orbis Mappa' (Amsterdam, 1605/24), borders engraved by Jodocus Hondius. Published in Günter Schilder, *The World Map of 1624* (Amsterdam: Nico Israel, 1997)
Courtesy of the Clements Library, University of Michigan.



C4.F23 **Figure 4.23** Willem Blaeu, 'Asiae', *Le Theatre du Monde* (Amsterdam, 1617 single sheet, 1635 atlas), engraved by Jodocus Hondius
Courtesy of the Clements Library, University of Michigan.

gazing over a landscape or cityscape (often presented in a bird's-eye view), or placed in more elaborate 'scenes' inside or around informational cartouches. While such images are loosely related to the impulse to provide ethnographic information, their primary conceptual purpose is to imply that a landscape is populated and to provide a perspective with which the viewer is invited to identify: the staged figures personify the power to see and comprehend.

C4.P53 Far more consequential in epistemological terms is the second strategy, whereby human figures are arrayed along marginal borders that organize them systematically according to the different territories they inhabit. Using native costume to reflect their view of indigenous custom, the illustrators of *cartes à figures* territorialize their figures by explicitly linking habitat to *habit*—a term which itself synthesizes the closely related concepts, *costume* and *custom*, *manners* and *morals*. Despite the fact that clothes can be taken on and off, employed to disguise as much as to reveal identity, they carry



C4.F24 **Figure 4.24** John Speed, 'The Kingdome of England', *Theatre of the Empire of Great Britain* (London, 1611), engraved by Jodocus Hondius
Courtesy of the Clements Library, University of Michigan.



C4.F25 **Figure 4.25** John Speed, 'Africae', *A Prospect of the Most Famous Parts of the World* (London, 1627/31), engraved by Jodocus Hondius
Courtesy of the Clements Library, University of Michigan.

C4.F26 **Figure 4.26** Peter Aretin, 'Regni Bohemiae nova et exacta description', engraved without captions by Paul Bayard, 1619/23; re-engraved by Daniel Vusín, 1665, with captions
Courtesy of the National Archives, Prague.

most of the burden of regional specificity in a complex semiosis of gender, religion, race, nation, and social status.

C4.P54 The margins of European continent maps tend to depict the relatively well-to-do, whereby a prosperous populace stands in for the nations of Europe as a whole. Figures on European country maps, in contrast, tend to either segment the nation or kingdom according to status hierarchy, with a vertical plotting of rulers or aristocrats, gentlemen and ladies, merchants, lawyers and city wives, and peasants or rustics (see Figure 4.24), or to segment according to different ethnic groups. Maps of non-European space, whether of continents or countries, follow that latter strategy, generally categorize people according to tribe, nation, religion, or ethnicity (see Figures 4.23 and 4.25). Clothing, physical gesture, and skin shading



C4.F27 **Figure 4.27** Gerard de Jode, 'Nova Totius Europa Tabula', *Speculum Orbis Terrarum* (Antwerp, 1578/93)
Courtesy of the Clements Library, University of Michigan.

(or vibrant colour on hand-coloured maps), often augmented by captions, distinguish European and Asian from American and African, as well as the putatively more 'civilized' North Africans from their southern counterparts.

C4.P55 Map margins and cartouches were not the only repositories of ethnographic representation, however. Over a decade before Plancius filled the interstices of his double-hemisphere world map with allegorical personifications, Gerard de Jode had introduced the ethnographic inset for his atlas, *Speculum Orbis Terrarum* (see Figure 4.27).

C4.P56 De Jode's floating inset design was picked up by Speed for his *Theatre*. Whereas Speed's borders for the 'Kingdom of England' (Figure 4.24) work by status differentiation, his inset for Ireland adds a scale of civility and barbarism with its captions for the 'noble', 'civill', and 'wilde' Irish. The French mapmaker Samuel de Champlain likewise used the ethnographic insert in 1612 for his influential map of the New France (see Figure 4.28).



C4.F28

Figure 4.28 Samuel de Champlain, 'Les Voyages de la Novvelle France Occidentale' (Paris, 1612)
Courtesy of the Newberry Library, Chicago.

C4.S5

4.5. The Logic of the Grid

C4.P57 The cartographic logic of the geometric grid, implicit since Ptolemy's map of the world and made newly practical by Mercator's projection,[51] formally motivated mapmakers' placement of bodies in space. Generally more explicit than the anatomical grid, the cartographic grid was formalized in converging lines of latitude and longitude, each portion of space signifying a difference in degree. By imposing a geometrical mesh over the earth's surface, the cartographic grid provided an inviting infrastructure upon which bodily inhabitation and habit could be inscribed. Although the regular graticules of the map aim to locate inanimate spatial volumes—rivers, hills, coastlines, towns—the treatment of bodies on maps from the 1590s up to the 1670s suggests that humans, as well, become subject to the logic of the grid. Pushed into insets or lined up on the margins, Muscovites and Moors, Turks and Floridians are abstracted from topography and plotted along homogeneous rectilinear axes that not only identify, organize, and categorize them as objects of knowledge, but, through slight variations within a repetitive scheme, implicitly offer them up for comparative viewing. Crucial to the effects of human representation on maps, then, is not only the specification of nation, ethnicity, race, gender, and status—the map's ethnographic *content*—but the extent to which bodies become subject to the logic of the grid.

C4.P58 The logic of the grid depends on a particular manner of partitioning space intent on effecting syntactical relations between parts and wholes. Depending on prior, invisible acts of description, collation, compression, and aggregation, *cartes à figures* tend to relate part to whole by means of visual metonymy. Metonymy is a figure of speech in which a concept or object is referred to by the name of something closely associated with or contiguous to it. A particular type of metonymy, that of synecdoche, prevails over these map formats. In synecdoche, a property of an object—for instance, an image of an Amerindian—substitutes for a larger entity of which it is a part, such as the continents of America (see Figure 4.29).

[51] In 1569 the Dutch theologian-astronomer Gerard Mercator published *Nova et aucta orbis terrae descriptio ad usum navigatium emendate accommodata* [*A New and Enlarged Description of the Earth with Corrections for Use in Navigation*], the projection of which flattened the earth onto a plane surface by opening up the poles and straightening the lines of latitude and longitude into a rectilinear grid. Because his is a cylindrical projection, continental proportions are dramatically misrepresented.

C4.F29 **Figure 4.29** Justus Danckerts, 'Novissima Americae Tabula' (Amsterdam, 1682)
Courtesy of the Bayerische StaatsBibliothek Munich.

C4.P59 In addition to synecdoche, the metonymic relation of parts to wholes is advanced by deploying relations of adjacency, contiguity, or parataxis—as when 'The Spaniard' is placed close to 'The French' to convey 'Europe', or 'The Egyptian' is placed above 'The Abyssinian' to convey 'Africa' (see Figure 4.22). Parataxis pulls people closer together, whether they are implied geographical 'neighbours' situated side by side or in apparent need of reunification, as happens with husbands and wives positioned on opposite margins. Through their use of these rhetorical schemes, these maps enable a single corporeal signifier to be read as simultaneously specific to its geographic locale (and, in that respect, individual) and as a composite of a larger corporate type—that is, a prototype. Human figures are used to *specify* within a greater whole (for example, merchant status within the entire rank hierarchy, or the Algonkian within the tribes of the Americas), even as the relations of specificity to generality shift according to topographical scale (that is, whether the map depicts a country, a continent, or the world). The logic of the grid thereby enables figurative degrees of similarity and difference to function as the conceptual coordinates by which the world's

diverse peoples were identified and differentiated, labelled and categorized, classified and compared.

C4.S6

4.6. The New World Body

C4.P60 A number of implications ensue from this emergent epistemology. First, the mass circulation of a repertory of national and tribal motifs ensured that the aggregation and repetition of images of the world's populace as a series of prototypes would lead to their ossification into stereotype: for instance, the savage Brazilian and Peruvian cannibals who appear on countless maps of South America and the filthy 'intestine-chewing savages' of the Cape of Good Hope, first depicted in Willem Blaeu's world map of 1607.[52] On any given map, such tropes and motifs might function by way of nudity, skin shading or colour, modes of eating and warfare, bodily comportment, and attributions of 'barbarism' or sensuality. The world-historical implications of stereotyping obviously conform to hemispheric asymmetries of geopolitics, and in this regard the graphic strategies of these maps no doubt lent significant support to the hardening of racial hierarchies emerging out of the transatlantic slave trade and the cultures of *métissage* increasingly taking hold in the Americas and East Indies.[53] We might note, as well, the strategic absence of the category of 'slave' in these maps' hierarchy of personhood.

C4.P61 Second, it is through the formal processes of aggregation and repetition that maps accomplish their ethnographic prototyping. How this played out in practice can be seen by comparing border figures in three maps of France. Jan Janszoon's 'Gallia', produced in Amsterdam in 1607, is clearly the model for the map of France produced by Speed in London (see Figures 4.30 and 4.31).[54]

[52] On Blaeu's representations of the Khoisan, see Jerry Brotton, 'Printing the Map, Making a Difference: Mapping the Cape of Good Hope, 1488–1652', in *Geography and Revolution*, ed. David N. Livingstone and Charles W. J. Withers (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 137–59, 152.

[53] See Valerie Traub, 'Sexuality', in *A Cultural History of Western Empires in the Renaissance*, ed. Ania Loomba (London: Bloomsbury, 2019), 147–80.

[54] The complex bio-bibliography of Janszoon's map led me to inadvertently invert the influence in an earlier essay, Valerie Traub, 'History in the Present Tense: Feminist Theories, Spatialized Epistemologies, and Early Modern Embodiment', in *Mapping Gendered Routes and Spaces in the Early Modern World*, ed. Merry E. Wiesner-Hanks (Farnham: Ashgate, 2015), 15–53. Originally published in 1607, 'Gallia' precedes Speed's 'France'; the image reproduced here is from the 1632 edition.



C4.F30 **Figure 4.30** Jan Janszoon, 'Gallia Nova Galliae descriptio multis in locus de integro emendata, similque effigies Principum, praecipuas Gallorum urbes ac habitus exhibens' (Amsterdam, 1632)
Courtesy of the Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Paris.

C4.P62 In certain respects, the two maps seem quite different: Speed depicts five single figures on each border, while Janszoon (in an unusual move) depicts eight pairs of same-sex figures. Yet Janszoon's figures are little altered on Speed's map. An almost contemporaneous world map by Claes Visscher, which unites these figures into marital pairs, demonstrates that the French merchant's wife, a slightly more portly figure on the world map, has come to stand, alongside her husband, for France itself (see Figure 4.32).

C4.P63 In the close-knit yet fiercely competitive cartographic industry, representative figures function as highly mobile, recyclable modules. The ossification of images thus was accomplished not only by *what* maps said, but also by the repetitive structure that governed *how* they said it.

C4.P64 Third, due to the globalizing mandate of early modern cartography, this ossification affected *all* of the world's peoples, the European as well as the African. Not only the exotic but the familiar were rendered up as rationalized objects of knowledge. So too with anatomy: no matter whether a

C4.F31 **Figure 4.31** John Speed, 'France' (London, 1626)
Courtesy of the Clements Library, University of Michigan.

cadaver is an Italian thief or German prostitute—the social strata from which corpses were most often obtained—the information it provides is presented as though it were universally applicable to medical knowledge everywhere. In this respect, anatomy and cartography had as large an impact on ways of 'knowing' Western Europeans as on ways of 'knowing' inhabitants of the East or West Indies. To recognize this epistemological impact is not to retrospectively equalize relations of domination, nor to diminish the participation of cartography in the ongoing colonial and imperial violence of early modernity. Selective images of barbarism are a potent legacy of an emergent capitalist industry intent on gaining mercantile, national, and imperial power—no more so than in the thriving entrepôt of Amsterdam, where cartographers were materially involved in producing maps for the Dutch East India Company.[55]

[55] On cartography as an engine for early modern empire, see J. B. Harley, *The New Nature of Maps: Essays in the History of Cartography*, ed. Paul Laxton ed. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001); Christian Jacob, *The Sovereign Map: Theoretical Approaches in Cartography throughout History*, trans. Tom Conley (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006); and Jerry Brotton, *Trading Territories: Mapping the Early Modern World* (London: Reaktion, 1997).



C4.F32 **Figure 4.32** Claes Visscher, 'Orbis Terrarum Typus de Integro Multis in Locus Emendatus' (Amsterdam, 1632)
Courtesy of the Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Paris.

C4.P65 In epistemological terms, however, something importantly supplemental to ethnocentric othering and the articulation of imperial power was happening on the surfaces of maps. Early seventeenth-century maps were generated and propelled by diverse aspirations: plunder, national competition, and colonial and imperial aspirations, to be sure, but also the prospect of mutually beneficial trade and intellectual and social curiosity that embraced an outward-looking if self-promoting cosmopolitanism.[56] These sometimes conflicting, sometimes aligned, phenomena informed mapmakers' attempts to conceptually grapple with what must have seemed a bewildering array of human bodies and cultures. And through the historical convergence of new technologies, talented personnel, and evolving modes of cognition, the precise material forms that their grappling relied upon led to the representational submission of *every* earthly inhabitant to

[56] See Traub, 'Cartography'.

the logic of the grid. By means of the conceit of a 'new world body', I indicate not only the important role played by illustrations of the indigenous peoples of the East and West Indies as models for subsequent map imagery, but the unprecedented spatialization of an ethnographically conceived global body that was universal in its reach.

C4.P66 Fourth, the prime conceptual coordinates of this new world body are not dictated by a binary logic of self and other. Rather, figurative and spatially delineated *degrees of similarity and difference* are the means by which the world's diverse peoples are identified and differentiated, labelled and categorized, classified and compared. Humans on maps exhibit gradations of nakedness and sumptuousness, prowess and inferiority, civility and barbarism. Various forms of cultural similitude (of family structure, for instance) and proximity (national borders, after all, meet at their edges), as well as various types of difference (most notably, skin colour) and distance (across the vast expanse of oceans), provide the coordinates upon which this epistemology battens. In its solicitation of identification and disidentification, the lines of force immanent in the logic of the grid invest, and disinvest, viewers in complex and cross-cutting, rather than merely binary, systems of relation.

C4.P67 Fifth, my analysis moderates the exclusive focus on ideological content that characterizes most scholarship concerned with cultural difference with attention to the material and formal technologies that made a new style of reasoning possible. Balancing the analytical weight accorded to the semiotic *content* of maps and their formal *syntax*, we are encouraged to recognize in the conceit of the new world body the possibility of a representative conceptual model, a stable secular standard, against which corporeal and cultural commensurabilities and alterities could be measured, evaluated, and ranked. Such a cognitive possibility provided the epistemological wherewithal to begin to conceptualize humans by means of ever more precise techniques of classification and comparison, and to apply this systematizing, degree-drive habit of thought to diverse populations across the globe.

C4.P68 Although this cognitive shift was made possible by the technological innovation of affordable copperplate engraving and the markets that sustained the 'print revolution',[57] what is most important is not the impressive

[57] Elizabeth Eisenstein, *The Printing Press as an Agent of Change* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). Especially salient to my argument are the effects that Bruno Latour, 'Drawing Things Together', in *Representation in Scientific Practice*, ed. Michael Lynch and Steve Woolgar (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), 18–68, discerns in the 'optical consistency' achieved by the medium of print to 'fix' objects of study: efficiency of communication, taxonomic classification, and superimposition.

level of detail that expert engravers made possible but the sheer volume of these images, as well as their generic uniformity and reproducibility across diverse sites of production and reception. It is above all the ability of printing technologies to move images around, to use them indifferently across genres and purposes, that sustained the conceptual shift I have identified. Isolated and singular yet combinable and repeatable, these printed image-concepts function as what Lorraine Daston, in a study of nonhuman scientific objects, calls 'epistemic image[s]': 'stand-in[s] for the too plentiful and too various objects in nature'. Representing 'a whole class of individuals',[58] epistemic images function as 'working objects'—that is, objects that do conceptual work—through the collective process of their selection, production, circulation, and reproduction.[59] Paving the way for a universal inventory of the world's peoples, the style of reasoning made possible by the new world body created ripple effects far beyond the limited objectives of medicine and mapmaking. In particular, it heralded abstract universalism—that is, a generalizing, emblematic representation used to fix a group's position on a grid of knowledge and power—as a particularly advantageous way to 'know' humankind. Regardless of who produced and used maps and anatomy books, the abstract universalism they inaugurated gestured towards the horizon of Enlightenment taxonomies that are still in the process of being claimed, contested, and deconstructed today.[60]

[58] Daston, 'Observation', in Dackerman, ed., *Prints and the Pursuit of Knowledge in Early Modern Europe*, 126–33, 129.

[59] Daston and Galison, *Objectivity*, 19.

[60] I am indebted to Garrett Sullivan, Mary Floyd-Wilson, Laurel Billings, Joseph Gamble, and Erik Maloney for their assistance in preparing this essay for publication. I am also grateful to Arlene Shaner for alerting me to the existence of Eustachius's *Opuscula* with a ruler. Portions of this essay draw from 'History in the Present Tense' and from 'The Nature of Norms in Early Modern England: Anatomy, Cartography, *King Lear*', in 'Shakespeare and Science', ed. Carla Mazzio, special double issue, *South Central Review* 26, nos. 1/2 (2009): 42–81.

C5

5

Place and Memory

History, Cognition, Phenomenology

John Sutton

C5.S1

5.1. Geographies of Mind in Place

C5.P1 If remembering, feeling, decision making, and other 'psychological' processes are by nature *animated* or *embodied* processes, then the geography of embodiment also includes a geography of mind. And if, further, such cognitive and affective processes are *distributed* and *ecological* processes, in that they sometimes spread across brain, body, and world,[1] then human minds are partly geographical or environmental in nature.

C5.P2 On this view, historically and culturally unique landscapes, architectures, technologies, and ecologies are not always simply external to our mental life, not merely settings and stimuli *for* thought on the one hand, and one of many kinds of thing to think *about* on the other. Instead, in certain circumstances the places we inhabit can partly *constitute* the processes and activities of feeling, remembering, and so on. As John Haugeland argues, the intelligence involved in our ability to navigate (for example) lies partly in our roads and paths.[2] This can remain true even through significant change in the nature of those roads and in the technological and cultural resources by means of which we interact with them: the widespread adoption of GPS and other navigational devices, for example, thus brings not merely a new set of external stimuli for the same old basic internal cognitive processes to use, but also transformations in those (distributed) processes themselves. Over time, the diverse components and resources of the natural and

[1] Andy Clark, *Being There: Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997); Edwin Hutchins, *Cognition in the Wild* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995); and Hutchins, 'Cognitive Ecology', *Topics in Cognitive Science* 2, no. 4 (2010): 705–15.

[2] Haugeland, 'Mind Embodied and Embedded', in *Having Thought: Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 207–37, 233–5.

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constructed lifeworlds which complement our biopsychosocial human nature can become parts of enduring but dynamic distributed ecologies. Such ecologies ground the emotional and cognitive practices of small groups and communities as well as individuals.

C5.P3 When people's ways of inhabiting places are fairly stable, involving more or less regular cycles of activities, tasks, or routines, their sense of belonging may be more or less taken for granted in the seamless experience of ongoing embodied interaction in accustomed locations and settings.[3] Work and worship, love and play, storytelling and dreaming, death and burial—life's events are set in and attached to found and built environments. This means that both the emotions and the memories of these lived and shared events may, for the people involved, inhere partly in the places where they happened—in or around offices or hilltops, parks or street corners, footpaths or fields, and rippling out into larger landscapes and connected locations. In a modern Western office or an early modern village, in agricultural or industrial or mountainous or maritime environs, the geography of embodiment is also psychological—affective and mnemonic—through and through. Spatial mobility in its more comfortable or voluntary forms can support or actively transform individual and group identity. It helps us to anchor lifetime periods and memories in distinct places and phases, and to embed the evaluations and narratives with which we make sense of our past and present in spatial frames of reference.[4] Paul Ricœur describes the connected and communal aspects of place memory thus:

C5.P4 > The memory of having inhabited some house in some town or that of having traveled in some part of the world are particularly eloquent and telling. They weave together an intimate memory and one shared by those close to one. In memories of this type, corporeal space is immediately linked with the surrounding space of the environment, some fragment of inhabitable land, with its more or less accessible paths, its more or less easy to cross obstacles.[5]

[3] What counts as stability is itself historically and culturally variable (see Iain Chambers, *Migrancy, Culture, Identity* (London: Routledge, 1994)), and as I note below norms of mobility were in flux in early modern England. A flexible model of place memory will have very distinctive instantiations, and must be sensitive to significant local variation.

[4] Emily Keightley and Michael Pickering, *Memory and the Management of Change: Repossessing the Past* (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave, 2017); and Igor Knez, 'Place and the Self: An Autobiographical Memory Synthesis', *Philosophical Psychology* 27, no. 2 (2014): 164–92.

[5] Ricœur, *Memory, History, Forgetting*, trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 148, quoted in Andy Wood, *The Memory of the People:*

C5.P5 But for these same reasons, disruption to or in a local lifeworld is likewise cognitive and emotional as well as social and practical. When customary places are destroyed or disrupted, or when individuals, families, or entire groups are forced off their land or out of their homes or cities, the consequent loss and alienation has many strands. Displacement can overwhelm social bonds and the integrity of the person or group. In the extreme, the traumas of displacement are cognitive and affective as well as practical and economic, because place is so deeply integrated into mind and memory.[6]

C5.P6 My primary aim in this essay is a big-picture and preliminary exploration of the nature of embodied place memory, in and through the specific historical context of early modern England. I build most immediately on a recent wave of cultural histories of landscape in this period. Wonderfully detailed integrative studies of embodied geographies by Nicola Whyte and Andy Wood, in particular, bring to bear extraordinarily rich and diverse source material on continuities and changes in early modern English practices of and attitudes towards place.[7] Although their work builds on and intersects with other cultural histories of landscape and memory centred upon specific religious and historical contexts,[8] this is a distinctive and creative strand of social and cultural history focusing on *vernacular* memory and custom and on *popular* senses of the past in place.

C5.P7 Historians like Whyte and Wood thematize memory directly, drawing out different aspects of what Wood calls 'topographies of remembrance' and engaging in productive dialogue with memory studies in other areas of the social sciences.[9] They set issues of landscape, place, and memory in early modern England in comparative context, tapping relevant work in anthropology, archaeology, and other areas of history to pick out both patterns across and unique features within distinct cultural and historical contexts. In Section 5.2 I extract from the work of Whyte and Wood a set of

Custom and Popular Senses of the Past in Early Modern England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 282.

[6] David Seamon, 'Lived Bodies, Place, and Phenomenology: Implications for Human Rights and Environmental Justice', *Journal of Human Rights and the Environment* 4, no. 2 (2013): 143–66.

[7] Whyte, *Inhabiting the Landscape: Place, Custom and Memory, 1500–1800* (Oxford: Windgather, 2009); and Wood, *Memory of the People*.

[8] Alexandra Walsham, *The Reformation of the Landscape: Religion, Identity, and Memory in Early Modern Britain and Ireland* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); and Daniel R. Woolf, *The Social Circulation of the Past: English Historical Culture, 1500–1730* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

[9] See Wood, 'Topographies of Remembrance', in *The Memory of the People*, chap. 4, 188–246.

characteristics of what I will call 'place memory' in early modern England, a notion I elucidate as we go. The emerging picture of the lifeworlds of place in early modern England is fascinating in its own right, but also productive for other inquiries into the geography and phenomenology of embodied place memory.[10]

C5.P8 This scholarly work on the cultural history of place does not stretch to consider the places and embedded customs under discussion as parts of distributed *cognitive* ecologies. This is perhaps not surprising, given historians' understandable reluctance to cede ground to psychological approaches which have often seemed unhelpfully individualist, universalizing, and anachronistic. But a kind of cognitive history based on the idea of distributed cognitive ecologies can produce both benefits and surprises. This contemporary framework integrates critiques of individualism that have emerged within mainstream cognitive science with constructive alternative theories and case studies of situated and socially distributed cognition in the wild.[11] Historical and cultural variation in mental processes themselves, not just in their cues and settings, is both encompassed and actively predicted by these approaches, which for some years now have been applied and extended in early modern literary and cultural history.[12]

[10] Edward S. Casey, *Remembering: A Phenomenological Study* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987); David Seamon, 'Situated Cognition and the Phenomenology of Place: Lifeworld, Environmental Embodiment, and Immersion-in-World', *Cognitive Processing* 16, no. S1 (2015), S389–S392; and Mick Smith, '"Somewhere in the North of England": A Recollective Ecology', *Emotions: History, Culture, Society* 1, no. 1 (2017): 137–60. Other work in cultural geography effectively evokes personal and affective experiences of and in landscapes, but likewise displays less interest in psychology, even of a situated or distributed kind: see for example John Wylie, 'A Single Day's Walking: Narrating Self and Landscape on the South West Coast Path', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 30, no. 2 (2005): 234–47.

[11] Hutchins, *Cognition in the Wild*; Andy Clark, *Natural-Born Cyborgs: Minds, Technologies, and the Future of Human Intelligence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Philip Robbins and Murat Aydede, eds, *The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Paul Griffiths and Andrea Scarantino, 'Emotions in the Wild', in Robbins and Aydede, eds, *Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition*, 454–66; Kourken Michaelian and John Sutton, 'Distributed Cognition and Memory Research: History and Current Directions', *Review of Philosophy and Psychology* 4, no. 1 (2013), 1–24; John Sutton, 'Shared Remembering and Distributed Affect: Varieties of Psychological Interdependence', in Kourken Michaelian, Dorothea Debus, and Denis Perrin, eds, *New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory* (London: Routledge, 2018), 181–99; and Steven D. Brown and Paula Reavey, 'Memory in the Wild' (forthcoming).

[12] Evelyn B. Tribble, *Cognition in the Globe: Attention and Memory in Shakespeare's Theatre* (New York: Palgrave, 2011); John Sutton, 'Spongy Brains and Material Memories', in *Environment and Embodiment in Early Modern England*, ed. Mary Floyd-Wilson and Garrett A. Sullivan, Jr(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2007), 14–34; Tribble and Sutton, 'Cognitive Ecology as a Framework for Shakespearean Studies', *Shakespeare Studies* 39 (2011): 94–103; Laurie Johnson, John Sutton, and Evelyn B. Tribble, eds, *Embodied Cognition and Shakespeare's*

C5.P9 So I also aim to develop, defend, and extend the treatment of cognitive history by way of distributed cognitive ecologies. Among a number of productive recent critical engagements with this framework,[13] I pick out concerns expressed concisely by Adam Rzepka in the course of a brilliant discussion of the imaginative production of place and places on the Shakespearean stage.[14] Rzepka identifies two methodological challenges to distributed cognition as an historical framework, both turning on anachronism. First, he contends that the theory 'does not reflect psychological theories current in the [early modern] period', thus neglecting historical actors' self-understandings and threatening 'a persistent fissure' between theory and archaeology or history.[15] Second, Rzepka worries that theorists of distributed cognition fail to implement their own wish to maintain or add a focus on mind and mental life to standard historical materialist attention to bodies and power: by engaging primarily with the humoral and physiological aspects of memory and mind, he suggests, we merely reprise an older 'insistence on materialism' and cannot achieve a genuine 'return to psychology' (312, 328). Commenting briefly on the first challenge along the way, and on the second in the essay's fina section, I aim to underline the point that doing this kind of cognitive history does not entail the step-by-step application of one master discourse to a passive recipient field. Indeed, I use historical considerations about place and memory to challenge psychology to move further and faster into the wild, to begin to address some more tangled aspects of the operations and practices of remembering in the real world, in a mode of interdisciplinary communication which seeks mutual benefits and surprises.[16] The general investigation into place memory encourages attention to some familiar

Theatre: The Early Modern Body-Mind (London: Routledge, 2014); Andrew Bozio, 'Embodied Thought and the Perception of Place in *King Lear*', *SEL Studies in English Literature 1500–1900* 55, no. 2 (2015): 263–84; and Sutton and Nicholas Keene, 'Cognitive History and Material Culture', in *The Routledge Handbook of Material Culture in Early Modern Europe*, ed. Catherine Richardson, Tara Hamling, and David Gaimster (London: Routledge, 2017), 44–56.

[13] See James A. Knapp, 'Beyond Materiality in Shakespeare Studies', *Literature Compass* 11, no. 10 (2014): 677–90.

[14] Rzepka, '"How Easy is a Bush Supposed a Bear?": Differentiating Imaginative Production in *A Midsummer Night's Dream*', *Shakespeare Quarterly* 66, no. 3 (2015): 308–28.

[15] Ibid., 327–28. See also Evelyn B. Tribble and John Sutton, 'Minds In and Out of Time: Memory, Embodied Skill, Anachronism, and Performance', *Textual Practice* 26, no. 4 (2012): 587–607.

[16] John Sutton and Evelyn B. Tribble, 'The Creation of Space: Narrative Strategies, Group Agency, and Skill in Lloyd Jones's *The Book of Fame*', in *Mindful Aesthetics: Literature and the Sciences of Mind*, ed. Chris Danta and Helen Groth (New York: Bloomsbury, 2014), 141–60. Cf. Felicity Callard and Des Fitzgerald, *Rethinking Interdisciplinarity across the Social Sciences and Neurosciences* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2015).

enough interactions between remembering, imagining, and perceiving which are as yet rarely acknowledged in cognitive theory and experiment.

C5.P10 Rzepka's challenges also point us towards another key source domain, the humoralist literary analysis of Renaissance and early modern works led by Gail Kern Paster, which mixes phenomenological and body criticism.[17] Not only has this form of literary humoralism rightly set its porous bodies, permeable minds, and swirling passions in the dynamic environments and ecologies within which fragile fluid equilibrium might be sought,[18] but it has also for some time rightly treated cognitive theorists like Andy Clark and Edwin Hutchins in a spirit of potential alliance rather than entrenched hostility. Just as Paster invokes Clark's account of 'continuous reciprocal causation' to catch the ceaseless exchange of fluids and elemental materials between body and world that characterizes the early modern ecology of the passions,[19] so Clark in turn puts Evelyn B. Tribble's historico-ecological analysis of Renaissance acting practices into play for his audience as independent evidence for distributed cognition.[20] As well as restating the mutual appeal of distributed cognition for literary humoralists, I aim, finally, to indicate the potential for new and integrative contact between the treatments of place and memory in both cultural histories and literary humoralism, by way of the latter's turn towards an ecology of the passions.[21]

C5.S2 5.2. Lifeworlds of Place in Early Modern England

C5.P11 Despite new levels of mobility in early modern English society—connected to economic, political, and demographic changes—significant practices of

[17] Paster, *The Body Embarrassed: Drama and the Disciplines of Shame in Early Modern England* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993); Paster, 'Nervous Tension: Networks of Blood and Spirit in the Early Modern Body', in *The Body in Parts: Fantasies of Corporeality in Early Modern Europe*, ed. David Hillman and Carla Mazzio (London: Routledge, 1997), 107–25; and Paster, Katherine Rowe, and Mary Floyd-Wilson, eds *Reading the Early Modern Passions* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).

[18] Mary Floyd-Wilson, *English Ethnicity and Race in Early Modern Drama* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); and Paster, *Humoring the Body: Emotions and the Shakespearean Stage* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004).

[19] Paster, *Humoring the Body*, 10, 34.

[20] Clark, *Supersizing the Mind* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 63–4. See also John Sutton, *Philosophy and Memory Traces: Descartes to Connectionism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); and Sutton, 'Exograms and Interdisciplinarity: History, the Extended Mind, and the Civilizing Process', in *The Extended Mind*, ed. Richard Menary (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010), 189–225.

[21] Paster, *Humoring the Body*. For a discussion of the public theatre as offering a distinctive passionate ecology, see Julian Yates' essay in this volume (Chapter 8).

both personal and shared remembering continued to be anchored in specific and experienced places. Even as technologies and strategies for dealing with past and future altered, memory was still richly scaffolded by landscapes, artefacts, architecture, and institutions which all themselves bore the traces of cultural intervention.

C5.P12 In a selective synthesis of the view of place memory emerging from the recent cultural histories, I draw in particular on Andy Wood's account of 'the memory of the people', based in large part on depositions and witness statements in the records of litigation from disputes in customary law.[22] This material affords Wood rich opportunity to delineate subtle markers of continuity and change. On the one hand, for much of the early modern period, local activities of remembering in specific environments and settings remained in many ways stable: many a customary practice still seemed to unfold as it had for time out of mind, same as it ever was. On the other hand, this depositional evidence reveals that 'a clear majority' of witnesses 'appear to have been migrants' who had known their current community and environs only from the age of sixteen or later: yet they typically claim, and are typically granted to have appropriate experience of or expertise in local customs (38). This sense of the cultural flexibility of remembrance drives Wood's vision of the many ways in which shared stories and individual memory could be integrated and entangled. The following sketch goes beyond Wood's explicit theorizing to schematize and distil some central features of his account.

C5.P13 First, place memory in early modern England is *social*, or at least naturally integrates individual and social practices of remembering, and is 'embedded in key sites, productive of a sense of remembered place that underwrites collectivities' (10). The kind of collectivity in question is primarily the small group or local community, not the larger groups often studied in contemporary social theories of 'collective memory'. Wood sets aside accounts of collective memory as homogeneous or as itself intrinsically tending towards convergence (15–29), and focuses on the vital role of shared or similar embodied experiences in particular places and settings in shaping and sustaining popular senses of the past. Place memory is social too in its functions, with the search for a 'usable past' always driven by present concerns or disputes, for example about boundaries or access rights. The sociality of place memory is both synchronic and diachronic. On the one hand, at particular times of change or dispute, interpretations of

[22] Wood, *Memory of the People*, 29–42.

customary practice or of land use were negotiated communally, within or across groups with more aligned or more competing interests. On the other hand, both stories and activities were repeated over decades and generations, as older people told what they had done and heard in the same settings in their youth. In 1738, for example, a 92-year-old Yorkshireman called Christopher Slater recalled being given at the age of 12 a green ribbon by which to remember the boundary stones of Melmerby and Aggerthorpe, an imperative impressed on him those eighty years earlier by 'old Antient Men' who declared that these 'Bounder stones…had been so riden all their time and as they had heard old people declare before them'—as Wood notes, such memories 'interlocked community, place and custom…to cascade memories down the generations' (209).[23] An important subsidiary feature in Wood's account is that the retrieval of place memory, often public and shared in these ways, is not mindless or entirely implicit: even though the fit between embodied memories and place is often seamless enough to remain unremarked, its exercise was in context often an explicit and deliberate part of a search for a usable past, rather than an automatic or unconscious one (14).

C5.P14 Second, place memory is *dynamic*, both in sustaining contested or variable accounts of past and place, and in being always open to renegotiation and re-evaluation. It was not imposed on the people by authorities, or in any linear way increasingly centralized or driven by newly universalizing national narratives. For example, in a striking reinterpretation of evidence on surveying and cartography, Wood rejects the idea that elite commodifying impulses flattened or reduced local difference and corralled landscapes into a single, precisely mapped grid. Far from devaluing vernacular memories, new cartographic practices actively relied on and cooperated with popular memory. Surveyors typically consulted and collaborated, more or less effectively, with local informants whose lifelong experience was essential in delineating boundaries or characterizing customary usage of land. Documents attesting to 'this active popular engagement in cartography' reveal a 'complex interplay of dominant and subordinate' interests (188–200). In contexts of conflict or disruption, questions of legitimacy or custom made it more urgent to deploy shared memories in service of particular aims: claims that particular practices had been in place since 'time out of mind' only needed to be made explicit when they were under threat. Wood's own grand narrative does drive on into later periods of 'ecological alienation'

[23] Cf. Philip Schwyzer, 'Lees and Moonshine: Remembering Richard III, 1485–1635', *Renaissance Quarterly* 63, no. 3 (2010): 850–83.

in which more systematic enclosure produced an awful dissonance between the remembered local world and what it had later become, identifying a 'placelessness that permeated the memories' of older people who lived on into times after land and communities 'had been carved up' (236–46, 341–51). But, as he notes, the ongoing dynamism of place memory remained in various forms of popular resistance and vernacular counter-memory, with those lands and those communities alive in shared memory and resonant with shared emotion.

C5.P15 Third, place memory is active and practical, or *embodied*. Place is powerful in memory, as Edward S. Casey argues, by way of the orienting function of the lived body.[24] In early modern lifeworlds of place, the setting for major events in English communities remained across generations 'an inhabited, known landscape, one walked across, worked on, ploughed over, dug into. It is a taskscape, a vernacular vision of the land and its past' (198).[25] Place memory was encoded and sedimented or consolidated, for individuals and their groups, through iterative and repetitive activity. Working and walking the land brought deep embodied familiarity not only with particular places but also with the events and stories associated with them at a fine-grained level that may not be easy for many of us to grasp. Through constantly acting in and on the land, early modern people were 'reading, monitoring and remembering change in the local world down to its most precise details' (229). These rhythms of embodied interaction operated at a range of timescales, including those of season, calendar, and religious ritual, and their operations effaced distinctions between enculturated natural features like trees, ditches, or rivers and wilded artefacts like crosses, ruins, or mounds.[26] Economically and ideologically salient practices like the marking of parochial boundaries in perambulation afforded particular embodied experiences.[27] As groups walked visible or conceptual lines between 'marks set for remembrance', a youth might be struck or have his head knocked on a stone 'to make him the better to remember that the same stone was a boundary

[24] Casey, *Remembering: A Phenomenological Study* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), 181–215.

[25] Cf. Tim Ingold, 'The Temporality of Landscape', *World Archaeology* 25, no. 2 (1993): 152–74; and Ingold, *Making: Anthropology, Archaeology, Art and Architecture* (London: Routledge, 2013).

[26] Walsham, *Reformation of the Landscape*, 5. Cf. Chris Gosden, 'Cognitive Landscapes: The Origins of the English Village', *Pragmatics & Cognition* 22, no. 1 (2014): 93–108, 96.

[27] Nicola Whyte, 'Landscape, Memory and Custom: Parish Identities *c.* 1550–1700', *Social History* 32, no. 2 (2007): 166–86, 175; and Whyte, *Inhabiting the Landscape*.

stone'.[28] To pain, food, and drink might be added further mnemonic sensory cues, such as hands laid on textured surfaces: local custom as social memory was heard, performed, and felt (208).[29] Wood's tempting descriptions of such early modern practices as 'the deliberate imprinting of an often complex mental map upon the minds of the young' (233, cf. 248), like his suggestion that surveyors and cartographers were 'converting the mental maps of local inhabitants into…textual products' (198), perhaps tend to overemphasize internal and individual representations of the landscape, neglecting the possibility that such 'mental maps', while complex enough, might be more distributed, substantially left out there in the environment, consisting more of practical *know-how in* unique settings than of abstracted or decontextualized *knowledge of* those settings. At the very least, the invocation of 'mental maps' in histories of place and memory signals the need for more intimate and productive interaction with the cognitive sciences.[30]

C5.P16 Fourth, place memory is mutual or *inter*active, in that the land and its features were never merely static or passive surfaces upon which human physical and conceptual activity was inscribed, but rather were always evolving, accumulating their own histories, bearing the changing traces of innumerable nonhuman as well as human actions and events. So by 'place memory' I do not mean only memory *of* and *for* places; I do not mean only places as shaping cues or stimuli *to* memory, as primarily a 'stimulus' or 'a fillip to the task of remembering'.[31] I mean to suggest a dynamic reciprocal connection rather than a one-way relation,[32] and to treat places themselves as the physical vehicles of certain activities of remembering. Some changes in the land operate across timescales quite different from that of typical human experience, but places remain 'archives of memory' which can be tapped in many different and unpredictable ways: the history of humans'

[28] Wood, *Memory of the People*, 203, 207.

[29] An anthropological parallel can be found in Keith H. Basso's account of landscape and language among the Western Apache, for whom the ways that 'wisdom sits in places' are impressed especially on young people urged to accompany their storytelling elders to unique and memorable places of specific significance. See Basso, *Wisdom Sits in Places: Landscape and Language among the Western Apache* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1996), 129–43.

[30] Barbara Tversky, 'Cognitive Maps, Cognitive Collages, and Spatial Mental Models', in *Spatial Information Theory: European Conference, COSIT'93*, ed. Andrew U. Frank and Irene Campari (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1993), 14–24; and David Turnbull, 'Maps Narratives and Trails: Performativity, Hodology and Distributed Knowledges in Complex Adaptive Systems—An Approach to Emergent Mapping', *Geographical Research* 45, no. 2 (2007): 140–9.

[31] Walsham, *Reformation of the Landscape*, 7, 618.

[32] Contrast Knez, 'Place and the Self', 175.

physical and narrative interventions in a landscape remains in place alongside the traces of evolving longer-term environmental movements, all accretions available for potential but uncertain present or future activities and interpretations.[33] Interactions with the early modern English land were forms of creative and sensitive craft, not the imposition of human meaning on a static surface or the reading and conceptual ordering of a set repository. Though culturally as well as naturally constructed, the active and accumulative landscape tended to exceed or resist any particular classification. Earthworks or barrows, hillforts or boundary markers, place names or relics, for example, all had histories of their own, landmarks always accruing new meanings and stories which might overlay and interanimate earlier traces, but would rarely entirely obliterate them.[34]

C5.P17 The historians and archaeologists I've been relying on here rightly stress that both landscapes and landmarks thus have a palimpsestic character, with traces superposed on traces.[35] But once we also treat human memory itself as literally distributed and ecological, we can characterize mental life in the same way. Most generally, remembering is typically constructive in the sense that selective fragments of episodic, sensory, embodied experience are fluidly meshed and blended, recombined in practice and in context rather than preserved or restored.[36] More specifically, the enduring but dynamic resources on which such creative retrieval processes draw go far beyond our biological memory processes, which are far from stable, whether thought of as volatile and constantly reconsolidating neural engrams, or as patterns of flow in the fleeting animal spirits coursing incessantly through the pores of the brain. Human remembering is distributed or ecologically scaffolded, by nature incorporating diverse bodily, social, technological, and environmental resources, partly because only such integrated but

[33] William J. Turkel, *The Archive of Place: Unearthing the Pasts of the Chilcotin Plateau* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2007), xvii, 225–7.

[34] Cornelius Holtorf and Howard M. R. Williams, 'Landscapes and Memories', in *The Cambridge Companion to Historical Archaeology*, ed. Dan Hicks and Mary C. Beaudry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 235–54; Nicola Whyte, 'The Afterlife of Barrows: Prehistoric Monuments in the Norfolk Landscape', *Landscape History* 25, no. 1 (2003): 5–16; Whyte, *Inhabiting the Landscape*; Wood, *Memory of the People*, 219–36.

[35] Ruth M. Van Dyke and Susan E. Alcock, 'Archaeologies of Memory: An Introduction', in *Archaeologies of Memory*, ed. Van Dyke and Alcock (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), 1–13; and Wood, *Memory of the People*, 231–2.

[36] Martin A. Conway, 'Memory and the Self', *Journal of Memory and Language* 53, no. 4 (2005): 594–628; David C. Rubin, 'The Basic-Systems Model of Episodic Memory', *Perspectives on Psychological Science* 1, no. 4 (2006): 277–311; and John Sutton, 'Remembering', in *Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition*, ed. Robbins and Aydede, 217–35.

heterogeneous systems enable the partial and fallible forms of stability and continuity that mark our emotional and cultural ways of being in time.[37] So memory itself has a palimpsestic or superpositional character, always projecting parts of the past into the present and the future, constantly expressing and revealing and recontextualizing the before in the after. And place is a particularly potent part of these extended meshworks[38] in part because of its distinctive temporalities—because it can combine or interfere with, support or constitute experience and memory in striking and enduring ways. I try to flesh out these claims below in suggesting that place memory integrates distinct kinds or forms of remembering, and goes beyond memory in resting on or fusing with imagination.[39] But first, I sum up the account of place memory I have drawn from cultural history and, in noting one specific puzzle about it, address one of the concerns I mentioned earlier about distributed cognition as a framework for history.

C5.P18 The picture of local place memory emerging from cultural history could be described as a *psycho*geography of embodiment or embodied mind. Whether simply relying on familiar pathways and environmental features as the past seamlessly animated the present, or—in times of disruption or dispute—negotiating competing accounts of local practices and customs in the search for a usable past, the mental and emotional life of early modern English people was *ecological.*[40]

C5.P19 For this reason, we might then want to try to tap and make sense of their *beliefs* about the nature of the intimate relations between bodily, cognitive, and climatic processes, and thus about their concomitant embodied *experiences.* Yet one dimension absent in the rich vision presented by Wood and the other cultural historians is the *humoral* aspect of memory and embodied thinking. As both medical and literary historians have shown:

C5.P20 pervasive early modern ideas about the bodily humours grounded not only conceptions of health and disease, but also dynamic understandings

[37] Sutton, 'Exograms and Interdisciplinarity'.

[38] Tim Ingold, *Being Alive: Essays on Movement, Knowledge and Description* (London: Routledge, 2011); and Carl Knappett, 'Networks of Objects, Meshworks of Things', in *Redrawing Anthropology: Materials, Movements, Lines*, ed. Tim Ingold (London: Routledge, 2011), 45–64.

[39] Emily Keightley and Michael Pickering, *The Mnemonic Imagination* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2012).

[40] I mention 'psychogeography' warily here, for this general summation of the picture of place memory I've sketched, without intending the term to take substantial trans-historical weight: its contemporary uses evoke modernist and urban contexts alien to our early modern settings. See Merlin Coverley, *Psychogeography* (London: Pocket Essentials, 2006); Tina Richardson, ed., *Walking Inside Out: Contemporary British Psychogeography* (London: Rowman and Littlefield, 2015).

> of temperament and character, and of what we would call psychological processes. In particular, the state of the quick and nimble animal spirits, subtle fluids derived from the blood and coursing through the brain and nerves, influenced the clarity and efficacy of reasoning, decision-making, and remembering. But because the animal spirits themselves were constantly changing, affected by places, bodily regimen, and the nature of one's passions, the mind in this ecological framework was porous, open to a variety of worldly influences.[41]

C5.P21 Both medical and moral practice sanctioned the systematic manipulation of the 'non-naturals': the regulation of air and climate, exercise and rest, sleep and waking, food and drink, repletion and excretion, and the passions.[42] The aim was to maintain appropriate dynamic balances between the external environment and the internal bodily and nervous fluids which grounded life and mind alike. In these *geo*humoral frameworks, the character and psychology of the English in particular was often seen as uniquely vulnerable to climatic influence, with brains and bodies taken to be either so moist and cold, so porous and spongy, that they absorb all influences too easily and are thus unsteady and inconstant; or so full, dammed up, and gross as to be volatile and barbarous.[43]

C5.P22 So why do these geohumoral themes seem not to show up in the recent cultural histories of place memory? Surely the influences of *local* airs, waters, and places might be expected to ground and mark distinctive psychogeographical worlds. But the bodies and the embodied experiences apparent in, for example, Wood's accounts of his depositions and witness statements seem at least initially to be less volatile, less phenomenologically fluctuating, than those worried over in the medical, moral, and fictional sources tapped by the literary historians of humoralism. Perhaps this is simply due to the distinctness of the respective evidence bases. Medical and literary historians have relied on published or performed texts, on Timothy

[41] Sutton and Keene, 'Cognitive History and Material Culture', 45. See also Paster, 'Nervous Tension'; Sutton, *Philosophy and Memory Traces*; and Erin Sullivan and Andrew Wear, 'Materiality, Nature, and the Body', in *Routledge Handbook of Material Culture*, ed. Richardson, Hamling, and Gaimster, 137–53.

[42] Andrew Wear, 'Medicine in Early Modern Europe, 1500–1700', in *The Western Medical Tradition, 800 BC to AD 1800*, ed. Lawrence I. Conrad, Michael Neve, Vivian Nutton, Roy Porter, and Wear (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 215–361, 360; and Mary Floyd-Wilson, 'English Mettle', in *Reading the Early Modern Passions*, ed. Paster, Rowe, and Floyd-Wilson, 130–46.

[43] Floyd-Wilson, *English Ethnicity and Race*; Floyd-Wilson, 'English Mettle'; and Sutton, 'Spongy Brains and Material Memories'.

Bright and Helkiah Crooke, Edmund Spenser and Robert Burton, Ben Jonson and William Shakespeare. Generally derived from and circulating among urban elites, these works contrast with the archival and legal or practical materials accessed by cultural historians like Whyte and Wood. Did humoral discourse and its associated phenomenologies have less of a grip at a local and practical level? Was the urge to implement 'the civilizing process' associated more with emerging *national* 'ethnological anxieties', in elite attempts at the 'systematic manipulation of the non-naturals',[44] and less with the seasonal cycles of community life and memory across England's diverse regions?

C5.P23 I do not know: these questions need to be put to the archives, with an eye to practical contexts in which ecologically anchored humoral passions might be invoked, where exchange between climate and cognition, the 'dynamic reciprocities between self and environment',[45] might have been seen as relevant. My hunch is that a range of forms of evidence beyond elite medical and literary sources will indeed reveal psychogeohumoral concerns and experiences at a local level too. We may find smaller stories which reveal shared early modern understandings of environmentally based psychologies and characteristics. The emotional worlds of people living on different sides of hills or moors, valleys or rivers, may be seen to differ: perhaps there are early modern microclimates of affect and decision making and constancy and trust. This is not a matter of contrasting the fantastical and imaginative world of elite dramas and fictions with a gritty popular conception of place and memory: as I will argue, ordinary experiences of place were thoroughly imaginative too, entirely permeated by projections and wishes.

C5.P24 Such further investigations in historical phenomenology will also elucidate one concern about the historical relevance of distributed cognitive ecologies: as Rzepka put it, 'even if objects [for example] functioned as participants in a 'cognitive ecology', they were not understood to do so' by historical actors, or according to the 'psychological theories current in the period'.[46] But this is too quick. An understanding of mind, memory, and character as intrinsically ecological, potentially incorporating objects, other people, and the physical environment, was indeed available in the early

[44] Floyd-Wilson, 'English Mettle', 140; and Gail Kern Paster, 'Eschewing Politeness: Norbert Elias and the Historiography of Early Modern Affect', *PMLA* 130, no. 5 (2015): 1443–49.

[45] Paster, *Humoring the Body*, 14.

[46] Rzepka, 'How Easy is a Bush Supposed a Bear?', 327–8.

modern period. The humoral phenomenology which has been identified in medical and moral psychology and in drama and poetry includes, in at least some of its forms, acceptance of the mental and emotional roles and natures of artefacts and environments.[47] As the preceding discussion suggests, Rzepka's concern may get a firmer grip at a vernacular level. Is there work to be done on any bodies of early modern English evidence parallel, for example, to Barbara Duden's archaeology of women's bodily experiences in eighteenth-century Germany?[48] And would such research confirm that the ecological and place-based understanding of memory and the passions identified in published works also animated popular conceptions of mind and world?

C5.S3

5.3. Remembered and Imagined Places

C5.P25 Because it will help me to get at a final set of characteristics of early modern place memory, I want to spend a little more time on Rzepka's charge that ideas about distributed cognitive ecologies remain overly reductive, neglecting the full range of historical attitudes to mind, soul, and (especially) imagination. Rzepka asserts that in their focus on physiology and anatomy, which is exemplified in references to the animal spirits and the bodily humors, theorists of distributed cognition 'have not tended to engage early modern psychological models beyond their material aspects'.[49] To the extent that some humanists identify any historical approach inspired by cognitive theory as overly reductionist and materialist, they have been understandably reluctant to engage in detail with such approaches. In his impressively thorough and even-handed survey of the interdisciplinary field of memory studies, Wood rightly notes that 'more explicitly biological approaches to remembering have had less impact' as practitioners adopt 'a social rather than a neurological reading of memory' (22). But because not all cognitive

[47] Paster, *Humoring the Body*; Evelyn B. Tribble and Nicolas Keene, *Cognitive Ecologies and the History of Remembering: Religion, Education, and Memory in Early Modern England* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2011); and Tribble and Sutton, 'Cognitive Ecology as a Framework for Shakespearean Studies'. Cf. Jonathan Gil Harris, *Untimely Matter in the Time of Shakespeare* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009); and Bruce R. Smith, *The Key of Green: Passion and Perception in Renaissance Culture* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009).

[48] Duden, *The Woman beneath the Skin: A Doctor's Patients in Eighteenth-Century Germany*, trans. Thomas Dunlap (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991).

[49] Rzepka, 'How Easy is a Bush Supposed a Bear?', 238.

theory is in fact grimly neurological and reductionist, there are forms of cognitive history which are also more pluralist and inclusive.

C5.P26 I have previously argued in response to such concerns that more extreme forms of reductionism—treating mental processes as *nothing but* neural processes and explicable *only* by way of the neurosciences—are, in fields even potentially relevant for historians, extremely rare, and in particular that they are much less prevalent and damaging than the distinct individualist or internalist idea that mental processes (at whatever level they are to be explained) occur solely in the individual head.[50] This is perhaps no longer quite right, with the rise of so-called 'ruthless' reductionism in philosophy,[51] the ongoing growth of applied as well as pop-science neuro-discourses such as neurolaw and neuroethics, and especially the development of more sophisticated biohistorical forensic sciences into a new history which promises to read the past off ancient DNA and microbiomes, off bones and isotopes. Such endeavours can be performed more or less effectively, and in particular do not inevitably write mind, experience, and agency out of history in the way that some overwrought and ill-informed critics fear:[52] for example, Robin Fleming's biographical sketch of 'Eighteen', a seventh-century Englishwoman whose body and grave in Cambridgeshire have some intriguing and unusual features, beautifully exemplifies Fleming's own call for rich forms of history, rich geographies of embodiment, derived from nontextual biological sources but expanding into cultural histories of place and practice.[53]

C5.P27 So it may indeed be important to keep mind, memory, and experience firmly and explicitly in focus in the coming era of biohistory, to avoid a new

[50] John Sutton and Evelyn B. Tribble, 'Materialists Are Not Merchants of Vanishing', *Early Modern Culture: An Electronic Seminar* 9 (2012), available at https://www.academia.edu/1054451/Materialists_are_not_merchants_of_vanishing_Sutton_and_Tribble_; and Sutton and Keene, 'Cognitive History and Material Culture'.

[51] John Bickle, 'Memory and Neurophilosophy', in *The Memory Process: Neuroscientific and Humanistic Perspectives*, ed. Suzanne Nalbantian, Paul M. Matthews, and James L. McClelland (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011), 195–215. See also John Sutton, 'Remembering as Public Practice: Wittgenstein, Memory, and Distributed Cognitive Ecologies', in Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, Annalisa Coliva, and Volker Munz, eds, *Mind, Language, and Action: Proceedings of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2015), 409–43.

[52] David Hawkes, 'Against Materialism in Literary Theory', in *The Return of Theory in Early Modern English Studies: Tarrying with the Subjunctive*, ed. Paul Cefalu and Bryan Reynolds (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2011), 237–57; and Roger Cooter, 'Neural Veils and the Will to Historical Critique: Why Historians of Science Need to Take the Neuro-Turn Seriously', *Isis* 105, no. 1 (2014): 145–54.

[53] Fleming, 'Writing Biography at the Edge of History', *American Historical Review* 114, no. 3 (2009): 606–14.

'mindlessness' in the humanities or in cultural geography. But the vast majority of work in cognitive theory, including especially the broadly 'situated' approaches to mind and emotion within which our work on distributed cognitive ecologies is firmly embedded,[54] does not even flirt with the elimination of mental life or the universalizing of the neural. Cognitive history of this type is not 'neurohistory',[55] for the principled reason that it sees memory and mind as distributed well beyond the brain.[56] While brains themselves can be aptly described as 'biosocial organs permeated by history',[57] cognitive history can operate on a broader canvas, in that it can address the practices, artefacts, and social processes of historically specific mental lives even where their effects on the brain cannot be directly identified.[58] Neither is distributed cognition at all imperialist: as I hope this essay demonstrates, it rather draws directly on, and seeks to contribute to, existing historical projects of many kinds. It is not that settled frameworks from the cognitive sciences are to be applied to history as privileged truths, but that mutual benefits can arise from the careful meeting of these approaches on topics of independent interest.[59]

C5.P28 I conclude with an attempt to push this wishful agenda a little further. I focus precisely on the core topic of Rzepka's own essay, the imaginative production of spaces, scenes, and landscapes.[60] Rzepka is addressing distinct modes of theatrical imagining as, in *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, characters and audiences shift between the accurate 'apprehension' of what is materially present on the stage, the 'alteration or overlay' of what is present by imagined or remembered scenes, and the 'radical abstraction from the stage required by the visualization of' the exotic landscapes conjured by Titania and Oberon (310–11). In describing the first mode, Rzepka helpfully points to a sometimes-neglected theoretical tradition in which imagination

[54] Robbins and Aydede, eds, *Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition*; and Jan Slaby, 'Mind Invasion: Situated Affectivity and the Corporate Life Hack', *Frontiers in Psychology* 7 (2016), article 266.

[55] Daniel Lord Smail, 'An Essay on Neurohistory', in *Emerging Disciplines: Shaping New Fields of Scholarly Inquiry in and beyond the Humanities*, ed. Melissa Bailar (Houston, TX: Rice University Press, 2010), 201–28.

[56] Louise Barrett, *Beyond the Brain: How Body and Environment Shape Animal and Human Minds* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011).

[57] Stephen Cowley, 'Why Brains Matter: An Integrational Perspective', *Language Sciences* 24, no. 1 (2002): 73–95, 75; and Daniel Lord Smail, *On Deep History and the Brain* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008).

[58] Sutton and Keene, 'Cognitive History and Material Culture'. [59] Ibid.

[60] For discussion of *A Midsummer Night's Dream*'s engagement with the meteorological and the spirit world respectively, see essays by Mary Thomas Crane and Mary Floyd-Wilson in this volume (Chapters 6 and 11).

is involved not just in fantasy or hallucination but also in accurate perception, filling in and filling out the experienced world not so much representationally as 'presentationally'. In the second mode, remembered scenes evoked by the characters, such as Hermia's recollection of childhood idylls lazing with Helena 'upon faint primrose beds', support or overlay what we see in the play's real time, in an amending or additive form of imaginative work. The final mode invokes both orderly and familiar topographies and disfigured envisioned landscapes, as the fairy quarrel skips across and flips rapidly between multiple evoked places, from 'a capsule survey of the English countryside' to the wildest far-flung places, in imaginative work which hints 'at loosening the restrictions of location itself' (313–23).

C5.P29 It is true that we always love and quarrel, play and suffer, in specific settings. But in fully occupying or inhabiting these places, alone and together, in perception and later in memory alike, we are not entirely bound by 'the restrictions of location'. Rzepka treats theatre, and *A Midsummer Night's Dream* in particular, as a particularly concentrated imaginative producer of place. But he also rightly sees these distinctive modes of imagining as exemplifying a broader 'functional distribution' of the complex and multiple early modern psyche, able to 'foster immersions in wholly immaterial worlds' (like those imagined and enacted in the *Dream*) outside the theatre too (328). After all, dreams and imaginings—insubstantial as they may seem—often persist as traces, not subject to erasure, with joyous or disruptive causal powers of their own. So I can, finally, offer some preliminary thoughts on the roles of imagination and play in and alongside (historical) place memory, taking up Rzepka's invitation to acknowledge the persistence of imaginary remainders in the quotidian world (327). To get to the work of imagination in place memory, I first look at the interanimation of multiple forms of remembering.

C5.P30 Distinct but complementary modes of remembering operate in the retrieval and transmission of place memory. Wood stresses that past events or narratives could be activated through visual, verbal, and written expressions, which are more often reinforcing or feeding off each other than conflicting and competing (247–71). Again, we can extend the point psychologically, to bring the same insight back to bear on multimodality within memory itself. Recall of personally experienced episodes mingles with repeated or generic shared experience, or with more schematic knowledge of how things have always or usually been in particular places. Whyte notes that specific instances of the burial or exchange of bodies at parochial boundaries in some cases later became smoothed out and incorporated into

more generic and communally accepted tales, as idiosyncratic moments became part, sometimes long after the event, of social systems of memory.[61] For Wood, the repeated stories which tied communities together could easily take on a vicarious mode, often not having or needing a single original author: the dense web of shared memories includes many narratives which have been performed or re-enacted many times over, because and by way of others' prior acts of remembrance (271–86).

C5.P31 These tight interanimations of personal and shared memory, and of episodic and semantic forms of remembering, can often be most clearly identified at work within unique settings and communities of practice. Even where philosophers and psychologists of memory pay lip service to the importance of interaction between these forms of remembering, their attention rarely stretches beyond the attempt to address each distinctly in order to address their interanimation in practice.[62] Place is not just a vital catalyst for these ways of fusing or overlaying various forms of remembrance. It is often itself one element in the distributed system, affording easy multimodal projection onto and across well-known locations and features for those who inhabited their land in such customary and deeply embedded ways. For Whyte, local landscape features were also integrated into complex mnemonic systems. The traditions of boundary marking and landmark noting were not simply enacted on ritual occasions like the perambulations of Rogation week, but were also woven into many familiar but unique local ways of recognizing and sequencing significant events. This kind of opportunistic use of space, interlacing real landscapes with imaginary and symbolic ideas or orders, could be seen as a popular version of the elite arts of memory: but the essential anchoring of the blended space in a specific set of familiar local landmarks, rather than a constructed space in the scholar's imagination, perhaps suggests closer parallels with related uses of the 'method of loci' in non-Western contexts, such as the Trobrianders' narrative myths structured around island geography as studied by Malinowski and then Hutchins.[63]

[61] Whyte, 'Landscape, Memory and Custom'.

[62] Jeffrey P. Toth and R. Reed Hunt, 'Not One Versus Many, but Zero Versus Any: Structure and Function in the Context of the Multiple Memory Systems Debate', in *Memory: Systems, Process, or Function?* ed. Jonathan K. Foster and Marko Jelicic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 232–72.

[63] Frances Harwood, 'Myth, Memory, and the Oral Tradition: Cicero in the Trobriands', *American Anthropologist* 78, no. 4 (1976): 783–96; and Hutchins, *Cognition in the Wild*. For different points of comparison here see also, on projection and imagination, David Kirsh, 'Projection, Problem Space and Anchoring', in *Proceedings of the 31st Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society*, ed. Neils Taatgen and Hedderik van Rijn (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2009); and, on material mnemonics in other ancient landscapes, Lynne Kelly,

C5.P32 Moving through the physical environment integrates, in turn, habitual or skill memories with personal and experiential memories, again at both individual and social levels at once. Intergenerational transmission of skills and know-how involves both specific episodes of trial and error, and repeated cumulative practice. Such meshing of more embodied and more cognitive forms of memory is a key vehicle for the maintenance of cultural knowledge and creativity.[64] Notably, modernist and violent schemes for cutting children off from their traditional communities—in the misguided assimilationism behind the forced removal of the 'stolen generations' in Australia and Canada, for example—have targeted bodily habits as much as stories, and skills and customs as much as explicit or traditional knowledge.[65] Only when cultural apprenticeship can take its natural multimodal form, when younger people learn how to act and what to do in the right places and at the right times through being exposed to specific information, will embodied practice shape and fill in the gaps in explicit narratives and memories.

C5.P33 But mindful bodies do not operate only in the actual environment. The way that we inhabit imagined worlds is often as important and emotionally significant as our location in real geographies. Bodily movements, like memories, have many functions beyond the instrumental aims of the present: in, across, and between particular locations, they carry the past, they suggest futures, and they realize possible or sometimes impossible alternatives. As Casey puts it, 'the lived body traces out the arena for the remembered scenes that inhere so steadfastly in particular places: the body's maneuvers and movements, *imagined as well as actual,* make room for remembering placed scenes'.[66] So, finally, just as Rzepka showed us imagination operating in perception, projection, and fantasy alike, so we can identify a central imaginative component in place memory. Place memory is not bound by the limitations of perception or of the singular physical world: it is intrinsically also imagined and imaginative, affording 'a local habitation' to many and varied forms of dream, fiction, and wish. This is apparent even in the documentary and heavily practical archives excavated by cultural historians: for Wood, 'custom and local memory constructed ways of seeing

Knowledge and Power in Prehistoric Societies: Orality, Memory, and the Transmission of Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

[64] Kim Sterelny, *The Evolved Apprentice* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2012).

[65] Sue Campbell, *Our Faithfulness to the Past: The Ethics and Politics of Memory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

[66] Casey, *Remembering*, 189, italics added.

the landscape, *enmeshed within a complex web of imagined boundaries and spaces*, caught within a world of living tradition'.[67] While the historical study of such imagined boundaries and spaces, alongside other phenomena of memory and place, poses many challenges, it can potentially point the way to topics towards which psychology and cognitive theory need to reach.[68]

[67] Wood, *Memory of the People*, 13, italics added.

[68] My thanks to the editors; to Gail Kern Paster for her inspirational work and inspiring example over many years; to Lyn Tribble and my other collaborators in historical research, including Nick Keene and my colleagues on the Conversions project, especially Ben Schmidt, Mark Vessey, Bronwen Wilson, and Paul Yachnin; and to Greg Downey, Graeme Friedman, Christine Harris-Smyth, Roland Smith, and Kim Sterelny.

C6

6

Meteorology, Embodiment, and Environment in Shakespeare's *A Midsummer Night's Dream*

Mary Thomas Crane

C6.P1 In his essay on 'The Ecology of Self in *Midsummer Night's Dream*', Robert N. Watson reframes C. L. Barber's 'familiar three-part movement of Shakespearean comedy from a decadent or desiccated city out into the green world and back to a revived city' in terms that resonate with issues of embodiment and environment, describing a 'near dissolution of humanity in the wilds of nature' leading to 'a more flexible and biologically inclusive definition' of the human at the play's end.[1] Watson's reading of the play is compelling, but the efficacy of 'the wilds of nature' that he describes depends on taking a very different view of 'nature' than did Barber himself. As Steven Greenblatt notes in an introduction to a new 2012 edition of *Shakespeare's Festive Comedy*, 'the Elizabethan seasonal festivals described in Barber's book are not raw, but cooked. That is, they show signs of aesthetic form conferred by his reading them through the theories of Frazer, Bergson, and Freud, and, still more, by his viewing them through the lens of Shakespeare's art.'[2] Greenblatt argues that Barber's folk ritual 'always already manages to sound like a version of pastoral' (xv). Barber does not describe the 'wilds of

[1] Watson, 'The Ecology of Self in *Midsummer Night's Dream*' in *Ecocritical Shakespeare*, ed. Lynne Bruckner and Dan Brayton (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 33–56, 38.

[2] Greenblatt, introduction to *Shakespeare's Festive Comedy: A Study of Dramatic Form and Its Relation to Social Custom*, by C. L. Barber (1959; repr., Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), xv. Barber's study was enormously influential and shaped understanding of Shakespeare's comedies into the 1970s. Greenblatt notes in his introduction to the reprinted edition that the book 'has retained its freshness, its vitality, and usefulness across a span of time that has doomed most other critical studies, even the most celebrated among them, to seem brittle and faded' (xiii).

Mary Thomas Crane, *Meteorology, Embodiment, and Environment in Shakespeare's A Midsummer Night's Dream*
In: *Geographies of Embodiment in Early Modern England*. Edited by: Mary Floyd-Wilson and Garrett A. Sullivan, Oxford University Press (2020).
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198852742.003.0006

nature', but instead focuses on human interventions in and responses to nature.

C6.P2 Barber's anthropocentric approach to the natural world leads him to read *A Midsummer Night's Dream* as centrally concerned with managing the unruly forces of nature and imagination. In Barber's terms, the play, like all festive comedies, uses the green world to move the characters 'through release to clarification', in this case about 'the tricks of strong imagination'.[3] For Barber, the traditional festive rituals of Maying and Midsummer served to 'frame' the natural cycles of the year, 'policing the boundaries of license and restraint, natural and unnatural' (4). New historicist, postcolonial, feminist, and queer critics of Barber have tended to point out the complicity of the restraint he celebrates with structures of power and repression, but nevertheless still see the green world as affording a temporary experience of release that works ultimately to resecure hierarchy and institutional controls.[4]

C6.P3 And yet, Barber's reading of what happens in the green world of this play is probably the least satisfactory of his readings of the comedies: the play that is most explicitly about rural festivity seems difficult to relate to the 'release to clarification' pattern. He acknowledges that the 'drastic helplessness of will and mind' that the lovers experience in the forest results in 'a farce which puts them beside themselves to take them beyond themselves', but whatever change occurs comes with 'little suggestion that it involves a growth in insight' (147). For Barber, the green world (with its imagery of water, melting, and transformation) presents 'a moment where the perceived structure of the outer world breaks down, where the body and its environment interpenetrate in unaccustomed ways, so that the seeming separateness and stability of identity is lost' only to be resecured at the end of the play through the institutions of hierarchy and marriage (153).

[3] Barber, *Shakespeare's Festive Comedy*, 2, 141.

[4] See, for example, Shankar Raman's account of older readings that trace 'the potentially disruptive forces of passion, imagination, and irrationality, which are then harmonized with the putatively rational order of a social world framing the dream in the forest', and newer readings which 'have emphasized the play's ideological intervention in the formation of normative social categories', in *Framing 'India': The Colonial Imaginary in Early Modern Culture* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 241. There are a number of such readings. Louis Montrose, '"Shaping Fantasies": Figurations of Gender and Power in Elizabethan Culture', *Representations*, no. 2 (1983): 61–94, is an early example of a focus on 'the authority to name the forms' and 'the power to control the subjects of mental disorder' in the play (61), although Montrose is also concerned to show how the play manages male anxiety about Queen Elizabeth's disruption of gender hierarchies.

C6.P4 Of course, the work of Gail Kern Paster, Mary Floyd-Wilson, and others has in the years since Barber's book made clear to us the extent to which 'the body and its environment' were, in the early modern period, always seen as interpenetrating, with profound implications for the concept of identity. Paster has argued that 'humoral subjectivity' is 'a form of consciousness that is open, penetrable, fluid, and extended outwards to the higher animals with whom it shared affective workings'.[5] For Floyd-Wilson, 'ethnic distinctions . . . rest on measurements of *how* the self interacts with the world: the degree to which one is open or detached, leaky or replete, languid or alert'.[6] In *The Body Embarrassed*, Paster compellingly charted the disciplines of shame that were developed to embarrass the leaky early modern body into adherence to the norms of gender and social hierarchy.[7] Certainly order is imposed on the unruly and conflicting passions of the four young lovers by the end of the play. But if we look closely at the representation of the environment of the forest world, and at the intersection of meteorological and humoral experience, I think we can see a play that calls attention to the difficulty with which human beings and their cultural institutions attempt to control the vagaries of nature, both human/humoral and environmental/meteorological. Attention to meteorology lets us recognize in Barber and in historicist critiques of his work what Jane Bennett has described as a materiality that 'most often refers to human social structures or to human meanings "embodied" in them and other objects', and, having recognized this facet of historical materialism, to begin to turn towards the 'dogged resistance to anthropocentrism' that she locates in 'vital materialism'.[8]

C6.P5 I want to argue here that the fairies in the play function as anthropomorphized agents of meteorology.[9] Acting in and through the power of the

[5] Paster, 'Melancholy Cats, Lugged Bears, and Early Modern Cosmology: Reading Shakespeare's Psychological Materialism Across the Species Barrier', in *Reading the Early Modern Passions: Essays in the Cultural History of Emotion*, ed. Gail Kern Paster, Katherine Rowe, and Mary Floyd-Wilson (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 113–29, 116.

[6] Floyd-Wilson, 'English Mettle', in *Reading the Early Modern Passions*, ed. Paster, Rowe, and Floyd-Wilson, 130–46, 134.

[7] Paster, *The Body Embarrassed: Drama and the Disciplines of Shame in Early Modern England* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993). She focuses on the scatological/erotic charge of Titania's relationship with Bottom.

[8] Bennett, *Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), xvi.

[9] Watson, interestingly, reads the play through a thought experiment that views the fairies in 'the role of microbes' which reveal the extent to which humans are 'less inhabitants of an ecosystem than participants in it' (Watson, 'Ecology of Self', 34). Associating them with meteorological processes leads to some of the same conclusions.

moon (the dividing point in the cosmos between the orderly and unchanging physics of the heavens and the disorderly changes of the mortal sublunar realm), the winds, fog, and dew, the fairies' abilities are consistently described in meteorological terms. Although Barber viewed the fairies as involving an aestheticization of ritual control over nature, and argued that they were based on Ovid and court entertainments as much as on rural tradition, I want to argue that they function in the play as an embodiment of Bennett's 'vital materiality', which helps reveal 'that culture is not of our own making, infused as it is by biological, geological, and climatic forces'.[10] The fairies' powers identify them, literally, as forces of nature—and of the particularly unruly elemental nature that intersects with the unruly humoral body.[11] The fairies push us to imagine what Bennett calls 'materialities as actants' (62) as the play uses anthropomorphism (embodying natural forces in human actors) to work 'against anthropocentrism' (120). By representing material forces in quasi-human form, 'a chord is struck between person and thing' to provide a perspective that lets us see the human as 'no longer above or outside a nonhuman environment' (120). Meteorological treatises published in sixteenth-century England can provide a gloss for many of the fairies' powers and actions and for the conditions created in their woodland setting, including their connection with imagination and illusion.[12] These treatises show that the moon, the winds, the fog, and the dew that suffuse the play are especially associated with change, volatility, evanescence, and illusion—properties of mortal, elemental matter that are not easily controlled by human agents.

C6.P6 Many critics have noticed the play's frequent references to the moon. The word moon appears twenty-three times in *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, many more times than in *Love's Labour's Lost*, the play with the next highest frequency of use (eight times). As critics have long argued, references to the moon in *A Midsummer Night's Dream* are shaped by the complex

[10] Bennett, *Vibrant Matter*, 112, 115. Mary Ellen Lamb argues that the play also calls on fairy narratives used by people of lower status to conceal transgressive behaviour, but that in the process it 'represents a precondition for the denigration and eventual rejection of popular culture as vulgar by the eighteenth century' ('Taken by the Fairies: Fairy Practices and the Production of Popular Culture in *A Midsummer Night's Dream*', *Shakespeare Quarterly* 51, no. 3 (2000): 277–312, 277).

[11] Rebecca Totaro argues that in the first tetralogy, 'meteorology served as the elemental descriptive register from which Shakespeare drew to increase the intensity associated with the psychophysiological changes he depicted on stage' ('The Meteorophysiology of the Curse in Shakespeare's First Tetralogy', *English Language Notes* 51, no. 1 (2013): 191–209, 191).

[12] For a reading of *A Midsummer Night's Dream* that associates the agency of the faeries with the unseen world of the spirits, see Mary Floyd-Wilson's essay in this volume (Chapter 11).

mythological associations that allow it to create a mysterious atmosphere for the nocturnal forest world of the fairies. The moon goddess (variously called Phoebe, Cynthia, or Diana) provided one of the several personae attributed to Elizabeth I as a way of naturalizing (or rather, supernaturalizing) her unmarried state, but this persona could also be used against her, since the moon was associated with change and with women's humoral weakness and flux.[13] In late sixteenth-century England, the moon was also a central and contested liminal point in the cosmology inherited from classical antiquity, dividing the realm described by astronomy from that covered by meteorology. In the Ptolemaic/Aristotelian system, the sphere of the moon marked the dividing line between the unchanging realm of the upper heavens, where motion was naturally ordered and circular, and the lower changeable and disordered realm of the four elements. Above the moon, nothing could change or die; below the moon, things changed constantly and were subject to death and decay. As Robert Recorde explains in his 1556 textbook on astronomy, *The Castle of Knowledge*, the heavens are divided into spheres, of which 'the lowest sphere is the sphere of the Mone under which the foure elementes succeed'.[14] The area below the moon is called 'the Elementarie parte' of the cosmos, 'and because those elementes do dailye increase and decrease in some partes of them (though not in all partes at ones) and are subject to continuall corruption, thei are distinct from the rest of the world, which hath no such alteration or corruption, which parte is above all the foure elementes' (7).

C6.P7 The idea that the moon constituted a significant boundary in the universe was so powerful that it could be compatible with both the Ptolemaic and Copernican systems. Leonard Digges, in the first translation of Copernicus's *De revolutionibus* into English, describes Copernicus's argument that 'the Earth resteth not in the Center of the whole world, but only in the Center of this our mortal world, or Globe of Elements, which environed and enclosed in the Moon's Orb, and together with the whole Globe of mortality, is carried yearly around the Sun'.[15] While astronomy (both

[13] Sir Walter Ralegh was one of the first of Elizabeth's courtiers to associate her with the moon, as part of play on the acknowledged power of the moon over water (her nickname for him). The association was then more widely adopted, but Ralegh returned to it in 'The Ocean to Cynthia' as a way of complaining about her fickleness when he was in disfavour. See Robert T. Stillman, '"Words Cannot Knytt": Language and Desire in Ralegh's *The Ocean to Cynthia*', *SEL Studies in English Literature, 1500–1900* 27, no. 1 (1987): 35–51.

[14] Recorde, *The Castle of Knowledge* (London, 1556), 9.

[15] Digges, *A Perfit Description of the Caelestiall Orbes*, in *A Prognostication everlasting of right good effect* (London, 1576), M11r.

Ptolemaic and Copernican) was the discipline that charted the movements of the heavenly bodies, astrology used their location to determine their potential effects on the sublunar realm, and meteorology studied the behaviour of the four elements when acted upon by the heavenly bodies. Whatever the model used to determine the location of the heavenly bodies, all changes in the sublunar realm were dependent on their power. As John Rastell explains in his didactic play 'Four Elements' (*c*.1519), 'the elementis and other bodyes all | Beneth take theyr effectys and operacyons | Of the bodyes in the region ethereall' so that 'yf the movynges above sholde onys cease | Beneth sholde be nother increase nor decrese'.[16] Human bodies were also subject to the influence of celestial bodies, since the four bodily humors shared the same qualities as the four terrestrial elements, and therefore underwent similar processes and changes.

C6.P8 The significance of the lunar boundary was, however, called into question by the appearance of a new star, a supernova in the constellation Cassiopeia that first became visible in November 1572. Since change was supposedly impossible above the moon, new stars had in the past been explained as comets or meteors, which were thought to be atmospheric phenomena (under the rubric, as we shall see, of meteorology). In 1572, however, for the first time mathematicians and astronomers like Tycho Brahe, Thomas Digges, and John Dee possessed the instruments and mathematical knowledge to determine that the new star was indeed located above the moon, therefore raising the possibility that change could occur both above and below the moon.[17] The new star was variously explained as a miracle, a sign that the world was about to end, or an indication that new theories were needed to explain the structure of the universe. As I have argued elsewhere, writers like Gabriel Harvey, Edmund Spenser, and Christopher Marlowe all registered the disruptive effects of the new star. Its appearance did not necessarily destroy belief in the lunar boundary, but it called attention to it, and to the role and location of change in the universe.[18]

[16] Richard Axton, ed., *Three Rastell Plays* (Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 1979), 35, lines 169–75.

[17] One indication that the new star was located above the moon was the absence of parallax. As Steven Shapin explains, 'parallax is the change in angle when an object is viewed from two positions. The annual parallax of a close heavenly object ought to be noticeably large, whereas that for a very distant object might be so small as to be undetectable', which was the case with the new star. See Shapin, *The Scientific Revolution* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 26.

[18] See Mary Crane, *Losing Touch with Nature: Literature and the New Science in Sixteenth-Century England* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014).

C6.P9 Meteorology was the area of natural philosophy that studied sublunar physics and the changing forms that the four elements could take as they were acted upon by the higher heavenly bodies—the sun, moon, planets, and stars. Craig Martin has argued that Aristotle's *Meteorology* differed from his other works in being 'conjectural, based on observation, and overwhelmingly concerned with material and efficient causation'.[19] As a result, the *Meteorology* was not subject to the same critiques to which other fields of scholastic philosophy were increasingly subjected in this period. The *Meteorology* remained 'relevant to even those who opposed Aristotelian thought' and 'became the foundation for an experientially based corpuscular philosophy' (2).[20] In sixteenth-century England, Protestant writers like William Fulke revisited meteorology in order to find natural explanations for phenomena (like comets, earthquakes, strange images in the sky) that had been previously considered to have supernatural causes.[21]

C6.P10 Fulke, in his 1563 meteorological treatise *A Goodly Gallerye*, explains the scope of this branch of science, listing examples of common meteorological phenomena categorized by their location: 'In the aire be generated rayne, hayle, snow, dew, blasing starres, thonder, lightning &c. In the earth be welles, springs, earthquakes, metalls minerals, &c. made, and as it were in their mothers belly begotten & fashioned.'[22] Extending this classificatory scheme, he identifies meteors of the air according to their location:

C6.P11 > In the hyghest region, be generated *Cometes* or blasing starres, and such lyke of diverse sortes. In the midle region cloudes, rayne, stormes, wyndes, &c. In the lowest region, dewe, frost, horefrost, mistes, bryght rods, candels burning about graves, & gallows where ther is store of clamy fatty or oyly substaunce, also lightes and flammyng fiers, seene in fieldes, &c. (6r)

C6.P12 Fulke's reference to 'clamy fatty or oyly substaunce' hints at the physical mechanisms believed to cause these phenomena. Just as water, when it evaporates, gives off water vapour, so too, Aristotle theorized, did the earth

[19] Martin, *Renaissance Meteorology: Pomponazzi to Descartes* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011), 2.

[20] See Gwilym Jones, *Shakespeare's Storms* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2015) for an account of Shakespearean meteorology in relation to performance practice.

[21] Richard Bauckham argues that Fulke is concerned to 'explain in terms of natural cause and effect phenomena which at the time were widely attributed solely to supernatural causes' ('Science and Religion in the Writings of Dr. William Fulke', *British Journal for the History of Science* 8, no. 1 (1975): 17–31, 27).

[22] Fulke, *A Goodly Gallerye* (London, 1563), 5r.

give off a similar 'exhalation' when warmed by the sun. Earthy exhalations were thought to be denser, and clammier or greasier, than water vapour, and therefore able to catch on fire. The sun (and to some extent the moon and the winds) acted on these vapours and pulled them up into the atmosphere, where the temperature of the region to which they ascended determined whether they would condense and fall back down to earth (rain), freeze and fall back down to earth (snow, hail, sleet), or rise up to the upper area of fire, catch fire, and fall back down as a meteor, comet, or 'blazing star'. Exhalations trapped in the earth might cause earthquakes as they tried to escape, or might harden into minerals if they were unable to get out. Winds were caused by exhalations 'drawne up into the aire by the power of the sunne, & by reason of the wayght therof being driven down, is laterally or sidelongs caried about the earth' (18r).[23]

C6.P13 Titania's speech in act 2, scene 1 of *A Midsummer Night's Dream* describing the effects of her quarrel with Oberon provides the clearest and most extended description of their meteorological powers, although this language permeates the play.[24] Titania claims that her followers' dances are addressed to the winds, and since Oberon has disrupted them with his 'brawls', the winds have 'suck'd up from the sea | Contagious fogs, which falling on the land, | Hath every pelting river made so proud | That they have overborne their continents'.[25] Fulke explains how mists occur when 'any *vapor* is lifted up into the ayre, by the heate of the sunne, which not being strong enough to drawe it so high, that the colde maye knitte it' (48r). Rain occurs when a cloud is warmed when 'the Southerne wynde, or any other wynde of hotte temper, doth resolve it againe into water' (49r).[26] These floods in turn destroy crops and disrupt the seasons.

C6.P14 In addition to its disruptive effect on the winds, the fairy quarrel has also angered 'The moon (the governess of floods)', who 'pale in her anger, washes all the air, | That rheumatic diseases do abound' (104–6). In the intertwined

[23] S. K. Heninger Jr, *A Handbook of Renaissance Meteorology* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1960), provides a clear summary of meteorological theories from the period and a catalogue of meteorological references found in various literary works. He describes different theories of winds (107–20).

[24] For a different reading of Titania's speech, see Henry Turner, who argues that Shakespeare uses 'mythic symbols to describe the "complexity" of natural forces' (*Shakespeare's Double Helix* (London: Continuum, 2007), 34). He emphasizes the role of magic in creating the illusions that I link to meteorology and optics.

[25] G. B. Evans, ed., *The Riverside Shakespeare* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974), 2.1.89–92. All quotations from Shakespeare's plays come from this edition.

[26] Heninger, *Handbook of Renaissance Meteorology*, 53, discusses this passage, but in general does not see *A Midsummer Night's Dream* as particularly shaped by meteorological references.

doctrines of humoral medicine and meteorology, the moon's control over water, both in the body and in the environment, was well known. William Cunningham, explaining the control of the moon over the tides in his *Cosmographical Glasse* (1559), cites Galen's argument that 'when as the Mone increase in light, al moist thinges in like case increase: & when as her light decreaseth, they in like sort decrease'.[27] This lunar 'distemperature' is therefore understood as affecting both the body, causing an increase of watery rheum, and the weather, causing an alteration of the usual pattern of the seasons. Seasonal patterns represented one way that meteorology (and the almanacs and other guides that taught its tenets) helped people feel some limited control over the elements, but the quarrel of Oberon and Titania has disrupted that control.

C6.P15 Titania also describes her relationship with the mother of the contested 'Indian boy' in terms mediated by the wind, describing how they gossiped together 'in the spiced Indian air, by night' and watched ships with sails that 'grow big-bellied with the wanton wind' (2.1.124, 129). Critics have correctly noted the implication of this passage in colonial trade relations.[28] During the Middle Ages, spices were in great demand, partly as medicines with hot and dry properties that countered the dangerous cold and wet tendencies of meat and fish—in other words, as preventatives of 'rheumatic diseases'.[29] The 'spiced Indian air' may even refer to the monsoon winds that made it possible for ships to cross the Indian ocean. Air and wind in this passage are associated with fertility, as the sails 'conceive | And grow big-bellied with the wanton wind' in parallel with the votaress whose 'womb then rich with my young squire' seems to swim on land (128–30). The emphasis in this passage on human mastery of and even commodification of the elements is undone when Titania concludes her descriptive reminiscence with a blunt statement: 'but she, being mortal, of that boy did die'

[27] Cunningham, *The Cosmographical Glasse* (London, 1559), 145r.

[28] See Raman, who notes that Titania 'cunningly instrumentalizes the discourse of mercantile colonialism to justify her ownership of the child', so that 'Oberon's and Titania's economies both rest upon commodifying the East, thereby assimilating its otherness within structures of Western thought' (*Framing 'India'*, 244–5). See also Gitanjali Shahani, who argues that the play's 'fairy world effectively captures the tensions between pre-capitalist modalities of everyday social relations and emerging capitalist rituals of value, exchange, and conspicuous consumption' and that Titania 'explicitly links her desire for the Indian boy with a desire for Indian merchandise' ('The Spicèd Indian Air in Early Modern England', *Shakespeare Studies* 42 (2014): 122–37, 130, 132).

[29] See Paul Freedman, *Out of the East: Spices and the Medieval Imagination* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), 55, for the medicinal properties of spices as hot and dry agents.

(135). Below the moon, the fairies may have the power to control the elements, but not mortality itself.

C6.P16 Puck and the other attendant fairies also work as meteorological agents, similarly using the moon, the winds, fog, and dew to make temporary alterations to the environment. Titania's attendant fairy travels 'swifter than the moon's sphere' and serves the fairy queen by spreading dew: 'I must go seek some dewdrops here | And hang a pearl in every cowslip's ear' (2.1.14–15). When Oberon accuses Titania of involvement with Theseus—'Didst not thou lead him through the glimmering night' (2.1.77)—he may be suggesting that she acted through 'fools fire', which, according to Fulke, is 'a kind of light, that is seen in the night season, & seemeth to goe before men, or to followe them, leading them out of their waye' (11v), caused by fiery exhalations. Oberon orders Puck to 'overcast the night; | The starry welkin cover thou anon | With drooping fog as black as Acheron' (3.2.355–7). At the very end of the play, Oberon uses 'field-dew' to consecrate the bridal chambers of the Athenian couples (5.1.415). Fog and dew both appeared when the sun (or moon) was not strong enough to pull water vapour up into the sky. Fog tended to have negative associations, but dew was more positive, because it was thought to take several beneficial forms.[30] Fulke identifies 'one kynde of the sweet dewes' which 'is called *Manna*, being whyghte lyke sugar'; another 'very pretious kynde of dewe' in Arabia, which falls on an herb eaten by goats; and yet another kind of English sweet dew, called 'meldewes', that 'is as sweet as hony' (53v). Dew could only appear 'in the most temperat calme tyme' (54r). Both fog and dew were short-lived phenomena, quickly dispersed or dried up by sun and wind, embodying the continually changing nature of the elements.

C6.P17 During the middle acts of the play, Oberon and Puck make various attempts to interfere in human and fairy relationships using a herbal potion that, when applied to the eye, causes the subject to fall in love with the next person who comes into view. The confusions that result as they misapply the potion suggest again that the fairies' power over the sublunar world tends to magnify the disorderly nature of the elements. The etiology that Oberon offers of the herb's power to induce instant love has been correctly read as an example of the play's reliance on Ovid and courtly entertainments as sources for the fairies' powers.[31] But even here, meteorology and

[30] Heninger, *Handbook of Renaissance Meteorology*, 62–3, 68–9.

[31] See Barber, who argues that Oberon describes a scene from Elizabeth's visit to Elvetham in 1591 (*Shakespeare's Festive Comedy*, 138–39). Louis Montrose links the play to several

astrological medicine are intertwined with mythology to provide a plausible explanation for the power of the herb, with the moon taking its usual intermediary role. Just as the sun and moon acted on the terrestrial elements to produce weather, so too did they act on plants and living things to cause their growth.[32] Astrological medicine described the influence of the heavenly bodies on particular plants. As Anthony Askham notes in his *Litell treatyse of Astronomy, very necessary for Physyke and Surgerye* (1550), 'it is manyfeste and well knowen … that all herbes, stones, gummes and metalles, hath theyr generacions, dispocicyons, vertues, and proprietyes of the Sonne, Moone, and Sterres'.[33] The moon has a particular role, since it 'is the lowest of all the planetes … and is the mediatrix … and conveyre of the vertues and propertyes of al the other planetes, from the one to the other, and is also the commixter and joynere together of all the heavens and elementes'. So, for example, 'the Moone in her course passynge by the Sterres … mynystreth the influence of Saturn to the herbe' (A5v).

C6.P18 When Oberon describes how Cupid's arrow was 'quench'd in the chaste beams of the wat'ry moon' before striking the 'fair vestal throned in the west' (2.1.157–62), he describes a process not all that different from the natural operation of the moon on the elements, with Cupid's arrow standing in for a directed version of the beams or 'species' that all heavenly bodies emitted.[34] Similarly, when the arrow strikes the flower, 'Before milk-white, now purple with love's wound' (167), it again acts like the beams of a star or planet mediated by the moon to convey some 'vertue' to the plant, in this case the ability to make someone 'madly dote' on the next person or animal that is seen. Similarly, this first herb's effect can be undone by another herb 'whose liquor hath this vertuous property, | To take from thence all errors with his might, | And make his eyeballs roll with wonted sight' (3.2.367–9).

different courtly entertainments and argues that 'the pervasive cultural presence of the Queen was a condition of the play's imaginative possibility', linking that in turn to that fact that 'the festive conclusion of *A Midsummer Night's Dream* depends upon the success of a process by which the feminine pride and power manifested in Amazon warriors, possessive mothers, unruly wives, and wilful daughters are brought under the control of lords and husbands' (*The Purpose of Playing: Shakespeare and the Cultural Politics of the Elizabethan Theatre* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 161).

[32] For an account of the relationships among the moon, plants, and human desire in a different context, see Shannon Kelley, 'Desire, a Crooked Yearning, and the Plants of *Endymion*', *Renaissance Drama* 44 (2016), especially pp. 10–14.

[33] Askham, *A litell treatyse of astrouomy very necessary for physyke and surgerye* (London, 1550), A2r.

[34] The 'fair vestal' has been identified with Elizabeth I, and the role of the moon here reflects its association with her chastity, as well as with her potential fickleness.

When Puck attempts to use the herb like a portable version of Cupid's arrow, however, his misapplications simply add to the number of seemingly arbitrary changes of affection already underway.

C6.P19 From the beginning of the play, love and desire (called 'fancy' in the play) are associated with the unpredictably malleable and changeable nature of the sublunar humors and elements.[35] These connections are certainly influenced by conventional metaphors that express the experience of love in terms of weather. However, because the elements and humors were composed of the same matter and behaved similarly under the influence of heat and cold, these metaphors are not just fanciful tropes, but rather working analogies that allow processes that would otherwise be hidden in the interior of the body to be imagined in visual terms.[36] Meteorological references are used here, as with the fairies, to suggest the temporary and volatile nature of desire. Momentary sympathy in love is described as being 'brief as the lightening in the collied night' (1.1.145), alluding to what Fulke calls '*coruscation*', which is 'a glistering of fyre, rather than fyre in deade, and a glymmerynge of lyghtning' (26v). Change of affections is described as melting, as when Hermia tells how Demetrius 'hail'd down oaths that he was only mine; | And when this hail some heat from Hermia felt, | So he dissolv'd, and showers of oaths did melt' (1.2.243–5).[37] When Demetrius himself struggles to explain his sudden shifts from Hermia to Helena, and back to Hermia, he describes his love as 'melted as the snow' (4.1.166).

C6.P20 Ideas derived from meteorology, optics, and humoral medicine are also intertwined in the play's representation of fancy, imagination, and dreams—all considered to be unruly, malleable, and deceptive. Here, the concept of 'impression' links these discourses, based on a set of ideas developed in the Middle Ages to provide a plausible physical mechanism to explain some forms of occult causation, such as action at a distance. In Aristotle's universe, only phenomena that were observable in the course of daily experience were subject to explanation. When some object or force seemed to

[35] Watson, 'Ecology of Self', notes recent research on the role of hormones in the experience of love to conclude that 'love involves forces and interactions and emergent phenomena so mysterious… that we might as well turn the names of the compounds into names of fairies' (35–6).

[36] See Totaro, who notes that 'human bodies largely conformed to the rules governing all sublunar bodies' ('Meteorophysiology', 191). Mary Floyd-Wilson suggests that what seem to be metaphors comparing the womb to the lodestone are not to be viewed as 'mere analogy but as a strategy for representing their shared yet hidden physics' (*Occult Knowledge, Science, and Gender on the Shakespearean Stage* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 76).

[37] For more on the rhetoric of dissolution and melting in the early modern period, see Kristen Poole's essay in this volume (Chapter 7).

exert an impact on something else across a distance and no visible or sensible connection existed between them, that connection was considered to be 'occult'—which meant simply 'hidden', not supernatural. Most occult phenomena were understood to have natural causes, but they were natural causes that were unavailable for human observation. The prototypical occult force was that emitted by a magnet—because whatever attracted iron or other magnets to it could not be seen. The force exerted by the heavenly bodies on the elements and the invisible mechanisms that conveyed sensory information across space were also 'occult'.

C6.P21 Stuart Clark, in his book *Vanities of the Eye*, has noted that Aristotle's theories about 'precisely how the organs of sense received information about their sensibles via a medium . . . was subject to considerable debate'.[38] Medieval thinkers developed the concept of *species* (often translated as 'rays') in order to resolve some of these difficulties and express 'the distinction between the matter and form—or between the substantial form and sensible form'.[39] This concept was necessary to explain how the forms of things could travel across space and affect the human body—the problem of invisible 'action at a distance' for which Aristotelian matter theory could not account very well. Clark explains how writers like Roger Bacon developed the theory that *species* or rays 'radiated out from these objects into the surrounding medium, usually the air, transmitting images of the qualities physically (that is, by alteration) through the medium to the eye' (15). This intramissive theory of vision had almost completely replaced earlier extramissive theories (in which the eyes shot out beams to capture images) by the late sixteenth century. The crystalline humour of the eye, according to Helkiah Crooke, received the 'species or forms of visible thinges' and they were 'imprinted therein . . . like unto waxe'.[40] Here, the wax is metaphorical, but the impression of species on the crystalline humor of the eye is literal.

C6.P22 The heavenly bodies also emitted *species*, and John Dee argued in his *Propaedeumata Aphoristica* (1558) that 'the stars and celestial powers are like seals whose characters are imprinted differently by reason of differences in the elemental matter'. These 'celestial rays . . . possess a great readiness to

[38] Clark, *Vanities of the Eye: Vision in Early Modern European Culture* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 14.

[39] Ibid., 15.

[40] Crooke, *Mikrokosmographia* (London, 1615), 568, 571; quoted in Clark, *Vanities of the Eye*, 19.

influence everything, or to imprint their energies upon it'.[41] Dee also argues that mirrors or lenses could be used to magnify stellar species so that 'you would be able, by art, to imprint the rays of any star much more strongly upon any matter subjected to it than nature itself does' (149). The earth's atmosphere was also capable of receiving 'impressions' in the form of vapours drawn up from the earth and water by the heat of the sun. The science of meteorology described rain, snow, hail, rainbows, fossils, and earthquakes as 'impressions' caused by the movement, melting, or solidification of vapours. Fulke describes how vapours 'passe the lowest and midle region of the ayre, and are caried up even to the highest region, where for the excessive heat, by nearenes of the fier, they are kindled, and cause many kinde of impressions' (2v–3r). Fulke's treatise explains that many reported 'wonderful apparitions' (44r) in the sky—like multiple suns, multiple moons, or 'sightes of armies fighting, in the ayre, of Castels, Cities, and Townes, with whole countries' (45r)—are caused 'naturally, when the disposition of the ayre, hath been suche, that it hath received the image of manye things placed and done on the earth' (46r) like a reflection in a mirror. Clouds could provide an especially receptive screen for these projected impressions.

C6.P23 Fog and dew were also associated with dreams and visions, through an analogy with the behaviour of humors within the body, and as a condition for creating them. Thomas Nashe, in *The Terrors of the Night* (1594), likens the kinds of images in the sky described by Fulke to dreams and visions:

C6.P24 > Sundry times wee behold whole Armies of men skirmishing in the Ayre, Dragons, wilde beasts, bloody streamers, blasing Commets, firiestrakes with other apparitions innumerable, whence have all these their conglomerate matter but from fuming meteors that arise from the earth, so from the fuming melancholly of our spleene mounteth the hot matter into the higher Region of the braine, whereof manie fearfull visions are framed.[42]

C6.P25 Nashe also describes how environmental conditions can themselves contribute to dreams and visions, explaining a vision of a ghost because 'the house where this Gentleman dwelt, stood in a low marish ground, almost as

[41] Wayne Shumaker and J. L. Heilbron, ed. and trans., *John Dee on Astronomy: Propaedeumata Aphoristica (1558 and 1568)* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1978), 135.

[42] Nashe, *The terrors of the night or, A discourse of apparitions* (London, 1594), C2v.

rotten a Clymate as the Lowe Countreyes, where their mystie ayre is as thicke as mould butter, and the deaw lyes like frothie barme on the ground' (G4v). He agrees that 'moyst braynes' are more susceptible to dreams that are like 'a ridiculous idle childish invention' (C4r).

C6.P26 Egeus calls on a similar physics of impressionability when he argues that his daughter loves Demetrius because he has 'stol'n the impression of her fantasy' with songs and gifts, which are 'of strong prevailment in unhardened youth' (1.1.32, 35). Women's bodies were, of course, considered to be moister than men's, and young hearts and brains softer than older ones, so young women were particularly subject to impression. As Viola says in *Twelfth Night*, 'How easy is it for the proper-false | In women's waxen hearts to set their forms' (2.2.29–30). But young men were also malleable, forming impressions that tended to melt away, as Helena notes, at the sight of another love object.

C6.P27 Thus, the herbal potion that will cause Titania to become 'full of hateful fantasies' (2.1.258) seems part of this nexus of impressions: the flower was struck by Cupid's arrow, from which it derived its special 'vertue' of causing sudden love. But songs, sights, and gifts can also cause similar love-altering impressions. When the four lovers struggle to explain what has happened to them in the forest, in addition to the previously noted language of melting, they also reference optical illusions like those described by Fulke: 'These things seem small and undistinguishable | Like far-off mountains turned into clouds' (4.1.187–8); 'methinks I see these things with parted eye | When every thing seems double' (4.1.189–90). The foggy, moonlit, dew-laden atmosphere of the forest has been conducive to moist impressions like dreams, and Demetrius offers another explanation: 'it seems to me | That yet we sleep, we dream' (4.1.193–4), an idea that Bottom picks up on in the lines that follow, describing his own 'most rare vision . . . a dream, past the wit of man to say what dream it was' (4.1.205–6).

C6.P28 Theseus, of course, seeks to transform this tenuous and uncertain moment of stasis into a permanent, socially sanctioned order. What had been previously enacted through physical interactions of the elements and humors is translated into the discourses of church and state. Uninterested in learning more about what has actually happened in the forest, Theseus will 'overbear' Egeus's will, so that 'in the temple' the two couples will 'eternally be knit', followed by a 'feast in great solemnity' (4.1.179–85). The scene ends with Bottom's attempt to 'expound' his dream according to a biblical paradigm, planning to turn it into a vehicle for patronage. Paster correctly reads Bottom's incoherent dream narrative as a 'repression of his experience in

the woods' and as a way of 'regaining the bodily control and sense of somatic boundary so decisively lost to Titania'.[43]

C6.P29 In act 5, the characters return to Athens and leave the elemental forest world behind. As human control is reasserted, references to meteorology seem to be abruptly discontinued. Theseus expresses his distrust of 'the lunatic, the lover, and the poet', but does not refer to the power of the moon, or sensible impressions, in creating their illusions. He translates what had previously been imagined as physical interactions into abstractions; instead of being impressed, the rational faculty seems to be in control as the brain 'apprehends', and 'comprehends'. Even the Pyramus and Thisbe play reduces the moon to a set of stage props, and human mortality becomes manageable as a joke. The arrival of midnight is announced not by the moon or stars, but by the 'iron tongue' of a human artefact (5.1.363).

C6.P30 At the very end of the play, the fairies several times refer to the power exerted by the alteration of day and night over the rhythms of their lives, turning away from the unruly elemental world to the ordered cycles of the heavens. They run 'from the presence of the sun | Following darkness like a dream', and plan to 'meet we all at break of day' (5.1.385–6, 422). They move indoors and are surrounded by the paraphernalia of domestic life: a fire and a broom.

C6.P31 Ironically, though, they bring 'field-dew', the most evanescent of meteorological substances, into the house in order to 'consecrate' the human marriage beds, claiming to be able to ensure that the couples' issue 'ever shall be fortunate', that the couples will 'ever true in loving be', and that Theseus 'ever shall in safety rest' (5.1.405–7, 420).

C6.P32 Watson has noted that the fairies in this scene 'finally stand on guard against inward corruption, including misprints in the genetic alphabet that misshape human bodies and hence human lives'.[44] He points out that the 'mole' and 'hare-lip' which the fairies promise to prevent represent 'the possible invasion of other-animal characteristics into the human' (50). Early modern anxieties about procreation often centred on a desire for sameness, for the reassurance that offspring resembled (and therefore confirmed the paternity of) their father. Leontes, in *A Winter's Tale*, uses the language of impression to express his approval of Florizel's likeness to his father: 'Your mother was most true to wedlock, Prince, | For she did print your royal father off, | Conceiving you'. (5.1.125–6). However, it was well known that

[43] Paster, *Body Embarrassed*, 142–3.

[44] Watson, 'Ecology of Self', 50.

the maternal imagination carried a power to impress a baby *in utero* that could disrupt the transmission of paternal sameness. Jane Sharp explains this imaginative power in meteorological terms:

C6.P33 [I]f the mother long for figs, or roses, or such things, the child is sometimes markt with them. *Avicen* gives this reason for it, that the aery spirits that are nimble of themselves, are soon moved by the phansie, and these mingle with the nutrimental blood of the child and imprint this likeness from imagination. This is a deep speculation, but it may be compared and represented to our understanding by those equivocal generations made in the air of frogs, and flies and the like by the forming faculties of the Heavens, so are the forms imagination sends engraven on the light spirits.[45]

C6.P34 Here, a process similar to the visions in the sky described by Fulke, or perhaps a process of spontaneous generation involving water vapour and solar rays, explains the power of imagination to disrupt likeness with alien markings. The fairies have been associated throughout the play with the active and disruptive force of elements and humours, so their promise that they will guarantee unmarked children seems questionable. Similarly, fairy assurances that things will stay the same forever, like Theseus's declaration that the lovers will 'eternally be knit', fly in the face of the emphasis through the first four acts on the material conditions of 'this globe of mortality', where the interaction of elements and humors below the moon ensures that change is constant, that reality is obscured by illusions, and that human beings are mortal.

C6.P35 Puck's final suggestion in the epilogue that the play itself may have been just a 'vision' or 'dream' may also call the promises of order and stasis offered in act 5 into question. His exclamation earlier in the play, 'Lord, what fools these mortals be', can be read as a comment on vain human attempts to achieve control over the changing elements and to impose order below the moon. Although comic form, as Barber argued, demands some sense of order restored at the end of the play, readers after Barber have been more attuned to the ways in which Shakespeare's comic endings are questioned or undermined, often by hints that the final order represents an imposition of heteronormativity and hierarchy, and that the characters retain in the end

[45] Sharp, *The Midwives Book*, ed. Elaine Hobby (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 96–7.

some of the limitations that hindered them at the beginning of the play. Recognizing the fairies in *A Midsummer Night's Dream* as anthropomorphized representations of the constantly changing environmental forces that act powerfully on human bodies steers us away from judgements about human character and moral culpability, or the plausibility of the happy ending. Instead, the fairies point us towards an awareness of the vital agency of the nonhuman world, an awareness which Bennett has argued has the power to 'chasten…fantasies of human mastery, highlight the common materiality of all that is, expose a wider distribution of agency, and reshape the self and its interests' (122). The fairies help us recognize that body and environment are interconnected in an assemblage that is, finally, not subject to human control.

C7

7

'My Hand Would Dissolve, Or Seem to Melt'

Poetic Dissolution and Stoic Cosmology

Kristen Poole

C7.P1 Throughout late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century literature, we find poetic speakers, dramatic characters, a natural landscape, and indeed a cosmos that is in a state of melting or dissolving. This dissolution can be corporeal: 'The body wants coherence in his parts, | Can not consist, but seuer, and *dissolue*', writes George Chapman.[1] It can be spiritual: 'I will *dissolue* and *melt* my soule to night', writes John Marston.[2] It can be environmental: 'The *World* (like *Ice*) is slippry, brittle, cold; | And, apt to *melt*, and quickly *shift* his *Formes*', contends John Davies.[3] And the dissolution can be eschatological: 'That dreaded Day of Ire, | Shall *dissolue* the World in Fire', writes Josuah Sylvester in his translation of Du Bartas.[4] This imagery of melting or dissolving permeates early modern literature, as I will show at length.

C7.P2 Some expressions of melting/dissolving appear placidly matter-of-fact, simply acknowledging a process of human physiology (melting to tears, for instance), a natural process (ice melting to water), or the cosmic life cycle (the inevitable dissolution of the world). Other expressions of this physical transformation are less irenic: a sense of the self, the body, and the world as

[1] Chapman, *The Conspiracie, and Tragedie of Charles Duke of Byron* (London, 1608). All references to sixteenth- and seventeenth-century non-Shakespearean texts are gathered from the ProQuest Literature Online (LION) database. Throughout this essay, I am italicizing 'melt', 'dissolve', and 'resolve' in early modern quotations for ease of reading.

[2] Marston, *Iacke Drums Entertainment: Or the Comedie of Pasquill and Katherine* (London, 1601).

[3] Davies, 'A serious Meditation of the last Iudgement: worthy to be often minded, and repeated', in *The Muses Sacrifice* (London, 1612).

[4] Sylvester, 'A holy Preparation to a ioifull Resurrection', in *Du Bartas: His Divine Weekes and Workes* (London, 1621).

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labile and prone to dissolution can invoke fearful emotions ranging from anxiety to terror. The most familiar articulation of this preoccupation with melting and dissolving can be performed as either rational or horrified, or as both together: 'O that this too too solid flesh would *melt*, | Thaw, and *resolve* itself in to a dew', says (or sighs, or screams) Hamlet (1.2.129–30).[5] These lines are an infamous editorial crux: is the flesh supposed to be solid (per the Folio), or sallied (Q2), or sullied (perhaps what Q2 meant)?[6] The particular state of the flesh does not concern me, however; what is intriguing is that the flesh, in whatever condition, *melts*.

C7.P3 Why were early modern authors, Shakespeare included, so fascinated with melting and dissolving? Or perhaps that is the wrong question. Do the frequent references to melting and dissolving signal not fascination, but its opposite, the familiarity of this habit of thought? Today idioms of gravity pervade our discourse—we speak of someone being 'down to earth', or of moving in an 'orbit'—without inviting specific thoughts of Newton or Einstein. Gravity is part of our worldview and our phenomenological experience. Similarly, idioms of melting and dissolving might pervade early modern discourse without requiring meditations on the scientific underpinnings of the metaphor. But the work of the poet is to defamiliarize the familiar, to denaturalize the natural; we do not need to choose between poetic fascination and quotidian discourse, since the poet can help us to see the strangeness of the everyday.

C7.P4 The work of the historicist literary scholar is, in part, to explore the cultural knowledge and understandings that underwrote the metaphors people lived by; historicizing metaphors leads us into other intellectual and phenomenological worlds. As I explore the recurrence of melting/dissolving in early modern literature, therefore, I proceed with some working assumptions. I assume that in their extensive references to melting and dissolving, sixteenth- and seventeenth-century authors were not collectively inventing a poetic lexicon but were using an available discourse, albeit manipulating that discourse to accentuate and defamiliarize its physical and affective consequences. In surveying the use of *melt* and *dissolve* in early modern poetry, prose, and drama, we find many mundane, trite, or hackneyed uses of the terms—emerging, in part, from popular expressions, biblical idioms, and the worn poetic fabric of the tearful Petrarchan lover. Yet we also encounter

[5] All quotations from Shakespeare, except for *Antony and Cleopatra*, are from Stephen Greenblatt et al., eds, *The Norton Shakespeare* (New York: Norton, 1997).

[6] See Greenblatt et al., eds, *The Norton Shakespeare*, 1675n9.

many formulations of melting and dissolving that make the ideas pop into focus, often looking suddenly very strange. I am also assuming, then, that what we perceive as 'mere' metaphor can in fact express early modern epistemology and phenomenology;[7] for us, it is purely figurative to speak of a melting heart, but this expression could truly convey an early modern understanding of the body and of material physics.

C7.P5 Those physics, as far as melting and dissolving are concerned, derive from the ancient Stoics. The inheritance of Stoic theories of cosmology and material physics provided early moderns with a vibrant and dynamic way of understanding matter; this material understanding inflected the experience of the body as well as expectations of the behaviour of the earthly environment and the wider cosmos. Just as today's casual expressions or artistic allusions to gravity can reveal a perception of the world that is still essentially Newtonian, so too early modern references to matter melting and dissolving indicate the absorption of fundamental Stoic ideas, particularly the notion that matter is a fluid continuum.

C7.P6 Stoic physics grounded the medical theories of Galen, whose significance for early modern thought and experience was brought to the fore by the pioneering work of Gail Kern Paster. Paster's studies of Galenic humoral theory and the early modern body enabled us to see through metaphor to phenomenological experience and epistemological organization. By attending to the humoral epistemology that underlay particular words and expressions of early modern literature (such as those associated with the 'leaky' female body), Paster deepened the interconnections between literary study and the history of science; we could see much more clearly how dramatic or poetic texts articulated (intentionally or not) the dominant medical theory of the day.[8] Subsequently, Paster expanded the implications of recognizing the prominence of Galenic medicine by showing how the humoral body participated in the larger natural environment: 'Humoral subjectivity becomes recognizable as a fluid form of consciousness inhabited by, even as it inhabits, a universe composed of analogous elements.'[9] While the microcosm/macrocosm relationship was familiar knowledge in early modern

[7] A number of scholars have discussed this idea. See, for instance, Michael Schoenfeldt, *Bodies and Selves in Early Modern England: Physiology and Inwardness in Spenser, Shakespeare, Herbert, and Milton* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 8.

[8] See Paster, *The Body Embarrassed: Drama and the Disciplines of Shame in Early Modern England* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), chap. 1.

[9] Paster, *Humoring the Body: Emotions and the Shakespearean Stage* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 137.

studies, somehow it had become dried up in scholarly accounts. Paster reinvigorated the study of the conceptual integration of body and environment, of the human and the cosmic. In showing how humoral accounts of the body were experiential and affective realities, Paster restored a deep sense of the period's alterity and challenged us to imagine the implications of inhabiting a humoral body and a humoral cosmos.

C7.P7 My own investigation of melting and dissolving will therefore be indebted to a set of Pasterian assumptions and intellectual moves. My hope is that I might pay the debt forwards by deepening our understanding of the underlying Stoic precepts of Galen's theory and by showing how these Stoic physics were culturally active in the early modern period. Galen 'follow[ed] in the footsteps of the Stoics',[10] basing his humoral body and its fungible fluids on Stoic cosmology.[11] The Stoic cosmos was based on a continuum of matter, united by a fiery liquid known as *pneuma*, which could morph into any of the four elements. Galen's body was a similarly liquid continuum, with four humors that could transform from one to the other; as is well known, Galen's humors corresponded to the four elements. The humoral body and the Stoic universe thus functioned in similar ways, through solubility and the continuous mutations of the humors or the elements. In Galenic medicine, this solubility was both necessary for health and the cause of illness. In Stoic physics, solubility was central to the theory but also targeted by critics as its weakest point: if matter is composed of a fiery liquid, what is to prevent the cosmos from dissolution?

C7.P8 In order to understand the physics underlying the use of *melt* and *dissolve* in many early modern texts, I will first lay out the precepts of Stoic cosmology; then examine how these ideas were manifest in contemporary literature through the pervasive idiom of melting and dissolving; and finally survey how the ideas of melting and dissolving appear in the Shakespearean canon, zooming in on *Antony and Cleopatra*. The picture that emerges is of a world in which Stoic physics was a central aspect of material and environmental epistemology. Stoic physics influenced not only the particular idea of the humoral body, but the very relationship of human and environment. Ultimately, this relationship involved not only material physics, but also corresponding affective states.

[10] Samuel Sambursky, *Physics of the Stoics* (London: Routledge and Paul, 1959), 30.

[11] A. S. Weber, 'New Physics for the Nonce: A Stoic and Hermetic Reading of Shakespeare's *Antony and Cleopatra*', *Renaissance Papers* (1995): 93–107, 96; and Peter Barker and Bernard R. Goldstein, 'Is Seventeenth Century Physics Indebted to the Stoics?', *Centaurus* 27, no. 2 (1984): 148–64, 154.

C7.S1

7.1. Stoic Physics

C7.P9 Stoic cosmology and its attendant physics provided a rival theory to Epicurean atomism,[12] and outlining the distinctions between the two material philosophies is a good way to understand them. Where Epicureans conceived of matter in terms of atoms, Stoics understood matter to be a continuum. Epicurean atoms required space to travel, and thus there was a void between them; the Stoic plenum, by contrast, did not allow for any void within the universe.[13] For Epicureans, the objects of this world—say, a table, a pear, or the body of a child—come into being through atoms constantly moving and rearranging; for Stoics, these objects are the consequence of the continuous matter morphing into different elements. In the Epicurean world, bodies are separate and distinct from each other; in the Stoic world, they are all part of a larger continuous whole—the table, the pear, and the child are simply different qualities of the continuum. In the Epicurean view, divinity is radically transcendent: while the cosmos came into being through divine creation, the gods have withdrawn from the world and do not direct the random movement of the material-forming atoms. In the Stoic view, divinity is radically immanent: the divine pervades the continuum of matter to the extent that God and cosmos are one and the same.

C7.P10 Central to Stoic cosmology and physics—and the ancestor, as it were, of the Holy Spirit in Christian theology[14]—is *pneuma*, a fiery liquid that pervades the cosmos. *Pneuma* is the soul of the world, and the substance of the world; it is at the centre of the unified systems of Stoic physics and ethics.[15] In Stoic thought, this *pneuma* is understood conceptually in a number of ways. We can begin, as Stoic cosmogonies do, with the first principles, or *archai.* The key Stoic thinkers (Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and Archedemus) all recognized two *archai*, the passive and the active.[16] The passive is also known as matter (*hyle*); the active is known as *logos* or prime

[12] See Sambursky, *Physics of the Stoics*, 39.

[13] R. W. Sharples, *Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics: An Introduction to Hellenistic Philosophy* (London: Routledge, 1996), 34

[14] Michael Lapidge, 'Stoic Cosmology', in John M. Rist, ed., *The Stoics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 161–86, 176.

[15] Barker and Goldstein, 'Seventeenth Century Physics', 149; Weber, 'New Physics for the Nonce', 95.

[16] David E. Hahm, *The Origins of Stoic Cosmology* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1977), 29.

matter. Typically the *archai* are just called matter and God,[17] although this oversimplifies things. R. W. Sharples points out that the active 'prime matter' can also be understood as a principle, or as the divine; everything in the world is produced by the active principle (God) working on the passive principle (matter).[18] Thus 'matter' in discussions of Stoic physics does not correspond directly to our own physical conception of the term; Stoic matter is at once stuff and principle, the material and the abstract. While Stoics debated the particular qualities of the *archai*, they all agreed that the *archai* are inseparable, since God penetrates matter in a total mixture.[19] The *pneuma* was all-pervasive, so the distinction between prime and qualified matter—or between the active and passive principles of matter, or between God and matter—was a theoretical one.[20]

C7.P11 Primary matter is '*quantitatively* constant, indestructible, incapable of increase or diminution'; however, it is 'not *qualitatively* constant, but capable of transformation. It becomes by turns all the four elements.'[21] This elemental transformation is an integral part of Stoic cosmogony. The originary element was fire (the form of *pneuma*), which, in Chrysippus's account, 'changed through air into water; from the water, when earth has settled out, air is evaporated; then, when the air has thinned, *aether* is spread around in a circle'.[22] Elemental transformation continues to be a defining feature of Stoic cosmology; since Stoic matter is zero sum, there is never any creation of new matter, only change in the existing matter.[23] This process of transformation explains the existence of objects and creatures in the everyday world we inhabit: we live in the midst of a shifting continuum of matter.[24] The different objects and features of the world that we perceive are not discrete physical entities (as they would be in Aristotelian physics), but are rather just parts of a cosmic whole, 'qualitative modifications of the underlying combination of the active and passive principles'.[25]

[17] Ibid. [18] Sharples, *Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics*, 43.
[19] Hahm, *The Origins of Stoic Cosmology*, 32.
[20] Sharples, *Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics,* 45–6.
[21] R. D. Hicks, *Stoic and Epicurean* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1910), 24. See also H. A. K. Hunt, *A Physical Interpretation of the Universe: The Doctrines of Zeno the Stoic* (Carlton, Australia: Melbourne University Press, 1976), 18.
[22] Quoted in Hahm, *The Origins of Stoic Cosmology*, 31.
[23] Ibid., 38.
[24] Hunt, *Physical Interpretation*, 33; and Jean-Baptiste Gourinat, 'The Stoics on Matter and Prime Matter: "Corporealism" and the Imprint of Plato's *Timaeus*', in *God and Cosmos in Stoicism*, ed. Ricardo Salles (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 66.
[25] Sharples, *Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics*, 46.

C7.P12 A point of internal Stoic debate is how these qualitative modifications took place. Zeno maintained that the four elements come from water through the processes of settling and gathering, evaporation, and ignition; Chrysippus maintained that all change can be attributed to solidification and dissolution or thinning.[26] Stoics also drew upon philosophical precedents for their ideas about physical processes of transformation: Archelaus believed that water, melted by fire, produces either earth or air (depending on whether it settles or overflows); Plato (whose notion of the world-soul was an important influence on Stoic physics) explained in the *Timaeus* that when water is solidified it becomes stone and earth, when it is melted it becomes wind and air, and air can ignite and become fire.[27] David E. Hahm notes how the Platonic processes of elemental transformation are the same used by the Stoics: solidification, gathering, quenching, becoming dense, melting, dispersion, and kindling (59).

C7.P13 Stoic cosmology and its attendant physics thus present a range of transformations. The immediate world around us—the objects, creatures, and natural landscape—are the product of a pervasive *pneuma* that transforms into all that we see, as *pneuma* shifts into different elements and forms. This is not an environment of solidity and stability, but one that is labile. Like the Galenic body, with its four mutating humors, the cosmos is a shifting, living, liquid corpus. Homologies between body and cosmos are, in fact, present in both Galenic theory and Stoic cosmology. And like the human body, the cosmos experiences a life cycle: it is conceived through insemination, creates the four elements, and assumes a geocentric shape, with the earth circled by water, then air, then increasingly pure *pneuma* (fire) extending outward to the sphere of fixed stars.[28] At the end of a cosmic life cycle, all returns to the fiery, liquid *pneuma* in what is known as *ekpyrosis*; this universal conflagration is not an act of destruction but an apotheosis, a full realization of the divine.[29] This cycle repeats infinitely.[30]

C7.P14 These types of transformation, with the pervasive fiery liquid *pneuma* shifting into different forms or elements, correspond quite obviously with notions of melting, the change from one physical state to another. Less obvious—but in some ways even more crucial—is the specific concern about

[26] Hahm, *The Origins of Stoic Cosmology*, 58. [27] Ibid., 59.

[28] Peter Barker, 'Stoic Contributions to Early Modern Science', in Margaret J. Osler, ed., *Atoms, Pneuma, and Tranquility: Epicurean and Stoic Themes in European Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 138.

[29] Sharples, *Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics*, 48; and Gourinat, 'Stoics on Matter', 59–60.

[30] Hunt, *Physical Interpretation*, 33.

dissolution in ancient debates about Stoic physics. Critics questioned the possibility of universal coherence in the Stoic system. While there was no void within the (spherically shaped) Stoic cosmos, the cosmos itself existed within a void. What, then, held the cosmos together? Why would it not dissolve into the surrounding void? More immediately, if the objects of this world are created by *pneuma* morphing into different elements and substances, what was to give objects their shape, and to keep them from dissolving? If the world is composed of a fiery liquid, critics asked, what enabled coherence? It is one thing to imagine atoms adhering to one another; it is another to make sense of a liquid world.

C7.P15 Questions of coherence and dissolution therefore presented the most direct challenges to Stoic physics. And the Stoics answered these in a number of ways over time, as Samuel Sambursky has discussed. As with everything in the Stoic system, understanding *pneuma* is the key. Sambursky explains that a 'basic function of the pneuma is the generation of the cohesion of matter and generally of the contact between all parts of the cosmos.'[31] Answering critiques that passive matter would be incapable of cohesion on its own, the Stoics asserted that prime, active matter had a twofold property of coherence, both *being* cohesive and *making* cohesive (4). In addition to ideas about different types of cohesion, the Stoics developed a theory of internal cosmic tension (*tonos*) created by the *pneuma*. The question of how this cosmic tension held things together was of concern for the *ekpyrosis*, the final conflagration of the cosmic life cycle. The *ekpyrosis* involved a release of cosmic tension; this 'is implied in the term that is most often used to describe the conflagration: *analysis*, that is, "loosening' or 'dissolution". . . . But if tension is released at *ekpyrosis*, what then prevents the fiery mass from dissolving into the surrounding void (if such it be)?'[32] The answer to this particular question (that the spherical shape of the cosmos, like the soul, keeps it together) is less important than the fact that the questions of cosmic coherence and dissolution were such a concern to Stoic thinkers.

C7.P16 There is obviously much more to be said, but I hope to have provided a basic context for discussing the relationship of Stoic physics to poetic expressions of melting and dissolving in early modern English literature. I have not found a sustained analysis of this relationship, which is perhaps not surprising since, in the history of science, the influence of Stoic physics on sixteenth- and seventeenth-century materialism has been, until recently,

[31] Sambursky, *Physics of the Stoics*, 1. [32] Lapidge, 'Stoic Cosmology', 182

'almost completely ignored', as Peter Barker notes.[33] But recent research has emphasized the importance of Stoic ideas for early modern science, especially around the turn of the seventeenth century. Stoic physics made their way into the popular and intellectual imaginations through a variety of avenues. Barker has argued that Stoic ideas (via Cicero) first re-entered European culture through humanist writers (such as Petrarch and Rabelais) and were subsequently taken up by natural philosophers (141–3). (This trajectory is an important corrective to habits of thought among literary scholars and historians of science, who tend to assume the priority of scientific ideas which then make their way into literature.) Similarly, A. S. Weber contends that an initial Renaissance interest in Stoic ethics led to an interest in Stoic physics and cosmology, since for the Stoics ethics and physics were interrelated.[34] Renaissance authors had access to a number of classical texts explaining Stoic beliefs (Seneca's *Epistulae morales* and *Naturales quaestiones*, Lucan's *Pharsalia*, and Cicero's *De natura deorum*), as well as works by patristic authors sympathetic to Stoic ideas (Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria, and Jerome), and there was an intellectual effort to reconcile Stoicism and Christianity (95).[35] Central to the dissemination of Stoic ideas was the popularity of Galenic medical theory: 'Sixteenth-century medicine offers one of the routes by which the concept of a fluid plenum entered physical thinking. The most influential ancient texts in medicine during this period were the works of Galen who had adapted the Stoic *pneuma* to a variety of uses in physiology and psychology.'[36]

C7.P17 Paradoxically, the popularity and ubiquity of Stoic ideas in both the classical and early modern periods can make them difficult to see.[37] In the classical era, Cicero and Seneca helpfully identify some ideas as specifically Stoic, but scientific authors often tended to blend various influences; for example, Galen adapts the Stoic *pneuma* for his physiology but also borrows Hippocratic and Aristotelian concepts.[38] Similarly, the theological/philosophical eclecticism of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries could combine Stoic physics with other scientific theories, such as the Epicureans' atomism;[39] Francis Bacon, for instance, integrated both

[33] Barker, 'Stoic Contributions to Early Modern Science', 135.
[34] Weber, 'New Physics for the Nonce', 94, 95.
[35] See also John Sellars, 'Is God a Mindless Vegetable? Cudworth on Stoic Theology', *Intellectual History Review* 21, no. 2 (2011): 121–33, 122.
[36] Barker and Goldstein, 'Seventeenth Century Physics', 154.
[37] Barker, 'Stoic Contributions to Early Modern Science', 140.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Ibid., 136.

atomism and 'pneumaticalls' in his thought.[40] In sum, as Barker writes, 'For Stoic themes to appear in the works of such a diverse group suggests a wide dissemination of these ideas—a climate of opinion, rather than a tightly articulated theory passed on by a small group of its exponents' (136). When we seek for Stoic physics in Renaissance texts, then, we are looking less for scientific particulars than for larger concepts: the notion of a pervasive God, a continuum of matter, and a world constituted through transformation of fluid.

C7.S2

7.2. Melting and Dissolving in Early Modern Literature

C7.P18 If we look for manifestations of Stoic physics through the operations of melting and dissolving, we find examples in abundance. A survey of the use of *melt* and *dissolve* in English poetry, prose, and drama from 1550 to 1650 reveals some patterns in the use of the terms.

C7.P19 We notice, first, that the terms were frequently used together. Mildmay Fane, for instance, writes 'Embracing all those Bounties with such Souls, | May ready be to *melt* and to *dissolve*'.[41] Here, the implied actions of *melt* and *dissolve* appear to be synonymous, as processes of liquefaction. (The *Oxford English Dictionary* (*OED*) verifies that within the period the terms could be synonymous.)[42] Elsewhere, *dissolve* and *melt* are two different but closely allied stages of matter changing from solid to liquid. William Lithgow, for example, writes of the Scottish mountains, 'the forked *Tops*, | *Dissolue*, and *melt* in *Heliconean* drops'.[43] We find a similar instance in Francis Quarles's writing:

C7.P20

> Sweet Reader, vrge me not to tell, for feare
> Thy heart *dissolue*, and *melt* into a teare.
> Excuse my silence: If my lines should speake,
> Such marble hearts, as could not *melt*, would break.[44]

[40] Stephen Clucas, '"The Infinite Variety of Formes and Magnitudes": 16th- and 17th-century English Corpuscular Philosophy and Aristotelian Theories of Matter and Form', *Early Modern Science and Medicine* 2, no. 3 (1997): 251–71; repr. in Clucas, *Magic, Memory and Natural Philosophy in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (Farnham and Burlington, VT: Ashgate Variorum, 2011), chap. 10, 6–7.

[41] Fane, 'The necessity and grounds of Faith', in *Otia Sacra Optima Fides* (London, 1648).

[42] *OED Online*, s.v. 'dissolve', trans. 2 and 2a, *intrans.* **14 and** 14a.

[43] Lithgow, 'Scotlands Welcome to Her Native Sonne, and Soveraigne Lord, King Charles', in *Scotlands Welcome* (Edinburgh, 1633).

[44] Quarles, *Argalvs and Parthenia* (London, 1629).

C7.P21 The distinction in physical operations is not always clear—George Sandys writes about the biblical Job, 'For oh, his terror *melts* my heart to teares; | *Dissolves* my braine, and harrowes me with feares'—but they are clearly habitually allied.[45]

C7.P22 Today we most often employ *dissolve* to mean diffusing a solid in a liquid, but in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries *melt* and *dissolve* were both particularly associated with heat. Here is one instance from Christopher Harvey:

C7.P23 The heart that in my furnace will not *melt*,
When it the glowing heat thereof hath felt
Turne liquid, and *dissolve* in teares
Of true repentance for its faults[.][46]

C7.P24 And here is another from John Quarles:

C7.P25 Let not thy *tears* destroy me, but let me
Dissolve to tears (dear God) and weep to thee:
It is the *heat* of my *offences* makes
The *Heav'ns* to *melt* (O Heav'n some pity take!)[.][47]

C7.P26 And, even more extensively, this from George Chapman:

C7.P27 She comes, ô Bridegroom shew thy selfe enflam'd
And of what tender tinder Loue is flam'd:
Catch with ech sparke, her beauties hurle about:
Nay with ech thoght of her be rapt throughout;
Melt let thy liuer, pant thy startled heart:
Mount Loue on earthquakes in thy euery part:
A thousand hewes on thine, let her lookes cast;
Dissolue thy selfe to be by her embrac't.[48]

C7.P28 As this sampling shows, we repeatedly encounter a melting/dissolving of the body (heart, liver), of the self ('shew thy selfe enflam'd', 'Dissolue thy selfe'), and of the cosmos (the '*Heav'ns*'). Let's quickly consider these three areas in turn.

[45] Sandys, 'A Paraphrase Vpon Iob', in *A paraphrase upon the divine poems* (London, 1638).
[46] Harvey, 'The trying of the Heart', in *Schola Cordis* (London, 1647).
[47] Quarles, 'Englands Complaint', in *Fons Lachrymarum* (London, 1648).
[48] Chapman, *Andromeda Liberata* (London, 1614).

C7.P29 Here is a quick sweep of various ways that the terms are used in the context of the body: 'My sinews shrinke like leaues parcht with the sunne | My *blood dissolues*, nerues and tendons fayle';[49] 'My liuer and my lungs giue vp, | my *hart doth melt* amaine';[50] 'My *earthy mould*, doth *melt* in watrye teares';[51] 'When I forget to thinke on ye, | My selfe must cease my selfe to be, | For sooner may my *flesh dissolve*, | And humid earth my bones involve';[52] 'Nowe *melting Eyes* dissolue, O windie Sighes disclose, | The airie Vapoures of my griefe, sprung from my watrie woes'.[53]

C7.P30 In addition to particular references to the body melting or dissolving, we find expressions of a more general dissolution of the self: 'Should I remain congeal'd, and in such fires | Not straight *dissolve*'.[54] The soul, too, can dissolve. This applies to human beings ('*Dissolve, dissolve* my soul, turn Ayr')[55] as well as to animals ('al beasts are happy, for when they die, | Their soules are soone *dissolud* in elements')[56]. *Dissolve* could mean to die,[57] but here the dissolution that comes with death is expressed as an elemental transformation rather than just a departure.

C7.P31 Beyond bodies and selves, melting and dissolving was perceived as a quality of the larger earthly environment. There is a perceived precariousness to the world's very existence, as matter can always morph into something else. The elements themselves can be reconfigured, as we see in the words of George Peele:

C7.P32
> Ye Elements of whome consists this clay,
> This masse of flesh, this cursed crazed corpse,
> Destroy, *dissolue*, disturbe, and dissipate,
> What water, earth, and aire conieald.[58]

[49] Henry Chettle, *The Tragedy of Hoffman* (London, 1631), performed in 1602.

[50] George Turberville, *An Epitaph vpon the death of Henry Sydhnam, and Giles Bampfield Gentlemen*, in *Tragicall Tales* (London, 1587). This reference to the melting heart is a common one, and emerges from biblical usage as a literal translation of Hebrew idioms (see *OED Online,* s.v. 'melt', **3a**).

[51] Philip Sidney, *The Countesse of Pembrokes Arcadia* (London, 1593).

[52] Samuel Pick, 'To his worthy esteemed good Friend Mr. Iohn Wadland', in *Festum Uoluptatis* (London, 1639).

[53] William Lithgow, 'An Elegie, Containing the Pilgrimes most humble Farewell to his Natiue and neuer conquered Kingdome of Scotland', in *The Pilgrimes Farewell* (Edinburgh, 1618).

[54] Leonard Lawrence, *Ephithalamium: Or, A Nuptiall Song, with a Narrative of Loves progresse* ([London?], 1650).

[55] William Peaps, *Love In Its Extasie* (London, 1649).

[56] Christopher Marlowe, *The tragicall Historie of Doctor Faustus* (London, 1604).

[57] *OED Online*, s.v. 'dissolve', trans. 6.

[58] Peele, *The Battell of Alcazar* (London, 1594).

C7.P33 The sense that certain elements 'congealed' and then dissolved takes a variety of configurations. Where Peele has water, earth, and air combining, Henry More has everything made of air—although matter passes into liquid before returning back to air:

C7.P34
For sooth to sayn, all things of Air consist
And easly back again return to air.
Witnesse the carkases of man and beast
. . . no reliques seen
Of former shape, saving the bones bare,
And the bare bones by Time and Art, I ween,
First into liquour *melt* to air ychanged been.[59]

C7.P35 The pattern that emerges in early modern poetry is not of consistent agreement on how particular elements come together, but rather a commonly held idea of elemental metamorphosis. Here, John Weever:

C7.P36
The fyre, red-blushing of his fact ashamed,
Clad him in Smoke, the smoke to Aire he turned,
That aire to water, water earth receiued,
Earth, like the fyre to *melt* to water, burned:
Earth, Water, Aire, Fyre, symboliz'd in one,
To quench, or coole, *Oldcastles* Martyrdome.[60]

C7.P37 Nothing is firm or permanent; we meet a natural environment that can melt away. '*Dissolue* you Mountaines, and you durate Rockes', writes one T. W.[61] As Ben Jonson succinctly expressed this process, '*Melt* earth to sea, sea flow to ayre, | And ayre flie into fire'.[62] Jonson's progression (earth to water to air to fire) takes us back to Plato's progression in the *Timaeus*, and, as we have seen, this idea was taken up by the Stoics and made central to their system of physics. This sense of a fluid, metamorphic, fungible transformation of

[59] More, *A Platonick Song of the Soul*, *Treating, Of the Life of the Soul*, in *Philosophicall poems* (Cambridge, 1647).
[60] Weever, *The Life and death of Sir Io: Oldcastle knight, Lord Cobham,* in *The Mirror of Martyrs* (London, 1601).
[61] T.W., *The Lamentation of Melpomene, for the death of Belphaebe* (London, 1603).
[62] Jonson, *Oberon, The Faery Prince* (London, 1616).

matter is a manifestation of an underlying idea of physics that is grounded in Stoic principles.

C7.P38 What about *dissolve* as an expression of a more Epicurean model of atomism? There are instances of this, when dissolving is associated with dust rather than liquefaction. Thomas Overbury writes: 'Onely this dust doth here in Pawne remaine, | That when the world *dissolues*, she come againe'.[63] Later in the seventeenth century, John Quarles observes 'our earthen vessels must | At last *dissolve*, and turn themselves to dust',[64] and Edward Buckler laments, 'Our dissolution is so much the nigher. | Smoke builds but castles in the air: ascend | Indeed it doth aloft, but yet it must | At high'st *dissolve*, we vanish into dust'.[65] Fane directly connects the idea of dissolving with the process of breaking back into atoms:

C7.P39
> How doe we not perceive the Clay we tread on,
> To be the substance whereof we were made:
> And by the Sun that Attom'd into Dust,
> Tells us but what we must *dissolve* into.[66]

C7.P40 We even find *dissolve* directly associated with Lucretius: 'Lofty [Lucretius] shall liue that houre, | That nature shal *dissolue* this earthly bower', writes Christopher Marlowe.[67] Lucretius and Epicurean physics have of late been of scholarly interest, due in part to Stephen Greenblatt's account of the Renaissance rediscovery of *De rerum natura*.[68] In my survey of the word *dissolving*, however, I find it is used most often to signify the type of fluid metamorphic transformation inherent to Stoic physics and the *pneuma*, not the atomic disintegration that is the hallmark of the Epicurean world.

C7.P41 Perhaps the most overt association of dissolving and melting with the Stoics can be found in references to the end of the world, a critical part of

[63] Overbury, 'The Authors Epitaph', in *His Wife* (London, 1622).

[64] Quarles, 'An Elegie upon the son of Valor Sir Charles Lucas', in *Fons Lachrymarum* (London, 1648).

[65] Buckler, 'Profitable and pious thoughts of Death', in *Midnights meditations of death* (London, 1646).

[66] Fane, 'The necessity and grounds of Faith'.

[67] Marlowe, 'Elegia 15. Ad inuidos, quod fama poetarum sit perennis', in *Ovid's Elegies* (London, (1600?)). The ProQuest text here has '*Luereticus*'; the Oxford edition renders this 'Lucretius'; see Roma Gill, ed., *The Complete Works of Christopher Marlowe*, vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 35.

[68] Greenblatt, *The Swerve: How the World Became Modern* (New York: Norton, 2011), 5.

the Stoic understanding of the life cycle of the cosmos. See, for instance, Robert Anton:

C7.P42

> Tis the *condition* of this *glorious frame,*
> And all things that beneath the *Moone* we name:
> Nay, eu'n the things aboue her orbed-*face*,
> Do couet *changes* from their *natural place.*
> Till with *mutations*, all things thinke it best,
> To *melt* vnto their *Chaos*, and so rest.[69]

C7.P43 The phrase that tags this as specifically a Stoic cosmology is 'Nay, eu'n the things aboue her orbed-*face*': in Aristotelian and later Scholastic cosmology, there is a sharp distinction between the operations of sub- and supra-lunar matter, whereas the all-pervasive *pneuma* of the Stoic universe did not allow for this distinction.[70] The notion of *ekpyrosis*—the final dissolution when the cosmos will return to fire—is also a tag of Stoic physics, since *ekpyrosis* is not part of the rival Epicurean cosmology. We read of 'a *melting* firmament of fire'[71] and a 'flame | That shall *dissolve* the Worlds unwieldy frame';[72] 'the Elements *melt* with fervent heat';[73] '*Heav'n* shall *melt*, and *Earth* shal *meare* away';[74] things will last 'till the *dissolution* of the world, till the last general Bon-fire: when all the earth shall *melt* into nothing'[75]—the list could go on and on. The occasional minority opinion that the world will end with water (John Donne: 'This world, by waters sent from thee, my heaven *dissolved* so')[76] is overwhelmed by the majority view of a fiery end (Robert Heath: 'The world drown'd once agen? Sure holy text | Saies it should be by fire *dissolved* next').[77] The idea of a fiery world end can of course be found in the Bible—see for instance 2 Peter 3:10, 'But the day of the Lord will come as a thief in the night; in the which the heavens shall pass away with a great noise, and the elements shall melt with fervent heat, the earth also and the

[69] Anton, 'The Philosophers Seventh Satyr of the Moone', in *The philosophers satyrs* (London, 1616).
[70] Barker, 'Stoic Contributions to Early Modern Science', 138.
[71] Thomas Powell, 'Uertues Due', in *Vertues Due* (London, 1603).
[72] Thomas Bancroft, 'Celestiall comfort', *Two bookes of epigrammes and epitaphs* (London, 1639).
[73] William Prynne, *Histrio-Mastix, The Players Scovrge* (London, 1633).
[74] John Davies, 'An Extasie', in *Microcosmos* (Oxford, 1603).
[75] Anonymous, *The Puritan: or, The Widow of Watling-street* (1607).
[76] Donne, 'A Valediction of Weeping', in *Poems* (London, 1633).
[77] Heath, 'On a Map of the World accidentally faln into the water and spoiled', in *Clarastella* (London, 1650).

works that are therein shall be burned up'—but these biblical ideas are themselves derivative from, or at least reflective of, Stoic physics.[78]

C7.P44 An obvious question at this point is whether or not the authors I've cited above were aware of the Stoic underpinnings of these many poetic expressions. My answer would be: maybe, maybe not, but in either case it doesn't really matter. Certainly some of the individuals I've quoted may have read, say, Seneca's *Naturales quaestiones*, or works of contemporary natural philosophy. But probably most people took in Stoic physics as part of a popularized intellectual surround, as they took in Galen's medical theories without having to read his works or as we take in gravity without having to read Newton's *Principia*. The relevant point is that Stoic physics—revolving, as it does, around the idea of a pervasive *pneuma* and a shifting continuum of matter, an idea that would have made intuitive sense to a population raised with Galenic medicine and the humoral body—provided a dominant understanding of the workings of the universe and the relationship of human beings to the cosmos. Stoic physics has received scant attention from literary scholars, but it is a critical aspect of early modern epistemology.

C7.S3 7.3. Melting and Dissolving in the Shakespearean Canon

C7.P45 Shakespeare's texts share in this poetic interest in melting and dissolving. As in so many contemporary poems and plays, *melt* and *dissolve* frequently appear together. In *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, Helena complains that Demetrius 'hailed down oaths that he was only mine; | And when this hail some heat from Hermia felt, | So he *dissolved*, and showers of oaths did *melt*' (1.1.243–5).[79] In *The Two Gentlemen of Verona*, the Duke proclaims, 'This weak impress of love is as a figure | Trenchèd in ice, which with an hour's heat | *Dissolves* to water and doth lose his form. | A little time will *melt* her frozen thoughts, | And worthless Valentine shall be forgot' (3.2.6–9). In *The Tempest*, Prospero reassures Ferdinand,

[78] J. A. Harrill, 'Stoic Physics, the Universal Conflagration, and the Eschatological Destruction of the "Ignorant and Unstable" in 2 Peter', in *Stoicism in Early Christianity*, ed. Tuomas Rasimus, Troels Engberg-Pedersen, and Ismo Dundenberg (Peabody, MA: Henrickson, 2010), 115–40.

[79] See Mary Thomas Crane's essay on *A Midsummer Night's Dream* in this volume (Chapter 6), which comments on the meteorological implications of 'melt' in these lines.

C7.P46 Our revels now are ended. These our actors,
As I foretold you, were all spirits and
Are *melted* into air, into thin air;
And like the baseless fabric of this vision,
The cloud-capped towers, the gorgeous palaces,
The solemn temples, the great globe itself,
Yea, all which it inherit, shall *dissolve*.

C7.P47 (4.1.148–54)

C7.P48 The close verbal alliance of *melt* and *dissolve* is so prevalent that it appears even when the uses of the words are idiosyncratic, as in Prospero's 'The charm *dissolves* apace, | And as the morning steals upon the night, | *Melting* the darkness' (5.1.64–6).

C7.P49 Like his contemporaries, Shakespeare also uses *melt* and *dissolve* for both the body and the self. Characters are associated with the elements: Coriolanus concedes, 'I *melt*, and am not | Of stronger earth than others' (5.3.28–9). Antigonus recounts how Paulina '*melted* into air' (*Winter's Tale*, 3.3.36). We find, in particular, characters dissolving or melting into water in the form of tears: Titus tells young Lucius, 'Thou art made of tears, | And tears will quickly *melt* thy life away' (*Titus Andronicus*, 3.2.50–1); Richard II's queen hopes that others 'in pity may *dissolve* to dew, | And wash him fresh again with true-love tears' (5.1.9); and tears are implied when Albany is 'almost ready to *dissolve*, | Hearing of this [Gloucester's death]' (*King Lear*, 5.3.194–5). While these might seem like conventional poetic idioms, elsewhere the association between dissolving and the element of water is much more pronounced. Richard II wishes he 'were a mockery king of snow, | Standing before the sun of Bolingbroke | To *melt* myself away in water-drops!' (4.1.250–2). Lucrece invokes the idea of stone turning to water: 'For stones dissolved to water do convert. | O, if no harder than a stone thou art, | *Melt* at my tears and be compassionate' (*Rape of Lucrece*, 592–4).

C7.P50 As this last quotation indicates, not only people, but natural features of the environment can also melt or dissolve. In *Richard II*, Lord Scrope praises the king for taking bad news 'Like an unseasonable stormy day, | Which makes the silver rivers drown their shores | As if the world were all *dissolved* to tears' (3.2.102–4). Henry IV wishes to see into the future, to the time that will 'Make mountains level, and the continent, | Weary of solid firmness, *melt* itself | Into the sea' (*2 Henry IV*, 46–8). Speaking of the waves of a storm, Montano wonders what ships can hold 'when mountains *melt* on them' (*Othello*, 2.1.8).

C7.P51 These environmental meltings are aquatic, but we might note that in Shakespeare's plays it is equally possible to melt into air. Prospero, again, asserts that his actors 'Are *melted* into air, into thin air' (4.1.150). *Macbeth*'s witches similarly vanish 'Into the air, and what seemed corporal | *Melted* as breath into the wind' (1.3.79–80).[80] Venus had hoped that she and her beloved Adonis would melt together ('My smooth, moist hand, were it with thy hand felt, | Would in thy palm dissolve or seem to *melt*' (143–4)), but in the tragic ending of the poem, 'the boy that by her side lay killed | Was *melted* like a vapor from her sight' (1165–6).

C7.P52 Finally, we should acknowledge a corollary of *dissolve*: *resolve*. The word *resolve*, in the sense of re-solving, or coming back into being in a different form, appears much less frequently than *melt* and *dissolve*, but it is an important related term that gives insight into one of the most well-known lines in English literature. We return to Hamlet's desire that his flesh would '*melt*, | Thaw, and resolve itself in to a dew'. The phrase indicates a process of physical transformation: the solid flesh melts and then re-forms into water (dew). Similarly, Philip Sidney writes in *The Countesse of Pembroke's Arcadia*:

C7.P53 My earthy mould doth *melt* in watrye teares,
And they againe *resolue*,
To aire of sighes, sighes to the hartes fire turne
Which doth to ashes burne.
Thus doth my life within it selfe *dissolue*.[81]

C7.P54 Here, earth melts to water, which re-solves into air, which turns to fire, and so it goes: 'Thus doth my life within it selfe *dissolue*' might initially seem to indicate the end of life, but it signifies, instead, the elemental fungibility that is at the heart of Stoic physics, the life *within* the body. Melting, re-solving, and dis-solving are the operations of this transformation, as one element becomes another. This pairing of *re-solve* and *dissolve* appears as well in Sylvester's translation of Du Bartas's *Divine Weekes:* 'Ice | Into Water shall *re-solve*; | All the World (and all his Vice) | Into Nothing shall *dissolve*'.[82]

[80] For a discussion of the early modern belief that spirits take on bodies of air, see Mary Floyd-Wilson's 'The Habitation of Airy Nothings in *A Midsummer Night's Dream*' in this volume (Chapter 11).

[81] Sidney, *The Countesse of Pembrokes Arcadia* (London, 1593).

[82] Sylvester, '*Glacies*', in *Du Bartas: His Divine Weekes and Workes*.

C7.P55 Through this catalogue of examples, I hope to have established that Shakespeare's plays participate in a larger cultural and literary interest in melting and dissolving. While the purpose of this essay is to establish the presence of Stoic physics in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century literature, let us also quickly consider how this idea of melting/dissolving conveys not only a material sensibility but an affective one. As stated earlier, poetry, and literature more broadly, can work to defamiliarize the familiar, to make normative assumptions about the world suddenly seem a bit strange. The effect of such poetic defamiliarization when it comes to understandings of the natural world is not, however, simply to reveal the properties of physics. Since we are within the realm of the poetic, language carries a significatory surplus. In *Antony and Cleopatra*, for instance, discussions of melting and dissolving clearly engage with the fundamental precepts of Stoic physics, but these material transformations both indicate and express characters' emotional states as well.

C7.P56 Before considering specific moments of melting/dissolving in *Antony and Cleopatra*, it is important to recognize the degree to which the play invokes the elements, so crucial to the dynamic flow of the Stoic *pneuma*. Overt references to the four elements (water, earth, fire, air) appear in the context of preparations for war:

C7.P57 ANTONY: Their preparation is today by sea;
C7.P58 We please them not by land.
C7.P59 SCARUS: For both, my lord.
C7.P60 ANTONY: I would they'd fight i'th'fire or i'th'air;
C7.P61 We'd fight there too.[83]

C7.P62 Towards the end of the play, Cleopatra associates Antony with the element of water ('His delights | Were dolphin-like: they showed his back above | The element they lived in' (5.2.87–9)) and herself with fire and air ('I am fire and air; my other elements | I give to baser life' (288–9)). A reference to the elements shows up casually when Caesar takes leave of his sister: 'The elements be kind to thee, and make | Thy spirits all of comfort!' (3.2.40–1). And again, more substantially if more cryptically, in Antony's description of a crocodile: 'It lives by that which nourisheth it, and the elements once out of

[83] John Wilders, ed., *Antony and Cleopatra*, in *The Arden Shakespeare, Third Series*, ed. Richard Proudfoot, Ann Thompson, and David Scott Kastan (London: Routledge, 1995), 4.10.1–4. Future quotations are from this edition and will be cited parenthetically in the text.

it, it transmigrates' (2.7.57). This assertion comes in the midst of a comic, even absurdist account of the animal, but it leads the characters to joke about eschatology, which inherently entails questions of physics. Caesar asks, 'Will this description satisfy him?'—to which Antony replies, 'With the health that Pompey gives him, else he is a very epicure' (2.7.51–3). The Arden editors explain one possible meaning of this joke by glossing *epicure* as 'a follower of Epicurus who, believing there is no life after death, does not believe in "transmigration"'.[84] The joke implies a cosmic understanding that is in opposition to Epicurus, but the focus on elements suggests that the reference is not only to the transmigration of souls, but more generally to the morphing qualities of matter. All told, the characters in *Antony and Cleopatra* frequently think with the four elements, using them to organize and taxonomize the world and people and to signal awareness, even if in jest, of different physical theories.

C7.P63 Throughout the play, these elements enter into a fluid and fungible relationship with each other. There is a repeated sense of the solid transforming into liquid. We find this in Charmian's exhortation, '*Dissolve*, thick cloud, and rain, that I may say | The gods themselves do weep!' (5.2.298–9). The emphasis on 'thick' cloud turning to rain gives a sense not just of water going through different states, but of liquefying matter. Cleopatra uses the transformative properties of matter as a particularly cruel threat to a messenger who brings unwelcome news: 'The gold I give thee will I *melt* and pour | Down thy ill-uttering throat' (2.5.33–4). This horrific image of torturing a lowly servant through melted gold resonates with her lament at Antony's death: 'The crown o'th' earth doth melt' (4.15.65). This, in turn, echoes Anthony's earlier complaint, 'Authority melts from me' (3.13.94), but the association of gold, and then of a crown, with melting endows this 'crown' not just with the abstract qualities of 'authority' but with the actual materiality of metal. Then again, the melting of authority and the rounded crown taps into the powerful imagery of Antony's first substantial speech:

C7.P64 Let Rome in Tiber *melt*, and the wide arch
Of the ranged empire fall! Here is my space!
Kingdoms are clay! Our dungy earth alike
Feed beast as man.
C7.P65 (1.1.34–41)

[84] Wilders, ed., *Antony and Cleopatra*, 165n53.

C7.P66 These lines set the stage for repeated images of conflict between solid land and water. As David Bevington notes, 'In the war of the elements, both Antony and Cleopatra are ready to let the water devour the land' and '[m]elting and dissolution occur again and again'.[85] The melting of Rome into the Tiber becomes but part of a fungible natural economy, in which land can become water, and earth becomes malleable and the matter that is both beast and man. Melting is one exemplary operation of a labile universe.

C7.P67 The transformation of the environment is, in turn, deeply connected to changing states of emotional value: the loyal and the pure are transformed, like the world around them, into the disloyal and the sullied. This transformation can be the consequence of chance or dumb luck: as Cleopatra asserts, 'Some innocents 'scape not the thunderbolt. | Melt Egypt into Nile, and kindly creatures | Turn all to serpents!' (2.5.77–9). The consequences of earth changing to water are not merely physical, but transform the very nature and quality of creatures; here, innocence and kindliness are changed to the presumed evil of the snake. (This notion of physical transformation corresponding with qualitative change is introduced from the beginning, when in Antony we are presented with '[t]he triple pillar of the world transformed | Into a strumpet's fool' [1.1.12–13].)

C7.P68 This allied change of physical substance and affective qualities is synthesized in a synonym for melting that appears to be of Shakespeare's own coinage: *discandy*. The word appears only twice in the Shakespearean canon, in *Antony and Cleopatra* (which supplies half of the *OED*'s examples of the word). The current online *OED* defines the term succinctly as 'to melt, dissolve', although the second edition (1989) provided the fuller, 'To melt or dissolve out of a candied or solid condition'. As Antony uses the word, it encapsulates both a change of state and condition:

C7.P69 The hearts
That spanieled me at heels, to whom I gave
Their wishes, do discandy, melt their sweets
On blossoming Caesar[.]

C7.P70 (4.12.20–3)

C7.P71 The gloss in the Arden provides a wonderfully vivid explanation of these strange lines: 'the image is of dogs which, having been given sweetmeats,

[85] Bevington, ed., *Antony and Cleopatra*, in *The New Cambridge Shakespeare*, ed. Brian Gibbons (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 33.

allow them to melt and dribble from their mouths'.[86] Yes, but there is more here than drooling canines: Antony is describing the hearts of his soldiers, who are now losing their sweetness in disloyally going over to Caesar's side in the war. *Discandy* and *melt* are here bitter invectives describing treachery and a perceived transformation of emotional quality. As is typical of this play, the lovers pick up on each other's language, and Antony's use of this neologism repeats its earlier use by Cleopatra:

C7.P72 CLEOPATRA: Not know me yet?
C7.P73 ANTONY: Cold-hearted toward me?
C7.P74 CLEOPATRA: Ah, dear, if I be so,
C7.P75 From my cold heart let heaven engender hail
C7.P76 And poison it in the source, and the first stone
C7.P77 Drop in my neck; as it determines, so
C7.P78 *Dissolve* my life! The next Caesarion smite,
C7.P79 Till by degrees the memory of my womb,
C7.P80 Together with my brave Egyptians all,
C7.P81 By the *discandying* of this pelleted storm
C7.P82 Lie graveless[.]
C7.P83 (3.13.163–71)

C7.P84 The imagery here is again complex: if Cleopatra has a cold heart, it will produce hail that will fall down her neck, ending her life, and the melting of the hailstorm on her children will kill them all. It is a complicated answer to Antony's question about her affections, but again, what is really being conveyed here is a change in emotion (the posited loss of love) through an image of elemental transformation (the melting of hailstones). The Arden editor John Wilders discusses the play's 'distinctive images' by citing Maurice Charney, who observed that the images are of 'melting, fading, dissolving, discandying, disponging and losing of form'. Charney also notes that 'Shakespeare seems to be creating his own vocabulary to establish the feeling of disintegration in the Roman world'.[87] As I hope to have demonstrated, Shakespeare does indeed use images of melting, dissolving, and even 'discandying', but he is hardly 'creating his own vocabulary': he used a

[86] Wilders, ed., *Antony and Cleopatra*, 250n22.
[87] Charney, *Shakespeare's Roman Plays: The Function of Imagery in the Drama* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961), 140, quoted in Wilders, ed., *Antony and Cleopatra*, 34.

popular poetic discursive register, which itself reflected the physics of the Roman world.

C7.S4

7.4. Cosmologics

C7.P85 What emerges from this litany of examples—Shakespearean and non-Shakespearean alike—is a glimpse into an early modern epistemology of matter. For those living in late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century England, the world and those living within it could be metamorphic, as matter was continuous and transformative. This is a different understanding, and experience, of the world than that presented by Epicureanism. Greenblatt has elegantly presented that understanding of matter: 'The stuff of the universe, Lucretius proposed, is an infinite number of atoms moving randomly through space, like dust motes in a sunbeam, colliding, hooking together, forming complex structures, breaking apart again, in a ceaseless process of creation and destruction.'[88] While this was a culturally available understanding of materiality, Stoicism presented an alternative mode of comprehending, experiencing, and writing about the world. And although the study of historical phenomenology and epistemology is still in its early stages, I would maintain that Stoic physics predominated over the Epicurean counterpart in the popular imagination. Poets, playgoers, and the reading public may not have known the more intricate Stoic debates about the operations of the *pneuma* or the distinctions between prime matter and unqualified matter, but they knew their Ovid and they knew their Galenic humoralism. I have argued elsewhere for what I deemed 'Ovidian physics', an argument I arrived at in part through Paster's notion of 'cosmologic', humoral logic writ large in the universe.[89] A greater understanding of the Stoic physics that provided an intellectual grounding for both Ovid and Galen, and a recognition of the pervasive expressions of melting and dissolution in early modern poetry, makes it even clearer that the early modern world was metamorphic. We encounter, again, what Paster identified as 'the

[88] Greenblatt, *The Swerve*, 5.

[89] Kristen Poole, *Supernatural Environments in Shakespeare's England: Spaces of Demonism, Divinity, and Drama* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 56.

dynamic interplay between abstraction and materiality so important in Shakespeare'.[90]

C7.P86 Paster showed us the humoral economy that worked within the human body, and how deeply humoralism affected early modern people's assumptions about physicality and affective experience. Attending to the prevalence of the related Stoic physics enables us to better understand not just a metamorphic universe, but a relationship between the human body and the environment that was not considered bounded or differentiated. As the Stoic understanding of the *pneuma* persisted through millennia, the concept that human beings and the natural world were part of a continuum of qualitatively transformable matter took on real meaning for how people understood their experience of the world. How might we further develop this insight, one generated out of Paster's work? One path is to trace how the early modern 'cosmologic' influenced concepts of gender and literary form, and how these intertwined; Katherine B. Attié accomplishes this in a reading of *Antony and Cleopatra* that examines the formal and aesthetic implications of the play's interest in melting and dissolving, noting how the play values 'fluidity over firmness, excess over measure, dissolution over segregation'.[91] Another course is to interrogate how a particular understanding of the cosmos and its relationship to the human undergirds a constellation of epistemologies. More specifically, we benefit from recognizing that early modern notions of the structure of the cosmos, the terrestrial environment, and the body were not monolithic—Galen's medical theories shared the stage with those of Paracelsus, Stoic philosophies rivalled (or could pair with) the Epicurean. In what ways did an alignment with a particular understanding of the physical world sustain particular political or theological positions? Until very recently, twentieth- and twenty-first-century scholars tended to assume that a culture would share a common view on the workings of the natural world—Albert Einstein was a pop star, after all, and his theories not only unified different phenomena of physics but also established popular acceptance of certain scientific principles. It became normative to assume collective scientific beliefs about the world. But as our own

[90] Paster, *Humoring the Body*, 44.

[91] Attié, 'Regendering the Sublime and the Beautiful: Shakespeare's Cleopatra and Feminist Formalism', in *The Routledge Companion to Women, Sex, and Gender in the Early British Colonial World,* ed. Kimberly Anne Coles and Eve Keller (London: Routledge, 2019). I am grateful to Katherine for sharing a draft of this essay with me.

historical moment illustrates (at least in the United States), cultures can also be divided in their understandings of science, and these divisions entail a corresponding set of political and cultural differences. Might further inquiry into diverse early modern concepts of physics reveal corresponding distinctions in political positioning? Such a study would require a lifetime, or an extensive distributed scholarly conversation, but it is one worth having. Perhaps we have taken scientific consensus, in our own time and in the early modern period, too much for granted.[92]

[92] In writing this essay, I benefited enormously from the research assistance of John Coopman. I am also grateful to the members of a 2017 Shakespeare Association of America seminar (Cosmological Bodies), and to Mary Floyd-Wilson and Garrett Sullivan for their astute comments on drafts of the essay.

C8

8

Passions of the Flock

Julian Yates

C8.P1 > Anthropology is…faced with a daunting challenge: either to disappear as an exhausted form of humanism or else to transform itself by rethinking its domain and its tools in such a way as to include in its object far more than the *anthropos*: that is to say, the entire collective of beings that is linked to him but is at present relegated to the position of a merely peripheral role[.]
>
> C8.P2 Philippe Descola, *Beyond Nature and Culture*[1]

C8.P3 The advent of the 'ontological' or 'multispecies turn' in the social sciences and humanities has led to a radically altered sense of scale. Beyond calling into question (again) the primacy of a human subject, the move to consider the metaphysics of other forms of life offers us the possibility to embark on a wholescale redescription of our practices. What, once upon a time, we may have called the 'human' becomes instead a strange archive, a multispecies concatenation of properties that belong to animals, plants, fungi, bacteria, minerals, and beyond. We have always been, as it were, mixed beings. Differing historical configurations or hierarchies of humanness, eventuated as they are by the markers of gender, sexuality, race, age, and class, reveal themselves now to rely on alliances or correlations with and between other animals and plants—most corrosively, for example, in the case of those humans processed as if merely living animal 'stock'.

C8.P4 In this essay, I seek answers to two interrelated questions: How might an altered regime of description sensitive to the 'entire collective of beings' we come into being with lead us to redescribe the passions in early modern England? And how might such a description lead us to understand the dynamics of what Steven Mullaney has recently named the 'affective

[1] Descola, *Beyond Nature and Culture*, trans. Janet Lloyd (2005; repr., Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), xx.

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technology' of the public theatre?[2] My contention will be that models of the passions in the period offer a discursive trading ground in which concepts migrate between the registers of physiology, humoral psychology, theology, spiritual practice, and social theory. Or, better still, that models of the passions produce concepts that hybridize these registers, toggling between them in ways that reveal the interpenetration of discourses in much the way that, in the early modern period, humanism's moral philosophical questioning cohabited with an optative discourse of husbandry that aimed to manage animal, plant, and mineral resources. Ultimately, I wish to suggest that emerging institutions such as the public theatre were understood, by some commentators, to take on the pastoral role of a clerical hierarchy, the theatre becoming something like a shepherding effect, a state- or nation-building form of pastoral care that managed the affective contours of the audiences that flocked to it.

C8.P5 In what follows, I begin by reviewing the work of Gail Kern Paster with an eye to how she anticipates this multispecies turn. I then revisit the Jesuit Thomas Wright's exposition of the eleven primary emotions in *The Passions of the Minde in Generall* (1604), which, for Paster, offered an exemplary understanding of the early modern passions. While recent scholars have quite correctly observed that Wright's Catholicism makes him something of an outlier in the period as opposed to its exemplar—his writings depend on an unusual Thomism, and he is committed to thinking with and through the passions as part of a spiritual journey rather than regulating or even conquering them—it is this confessional particularity that proves key in understanding how his writings, unusual as they may be, foreground the passions as a discursive trading ground.[3] Accordingly, I ask how Wright's modelling of the passions through a highly resonant and religiously charged series of ovine and lupine metaphors functions within the larger biopolitical languages of the period, namely the extended metaphors of Christian pastoral and pastoral care that, for him, also formed the basis of his role as pastor or shepherd. I am particularly interested in Wright's use of predation as a heuristic scene for illustrating the emotions. He invites readers to oscillate between the minds of a compelling and singularly thwarted wolf and a plurality of boringly predictable and interchangeable sheep. In doing so,

[2] Mullaney, *The Reformation of the Emotions in Early Modern England* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015), 23.

[3] Erin Sullivan offers a very productive reassessment of Wright in 'The Passions of Thomas Wright: Renaissance Emotion across Body and Soul', in *The Renaissance of Emotion*, ed. Richard Meek and Sullivan (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2015), 25–44.

Wright produces a composite or hybrid sense of Christian subjects as a 'multispecies' flock—part wolf, part sheep, goat, dog, and so on—to be directed by their Christian shepherd, who, it is to be hoped, plays neither the wolf nor the fox. Wright's zoomorphism, in other words, trades on a series of animal matter-metaphors whose exemplarity depends on their associations in the animal hierarchy of political and religious fable, pastoral care, and physiology. I end by investigating the extent to which such a multispecies modelling of the flock might be said to shape accounts of theatre audiences in the period, audiences for whom public theatre might itself then be modelled as a form of pastoral care.

C8.S1

8.1. From Discipline to Ecology

C8.P6 In *Humoring the Body* (2004), Gail Kern Paster develops a model of embodiment that casts a human person as an ambulatory titration of fluids, a walking ecology. Our passions shift as they course through us, changing with the weather, with the air, with the land as we travel from locality to locality or to foreign climes, by the action of the substances we ingest or take as our 'food'. Our feelings, our emotions, cognition itself, become lively transactions with a world that no longer can be said to remain outside us.[4] We come saturated with other beings, with other forces. Historical phenomenology, the attempt to reconstruct the sensory data of individuals long since dead, discovers that it is joined at the hip with a general ecology—so much so that the stated aim of the book is to describe a 'premodern ecology of the passions'.[5]

C8.P7 This turn to ecology in *Humoring the Body* might be said to radicalize the insights of Paster's earlier *The Body Embarrassed* (1993), in which she describes the human body as a 'semipermeable, irrigated container in which humors moved sluggishly'.[6] The core insight that early modern men and women 'imagined that health consisted of a state of internal solubility to be

[4] See John Sutton's essay in this volume (Chapter 5) for a discussion of how the idea of 'distributed cognitive ecologies' can productively inform historical scholarship on place and memory.

[5] Paster, *Humoring the Body: Emotions and the Shakespearean Stage* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 9. Paster's contributions in the *Body Embarrassed* and *Humoring the Body* should also be read in the context of the larger turn to what Bruce R. Smith has famously termed 'historical phenomenology', an approach to sensory experiences past that has shaped so much subsequent work in early modern studies. See Smith, 'Theories and Methodologies: Premodern Sexualities', *PMLA* 115.3 (2000): 318–29.

[6] Paster, *The Body Embarrassed: Drama and the Disciplines of Shame in Early Modern England* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 8.

perilously maintained, often through evacuations [of variously fluid bodily substances—blood, milk, urine, faeces, tears, mucus, and so on], either self-administered or in consultation with a healer', remains a central proposition. Health or wellness continues to require a regime of attention that attends to the openings of the body, to the skin, and the senses, as contact zones with the world—an interface through which matter courses. Internal equilibrium still has to be maintained by and through an attention to these surfaces, an attention frequently most interesting and so subject to dramatization when misapplied, misdirected, overapplied, or unwanted. Much of the focus, likewise, in *Humoring the Body* remains on a salutary redescription of the ways in which, say, 'the differences between states of sinfulness…that post-Enlightenment moderns understand as spiritual and immaterial…[were] imagined [by early modern men and women] as differences in the characteristics of liquids in motion' (6). Grand metaphorical conceits are consistently discovered to unravel into material, metonymic concatenations of substances, physical processes, and their motions.

C8.P8 But where *The Body Embarrassed* focuses on the limits of the body, on sites of evacuation and their maintenance or failure, *Humoring the Body* reads that concern with boundaries as itself a symptom of the way the body comes saturated at all points by a world only notionally 'beyond' us. At almost every turn, the book invites readers to question the stability of categories such as body, world, human, plant, and animal, along with the limits of species. Still a virtuously maintained or slovenly neglected titration of fluids, the human body finds itself inundated by agencies otherwise than human. Moreover, human psychology becomes merely one subset or subspecies of something that is true for all creatures. Paster takes it as axiomatic that, for early modern men and women, 'since many of the [human] body's organ systems, and hence bodily fluids produced by them, belonged not just to human beings but to animals as well, it followed that humans and animals shared in the psychological consequences—the self-experience—of possessing them' (135–6). All species or kinds of beings are understood therefore to be 'passionate' and so affectively inclined. Descartes's automaton or auto-passioning animals remain emphatically of the future (if they ever were at all).[7]

[7] For an interrogation of Descartes's modelling of animal as automaton, see Jacques Derrida, *The Animal That Therefore I Am*, trans. David Wills (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008); and, in early modern studies, Erica Fudge, *Brutal Reasoning: Animals, Rationality, and Humanity in Early Modern England* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006); and Laurie Shannon, *The Accommodated Animal: Cosmopolity in Shakespearean Locales* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013).

C8.P9 The trajectory described by *The Body Embarrassed* and *Humoring the Body* might be represented, as I have implied, as a gradual movement from what Michel Foucault called 'discipline' to 'technologies of the self' and thence to a broader sense of the human body as a mobile, morphing ecology.[8] Concepts of embodiment and environment prove coextensive. They exist as interwoven, uneven coproductions. To focus on human embodiment, then, and its allied historical, philosophical, and sociological discourses, is to enter into a conceptual trading zone with the differently scaled discourses of political science, ecology, and cosmology. Moral philosophy and its attendant dietetic regimes, centred as they were for early modern Christian humanists on the cultivation of virtuous men and women, prove coterminous with discourses of good husbandry that might secure and maintain the health of the commonwealth. Here it's worth recalling that at the root of Paster's trans-species and trans-kingdom modelling of the passions is the model of the tripartite soul she and early modern men and women inherit from Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* and from which we receive the figure of the good or flourishing life (*eudaimonia*) with its careful nourishing and management of a soul that renders every human person, at base, an animal-vegetable being in need of careful management or husbanding. What we encounter in this figure of a soul that crosses species and kingdoms is the basis of what for Foucault and his inheritors counts as a general 'flesh' that biopolitics subdivides or parcels out as various forms of life.[9] This ecologically inclined model of 'flesh' as a mobile stratum or continuum allied to agricultural practices, foodways, medical technologies, and the demographics of humans and animals, marks the level at which

[8] Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process*, vol. 1, *The History of Manners*, trans. Edmund Jephcott (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978) remains an orienting reference for Paster. On 'techniques of the self', see Foucault, *Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault*, ed. Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman, and Patrick H. Hutton (London: Tavistock, 1988). For an emerging sense of embodiment and environment as co-productions, see Paster, 'Becoming the Landscape: The Ecology of the Passions in the Legend of Temperance', in *Environment and Embodiment in Early Modern England*, ed. Mary Floyd-Wilson and Garrett A. Sullivan, Jr(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 137–52.

[9] Take, for example, Foucault's modelling of race as a subdivision of the discourse of species in *Society Must Be Defended*. He writes that 'a population [may be treated] as a mixture of races, or more accurate', the state may 'treat the species . . . subdivide the species it controls, into subspecies known, precisely, as races. That is the first function of racism: to fragment, to create caesuras within the biological continuum addressed by biopower' (Michel Foucault, '*Society Must Be Defended': Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975–76*, trans. David Macey (New York: Picador, 2003), 255). For this use of 'flesh', following Maurice Merleau-Ponty, see Roberto Esposito, *Immunitas: The Protection and Negation of Life* (London: The Polity Press, 2011), 118–21, 140–1; and, in the context of critical animal studies, Cary Wolfe, *Before The Law: Humans and Other Animals in a Biopolitical Frame* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 50–8.

biopolitics emerges as a regime that manages the somatic, psychological, and thus social health of the individual and the collective.

C8.P10 It is within this larger context that Paster performs her virtuoso reading of Thomas Wright's *The Passions of the Minde in Generall*, a reading that attempts to remain faithful to what she regards as Wright's remarkable lack of self-consciousness about his anthropomorphism. And it is this fidelity that enables us to zero in on the way that, for Wright, the passions manifest as simultaneously social, rhetorical, and humoral. For Wright, the passions designate a core of animal sameness that a Catholic Christian subject should work with and through, a process that it was the vocation of priests such as Wright to foster. Beyond anticipating today's critical interest in animals and plants as occluded actors in our stories, the importance of Paster's work, for me, derives from the way she enables us to understand that notions of human embodiment come threaded through, and with, other forms of being. The regimes of somatic and psychic maintenance we encounter in her readings of early modern texts are never singular entities. They are always plural. They come haunted always by residues of those other beings whose passions we share even as early modern men and women hoped, perhaps, to demarcate themselves from them as rational, Christian, male, or female subjects, gentlemen and gentlewomen. When, in Paster's work, we encounter 'leaky vessels', 'melancholy cats, lugged bears, and other passionate animals', as well as plant actors, we are tracing the semiotic fine edge of biopolitical technologies that produce forms of life by mixing or folding together differing ways of being. Moreover, the multispecies basis of these forms should serve as a reminder or signal as to the ways in which the management of the humors and their attendant affects derives from the co-modelling of humans and other animal beings—perhaps most crucially, in Wright's case, wolves and sheep.[10]

C8.S2

8.2. Limit Cases and Primal Scenes

C8.P11 In chapter 6 of *The Passions of the Minde in Generall* (1604), the English philosopher, Jesuit, and religious controversialist Thomas Wright (*c*.1561–1623) sets out the 'division and number of the Passions of the

[10] For definitions of *companion* and *multispecies*, see Donna Haraway, *The Companion Species Manifesto: Dogs, People, and Significant Otherness* (Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press, 2003); and *When Species Meet* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 16–17.

Mind'. Famously, Wright does so by taking his readers on a tour of the 'eleven primary emotions experienced by the wolf and the sheep as they recognize each other as objects of fear and desire'.[11] Citing Aquinas as his source and authority for the eleven passions—'love, desire or concupiscence, delight or pleasure…hatred, abomination, sadness or pain…hope and despair, fear and audacity…[and] ire'—Wright suggests that their experience 'is common well nigh in all beasts, but most evident in the wolf and the sheep'. As Paster observes, after this initial invocation of Aquinas and scene setting, Wright seems less interested in the 'uncomplicated emotions of the fearful sheep than in what he represents as the complex emotional texture of the wolf's experience as it confronts obstacles to the fulfillment of its desire in the shepherd and his dogs'.[12] Wolves are interesting. Wolves are dangerous. Wolves, just like Wright and his fellow Christian readers, consume sheep. I quote the relevant passage at some length, including the admittedly small and not terribly interesting sheepy passages that Paster's understandable lupine focus leads her to omit:

C8.P12 First the wolf loueth the flesh of the sheep; then, he desireth to have it; thirdly, he reioyceth in his prey when he has gotten it. Contrariwise, the Sheepe hateth the Wolfe, as an euill thing in himself, and thereupon detesteth him, as hurtfull to herself; and finally, if the Wolf seaze vpon her, she paineth and grieueth to become his prey: thus we haue loue, desire, delight, hatred, abomination, griefe, or heauinesse, the six passions of our coueting appetite.

C8.P13 But now, put case of the Wolfe should see the shepheard about his flock, armed with a guard of dogges; then the Wolf, fearing the difficulty of purchasing his prey, yet thinking the euent, though doubtfull, not impossible, then he erecteth himself with the passion of Hope, perswading him the sheepe shall be his future spoyle after the conquest: and thereupon contemning the dogges, despising the shepheard, not weighing his crook, stones, or rural instruments of war, with a bold and audacious courage, not regarding any daunger; he setteth vpon the flocke; where, in the first assault, presently a mastife pincheth him by the legge; the iniurie he imagineth ought not to be tolerated: but immediatly inflamed with the

[11] Paster, *Humoring the Body*, 152.

[12] Wright, *The Passions of the Minde in Generall: A Reprint Based on the 1604 Edition*, ed. Thomas O. Sloan (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1971), 23. Future quotations of Wright are from this edition. This passage is cited by Paster in *Humoring the Body*, 152–3.

> passion of Ire, procureth by all meanes possible to reuenge it: the Shepheard protecteth his dog, and basteth the Wolfe (as his presumption deserued). The Wolfe perceiving himself weaker than he imagined, & his enemies stronger than he conceiued, falleth sodainly into the passion of Feare, (as braggers doe, who vaunt much at the beginning, but quaile commonly in the middle of the fray) yet not abandoned of all hope of victory: therefore stirreth vp himself, and proceedeth forward: but in fine, receiuing more blowes of the shepheard, more woundes of the dogges, awearied with fighting, fearing his life, thinking the enterprise impossible, oppressed with the passion of Desperation, resolueth himself that his heeles are a surer defence, than his teeth, and so runneth away. By this example we may collect the other fiue passions of the inuading appetite, hope, boldnesse or presumption, anger or ire, feare, and Desperation.[13]

C8.P14 And so, all eleven primary emotions accounted for, exit the wolf, figurative tail between its legs, off for a quick costume change, to star in a revenge tragedy coming to a stage near you. The sheep, the shepherd, and his dogs doggedly remain, mundanely triumphant—their parts also apparently at an end.

C8.P15 In the discussion that follows, Paster tunes us into the 'mock heroic agon' of the encounter and the way in which Wright 'produce[s] a dynamic subject position for the wolf' almost so as to 'make the subject positions of the shepherd and his dogs inadmissible'. We inhabit the wolf's perspective. We predate along with him—and so experience his shifting emotions as 'he appraises, reappraises, and decides how he feels about developments in his *Umwelt* [environment]' (153). But this wolf is not quite a wolf, and neither is he a surrogate human subject. As Paster points out, 'Wright throws himself without a trace of anthropocentric embarrassment into the wolf's drama'. The similarity the wolf shares with the likes of you and me or with Wright 'is less the result of anthropomorphic thinking than it is an example of early modern fluid physiology at work in the behavior of animals and humans alike'. Paster goes on to explain the ways in which the doctrine of correspondences and sympathies between beings produces a 'taxonomy of animals thoroughly moralized not in terms of their relations to men but in terms of their relations to each other' (154–5). She points out also how, in a less comic and more moralized vein, the behaviour of the wolf

[13] Wright, *Passions of the Minde*, 23–4.

cohabits with women's behaviours when in danger. 'Women', she writes, 'are caught in a kind of mimetic regression, resembling… [the wolf] resembling them' (158).

C8.P16 But this hall of mirrors or mirrored beings means that Wright's wolf is not exactly a wolf, so much as a hybrid or layered creature. Neither a stand in for you and me, nor an actual wolf, he becomes what a wolf would be if he were modelled as having a humoral body. By this process of projecting a constitutive sameness only then to eventuate it, Wright produces multiple differences: a menu of differing types of animal embodiment (sheep, wolf, dog) and men and women. The wolf becomes something like an experimental, technical, or even technologized animal, both real and rhetorical—'the limit case of the sensitive soul' caught up in a dynamic rehearsal of a 'life-critical event' such as those dramatized on stage.[14] And as Paster offers, when push comes to shove, the defining difference between a wolf and early modern men and women lies not in the workings of their humoral bodies or the range of experience of the passions each enjoys, so much as 'the ethical neutrality of the object of its desire—sheep on the hoof, meat raw rather than cooked' (155). The difference between a man, a woman, a sheep, and a dog comes down to a question of their orientation—though, for Wright and his readers, such an orientation came primed by the heft of a theological foundation.

C8.P17 In the terms of animal ethology, the complex layering of beings Paster recovers reveals not the anthropomorphic basis to Wright's modelling but a structure of anthropo-zoogenesis, the co-making or co-modelling here of wolves and humans, but also of sheep and dogs. Wright's representation of the wolf's emotions reveals the core, constitutive power of the humoral body as an engine that produces and then continues to influence emotional and cognitive states. But the permutations of this model as the environment changes and the wolf experiences joy or fear or danger means that his similarity or correspondence to other animals or to men and women or, when sleeping, to a plant, is in a state of continual change. Such is the multiple and shifting flavour to wolf being. And as the wolf's emotional state shifts, his proximity to other forms of life flickers in and out of view—suggesting a range of metaphorical associations grounded in a sense of shared bodily process and cognitive awareness. Wright feels no 'anthropomorphic embarrassment' because of the primary obviousness of the physiological processes

[14] Paster, *Humoring the Body*, 164, 156.

he describes. These processes lead him to write the story of cognition and emotion across the apparent boundary of species difference. He projects a certain element of equivalence between wolf and human, but this equivalence is enabled by a differently zoned 'cut' that eventuates the continuum he posits: the ethical orientation that constitutes less an essence to the human at a physiological or psychological level than something like a minimal definition of the social. The wolf enjoys his sheep 'raw'. Wright enjoys his sheep 'cooked', which is to say thoroughly subsumed to the processes anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss understood as constitutive of 'culture', which is not quite, in early modern terms, to say that wolves are without 'culture', but to acknowledge that their ways are differently 'social' than those of early modern Christian men and women. This difference may be reckoned, quite precisely, by the use each makes of the sheep.[15] Christians enjoy the bounty sheep offer and put them to good use. Wolves lay waste to the sheep, revelling in the expenditure of this commodity.

C8.P18 What then of the sheep, their shepherd, and his dogs? What parts do they play in Wright's scene and, for that matter, in the production of differently configured animals and theoretically human persons and their attendant dramas in early modern England?

C8.S3

8.3. Hurtless Beasts

C8.P19 To begin, we can say that, along with the wolf, the sheep seems to share in a core set of passions. 'The Sheepe hateth the Wolfe, as an euill thing in himself, and thereupon detesteth him, as hurtfull to herself', observes Wright, 'and…she paineth and grieueth to become his prey: thus we haue loue, desire, delight, hatred, abomination, griefe, or heauinesse' (23). Left to herself, or with her own kind, the ewe 'hates' the wolf as we would hate something 'hurtful' to ourselves. The doctrine of correspondences, or in this case, their lack, renders sheep and wolf mortal and so 'natural' enemies. The sheep's physiology obeys the same humoral logic, of course, as that of a wolf or a human, but the default or zero-degree ethical orientation this implies is altered profoundly by the addition of the shepherd, along with 'his crook, stones, or rural instruments of war' and his canine helpers or extensions of self (24). The scene of predation is now coded as an attack on or attempted

[15] Lévi-Strauss, *Mythologiques*, vol. 1, *The Raw and the Cooked* (1969; repr., Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983).

interruption of a scene of pastoral care, or, more exactly, part of the reason for the need for pastoral care in the first place—in order to see off such wolfish attacks.

C8.P20 The presence of the shepherd writes this scene of lupine excitement become frustration and flight into a larger, biblically authorized, and theologically freighted story. Even as we inhabit the wolf's perspective, he remains coded as an intruding evil, a parasite that seeks to reroute the pastoral scene, and the singularized sheep become prey, to his own ends. His 'evil' proves doubly normative, embedding a sense of natural relations (prey and predator) and then the wrongness of his competition with and so wasting of the relations that obtain between sheep, shepherds, and sheepdogs. The scene of good and thrifty husbandry, underwritten by natural law, stands as a defining moment or foundation. What presents, then, as a scene of simple predation, plays out as an encounter in which the material-semiotic heft of the sheep-shepherd-dog multispecies codes the singularized wolf's desires, now moralized as parasitic and wasteful. The wolf's natural and so neutral 'evil' redoubles. It folds upon itself to become something cultural and so sinful. The scene of shepherding constitutes a dominant code—relegated, so it seems, to the background in this scene of predation. But that relegation testifies to its gravity, its orienting heft as a given or axiomatic structure that takes priority. It marks the constitutive difference between the solitary, extra-social wolf and the scene of companion-species belonging that gives rise to the interrelations between persons, sheep, and dogs.

C8.P21 This grounding priority should come as no surprise, given the way the metaphors of pastoral care write the story of social organization in the West and continue, even in the evolved forms of a society of control, to give us our daily biopolitics. '*Omnes et singulatim*', we might say with Foucault—all together and one by one: 'the shepherd counts the sheep. He counts them in the morning when he leads them to pasture, and he counts them in the evening to see that they are all there, and he looks after each of them individually.'[16] This scene of counting, of an enumeration that also evaluates and manages coeval multiplicities—humans and sheep—provides a matrix both for the articulation of the flock and also for 'the paradoxically distributive side of the Christian pastorate', that, even as it attends to the salvation of

[16] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*: *Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977–1978*, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Picador, 2007), 128–9. The next six paragraphs of my essay summarize and rework material from 'Counting Sheep in the Belly of the Wolf', in *Of Sheep, Oranges, and Yeast: A Multispecies Impression* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2017).

each and every sheep, accepts 'the sacrifice of a sheep that could compromise the whole.... The sheep that is a cause of scandal', Foucault explains, 'or whose corruption is in danger of corrupting the whole flock, must be abandoned, possibly excluded, chased away, and so forth' (169). The name for such a sheep, such a wayward soul that compromises the integrity of the flock, might also, of course, be 'wolf'. So, the sinfulness of the wolf's desire to render the sheep 'prey', to eat the sheep according to his lupine needs, to undo the sheep as divinely ordained commodity, works also to naturalize and to legitimate the consumption of the sheep by early modern men and women. The wolf's misconduct serves also to naturalize proper or normative consumption. Coded as excessive, the wolf's 'natural' and so neutral orientation to his object renders the equally neutral 'cultural' orientation of the shepherd 'natural'. Moreover, the sheep, so it would appear, if anyone remembers to ask them, seem to approve of the use they receive at human hands. Their opinion is not sought because it also exists as a given, just as few pause to consider the opinion of the sheepdogs, whose fidelity is taken as read. The ewe experiences a quick-fire series of emotions at the sight of the wolf but makes no such protests, apparently, to her shepherds come at shearing time or as the end of her life approaches.

C8.P22 In his *Historie of Foure-Footed Beastes* (1607), Edward Topsell praises the superlative 'profit' of English sheep, especially profitable, he offers, given the absence of wolves in England, making Wright's scene something of an archaic little theatre.[17] Oh happy English sheep! If Topsell is to be believed, they know nothing of the experience of the frightened ewe Wright describes. Their wool is especially 'soft and curled' and valuable. For it is fear that makes their fleeces coarse. It is fear also that causes the fleece of a dead sheep to corrupt. Unlike their continental cousins and competitors on the international markets, English sheep know no fear, nor thirst, for the temperate, predation-free clime of England 'quench[es] their thirst with the dew of heauen'.[18] Such are the benefits of being that most useful of English animals. Coded as innocent or more frequently as 'hurtless', sheep became for early modern writers a series of naturalized affordances. Extolled for their usefulness, *utilitas*, or, in humanist terms, their 'profit', sheep were that most ideal of creatures, proof of the bounty and beneficence of the divine shepherd.[19]

[17] Topsell, *The Historie of Four-Footed Beastes*, 626–7. [18] Ibid., 626.

[19] The term *profit* translates the Latin *utilitas* into early modern English. For perhaps the most formative use of the term for writers at the end of the sixteenth century, see Roger Ascham, *The Schoolmaster*, ed. Lawrence V. Ryan (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1974).



C8.F1 **Figure 8.1** 'June'. Manuscript illustration from Thomas Fella's 'booke of divers devises'
Folger Shakespeare Library, MS V. a. 311, 51r–52v.

C8.P23 So it is that the figure of the sheep serves as an emblem for Christian meekness and subordination before the divine. As an illustration from Thomas Fella's manuscript Commonplace Book for June, dating from the late sixteenth century, attests (see Figure 8.1), the scenes of shearing and milking sheep stand as positive exempla of human labour against the uncertainly coded wine making that appears on the facing page. June is shearing season, and the scene Fella depicts illustrates the labours of the month—the care to be taken of sheep, cows, and all forms of cattle. On the facing page, we watch as grapes are made into wine. One figure attentively decants wine or grape juice from one barrel. But another guzzles down the fruits of their labour. The figures' absorption in their tasks and pleasures figures a negative version of the ethic of care and absorption represented by the labour of sheep farming on the facing folio page. Meanwhile, up in the rafters, an uncertainly sexed person straddles the troughs below, a stream of urine and faeces descending, either into the container holding the wine or behind it. 'The very image of idelnese' is how the motto captures the scene, coding its uselessness and expenditure of resources.[20]

[20] Fella, Commonplace Book, Folger Shakespeare Library, MS V. a. 311, 51r–52v.

C8.P24 The motto describes the virtuously sheepy labours (milking, washing the fleece of the sheep, preparing for shearing) as follows:

C8.P25
> This hurtlesse beast with meeke moods yelds wool
> And skin to cloth our naked clotte of claye.
> He gives his flesh to feede our bellies full.
> Nought for him selfe he brings but for our staye.

C8.P26 And the sheep, so it appears, accept their purpose. They agree to function as a series of animated use values for the burgeoning numbers of 'naked clotte[s] of claye' who put them to use during their brief 'stay' on earth. It's tempting to imagine the wolf here, on the outside of this arrangement, reading these verbal and visual encomia and being struck by the (to him) perverse multiplication and so omnipresence of sheep products in this world. I picture him salivating but also, perhaps, a bit put out by a world written so as to further or simply to reaffirm the governing centrality of a human-sheep-dog multispecies to the detriment of wolves. But a neutral description of the scene paints a stranger picture still. For, clothed in sheep, full of sheep, reading by sheep-light books bound in sheep, the words written on sheep or on paper steeped in boiled sheep bones, all those shepherding 'clottes of claye' resemble some mimetic sheep-being or human-sheep hybrid.

C8.P27 While it may seem that the coextensive zoomorphism/anthropomorphism that co-writes sheep and 'clottes of claye' goes missing or remains unthought, it would be more accurate to say that it serves as the axiom or, in Foucault's terms, the governing positivity, that underwrites the woodcut.[21] In this image, with its accompanying motto, we watch the way sheep are written as a virtuous, self-sacrificing (or, more properly, always already self-sacrificed) and so naturalized anti-narcissism, and so as humorally less interesting because 'hurtless' than the hurtful wolf who, by that hurtful complexity, corresponds to human passions and behaviours gone badly wrong. Sheep, in this schema, exist in order to be used and that existence as a commodity is their 'true' essence, a 'natural' because 'cultural' or 'cooked' version of the wolf's parasitic expenditure.

[21] Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), 125–31.

C8.P28 Within the likes of Fella's illustration, the logic of pastoral care manifests as a hierarchical series of metaphors that stabilizes the contradictions which might arise from the cross-cutting of beings that the motto and the image sets in motion and that underwrites Wright's investigation of the passions. Here, in other words, we watch and read the set of operations that co-write or co-make sheep as 'sheep', and 'clottes of claye' as Christian (if not yet human) persons, rendering the sheep virtuously 'sheepy' and the clay gratefully 'sheepish', forced to read the sheep's essence as the standard that his or her own Christian devotion should emulate. The virtuous 'clotte of claye' who views the scene and reads the motto is forced to shuttle between gratitude for his and her non-sheepy privilege that enables his and her use of the world, and a sheepy insufficiency or sheep-envy as he or she addresses the divine shepherd. The *post facto* attribution of a 'selfe' to the sheep—a 'selfe' that is constantly sacrificed—represents the logic of deprivation that funds the apparent universalism of the sheep as emblem of a perfect subordination to divine will and divine planning. Thus, as the mottos to Fella's illustration imply, and as Wright's modelling of the passions presumes, when you contemplate your own creaturely life, 'clotte of claye' that you are, know that you must be or become a sheep, metaphorically at least, in your conduct with regard to the divine. Use the sheep. Eat the sheep. Shear the sheep. Boil the sheep down to make glue. But become the sheep in how you orient yourself towards your shepherd. For, as Foucault observes, the radically individualized articulation of each and every subject is the essence of pastoral power's management of the flock and its passions by its shepherds. That and also 'the paradoxically distributive side' that auto-produces the dissident black sheep, goat, or wolf—the 'very image of idelnese'—which must be discarded for the good of the flock'.[22]

C8.P29 What happens when there is no shepherd? What happens when the likes of Wright do not exist to direct readers as to the contours of their passions? What happens to the flock that goes shepherdless and which might therefore experience a wider range of passions than is the norm, at a loss for how to manage, giving into the 'heaviness' that sinks Wright's ewe? Or, worse still, what is it that induces sheep to aspire to wolfish complexity and promote themselves up the species hierarchy so that they come to rival their shepherd or seek his removal? In order to answer these questions, we need

[22] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 169, 176–8.

to visit the public theatre, or one version of it, as modelled by prose polemicist Thomas Nashe.

C8.S4

8.4. Passionate Regimes

C8.P30 In *Pierce Pennilesse* (1592), Thomas Nashe makes an argument for 'the pollicie of Playes' as 'very necessary' 'light toyes' that will 'busie [the] heads' of those people who find themselves with too little to do when a 'State or Kingdome that is in league with all the world…hath no forraine sword to vexe it'.[23] There's nothing quite like 'feare of invasion…every houre', he observes, to keep people on their toes—to enervate and so animate the multitude and ensure that the State is thereby 'confirmed to endure'. War, or better yet 'feare of war', keeps people busy. Peace renders them idle and thus restless. This mooting of the social role of public theatre comes when Nashe's dream vision of the Seven Deadly Sins is nearing the end of his portrait of Sloth. Fella's wine house with its portrait of dissipating idleness beckons. Raising the spectre of a disassociation of the flock into a pack of wolves, Nashe offers theatre as a surrogate for the aesthetic enervation and so entertainment of war. Plays are not the cause of civil disorder. On the contrary, they have a 'necessary' function—to provide one of the fourfold pleasures that 'men that are their owne masters…bestow themselves vpon' during 'the after-noone', which is 'the idlest time of the day': 'game playing, following of harlots, drinking or seeing a Playe' (212). Isn't it better that those wandering sheep not called to heel by an Armada, or the threat of an Armada, have 'some light toyes to busie their heads withal…cast before them as bones to gnaw vpon' (211) so that they don't look around for something else to chew? Tracing out the logic of Nashe's suspended or incomplete zoographic metaphors, we might say that his throwing of play-'bones' to underemployed sheep on their way to becoming wolves ensures that they

[23] Nashe, *Pierce Pennilesse*, in *The Works of Thomas Nashe*, ed. R. B. McKerrow (1910; repr., Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958), 1, 212–15. All references will be to this edition. The next three paragraphs offer deepen the reading of the same passage in Nashe's *Pierce Pennilesse* I offer in 'Skin Merchants: Jack Cade's Futures and the Figural Politics of Shakespeare's *Henry VI Part II*', in *Go Figure: Forms, Energy, Matter in early modern England*, eds, Judith Anderson and Joan Pong Linton (The Bronx: Fordham U. Press, 2011), 165–8, drawing out the animal imagery as it pertains to the way Nashe models the audience of public theatre, and revising that reading in light of Mullaney's signally important arguments about Nashe in *Reformation of the Emotions*.

remain both sheep and also, by the convoking function of the plays they watch together, a flock.

C8.P31 According to Nashe, plays accomplish this task by recycling virtuous exempla from the recent historical past that serve to direct behaviour. 'First, for the subject of [plays]', he writes, 'it is borrowed out of our English Chronicles', resuscitating our 'forefathers valiant acts…that haue line long buried in rustie brasse and worme-eaten bookes' (212). He offers the example of 'brave *Talbot*', inviting readers to consider the joy Talbot would have felt had he known that,

C8.P32 > after he had lyne two hundred yeares in his Tombe, hee should triumphe againe on the Stage, and have his bones newe embalmed with the teares of ten thousand spectators at least (at severall times), who, in the Tragedian that represents his person, imagine they behold him fresh bleeding. (212)

C8.P33 If Nashe is referring to the play Philip Henslowe named 'harey the 6' in his diary, the play that would become what we now call *Henry VI, Part 1*, then apparently, as so many commentators have noted, it must have gone very, very well. Indeed, the 'Tragedian', frequently read as a reference to the 'Ned Alleyn' whom Nashe says he'll commemorate if he ever writes anything in Latin (215), must have been especially moving.[24] And therein lies the power of plays that Nashe offers as plays' defence. Against their detractors, Nashe proclaims that 'there is no immortalitie can be given a man on earth like unto Playes' (212). He offers public theatre up as an agent of distraction, an enervating recipe that will provide the commonwealth with doses of distilled virtues past to ensure that metaphorical sheep remain 'sheep'. Virtuous action will be worthy of replication and re-embalming, producing fake (i.e. animal) blood and real (i.e. human) tears as opposed to a differently distributed and differently scaled shedding of real blood.

C8.P34 What remains remarkable about this passage is the way its suspended or incomplete zoomorphic metaphors imply theatre's efficacy as an affective technology. Seeing and hearing a play, Nashe argues, will, if the subject matter and the mode of delivery promote virtue, have a transformative effect on an audience, collectively fleecing an idle multitude on their way to wolfishness. Andrew Gurr has written persuasively of this passage as the 'first

[24] Andrew Gurr, *Playgoing in Shakespeare's London*, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 165.

description of mass emotion other than laughter in any London playhouse', citing Nashe as a key fragment in understanding shifts in stage practice during the Armada years.[25] Mullaney has offered the most sustained investigation of Talbot's winking in and out of being in the first tetralogy. He reads the likes of Talbot as an ambivalently coded 'constructed archaism' keyed to the ways in which early modern men and women both remembered and forgot their past in the wake of the trauma of Reformation.[26] For Mullaney, Nashe's reference to Talbot cuts both ways, raising the possibility of virtuous exemplarity only to remind readers of the omissions or uncanny rippling of the history that the first tetralogy summons to the stage. Talbot appears in order to be disappeared, and his flickering in and out of being constitutes a stuttering of the historical record. The trauma of Reformation, as it were, disassociates or disaggregates the relations between pasts, presents, and futures. Talbot becomes 'an aporia, a *problématique* that brings the future and the anachronistic together. He is there (and not there) in order to help us think about a present whose ties to the past were at best under suspicion and at worst subject to dissolution, through various efforts to enforce a kind of affective amnesia in the Reformation.'[27] For Mullaney, then, the first tetralogy becomes something on the order of an 'affective laboratory', an experimental technology for exploring trauma that allegorizes the disarticulation of the sacraments and Eucharistic significance. It invites its audiences into an exploration of what it means to exist as a passionate creature in an uncertainly coded 'now' inscribing those experiences in its discontinuous and contradictory representation of times past.

C8.P35 What tends to go unnoticed or underread in Nashe's repositioning of plays and playgoing as a kind of virtuous or moral philosophical, and so passionate, calisthenics, perhaps because it appears so clichéd—of a piece with the cult of memorialization in the period and the public theatre's uncertainly coded summoning of ghosts back to the stage—is the emphasis on the affective register in which plays transport their audience. Momentarily inhabiting the skin of the now-defunct Talbot, Nashe freezes the Tragedian's performance and the reaction of the 'spectators' as something Talbot does not see but would have 'joyed' to think on if he could have anticipated it. He does not describe the play or summarize a performance or give us access to the stage at all. Instead, his prose imagines and so

[25] Ibid. [26] Mullaney, *Reformation of the Emotions*, 126. [27] Ibid., 123.

completes the affective circuit that forms between the audience the play convokes and the dead man the performance brings back by projecting the dead Talbot into the audience and so folding time in a way only the stage can. Nashe treats us therefore to two mutually incompatible and opposing perspectives—perspectives he marries or combines by virtue of his own rhetorical performance. In effect, he opens a window into the relays of the public stage as an affective technology, offering the particular flavour to the mode of temporality and the passion or emotion they produce. He posits an affective and physiological economy in which tears cried in the theatre become the fluid that embalms the dead. In doing so, he posits a continuum of the flesh that extends to the grave or the charnel house and so to the stage. Public theatre's relation to the body—individual and collective, humoral and social—comes to serve therefore as a relay between the living and the dead. And Talbot, much like Wright's wolf, serves as a technical prosthesis or experimental subject keyed to the reanimating power of Nashe's *katabasis*. And this Talbot stands surety as chief witness for the efficacy of the stage as a machine for producing various kinds of 'pasts' in the 'present', rendered less as a spectacle than as an impossible thought in the bones of a dead man, 'newe embalmed with the teares' of the audience. It is this economy of tears become embalming fluid, keyed as it is to a conservation and regulation of virtue in theatre's audiences, that keeps undirected 'human' sheep that might have 'wolfish' thoughts 'sheepish', which is to say docile. In the theatre, this flock sits and stands convoked as a time-bound audience to be dosed with historical highs and lows, and so, perhaps, configured as an imagined community.

C8.P36 Ultimately, what Nashe is selling—along with his own expertise as pamphleteer and purveyor of news if not yet the novel—is the efficacy of theatre as an affective tool for dosing the passions of the flock. He promotes theatre's existence not as an allegory of sacramental efficacy, but as the new repository of an aesthetic and so affective force that rezones the sacramental power liquefied by the Reformation. What the likes of Thomas Wright—religious controversialist, sometime friend and enemy both to the Catholic Mission and the Essex circle—might have made of Nashe's argument, we do not know. Suffice to say that he would have recognized his claims as a challenge to the once-universal affective technology of the Catholic Mass and the Eucharist as the Sacrament of Sacraments, a technology that, though his lexicon is not ours, he would have understood as both humoral and social.

C8.S5

8.5. Animetaphors

C8.P37 In this essay, I have argued that categories of identity we have readily processed as purely 'human' are in actuality the products of our co-making with other forms of life (animal, vegetable, and more). In *Animal Capital*, Nicole Shukin argues persuasively that the history of biopolitics has neglected the way the 'discourses and technologies of biopower hinge on the species divide'.[28] In tracking this occlusion back into early modernity, prior to the emergence of species as a stable discourse, and so into a world of kinds, I have attempted to demonstrate the potential interpretive gains to be had from modelling human emotions or 'passions' by and through the way they are shared with animals otherwise than human and so understood. Wright's modelling of fear comes routed through the correlations formed by the co-articulation of humans and sheep as coeval multiplicities, and it's the semiotic fine edge of this process that I have attempted to trace, culminating in how Nashe's defence of theatre transforms the sheepy origins of the audience he imagines into the behaviours of theatregoers that begins to forget their hybrid origin in the pastoral metaphors of sheep and shepherding. That Nashe's metaphors have not yet lost their sheepy metaphorics, that we can recognize them therefore as 'animetaphors',[29] offers, perhaps, an indication that the transition from pastoral care to a modern biopolitical regime has not yet been made. And this indication suggests that in the future we might have much to learn from the animal and plant presences that lurk in ostensibly human concepts in early modern texts. That we shall be able to discern the stacking of beings that underwrites such metaphors, and so recover these chapters in the story of biopolitics, is due in no small part to the work of Gail Kern Paster.

[28] Shukin, *Animal Capital: Rendering Life in Biopolitical Times* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota press, 2009), 11.

[29] The phrase 'animetaphor' was coined by Akira Mizuta Lippit in *Electric Animal* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000).

C9

9

Speaking (of) Faces

The Gestural Body in *Measure for Measure*

Elizabeth D. Harvey

C9.P1 Even before Isabella's first appearance onstage in *Measure for Measure*, Claudio describes his sister's ability to 'move men' without words by means of her 'prone and speechless dialect'.[1] Although he quickly augments that portrayal by acknowledging her ability to harness 'reason and discourse' in speech, his initial privileging of Isabella's mute postural skills unveils the subterranean energies of gestural dialect that subtend the play. Gesture is a manner of carrying or moving the body; cultivated by Quintilian and Cicero and their early modern followers as an elaborate system of communication, it was also, crucially for my argument, a series of disturbingly involuntary communications and revelations. Desire in the play is a hidden pulse that erupts in uncontainable and unpredictable ways, disturbing the façade of propriety and the law. In this essay I investigate how gestural and affective language is entangled with gender, anatomical understandings of gesture and muscles, and early modern psychology in Shakespeare's Vienna. My particular focus is the face, the frontal aspect of the head, which both reveals and conceals the operations of the mind. The face epitomizes the escaping, involuntary nature of desire in *Measure for Measure* and illuminates the secret energies that shape the play's transactions.

C9.P2 Gestural communication in *Measure for Measure* supplements, undergirds, invades, and disrupts logical and legal discourse. It carries the dangerous currents of desire that pervade Renaissance Vienna, surreptitious operations of eroticism that are condensed into the figure of the bed trick. Plotted offstage with the disguised Duke acting as bawd, the almost silent

[1] William Shakespeare, *Measure for Measure*, in *The Norton Shakespeare*, 2nd ed., ed. Stephen Greenblatt et al. (New York: W. W. Norton, 2008), 1.3.181–2. All quotations from Shakespeare's plays and poems are from this edition.

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tryst is devised for the 'heavy middle of the night' in a hidden location, a 'garden circummured with brick' behind a 'planchèd gate' that requires two keys for entrance (4.1.28–35). The audience is privy to its preparation and aftermath, but the sexual encounter itself is not staged.[2] While the dream-like sexual substitution remains invisible for much of the play, it ultimately erupts from its narrative cloistering when Mariana announces it publicly in the legal, discursive confrontations of the final scene. The bed trick thus straddles and intermingles what the play elsewhere imagines as divided and incompatible registers: legal/illegal, rational/irrational, voluntary/involuntary, sexual/chaste, silent/spoken, corporeal/discursive communication. No more containable than Juliet's pregnancy, the lecherous sparrows of Vienna that resist policing, or the insistent eruption of Angelo's lust, the corporeal urgencies of desire and generation circulate in the city and in bodies with transgressive, unpredictable force.

C9.P3 My exploration of gesture in the play involves the whole body but grants particular attention to the face and the head. To designate Isabella's dialectic as 'prone' is, among other things, to evoke an image of a prostrated body, face and belly down. Pronation is a gesture of abasement in part because it obscures the face, diverting the social engagement of face-to-face confrontations into the body. Although I discuss gesture in general, I will focus on the way early modern thinkers and recent psychologists alike privilege the face as a rich matrix of gesture, both in its encounters and in its refusals of engagement. We witness this primacy early in the play when the nun Francisca directs Isabella to answer the monastery door and speak with Lucio; as an 'unsworn' novice, Isabella is not yet bound by the restraints imposed upon the votarists of St Clare. Once they have taken their vows, the nuns cannot speak to men except in the presence of the Prioress, and even then, says Francisca, 'if you speak, you must not show your face, | Or, if you show your face, you must not speak' (1.4.12–13). This chiastic directive for monastic silence divides discourse into the two apparently mutually

[2] Will Stockton and James M. Bromley argue that the bed tricks in *Measure for Measure* and *All's Well That Ends Well* create a space of obscurity in which the nature of the sexual acts is unknown. This indeterminacy extends to other kinds of sexual encounters—gestures, innuendo, touch, imagining—that are often radically ambiguous in the way that they are received by characters or understood by audiences and readers. Stockton and Bromley's insights liberate the discourses of sexuality from heteronormative expectations, enlarging both the possibilities of sexual engagement and the intersubjective linguistic and extralinguistic encounters in which they are embedded. See 'Introduction: Figuring Early Modern Sex', in *Sex before Sex: Figuring the Act in Early Modern England* (Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press, 2013: 1–23).

exclusive aspects that shape the play's architecture: spoken or written language—here registered as speech—and the gestural body, synecdochized by the face.[3]

C9.P4 Francisca's monastic directive is important to my argument for two reasons. First, she locates the importance of gesture in the face as a distinct form of mirrored communication, a face-to-face encounter syntactically echoed by the play's title. My analysis of cephalic and facial gesture in the play engages the writings of John Bulwer (*c*.1606–56), who is best known for his cataloguing of the bodily gestures in *Chirologia*, the first English sign language. I will be drawing here, however, on his less well known but brilliantly innovative dissection of facial muscles, *Pathomyotomia*. Bulwer's treatise was published in 1649, but some of its insights depend on an older cultural logic. Helkiah Crooke (1576–1648) gathered from other anatomical writings similar ideas about the linkage between facial muscles and affect, and the circulation of these ideas must have enabled Bulwer's more extended study. I read *Measure for Measure* by way of Bulwer's pivotal early modern study of emotion and faces, for I will claim that Bulwer's theorization of affect offers potent insights into the imbrication of desire and agency in the play. Facial expression registers both an intrapsychic state (how an individual subject experiences emotion) and an intersubjective encounter (how that emotion is expressed, received, or even manipulated in a social context). In his description of voluntary and involuntary muscles, Bulwer illuminates the powerful and troubled relationship between affect and the will. His account furnishes insight into the operations of agency, political power, and desire in a play that stages how human desire flows between and among people, how it solicits and resists legal and political regulation, and how it operates invisibly both as a felt force for the individual subject and as an uncontainable force moving between human subjects.

C9.P5 Second, Francisca's direction about speech and faces is formulated as a chiasmus, as I have noted.[4] The chiastic diptych replicates in its mirrored

[3] Philosophers acknowledge a similar division, even as they recognize the intricate intertwining of the two aspects. Charles Taylor, for example, distinguishes between language on the one hand and 'enactment' on the other, bodily gesture and the social or expressive aspects of communication. 'The primary locus of language is conversation, and the original locus of this is in face-to-face encounters. But setting up these requires not just word utterance but also body language, eye contact or its absence, tone of voice' (*The Language Animal: The Full Shape of the Human Linguistic Capacity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016), 48).

[4] Gail Kern Paster, elaborating on Maurice Merleau-Ponty's theorization of the face-to-face encounter with the world, emphasizes the inevitably social and transactional nature of emotion. See Paster, *Humoring the Body: Emotions and the Shakespearean Stage* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 8.

linguistic structure the speechless encounter between faces that Francisca imagines at the monastery gate. The mute nun inside the cloister gazes at the face of the outsider who returns her gaze, an inversion that encapsulates the trope's characteristic crossing of divergent elements. George Puttenham nicknamed the figure the 'Cross-Couple', describing the chiasmus as two contraries tied together at the middle.[5] Eve Sedgwick's fascination with the trope in *Between Men* focuses on its 'criss-cross' relationship with temporality, in which its affinity to *Nachträglichkeit* or 'deferred action' allows the first term or subject to be modified by subsequent experience.[6] Key to my reading of chiasmus in *Measure for Measure* is Sedgwick's contention that the diagonal crossing of these subjects in chiasmus 'conceals their discontinuity'.[7] The fulcrum of the X is, in my understanding, a blind spot, a point of obscurity, a suspension. Chiasmus is *Measure for Measure*'s signature rhetorical figure, and its narrative counterpart is substitution. Just as chiasmus draws divergent elements together, yoking them at the middle of the X, so substitution is a structural relationship that acknowledges difference between an original and a proxy and then binds them through their association. The numerous substitutions and mirrorings that configure the plot in *Measure for Measure* share with chiasmus the blind spot of its crossing, the moments of enigma which, like the play's bed trick, mufflings, and disguises, shroud discontinuity.

C9.P6 The substitutions Angelo for the Duke, Mariana for Isabella, and Barnardine for Claudio drive the plot, but an intricate web of implicit substitutions shapes the play's subtler transactions.[8] Angelo's unknowing sexual 'sin' with Mariana exactly replicates Claudio's infraction with Juliet, since both sleep with their betrothed. Yet Angelo refuses to acknowledge his potential similarity to Claudio. Claudio's plea that Isabella sacrifice her maidenhead for his life pairs mortality and sexuality, placing gender in the blind spot of the cross-coupling. The consequences of sexuality are fundamentally different for brother and sister, and the face-to-face encounter between the siblings accentuates both how they are affectively joined and how they diverge in their responses.

[5] Puttenham, *The Art of English Poesy: A Critical Edition*, ed. Frank Whigham and Wayne A. Rebhorn (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press), 291.

[6] Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, 'Archive—Rhetorical Devices', s.v. '*chiasmus*', http://evekosofskysedgwick.net/teaching/rhetorical-devices.html.

[7] Sedgwick, *Between Men: English Literature and Male Homosocial Desire* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 15.

[8] Alexander Leggatt provides an illuminating and exhaustive account of these substitutions in 'Substitution in *Measure for Measure*', *Shakespeare Quarterly* 39, no. 3 (1988): 342–59.

C9.P7 In his brilliant analysis of chiastic structures in *The Rape of Lucrece*, Joel Fineman argues that Shakespeare's repeated foregrounding of chiasmus links violence and eroticism. As Tarquin lies in bed 'revolving' in his mind the intended rape, 'will' figures as the pivot between 'abstaining' and his 'will's obtaining'.[9] Like *Lucrece*, *Measure for Measure* anatomizes psychic motivations, affective responses, and the political implications of coercive sexual encounters, and in both texts the will figures prominently. Angelo's desire to possess Isabella against her 'will' implicates questions of volition and coercion. As I will be arguing in more detail, John Bulwer's imputation of will and agency to muscles in *Pathomyotomia* situates the operation of facial expression in the terrain of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, for Bulwer's anatomy of the face directly illuminates how the issues of desire, voluntary and involuntary choice, and the imposition of personal and political 'will' shape the ethical issues at the centre of *Measure for Measure*.[10]

C9.P8 The confrontations with the other in *Measure for Measure* exemplify what A. D. Nuttall calls 'vicarious action',[11] a kind of emotional chiasmus, since they expose a series of ethical issues that centre on empathy, on whether the looker can understand or inhabit the alterity of another. Emmanuel Levinas's influential theorization of the nakedness of the face sees it as encoding the fundamental suffering of humanity, an assessment that rests on early modern privileging of the face as the signifier of the human.[12] To refuse this mirrored gaze of vulnerability, as Angelo does with Claudio or Mariana, is to undermine his awareness of human vulnerability, his own and that of his subjects. This repudiation is especially damaging to one who wields political power, as Angelo does, for the imposition of his 'will' has destructive agency. I will probe the consequences of emotional agency and its failures in *Measure for Measure* through an analysis of gesture, facial muscles, and their affective expression.[13]

[9] Fineman, 'Shakespeare's Will: The Temporality of Rape', *Representations*, no. 20 (1987): 25–76, 38–9.

[10] See W. R. Elton, 'Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* and Shakespeare's *Troilus and Cressida*', *Journal of the History of Ideas* 58, no. 2 (1997): 331–7.

[11] Nuttall, '*Measure for Measure*: Quid Pro Quo?', *Shakespeare Studies*, no. 4 (1968): 231–51, 232.

[12] Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1969), 66.

[13] Shigehisa Kuriyama notes that anatomical preoccupation with muscles is a Western phenomenon and that traditional Chinese medicine does not make the muscles a central feature in mapping the body. See his important chapter, 'Muscularity and Identity', in *The Expressiveness of the Body and the Divergence of Greek and Chinese Medicine* (New York: Zone Books, 2002), 111–52.

C9.S1

9.1. *Measure for Measure* and Cephalic Gesture

C9.P9 The play opens with the Duke's observation, as he prepares to relinquish his political authority, that to 'unfold' 'the properties' of government 'would seem in me t'affect speech and discourse' (1.1.3–4). The Duke's transfer of power to his chosen deputy, Angelo, is a substitution of 'heads of state' that anticipates the swapping of decapitated heads at the end of the play. *Measure for Measure* is thus framed by a substitution of heads, metaphorical and political at the play's inception, and literal and bodily at the end. In between these cephalic exchanges, the play 'unfolds' the properties of language—gestural and linguistic, facial and spoken—beginning with the judicial 'sentence' of decapitation to which Claudio is subjected. The action of the play is doubly suspended, first by the Duke's apparent interruption of his political rule, and then by the space between the judicial imposition of Claudio's sentence and its execution.

C9.P10 In the long interval between these narrative events in *Measure for Measure*, Shakespeare explores the imbricated nature of gestural and linguistic communication. The Duke's cryptic opening utterance—'Of government the properties to unfold | Would seem in me t'affect speech and discourse'—ostensibly means that when he tries to explain governance, he becomes verbose, prolix in discourse. The judge Escalus excels by comparison in translating political and judicial knowledge into enacted practice. When the Duke invests Angelo with his power, disguising himself as a friar in order secretly to watch over Vienna, however, the Duke's penchant for 'speech and discourse' is loosed into the play, proliferating in wordplay and gestural communication that continually reveal and refashion the nature of language. Although the play pries apart gestural and verbal discourse, making both aspects visible and audible, it also repeatedly insists on their interrelationship. Gesture and cadence are embedded in verbal language, as the play makes clear, and enacted discourse is often supplemented with or glossed by its translated verbal counterpart. Utterances continually fracture unitary meaning through punning and wordplay, and facial expression diverges from words, dividing the play's discursive matrix against itself and rendering language as opaque and 'muffled' as the decapitated head at the end of the play.[14]

[14] Will Stockton provides a powerful model of 'antihermeneutic psychoanalytic' reading in *Playing Dirty: Sexuality and Waste in Early Modern Comedy* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011) in which, following Jean Laplanche's revisions of Freud and Laplanche,

C9.P11 *Measure for Measure* examines the circulation and regulation of desire, and it is therefore fitting that gestural discourse carries with it a particular kind of affective charge. The Duke's choice of verb in his opening utterance, *affect*, means in its simplest sense 'to incline', 'to show a preference for',[15] but the word derives from the Latin *affectare*, to desire or seek after. Affect and its variants, *affection* and *affections*, recur in the play, marking the transmission of desire, emotional attachment, and deceptive appearance. The bloodless Angelo is able to pronounce a death sentence without remorse because his apparent virtue is divorced from the affections that would allow for mercy or pity. His reception of Isabella's pleas for her brother's life seems devoid of empathy either for Claudio's transgression or for his fate; Isabella repeatedly tries to persuade him—initially through a chiasmus—to switch places imaginatively with her brother so that he can feel what Claudio is feeling: 'if he had been you, and you as he, | You would have slipped like him' (2.2.84–5); or 'Go to your bosom, | Knock there, and ask your heart what it doth know | That's like my brother's fault' (2.2.166–8). Even as the play evokes the early modern commonplace that the head is the seat of reason and judgement and that Angelo as deputized Duke, 'head of state', might govern the wayward passions of Vienna and exemplify self-government and erotic restraint, it as quickly subverts this simple geography of desire and reason through Angelo's lust for Isabella.

C9.P12 The head can never be a simple territorialized image of reason or the soul precisely because its frontal aspect is the face. The face was for early modern anatomists the seat and mirror of the affections, and it reflected the passions of its owner, the physiognomical habits of expression, and the assumed countenance (affectation) it presented to others. The face and its gestural vocabulary thus offer a rich lexicon for affect and for the voluntary, and sometimes involuntary, modulation of muscles that presented those affects. The face was the body's primary social façade, and its complex ability to register or to contain emotion is embedded in the languages of intersubjective interaction, a social geography of communication.[16] As we shall see, this affective facial language is described in anatomical studies, promulgated

he privileges wordplay, tricks, and elements of early modern rhetoric (xii–xx). His analysis brilliantly explores the capacity of queer theory to disrupt both the orthodoxies of traditional psychoanalysis and the anachronism of early modern heterosexuality.

[15] *OED Online*, s.v. 'affect', v. 1–3.

[16] Brian Cummings and Freya Sierhuis, introduction to *Passions and Subjectivity in Early Modern Culture*, ed. Cummings and Sierhuis (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013), 1–9.

through rhetorical and dramatic instruction, and constitutes a specific discursive modality in *Measure for Measure.* If facial expression maps and displays the body's affects, gestural and spoken communication in the play is also confined or expressed by particular municipal spaces: the Duke's palace, the convent, the brothel, the circummured garden, the prison, the suburbs, and the city gates.[17] These places augment the body's gestural work, topographically amplifying psychic states and social interaction.

C9.S2

9.2. Muscles and Facial Mobility

C9.P13 Following Galen's lead, the early seventeenth-century anatomist Helkiah Crooke characterized the head as a defensive structure, a watchtower, designed to protect the 'sentinels' of the eyes.[18] The brain is compassed with the battlements of the skull and adorned with a face 'as with a Beautifull Frontispice wherein the Soule inhabiteth . . . in her magnificence and throne of state' (431). When the Duke deputizes Angelo, he gives him the same 'scope' of power 'as [his] own', directing him to 'enforce or qualify the laws | As to your soul seems good' (1.1.70–3). Just as Crooke designates the soul, seated in the head, as the 'Soveraigne and Commander'[19] of the body, so too is Angelo, guided by his 'soul', deputized as governor of Vienna. Having anatomized the hairy backside of the head, Crooke turns to its frontal aspect, which the 'Latins called *Facies*' because in it the beauty and 'elegancy of humane nature doth most appear' (532). Crooke's anatomical description is undergirded by the humanist precept that distinguishes human beings from their animal counterparts: 'of all creatures onely man goeth upright and looketh directly forward' (532). Human beings have faces as a direct consequence of their bipedalism, according to Crooke, and the erect human posture aligns the face as forward facing. Not only is the face a potent signifier for the human, then, but the arrangement of the senses, with four of the five senses congregated in the visage, prepares it for the principal repercussion of that rational sovereignty: the capacity to communicate. As Crooke says of the tongue, 'the chiefe use of it in man is speech, the chief use in Beasts is tasting' (608). The eyes and ears also participate in human speech,

[17] This association of anatomical studies with mapping resonates with Valerie Traub's argument in 'Anatomy, Cartography, and the New World Body' in this volume (Chapter 4).

[18] Crooke, *Mikrokosmographia: A Description of the Body of Man* (London, 1615), 530.

[19] Ibid., 433, 428.

and even though Crooke gestures only briefly to the face and the muscles that animate it as instrumental in the sensory-communicative circuit, he locates in anatomical structure what natural philosophers of the passions already acknowledged about the face.

C9.P14 Early modern anatomists recognized that the face was inherently expressive. If the tongue is destined for speech, the face is ordained for affective display and communication. The early modern belief in the primacy of the face has had a potent afterlife, of course. Twentieth-century neurological studies have since established the fusiform gyrus as the part of the brain responsible for face recognition.[20] It is one of the earliest parts of the brain to develop, perhaps because facial identification is foundational to attachment, the infant's ability to bond with the mother.[21] Sigmund Freud's influential successors—Melanie Klein, D. W. Winnicott, and Wilfred Bion, among others—recognized that the developmental consequence of the human infant's extreme vulnerability was its dependence on others. The psychic life of the human subject is thus inextricably intersubjective and object oriented. Emotion is a currency in these transactional relations, and the primacy that both early modernists and psychoanalytic theorists accord to the face acknowledges its predominant place in the gestural lexicon. Silvan Tomkins, the psychologist and founder of affect studies, and Paul Ekman, who influentially systematized micro facial expressions, both demonstrated that the face is central to the production of affect.[22] Twentieth-century research confirms and extends early modern natural-historical and medical belief that likewise accorded the face a preeminent place. Crooke saw the face as furnishing an 'Image of the minde', an insight Lucrece echoes in the *Rape of Lucrece* when she declares that the face 'ciphers' the heart and 'expressly' tells its 'manners'.[23] Sir Thomas Browne itemized facial features,

[20] See Oliver Sacks, *The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat* (London: Duckworth, 1985); and his essay on his own prosopagnosia, or face-blindness, 'Face-Blind', *The New Yorker*, August 30, 2010, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/08/30/face-blind. See also Heather A. Berlin, 'The Neural Basis of the Dynamic Unconscious', *Neuropsychoanalysis* 13, no. 1 (2011): 5–31.

[21] Beatrice Beebe, 'Faces in Relation: A Case Study', *Psychoanalytic Dialogues* 14, no. 1 (2004): 1–51.

[22] Tomkins, 'The Face of Affect', in *Exploring Affect: The Selected Writings of Silvan Tomkins*, ed. E. Virginia Demos (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995): 205–290; Ekman, ed., *Emotion in the Human Face*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); and Ekman, ed., *Darwin and Facial Expression: A Century of Research in Review* (New York: Academic Press, 1973). Ekman's research forms the basis for the popular television series, *Lie to Me* (2009–11), whose central character is a world authority on deception because of his capacity to read micro expressions.

[23] Crooke, *Mikrokosmographia*, 532; Shakespeare, *Rape of Lucrece*, lines 196–7.

asserting that '[s]ince the brow speaks often true, since eyes and noses have tongues, and the countenance proclaims the heart and inclinations; let observation so far instruct thee in physiognomical lines'.[24]

C9.P15 Physiognomy was founded on the coupling of facial and bodily territories and their association with particular humoral balances, temperaments, and affects.[25] Facial regions accrued metaphoric significance, as when Crooke remarks that the Egyptians reckoned the nose to be the signifier of wisdom and prudence for its capacity to smell political stratagems.[26] The tapster and bawd Pompey in *Measure for Measure* relies on the established practice of reading faces when he enjoins Escalus to survey Froth's countenance and form a judgement of his character: 'I beseech you, sir, look in this gentleman's face—Good Master Froth, look upon his Honor. 'Tis for a good purpose.—Doth your Honor mark his face?' (2.1.154–7). Pompey asks whether Escalus can see any 'harm' in Froth's face. Escalus admits that he cannot readily see signs of criminality, and Pompey pushes his advantage, hyperbolically claiming that Froth's face is in fact the 'worst thing about him' (2.1.164–5) and that Froth should therefore be exonerated on the basis of his apparently innocent face. This facial reading occurs in a scene stuffed with obfuscating language, Elbow's malapropisms, Pompey's interminable discursive digressions, and riddling wordplay and allusions,[27] all of which contrast with the apparent transparency of Froth's face. In the play's final trial scene, faces mark the intersection of identity and probity in a different way. Angelo and the still-disguised Duke sit in judgement of Mariana's complaint, but she refuses to uncover her face until her husband bids her to

[24] Browne, *Christian Morals* (London, 1756), 68.

[25] The pseudo-Aristotelian treatise *Physiognomica* circulated widely (see T. Loveday and E. S. Forster, eds, *The Works of Aristotle*, trans. W. D. Ross, vol. 6, *Physiognomica* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1913)). For an account of medieval and early modern translations and commentaries, see Marke Ahonen, 'Medieval and Early Modern Physiognomy', in *Sourcebook for the History of the Philosophy of Mind: Philosophical Psychology from Plato to Kant*, ed. Simo Knuuttila and Juha Sihvola (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014), 633–4. Giambattista della Porta's *De humana physiognomonia* (1586) influentially compared human faces with animal faces, suggesting analogies between the temperaments and qualities. See also Sybille Baumbach, *Shakespeare and the Art of Physiognomy* (Penrith: Humanities-Ebooks, 2008).

[26] Crooke, *Mikrokosmographia*, 613. Andreas Laurentius, one of the two sixteenth-century anatomists upon whom Crooke most relies, summed up this regionalization. He said 'in the eye-browes dwels pride, in the Cheekes Shamefastnesse, in the Chinne majesty, in the Forehead wisedome, finally, in the who[l]e countenance beauty and honesty' (quoted in Crooke, 532–3).

[27] The references to Pompey's namesake, Pompey the Great, are especially intriguing, given the Roman general's five marriages, some of which were contracted as political alliances. Pompey's connection to pimping and prostitution in *Measure for Measure* aligns him with, even as it impugns, the custom of using sexual or marital alliance for legal or political advancement, a kind of socially sanctioned echo of the play's suburban sex workers.

unmask. Her testimony is delivered with her face concealed, making her compelling words supersede a judgement that might be influenced by identity and physiognomy. Mariana's allegations pivot on the ambiguity of the word *known*: although her husband '[k]nows not that he ever knew' her, yet she has 'known' her husband sexually. Just as 'knowing' is shrouded in the ambiguities of multiple meaning, so is her identity concealed by her veiled face. Muffling facial and discursive language accentuates the complexity of both modes, even as it emphasizes their often unacknowledged interdependence. As I will argue, shrouding the female face has particular significance in a play that couples sexual desire with the unstable veracity of both discursive and gestural feminine language.

C9.P16 As a physician, Crooke recognized that the face was continually changing, not just because it manifested health or disease but also because it reflected the activity of the mind. He called the face the '*Vultus a voluntatis iudicio*, because it bewraieth the disposition of the will, and is especially changed according to the variety thereof' (532). Thomas Hill, a writer and translator of popular scientific books, affirms facial mobility in his treatise on physiognomy, *The Contemplation of Mankinde* (1571): 'In a man the face remayneth, but the countenaunce doth alter: so that the countinaunce is named of the Latine worde Volando, which properly in Englishe signifieth a flying or vanishing away.'[28] Although faces have established physiognomical elements—a bony architecture, temperature, colour, and texture of the hair or skin—expressions of particular emotions move through the flesh of the face. 'The upper part (*frons a ferendo)*' of the face (the forehead), Crooke tells us, 'beareth the passions of the mind' (532). The word *emotion*, from the Latin *movere*, entered English in the second half of the sixteenth century, and it captures this sense of movement implicit in strong feeling. As anatomists and natural philosophers recognized, the face was the primary map for the passions and the mobility of shifting affects.

C9.P17 Muscles are, as Crooke and his anatomist predecessors recognized, the organs responsible for movement. Muscles form the principal component of the flesh, and they are distinguished by 'governing and being governed', because they move the part of the body 'for whose motion they were ordayned', and they are in turn ruled by the brain.[29] Crooke catalogues the muscles that mobilize the face, and when he discusses the movements of the eye, he assigns specific affects and corresponding names to certain muscles:

[28] Hill, *The Contemplation of Mankinde* (London, 1571), 90.
[29] Crooke, *Mikrokosmographia*, 738.

the muscle that lifts the eye up towards the brow, for example, is called the 'proud muscle', he tells us, because the motion lifts up the eye in 'a kinde of disdain' (748–9). The muscle that draws the eye towards the cheeks is called by contrast the '*humble* Muscle' because we draw our eyes downward in 'bashfulnesse', and the muscle seated at the outer corner of the eye that draws the eye outward is called the 'Muscle of Indignation or the Wayward Muscle' (749). Acknowledging the connection between facial muscles and emotions, Crooke cites Felix Plater, the Swiss physician whose 1606 work, *Praxeos Medicae*, provided an important classification of psychiatric disorders, as calling the muscles of the head 'the muscles of the affections'.[30] In *Measure for Measure*, we can see the linkage between motion and emotion, still audible in our modern English colloquial phrase 'to be moved'. Isabella can 'move' men with her 'prone and speechless dialect' (1.3.181–2), for instance, and Barnardine is not 'moved' to penitence, even when threatened with imminent execution (4.2.164).

C9.P18 Charles Darwin suggested in *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* (1872) that the 'free expression by outward signs of an emotion intensifies it'. He recognized that there was a complex correlation between the face's gestural mobility, the muscles recruited for the display of emotion, and the heightened or diminished capacity to feel affect.[31] He is anticipated in this work by Bulwer's *Pathomyotomia*, which systematized in exhaustive detail what Crooke's affective characterization of the eye muscles anticipates: the linkage between specific muscles and corresponding emotions. Crooke, Bulwer, and Darwin describe the chiasmic social relations figured by the face, and a blind spot or obscurity marks the complex site that harbours affect and the voluntary or involuntary mobilization of expression. Bulwer's Latin title captures the essence of his project: a dissection (*tomia*) of the muscles (*myo*) of the passions or affections (*Patho*). *Pathomyotomia* serves as an important antecedent to Darwin because it pushes the limits of physiognomy, which records how emotional habits imprint themselves on the still face. Bulwer's attention, by contrast, is directed to motion; he inventories the volatile manifestation of emotion in the countenance by dissecting muscles that make it mobile. He aims to capture the action of the mind. As a 'Face-Prophet', he digs into the 'secret and undiscover'd treasury of the

[30] Ibid., 745.

[31] Darwin, *On the Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals*, 2nd ed., ed. Francis Darwin (New York, 1890), 366. Darwin acknowledges Bulwer's description of a 'variety of expressions' and his anatomization 'at length [of] the muscles involved in each'.

Muscles' in order to 'track' the affections 'bedded…in the skin'.[32] Without these muscles, he asserts, a man would look like a '*Socraticall Statue*', always in one 'fix'd posture'. There 'might be *Facies*', but no '*Vultus*' to provide a 'voluntary explanation of his mind'. He would be like a cabinet locked up whose key was lost.[33]

C9.P19 The perspective of the early modern anatomist was essentially utilitarian and explanatory. Bodily organs were designed for a purpose, and the anatomist's task was to divine their functions. The anatomist's gaze was intrasomatic, directed beneath the skin to the workings of bodily parts, but when Crooke and Bulwer dissect the muscles of the eye, they also acknowledge the social, *inter*somatic aspects of the human body. Eyes were designed not just for vision; they were seen reciprocally from the outside, and their capacity to register expressions and affect was necessary for social interaction. Bulwer's treatise details the anatomical description of the cephalic muscles, exhaustively classifying each one, naming it, and comparing his own understanding with that of other anatomists. At the same time, he catalogues the expressive implications of the movement for which the recruited muscle is responsible as well as the affect associated with it. He begins with the movements of the head: 'When we *assent, affirm, yield, grant, vote, confirme, confesse, admit, approve*' of a thing, we '*Nod or bend our head forward*'. Like Isabella's 'prone and speechless dialectic', these movements demonstrate a '*yielding flexibility of the will*' that are aided by a pair of muscles he calls the '*assenting or yielding paire*'.[34] When we '*dislike, refuse, denie, or resent* a thing, we use the cast-up backwards Nod of our Head'. There are muscles for refusing and denying, for mocking and threatening, for dislike—these are called the '*Recusant Muscles*'—and for supplications and tenderness.[35] Bulwer's anatomization of the facial musculature provides a gestural lexicon of the passions that are rooted in the muscles of the face, from arching the eyebrows, furrowing the forehead, and wrinkling the nose to narrowing and widening the eyes. While Bulwer wanted to correlate single muscles with unitary affects, his own descriptions suggest that multiple muscles working in concert need to be recruited to produce facial expression. It would be too easy, however, to imagine a perfect correspondence between facial demonstration and the passions. The correlation

[32] Bulwer, *Pathomyotomia* (London, 1649), address to 'Physicians and Masters in Anatomie', a4; and address 'To the daring Advancer of all Somaticall Science', a1r.
[33] Ibid., 40. [34] Ibid., 47–51. [35] Ibid., 54–70.

between affect and its expression founders on two contested and interlaced issues: deception and the voluntary nature of the muscles.

C9.S3

9.3. Will, Rhetoric, Gesture

C9.P20 When Hamlet is preparing to stage the Mousetrap, he asks Horatio to watch Claudius carefully, scrutinizing the king's response for evidence of guilt: 'Give him heedful note, | For I mine eyes will rivet to his face, | And after we will both our judgments join | To censure of his seeming' (3.2.76–80). Hamlet imagines that the representation of strong emotion in the Mousetrap will elicit an answering affect powerful enough to separate Claudius's controlled self-presentation from involuntary facial expressions. If Hamlet keeps his eyes 'riveted' to his uncle's face, he may be able to decide the king's 'occulted' guilt (3.2.85). Hamlet has just dispensed advice to the players to modulate the 'whirlwind of [their] passion' by 'suit[ing] the action to the word, the word to the action', taking care not to 'o'erstep' the 'modesty of nature' (3.2.6–18). Attentive both to theatrical technique and to Quintilian's definition of oratory as words or 'voice' and action or 'movement', Hamlet suggests that the player king curtail his gestures, counselling him not 'to saw the air too much with your hand, thus' (3.2.4). In *Institutio Oratoria*, Quintilian argues that bodily posture offers a speaking picture that could 'penetrate into our innermost feelings with such power that at times they seem more eloquent than language itself'. In a long section on movement, Quintilian itemizes the gestures of the head and the face, suggesting how they can amplify rhetorical effect. He draws particular attention to the head's carriage, for each of its postures communicates an affect: consent, refusal, affirmation, modesty, hesitation, wonder, and indignation.[36] In his discussion of facial expression, Quintilian concentrates on the power of the glance and the movements of the eyes and eyebrows as capable of stimulating emotion in the spectators.[37]

[36] Quintilian, *Institutio Oratoria*, trans. H. E. Butler (Loeb Classical Library, 1920), book 11, 4, 281–3, http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/e/roman/texts/quintilian/institutio_oratoria/11c*.html.

[37] Evelyn B. Tribble offers an instructive account of the intersection between classical rhetorical instruction and theatrical gesture in *Cognition in the Globe: Attention and Memory in Shakespeare's Theatre* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). See also John Astington on gesture in Shakespeare, 'Actors and the Body: Meta-Theatrical Rhetoric in Shakespeare', *Gesture* 6, no. 2 (2006): 241–59.

C9.P21 Bulwer codified many of Quintilian's ideas in his treatise on the art of 'Manuall Rhetorique', *Chironomia*, which was appended to *Chirologia* (1644). If *Chirologia* harnesses the 'natural' movements, *Chironomia* is about cultivating the art of hand gestures; these must be learned, sometimes by means of examples drawn from Roman theatrical practices, in order for a declamation to be wholly persuasive. Three central ideas subtend Bulwer's passionate history and inventory of hand gestures. The first and most important claim is that the hand is a metonym for human reason. If bipedality accentuates the face, it also makes hands into mobile instruments, thus distinguishing humans from animals. The hand, says Bulwer, is the signifier or '*companion of Reason*', even its substitute or deputy.[38] Second, hand gestures offer a universal mode of communication that transcends the difference between national languages. Third, manual eloquence provides a visual display that augments meaning and persuasion by soliciting emotional response from the spectators, even covering the defects of speaking 'by the Elegancie of this Artifice'.[39] The primacy Bulwer grants to reason, which also informs *Pathomyotomia*, paints a portrait of human ecology that is firmly guided by a rational principle able to check and channel the force of affect that the gestural body could unleash in the spectator. His treatise articulates an implicit theory of affect, a portrait that privileges the capacity of reason to manage and manipulate emotional life by means of the 'voluntary' muscles of affection.

C9.P22 There are several difficulties with Bulwer's premise. If gestures can be cultivated, how can we tell what is genuine? This is, of course, Hamlet's dilemma and, indeed, a central complexity in the intersubjective exchange of emotion. Hamlet recounts the player's passionate description of the grief-stricken Hecuba amid the flames of Troy, a portrait so saturated with affect that even the burning 'eyes of heaven' would have been moist (2.2.543). Polonius remarks that the player himself seems to be swept up by the emotions he describes in Hecuba; his face changes colour and his eyes seem to fill with tears. In his soliloquy, Hamlet muses on this moment:

C9.P23 Is it not monstrous that this player here,
But in a fiction, in a dream of passion,
Could force his soul so to his own conceit,

[38] Bulwer, *Chironomia*, in *Chirologia* (London, 1644), 2–5. Farah Karim-Cooper, *The Hand on the Shakespearean Stage: Gesture, Touch and the Spectacle of Dismemberment* (London: Bloomsbury, 2016) provides an instructive study of hands and gesture in the plays.

[39] Bulwer, *Chironomia*, 'Praeludium'.

That, from her working, all his visage wann'd;
Tears in his eyes, distraction in's aspect,
A broken voice, and his whole function suiting
With forms to his conceit? And all for nothing!

C9.P24 (2.2.529–34)

C9.P25 The actor can through his art recruit a passion so convincing that it kindles a corresponding emotion in him; summoning the muscular resources of affect ignites the involuntary experience of 'real' feeling.[40] Hamlet's metatheatrical soliloquy reveals the layered intricacy of emotional response. He yearns to believe in an 'art' that could find 'the mind's construction in the face',[41] the straightforward idea that Claudius's instinctive response to the Mousetrap will simply undo the contrived arrangement of the countenance that he presents to the world. When Hamlet satirizes the duplicity of such obsequious and opportunistic gestures as 'crook[ing] the pregnant hinge of the knee' (3.2.54) to curry favour, he suggests that underneath these adopted gestures, one might discover a man who is not 'passion's slave', whose emotional honesty is worth cherishing in his 'heart's core' (3.2.65–6).

C9.P26 His reference to the fawning courtier evokes Norbert Elias's citation of Jean de La Bruyère's sycophantic, calculating courtier who cultivates bodily etiquette in order to survive and thrive in that duplicitous world: a man who truly understands court culture, says the French philosopher and moralist, 'is master of his gestures, of his eyes and his expression; he is deep, impenetrable. He dissimulates the bad turns he does, smiles at his enemies, suppresses his ill-temper, disguises his passions, disavows his heart, his feeling.'[42] Elias's point, which leaned heavily on Freud's recently formulated theories of the unconscious and the repression of pleasurable and aggressive instincts in *Civilization and Its Discontents*, is that the face, far from being a transparent screen for the mind, is a façade that can mask thought and emotion. Channelling the drives and affects changes the relationship between 'conscious and unconscious levels of the personality', producing ultimately a 'psychologization' that fundamentally alters both the inner

[40] For a fascinating account of this scene and a production of *Hamlet* in which Mark Rylance, the actor playing Hamlet, solicits real audience response to the questions Hamlet poses, see Penelope Woods, 'The Play of Faces: Audience and the Force of the Early Modern Face', in *Shakespeare and the Power of the Face*, ed. James A. Knapp (Farnham: Ashgate, 2015), 127–50.

[41] *Macbeth,* 1.4.12–13.

[42] Quoted in Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process*, trans. Edmund Jephcott (1939; repr., Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 476.

mind and social behaviour. To control affects and libidinal energies is to initiate a sociogenetic process in which the psyche and its social surround are mutually implicated in transformation.[43] The actor, the rhetorician, and the courtier become adept at cultivating the façade to insure smooth social functioning, but such self-government lays the foundation for deception, for the split that Shakespeare explores through 'seeming'. The word captures the division between inner thought and outward appearance, and also complicates the human subject's apprehension of and control over his or her own affective experience.

C9.P27 In *Measure for Measure*, we watch Lucio as he instructs Isabella how to display the appearance of emotion. When Isabella begins to plead with Angelo, the Provost says in an aside, 'Heaven give thee moving graces' (2.2.37). He hopes that Isabella, through her own display of emotion, will be able to engage Angelo's sympathy for Claudio's plight. In order to change Angelo's mind, Isabella must learn how to appeal to a man with 'snow-broth' for blood, 'one who never feels | The wanton stings and motions of the sense' (1.4.57–8). She has a coach in Lucio, who in a series of asides gives her instruction as if she were an actor in a play. His directions include gestural language ('kneel down before him; hang upon his gown' (2.2.44)), criticism of her affectless arguments ('You are too cold' (58)), increasing encouragement as she warms to the task ('Ay, touch him; there's the vein' and 'Ay, well said' (73, 112)), and contagious excitement as her plea becomes increasingly impassioned ('O, to him, to him, wench! He will relent. | He's coming; I perceiv't' (126–7)). Not only does Lucio orchestrate Isabella's increasingly effective performance as an interlocutor and actor, but as the scene heats up, his language also betrays the sexual underpinnings of his instruction. 'Touching', like 'moving', intertwines physical action and emotional experience. Maurice Merleau-Ponty reminds us in his work on the 'chiasm' that vision is a form of touching, and that the 'body sensed and the body sentient are as the observe and the reverse'.[44] In other words, Isabella enacts the chiasmic tropes of the play in this exchange, placing herself as the point of suspension between Claudio and Angelo and implicating herself in Angelo's desire even as she seems to be extricating herself from it. Lucio is her pimp—the go-between who brings her to Angelo—and her theatrical

[43] Elias, *The Civilizing Process,* 475–92.

[44] Merleau-Ponty, 'The Intertwining—The Chiasm', in Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, ed. Claude Lefort, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1968), 130–55, 138.

mentor, teaching her how to use her feminine and seductive arts to persuade. Lucio's asides carry progressive innuendo, as if the conversation were a sexual engagement that could coax Angelo to the verge of climax. Claudio's death sentence, it seems, can be redeemed only by the little death of Angelo's orgasm.

C9.P28 If Lucio's rhetorical tutelage prompts Isabella to harness her passion to her cause, engaging, however inadvertently, her sexual allure, Angelo responds in ways he could scarcely have anticipated. We can track the migration of passion and control through the variations of *will* as a word and as a concept. The first words Angelo utters in the play constitute a submission to the Duke: 'Always obedient to your Grace's will | I come to know your pleasure' (1.1.27–8). By act 2, it is Angelo's moral and legal will that is being imposed on Vienna. 'Is it your will Claudio shall die tomorrow?' asks the Provost (2.2.10). When Isabella begins to plead for Claudio's life, she describes herself as being 'At war 'twixt will and will not' (2.2.46), and when Angelo first encounters Isabella, he asks 'What's your will?' (2.2.27). The word means in its most obvious sense her wish or desire, but as his blood heats and he conceives a lust for her, the word expands its connotations. When Isabella returns, and Angelo proposes his coercive bargain—to give up her body to the same 'sweet uncleanness' (2.4.56) that stained Juliet in order to redeem Claudio's life—the word changes. Isabella's will has now been subsumed by Angelo's: she must 'fit' her 'consent to his sharp appetite', he says, and 'yield up thy body to my will' (2.4.161–4). Angelo's will is at once a sexual will, a desire that rises within him unbidden like an involuntary motion, and a political will, a wish to impose upon Vienna the same austerity that formerly governed his personal habits. Joel Fineman long ago drew our attention to how the puns on 'Will' infiltrate Shakespeare's representation of Tarquin's rape of Lucrece and how the intricacies of heterosexual desire are structured by the resistance and excitement vested in the 'cross-coupling figure of chiasmus'.[45] Tarquin and Lucrece are, Fineman argues, 'inverse versions of each other'.[46] Like Tarquin's ravishing of Lucrece, Angelo's appetite is piqued by Isabella's virtuous resistance. They are initially bound together by their repudiation of sexuality and by their mirroring language, but her modesty infects him, producing a 'strong and swelling evil | of

[45] Fineman, *The Subjectivity Effect in Western Literary Tradition: Essays toward the Release of Shakespeare's Will* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991). In this volume, see especially Fineman's essay, 'Shakespeare's *Will:* The Temporality of Rape', 165–221; and Stephen Greenblatt, 'Introduction: Joel Fineman's "Will"', ix–xix, xv.

[46] Fineman, 'Shakespeare's *Will*: The Temporality of Rape', 187.

my conception' (2.4.6–7) as if he were yoked to Isabella by a bond as passionate and even more illicit (because it is not mutually consensual) as the one that joined Claudio and Juliet.

C9.P29 Just as the secret sexual passion Claudio and Juliet share inevitably declares itself, writing with 'characters too gross' (2.1.132) upon Juliet's body for all to see, so does erotic desire in Vienna refuse the constraints of the law. Leaking from the bodies upon which continence has been enjoined, transgressing the suburban limits to which it has been confined, and releasing into circulation when the brothels are threatened, desire expresses itself somatically in Angelo's involuntary pregnancy of libidinal urgency. Repressive laws can no more control human erotic behaviour than they can dictate the activity of lecherous sparrows, for corruption will 'boil and bubble | Till it o'errun the stew' (5.1.12–13).[47] The play is filled with pregnant minds and thoughts, images of the body's permeability (particularly to disease), and pregnant bodies: Angelo's gestation of desire, Juliet's scandalous pregnancy, Mistress Elbow's immoderate last-trimester longing for 'stewed' prunes, and Lucio's rumour about Kate Keepdown, the woman he gets with child and repudiates.[48] The pun on stewed prunes enacts a desire that cannot be restrained by language or the law; Elbow's wife feels compelled by a desire cognate with her pregnancy to seek prunes in a 'stew' or brothel. It is as if punning language itself were pregnant with multiple meanings that write themselves in 'character too gross' (1.2.132). Reason and government restrain sexuality in Renaissance Vienna as ineffectually as morality did in Freud's Vienna, and in both cases the voluntary muscles of the will are inadequate to the task assigned to them. Desire continually escapes into language and gesture in somatic symptoms, parapraxes, and puns.

C9.P30 Norbert Elias reminds us that the psyche is necessarily entangled with physiology. Like 'the moulding of the facial muscles and thus of facial expression over a person's lifetime', he says, concepts like reason or self-restraint are produced in history 'through the network of dependencies' over a lifetime.[49] John Bulwer praises the voluntary (from the Latin *voluntas*,

[47] Gail Kern Paster discusses the linkage between fruit and pregnancy, fruit as aphrodisiac, and the physiological and psychological aspects of purging and sexual intercourse in *The Body Embarrassed: Drama and the Disciplines of Shame in Early Modern England* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 132–3.

[48] Mary Thomas Crane catalogues the lexical history of pregnancy and the circulation of metaphors in the play in 'Male Pregnancy and Cognitive Permeability in *Measure for Measure*', in *Shakespeare's Brain: Reading with Cognitive Theory* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 156–77.

[49] Elias, *The Civilizing Process*, 480.

'will, desire') nature of the facial muscles, as if they were as compliantly subject to the will as Angelo supposes sexuality will be coercively responsive to his political will in *Measure for Measure*. The play, however, fractures the sense of will as desire and as a kind of political injunction, dividing sexual appetite from willpower and political power from personal inclination. Bulwer celebrates motion as a principle common to animals and humans, but he then immediately distinguishes between the nature of bestial and human muscular activity. Whereas movement for 'brutes', to whom '*Will* is denyed', involves the sensitive faculties of cognition and appetite, human beings engage the intellective faculties, which Bulwer names the *Will*.[50] Bulwer explains these physiological relationships through an anatomical allegory of the brain that echoes Plato's *Phaedrus*: Bulwer's rider is the Will, the reins are the nerves or communicators, and the muscles are the horse. The muscles obey the command of the Will, which is conveyed to the horse by means of the reins.[51] Bulwer's allegory perfectly subjugates the animal aspect of the muscles that human beings share with their beastly counterparts. In *Measure for Measure*, however, animal imagery infiltrates language in ways that government and the law cannot police: Claudio's description of desire as 'Like rats that raven down their proper bane' (1.2.109), the Duke's characterization of the 'beastly touches' of procured sexuality (3.1.279), and the rumour that Angelo was 'begot between two stockfishes' (3.1.354) betray the seepage of a beastly vitality that is both unruly and procreative.[52] Bulwer's Will is no more able to restrain the muscles than Angelo as instrument of reason is able to subdue either his own desire or the rampant proliferation of sexuality in Vienna.

C9.P31 Bulwer's privileging of reason falters in moments of slippage between the voluntary and involuntary.[53] He acknowledges that some argue that we do not always know about, or are sometimes unaware of, muscular actions. Those who are sceptical of reason's primacy assert that the Will is double, for it is composed of a vigilant, waking will (*vigilantium*) and a sleeping will

[50] Bulwer, *Pathomyotomia*, 5–6.

[51] Ibid., 14. See also Paster's discussion of the analogy between a horse and the human temperament in *Humoring the Body*, 168–73.

[52] Janet Adelman glosses the reference to Angelo's fishy begetting as one of the ways the play repudiates origin in the maternal body and sexual desire in general: *Suffocating Mothers: Fantasies of Maternal Origin in Shakespeare's Plays, Hamlet to The Tempest* (New York: Routledge, 1992).

[53] For a description of the controversy around voluntary and involuntary movement in Galenic medicine, see Armelle Debru, 'Galen's Approach to Anatomy and the Soul', *History of Medicine* 2, no. 2 (2015): 127–31.

(*Dormientium*), and the will thus commands in either obscure or manifest ways (30). Even though Bulwer acknowledges that we may move the head, distort the facial features, or wink[54] inadvertently, he continues to maintain that all muscles controlled by a faculty—be it 'Phancie' or Reason—are voluntary. His insistence is worth marking. Stephen Greenblatt asserts that Bulwer must hold two demons at bay: the problem of culture (variations in gestural customs among people from different nations) and the problem of involuntary movements (tics or movements that escape meaning and control).[55] *Custom*, or its closely allied term, *habit*, is an impediment to Bulwer's vision of a universal gestural language because it introduces historical, personal, and national variants. I focus here on involuntary movement, although I show that it is also entangled with the cognate problem of custom or habit. Bulwer, citing Galen, names several mental states that might interfere with pure communication between the will and the muscles: extreme emotion (anger or passion), sleep, and madness. Angelo's involuntary desire for Isabella is an instance of the first state, for it is an immoderate passion that circulates pervasively outside the law in Vienna, contaminating his political and sexual will. Although we do not witness directly in *Measure for Measure* the nocturnal motions to which Bulwer refers in his second example, the bed trick is set explicitly in darkness, in the 'heavy middle of the night' (4.1.32), as if it were a kind of somnambulism. When Mariana describes the tryst in riddling language, 'I have known my husband, yet my husband | Knows not that ever he knew me' (5.1.184–5), Lucio initially imagines that the enigma could be explained by drunkenness, another altered state that compromises rationality. Mariana unpacks the literal aspect of her riddle when she reveals Angelo's ignorance of his lover's identity, but her cryptic formulation interrogates epistemology and states of consciousness: What does it mean to know something? What is the nature of knowledge? The bed trick, the narrative enactment of the chiasmic blind spot, takes place in the deepest night, in the place and time of sleep (where erection, arousal, and nocturnal emission can be involuntary occurrences), and, as with the somnambulism to which Bulwer refers, reason or the will

[54] The word connoted both blinking and sleeping (*OED Online*, s.v. 'wink').

[55] Stephen Greenblatt, 'Mutilation and Meaning', in *The Body in Parts: Fantasies of Corporeality in Early Modern Europe*, ed. David Hillman and Carla Mazzio (New York: Routledge, 1997), 221–41, 235. In her essay in the same volume, 'Sins of the Tongue', Mazzio notes Bulwer's coupling of the extended tongue and priapism, a connection between the 'unruly members' that amplifies my own arguments about sexuality and language in *Measure for Measure* (53–79, 59).

as voluntary principles are temporarily suspended. Angelo performs an act about which he has imperfect knowledge, and he is tricked into consummating a marriage he had repudiated, an act against his will carried out in the very moment he thinks he is imposing his will on Isabella. Freud made substitution—what he named displacement—central to 'primary process', which is evident in the language of dreams and the operations of the unconscious.[56] The bed trick as substitution speaks to the disguised figure of Mariana, to repression, and for early modern sensibilities, to the confusion between voluntary and involuntary that Bulwer disavows but that emerges nevertheless in the altered states of consciousness to which he alludes.

C9.P32 The third of the strange, involuntary mental conditions Bulwer names is madness. The threat of madness is used coercively in *Measure for Measure* to shape behaviour. When Angelo attempts to drive his sordid bargain with Isabella and she protests, promising to reveal his sexual predation, he laughs. 'Who will believe thee, Isabel? | My unsoiled name, th'austerness of my life, | My vouch against you, and my place i'th'state, | Will so your accusation overweigh | That you shall stifle in your report' (2.4.154–9). His will is pitted against hers, not only as male sexual desire against her resistant virginity, but as authority and virtuous reputation against her apparently deranged accusations of violation. It is his word against hers. This exchange lays the groundwork for the imputation of madness that threatens to disempower Isabella in the final trial scene, the accusation that she speaks in 'th'infirmity of sense', that she is 'touched with madness'. And yet, notes the Duke, her 'madness hath the oddest frame of sense'. Isabella begs the Duke not to 'banish reason | For inequality', but rather to allow his reason to 'make the truth appear where it seems hid' (5.1.51–66). As he is increasingly persuaded by her charges, he praises her in a strangely negative formulation: 'Many that are not mad | Have sure more lack of reason' (67–8). His words pry apart the link between apparent madness and apparent rationality; she seems mad, yet she is reasonable, and Angelo is the epitome of reason, yet he has lost control of his will and his moral compass. When the Duke continues seemingly to waver in his belief of Isabella's accusations, she invokes heaven to 'keep [her] in patience' until time can '[u]nfold the evil which is here wrapped up | in countenance' (5.1.117–18). In the same way that the Duke promised to unfold the properties of government at the beginning of the play, the end of the play treats the literal unveiling of the

[56] Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams*, in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, ed. James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1953), 4, 305–9.

mind behind the face or countenance. The Duke chastises his own lax government for having 'countenanced' the faults that have been allowed to fester in Vienna, and it is fitting, then, that reason and the voluntary and involuntary impulses are implicated in this trial.

C9.S4

9.4. Decapitation

C9.P33 Wordplay proliferates in, although it is by no means confined to, the subplot of *Measure for Measure*. The adjective *prone* in Isabella's 'prone and speechless dialectic' itself registers this doubleness, for it signifies both 'inclination or tendency' and a prostrate bodily position. Just as the law attempts to relegate sexuality to the suburbs, so is sexual desire often buried in punning or cryptic language. Angelo's initial proposition to Isabella is coded, and he is frustrated by her apparent obtuseness ('Your sense pursues not mine'). He has to translate his lust into plainer language: 'I'll speak more gross' (2.4.74–82), a word choice that menacingly echoes the 'characters gross' of Juliet's pregnancy. Puns exemplify linguistically how a word can signify in one state of consciousness and then be shadowed by other involuntary meanings that trouble the first. Sex and death are coupled in a similar bond, for they are joined by a pun Pompey uses that reverberates throughout the play. When Pompey is imprisoned for transgressions committed as bawd and servant to Mistress Overdone, the Provost compels Pompey to help with executions. Pompey thus exchanges his position as pimp or sexual go-between for a role in which he assists with death, becoming a kind of a soul pimp, or psychopomp(ey). The substitution of roles sutures sex and death together. When the Provost asks, 'Can you cut off a man's head?', Pompey replies, 'If the man be a bachelor, sir, I can. But if he be a married man, he's his wife's head, and I can never cut off a woman's head' (4.2.1–4). The obvious Pauline wordplay implicates the husband's rational and patriarchal authority as the 'wife's head', while the subliminal, unvoiced pun on maidenhead hitches the head as metonymy of reason to the hymen through the threat of violence. In both cases, 'cutting' the head involves a change of state: loss of virginity or death.

C9.P34 The pun is present, though less explicit, when Isabella visits Claudio in prison to deliver the results of her meeting with Angelo. She initially tells her brother that there can be no mitigation of his sentence, and Claudio responds by eroticizing death: 'I will encounter darkness as a bride, | and hug it in my arms' (3.1.82–3). Yet when he comes face to face with death in

his imagination, he quails, remarking that death is a 'fearful thing' (3.1.116). Isabella softens in response to his despair, hinting at how she might expiate his 'capital' offence: there is no remedy, she tells him, except 'as, to save a head, | To cleave a heart in twain' (3.1.59–60). The enigmatic line apparently means that the only way to save Claudio from execution is to yield her body to Angelo's desire, which would break her heart. But if the *head* designates her maidenhead and she preserves it, then Claudio's consequent decapitation would engender unbearable grief. Isabella's assertion, poised on the semantic ambiguity of *head*, is a fulcrum that syntactically balances the value of Claudio's head against her virginity. The pun also draws together the two heads, faces, and mouths of the female body, an analogical linkage that Lear makes explicit in his diatribe against female sexuality: 'behold yond simpering dame, | Whose face between her fork presages snow' (4.6.116–17). Isabella's and Pompey's punning references to the exchange of heads thus engages not only the male head and maidenhead, but it also inverts the body (gesturing towards a speaking nether mouth) and implicates multiple other forms of potential sexuality that link the face and genital area.[57]

C9.P35 The subsequent exchange between brother and sister continues to employ images that violently divide self from self, rending parts of the body from one another; if her brother consents to Isabella's sexual sacrifice in return for his life, she warns, his assent would 'bark your honour from that trunk you bear' (3.1.70), an ethical consequence as fatal to his soul as decapitation would be to his body. The head is the most vulnerable bodily part in *Measure for Measure* because the sentence of decapitation hovers over it from the beginning: *head* appears prolifically in the play's language, migrating and manifesting in compound words, explicit and implied metaphors, and puns. As the Duke's legal instrument, for example, Angelo is deputized to inject terror into the ineffectual 'strict statutes and biting laws' in order to subdue the 'headstrong weeds' (1.3.19–20) that have been allowed to flourish in Vienna. The word *headstrong* binds the head to impulsive force; government, the head, must control erotic desire by means of its legal instruments, the 'needful curbs and bits' that restrain the desiring, recalcitrant horse. If, for Bulwer, the rational Will recruits muscles to do its work, the law in *Measure for Measure* mobilizes its agents—the Provost, the

[57] Bromley describes the extensive wordplay around these possibilities in 'Rimming the Renaissance', in *Sex before Sex: Figuring the Act in Early Modern England*, ed. Stockton and Bromley, 171–94.

constable, and the executioner—to carry out its wishes. The play delegates and substitutes compulsively, appointing parts of the body—Elbow, the constable, for instance—to act on behalf of other parts, or deputizing Angelo as the head or 'face' of the absent ruler. The consequence of these dismemberments and replacements is a twinning or splitting of characters. They also invite us to see unlikely parallels, even as the characters themselves disavow such identifications.

C9.P36 Decapitation and disguise support these shadow allegiances. The Duke of 'dark corners' presides over the play as watcher, agent, and manipulator of events, but except for the beginning and end, he hides beneath his friar's habit. The wordplay on *habit* as customary actions and as clothing ironizes his monastic disguise, creating a space between the outward social habits that people assume and the interior life of the human subject. '*Cucullus non facit monachim*', says Lucio, quoting the proverbial phrase in Latinate obscurity; he subsequently stages its gestural equivalent by pulling off the monk's hood that obscures the Duke's face. As he does so, he proleptically images the face he will find there: a 'knave's visage', a wolfish or 'sheep-biting face' (5.1.346–7). His confrontation with the man he has repeatedly slandered nevertheless also enacts how 'habits' conceal and how face-to-face confrontations with an apparent opposite reveal occulted similarities. The Duke may not be as virtuous as he aspires to be, however much he insists on the stable continuity of his affections: 'Not changing heart with habit, I am still | Attorneyed at your service', he tells Isabella (5.1.436–7). Yet Lucio's sexually illicit and libellous nature implicitly reflects the Duke's own unacknowledged propensities. Even though his interventions are motivated by apparent ethical probity, the Duke could be said to be as implicated in sexual coercion and trafficking as those his laws aim to prosecute. The Duke's marriage proposal disturbingly echoes Angelo's illicit proposition, Lucio's delivery of Isabella as suppliant to Angelo is a version of Pompey's pimping, and the Duke's arrangement of the bed trick could be construed as sexual procurement, however benign its motives.[58]

C9.P37 The play uncovers what the apparently legitimate face of the law hides. In describing Angelo's diabolical bargain, Isabella images his countenance: 'This outward-sainted deputy, | Whose settled visage and deliberate word | Nips

[58] Carol Neely Thomas offers a similar interpretation within a more fully contextualized account of female sexuality in 'Female Sexuality in the Renaissance', in *Feminism and Psychoanalysis*, ed. Richard Feldstein and Judith Roof (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 209–29.

youth i'th' head…| As falcon doth the fowl' (3.1.87–90). If facial mobility fixes over time into customary expressions that stamp themselves on the countenance, Angelo's virtuous façade hides a corruption that belies the 'settled' nature of his public visage. Angelo becomes the beastly executioner who 'nips' off heads. His customary expression is the facial equivalent of the monastic habit that nuns and friars wear in the play, clothing that declares occupation and the piety associated with devotion to a religious order. The Duke can safely be left alone with Isabella because, as he tells the Provost, 'My mind promises with my habit no loss shall touch her by my company' (3.1.178–9). The logic of substitution and duplication that unfolds these habits shapes the muffling of heads in the final trial scene. 'Death's a great disguiser', the Duke tells the Provost when he advises him how to make Barnardine's severed head look like Claudio's (4.2.189). The pirate Ragusine's head circulates as a potent signifier of identity; the head looks like Claudio's because the hair and beard are similarly coloured, and it stands in for him in its silence. The decapitated head circulates through the final scene, implicating Claudio, Barnardine, and Ragusine by turns, signalling not just the horror of the dismembered human body but the political and metaphysical consequences of dividing legitimate rulers from their subjects, and reason from the desiring body.

C9.P38 When Isabella seeks to expose what lies behind Angelo's 'settled' visage, she disturbs the habits of expression through a process of alienation, of 'making strange'. She declares:

C9.P39
> Most strange, and yet most truly, will I speak.
> That Angelo's foresworn, is it not strange?
> That Angelo's a murderer, is't not strange?
> That Angelo is an adulterous thief,
> An hypocrite, a virgin-violator,
> Is it not strange, and strange?

C9.P40 (5.1.37–42)

C9.P41 Her repetition of *strange* interrupts habitual ways of listening and insists that we hear the force of the word's Latin root, *extraneus*, 'foreign or external'. Mariana's refusal to unmuffle her head forces her audience to separate her known female countenance from her testimony, suspending her identity. Isabella's defamiliarizing speech urges her listeners to dismantle their customary ways of knowing Angelo through his title, his habits, his settled face. The trial scene is set at the city gates, a threshold space that regulates who or

what enters and exits the city, protecting its boundaries against intruding strangers. The liminality of the setting echoes the chiastic exchange at the nunnery's door. Francisca's monastic directive—either to cover the face and speak or to show the face and be silent—reverberates throughout the trial scene, where the facial masking and speaking are transposed into a legal context. The play explores the entanglement of speech and gestural language and the way that entanglement is implicated in reason and desire. *Measure for Measure* can reassemble the intricate relationship between gestural and discursive language only by first disturbing their hidden linkages and affinities, by making them strange and binding them to their strangeness.[59]

[59] I am grateful to my perceptive editors, to Tim Harrison for his generative comments, and especially to Julie Joosten for her luminous insights and remarkable generosity.

C10

10

Sleeping in Error in Spenser's *Faerie Queene*, Book 1

Garrett A. Sullivan, Jr

C10.P1 We continue to live with and in a body imagined as both an object of scientific knowledge and mastery and an unruly, threatening, inhuman thing.[1]

C10.P2 In her fascinating book on the emergence of the physical body in ancient Greece, Brooke Holmes shows that, even as it was first being construed as an object of medical knowledge and self-care, the body was also understood to possess what she terms 'daemonic energies':

C10.P3 > On the one hand, the physical body is a model of intelligibility: although its workings are hidden, a physician trained in the medical *tekhnē*… may reconstruct them through reasoning.… On the other hand, the body is an untrustworthy and unfamiliar thing: it is prone to disorder, largely estranged from consciousness, and animated not by intentions but by impersonal, asocial powers.[2]

C10.P4 *Hupnos*, or sleep, is one of those powers. A somatic phenomenon that can overtake or overcome or even invade the body, sleep *descends upon* the sleeper (or, in Homer, *pours* over her); it operates like a form of enchantment, 'a messenger from a foreign world'.[3] Sleep reveals the extent to which both body and subject are alien to themselves.[4]

[1] Brooke Holmes, *The Symptom and the Subject: The Emergence of the Physical Body in Ancient Greece* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 4.

[2] Holmes, *Symptom and the Subject*, 4.

[3] Holmes, 16; she is discussing here the daemonic status of the symptom.

[4] This point chimes with Elizabeth D. Harvey's brief discussion of the sleeping will in this volume (Chapter 9).

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C10.P5 While Holmes's comments centre on ancient Greece, she identifies a problem that is relevant in other eras, including our own. Even as the body has been constituted ever more intensively as a medical object, or as a locus of self-surveillance, elements of embodied experience have remained unaccountable to such protocols. In the English Renaissance, sleep provides a particularly powerful example of this. It appears in a range of natural philosophical, spiritual, and political discourses as an important object of self-regulation and self-care that is tethered to a cultural emphasis on moderation.[5] And yet, efforts to bend sleep to the cultural will were shadowed by its unruly or inhuman dimensions. This is abundantly apparent in book 1 of Edmund Spenser's *Faerie Queene*.[6] At the beginning of book 1, the sleeping body of Redcrosse is both an object of self-care and subject to 'daemonic energies' that render Spenser's hero nonidentical to his status as the Knight of Holiness. The otherworldly dimensions of Spenserian sleep have classical literary origins, albeit more Roman than Greek; Spenser draws on Virgil's *Aeneid* in representing the complex relationship between sleep, affect, and cognition.[7] Indeed, the *Aeneid* serves Spenser as a powerful imaginative resource for thinking the relationship of the body's incommensurability, especially in the case of sleep, with the imperatives of self-government. At the same time, and in a manner befitting book 1's allegory, Spenser frames sleep in terms dictated by late sixteenth-century religious division. Put simply, Spenser associates 'daemonic' sleep with Catholicism and 'timely rest' with Protestantism. And yet, this does not go far enough, as these two conceptions of sleep also form the basis for what Spenser constructs as Catholic and Protestant models of cognition, affect, and embodiment. At the same

[5] For a brilliant account of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century changes in sleep's spiritual and ethical dimensions, as well as its shifting conceptualization within medical discourses, see Sasha Handley, *Sleep in Early Modern England* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2016).

[6] There has been minimal discussion of sleep's function in book 1 of *The Faerie Queene*. See Isabel G. MacCaffrey, *Spenser's Allegory: The Anatomy of Imagination* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 138–43; Benjamin Parris, '"Watching to Banish Care": Sleep and Insomnia in Book 1 of *The Faerie Queene*', *Modern Philology* 113, no. 2 (2015): 151–77. See also Giulio Pertile, '"And All His Sences Stound": The Physiology of Stupefaction in Spenser's *Faerie Queene*', *English Literary Renaissance* 44, no. 3 (2014): 420–51.

[7] On the indebtedness of *FQ* 1 to the *Aeneid*, see Lars-Håkan Svensson, 'Remembering the Death of Turnus: Spenser's *Faerie Queene* and the Ending of the *Aeneid*', *Renaissance Quarterly* 64, no. 2 (2011): 430–71; Patrick Cheney, *Spenser's Famous Flight: A Renaissance Idea of a Literary Career* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993); Andrew Fichter, *Poets Historical: Dynastic Epic in the Renaissance* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982); Colin Burrow, *Epic Romance: Homer to Milton* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993); and John Watkins, *The Specter of Dido: Spenser and Virgilian Epic* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995).

time, Spenser smudges the differences between these models even as he highlights them, and, in doing so, betrays an anxiety about the potential indistinguishability of error and truth.

C10.P6 In what follows, I will first discuss sleep as it appears in two episodes from the *Aeneid* upon which Spenser draws: the death of Palinurus in book 5; and Aeneas's descent into the underworld in book 6. From there, I will turn to book 1 of the *Faerie Queene*, paying particular attention to Redcrosse's abandonment of Una in cantos 1 and 2; Arthur's dream of Gloriana in canto 9; Redcrosse's vision of the New Jerusalem in canto 10; and his climactic fight with the dragon in canto 11.

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C10.P7 At the end of Book 5 of the *Aeneid*, the pilot Palinurus falls overboard to his death after, in John Dryden's translation, 'the soft God of Sleep, with easie flight, | Descends' upon him.[8] At first, Palinurus refuses to succumb: 'his fasten'd hands the Rudder keep, | And fix'd on Heav'n, his Eyes repel invading Sleep' (1108–9). The invader, however, is not to be denied:

C10.P8 The God was wroth, and at his Temples threw
A Brand in *Lethe* dip'd, and drunk with *Stygian* Dew:
The Pilot, vanquish'd by the Pow'r Divine,
Soon clos'd his swimming Eyes, and lay supine.
Scarce were his Limbs extended at their length,
The God, insulting him with superiour Strength,
Fell heavy on him, plung'd him in the Sea,
And, with the Stern, the Rudder tore away.
Headlong he fell, and struggling in the Main,
Cry'd out for helping hands, but cry'd in vain:
The Victor Daemon mounts obscure in Air.

C10.P9 (1110–20)

C10.P10 Upon discovering that Palinurus is missing, Aeneas, whom Dryden refers to as the 'watchful Heroe', moralizes his apparent death: 'For Faith repos'd on Seas, and on the flatt'ring Sky, | Thy naked Corps is doom'd, on Shores unknown to lye' (1129, 1135–6).

[8] *Virgil's Aeneid*, trans. John Dryden (1697), ed. Frederick M. Keener (London: Penguin, 1997), book 5, lines 1091–2. Henceforth cited in the text.

C10.P11 The story of Palinurus's fall occurs at the intersection of two conceptions of sleep, one suggesting its irresistible power and the other its putative regulability. On the one hand, Palinurus is doomed because of the overwhelming force of 'invading Sleep'; he is '*vanquish'd* by the Pow'r Divine', and, when he again meets Aeneas in the underworld, he tells his captain that his 'weary'd Eyes were *seiz'd* with fatal sleep' (6.477). On the other, Palinurus's sleep suggests to Aeneas a personal failing; he believes that the pilot let down his guard, foolishly placing faith in a placid sea and clear sky. And yet, we've seen Palinurus do the opposite; he refuses to 'trust the treach'rous Deep' (5.1103), but despite this he is overcome. Aeneas frames Palinurus's sleep in terms of self-regulation, though it seems that even the most vigilant of men would stand little chance against a 'Victor Daemon'. And yet, that is precisely to the point. Aeneas's status as the 'watchful Heroe' of the poem demands that, in his case, the insistent claims that sleep can make on *all* bodies must be denied or downplayed. Aeneas, the ultimate pilot of the Trojan ship, is 'watchful' after Palinurus isn't; as a result, his ship won't founder on the rocks of the Italian shore it is destined to reach: 'Sure of his Pilot's loss, [Aeneas] takes himself | The Helm, and steers aloof, and shuns the Shelf' (1131–2; see also 5.1–2).

C10.P12 In early modern thought, sleep's conceptual opposite is not 'waking' but 'watching'. Moreover, 'watch' carries with it connotations of vigilance that are crucial to Renaissance understandings of both heroism and leadership. A familiar example is the insomnia of Shakespeare's Henry IV and V; these kings claim to remain ever vigilant so that their subjects may enjoy their slumbers.[9] Indeed, in the *Henriad*, kingly vigilance rhetorically *requires* sleeping subjects in order to be realized as such: 'The slave, a member of the country's peace, | Enjoys [his sleep]; but in gross brain little wots | What *watch* the king keeps to maintain the peace' (*Henry V,* 4.1.286–90). To the Renaissance reader, then, Aeneas's heroic watchfulness at the end of book 5 emerges out of its recognizable contrast to Palinurus's slumbers.

C10.P13 Of course, Aeneas has not always been quite so watchful. In book 4, Hermes has to rouse him from his Carthaginian slumbers and remind him of his epic destiny: 'Sleep'st thou, O Goddess born! and can'st thou drown | Thy needful Cares, so near a Hostile Town?' (4.806–7). Aeneas has neglected his responsibilities—his 'needful Cares'—in favour of what Dryden terms 'easie rest' (800). Hermes's allusion to Aeneas *drowning* his cares in

[9] See Garrett A. Sullivan, Jr, *Sleep, Romance and Human Embodiment: Vitality from Spenser to Milton* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), chap. 3.

sleep necessarily evokes the unhappy fate of Palinurus. Moreover, his slumbers emblematize the major business of book 4: Aeneas's succumbing to his desire for Dido. As I've argued elsewhere, sleep in the Renaissance was commonly understood to both connote and enable the ascendancy of the passions.[10] Consequently, Aeneas's wakefulness at the end of book 5 stands in stark contrast to his earlier propensity for heavy sleeps, both literal and figurative. The watchful hero's disappointment with Palinurus, then, tells the reader that Aeneas has turned his back on his own amorous slumbers and redirected his bodily desires and energies towards his epic destiny. At the same time, it also intimates a disturbing similarity between the drowned pilot and his vigilant captain which the latter would like to refuse.

C10.P14 If the actions of Aeneas in book 4 are emblematized by his passionate slumber, book 6, which features Aeneas's descent into the underworld, is routinely understood as a culminating stage in Aeneas's redirection of his desires towards the attainment of both his destiny and of fame and glory. By offering Aeneas a glimpse of that future, the shade of Anchises 'fir[es Aeneas's] mind to mount the promis'd Throne' (1230). Book 6 is also peppered with references to sleep. Most obviously, Aeneas encounters 'Death's half-brother' near the entry way to the 'waste Dominions of the dead' (388, 379): 'The God of Sleep there hides his heavy Head: | And empty Dreams on ev'ry Leaf are spread' (396–7). Dryden's translation repeatedly foregrounds the compulsory nature of sleep—in the assertion of Palinurus's shade that his 'weary'd Eyes were seiz'd with fatal sleep'; in the drugged sop that the Sibyl uses to charm Cerberus: 'Long draughts of Sleep his monstrous limbs enslave' (572); and in allusion to the murder of Priam's son Deiphobos after 'heavy Sleep [his] weary Limbs possess'd' (701). The most intriguing sleep reference, as well as the most commented upon, comes at the end of the book, when Aeneas passes from the underworld through the ivory gate of Sleep—the gate, we are told, associated with *false* dreams (1235–42). Critics have routinely and inconclusively puzzled over this moment;[11] some have

[10] Sullivan, *Sleep, Romance and Human Embodiment*, chap. 2.

[11] Critical treatments of this crux include Nicholas Reed, 'The Gates of Sleep in *Aeneid* 6', *Classical Quarterly* 23, no. 2 (1973): 311–15; R. J. Tarrant, 'Aeneas and the Gates of Sleep', *Classical Philology* 77, no. 1 (1982): 51–5; C. J. Mackie, '*Nox Erat* . . .: Sleep and Visions in the *Aeneid*', *Greece and Rome* 38, no. 1 (1991): 59–61; Gordon T. Cockburn, 'Aeneas and the Gates of Sleep: An Etymological Approach', *Phoenix* 46, no. 4 (1992): 362–4; Urania Molyviati-Toptsis, '*Sed Falsa ad Caelum Mittunt Insomnia Manes* (*Aeneid* 6.896)', *American Journal of Philology* 116, no. 4 (1995): 639–52; and Ross S. Kilpatrick, 'The Stuff of Doors and Dreams (Vergil, *Aeneid* 6.893–98)', *Vergilius* 41 (1995), 63–70.

suggested that it undercuts or critiques book 6's laudatory vision of the imperial Rome of Aeneas's future. Whatever the ivory gate's significance, the nature of Aeneas's passage from the underworld frequently led Renaissance commentators to interpret the entire *katabasis* as a prophetic dream.[12] When thought of this way, we can see that Aeneas decisively bends his desires and ambitions towards fame and glory—that is, he finally realizes himself as Aeneas—in his sleep.

C10.P15 So, if books 5 and 6 give us an Aeneas ever watchful in the wake of book 4's intemperate slumbers, that figure is also directed and transformed in his sleep. In Virgil, there is no apparent contradiction here; indeed, Aeneas's prophetic dreams are in a powerful sense expressive of his watchfulness. For Spenser, however, contradictions abound. In book 1, Spenser recognizes the resemblances between the sleep of the 'fit false' dream and that of the prophetic vision; and between those affective and cognitive transformations that tend towards error and those that lead towards truth. He attempts to differentiate timely rest from daemonic sleep, coordinating the former to Protestant truth and the latter to Catholic error. And yet, just as the vigilant Palinurus is overcome by invading sleep, timely rest is shadowed by its daemonic counterpart.

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C10.P16 The first two cantos of book 1 of the *Faerie Queene* are dominated by error and errancy. Redcrosse's conflict with the allegorical figure of Error ends in victory, but not long after, our hero makes a pivotal mistake by abandoning Una, who represents truth or the true faith. Redcrosse's misplaced trust in Archimago paves the way for this mistake, which occurs in Redcrosse's sleep. That sleep is inaugurated in a fashion that underscores its daemonic nature: 'The drouping Night thus creepeth on them fast, | And the sad humour loading their eye liddes, | As messenger of *Morpheus* on them cast | Sweet slombring deaw, the which to sleepe them bides'.[13]

C10.P17 If sleep here exceeds the agency of Redcrosse and Una—we are told that *they* do *its* bidding—a few stanzas earlier it appears as a crucial part of

[12] See, e.g., David Scott Wilson-Okamura, *Virgil in the Renaissance* (Cambridge: Cambridge Universtiy Press, 2010), 156.

[13] Edmund Spenser, *The Faerie Queene*, ed. Thomas P. Roche, Jr (1978; repr., Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1987), 1.1.36.1–4. Henceforth cited in the text.

self-care. Indeed, Una exhorts Redcrosse to get some much-needed sleep in the aftermath of his battle with Error:

C10.P18 Then with the Sunne take Sir, your timely rest,
And with new day new worke at once begin:
Vntroubled night they say giues counsell best.
C10.P19 (1.33.1–3)

C10.P20 Una advocates 'timely rest', with *timely* meaning '[o]ccurring, done, or made at a fitting, suitable, or favourable time'.[14] This is sleep intentionally coordinated with diurnal rhythms and subordinated to the next day's 'new worke'.[15] Moreover, Una articulates sleep's importance for thought itself when she notes, 'Vntroubled night they say giues counsell best' (3)—the early modern version of 'sleeping on it'. Una's 'timely rest' is as un-daemonic as it gets; this is the sleep of careful self-regulation and self-consolidation, both of which are, because advocated by Una, associated with the true faith. Moreover, Una and Redcrosse conform to her advice: they don't stay up late, but instead turn in with the descent of 'drouping Night'. And yet, as we have also seen, the sleep whose bidding they do attests to a somatic unregulability that is echoed in Archimago's malign actions.

C10.P21 Immediately before Morpheus's messenger arrives to bid Una and Redcrosse to sleep, Archimago, who 'well could file his tongue as smooth as glas, |…told [Una and Redcrosse] of Saints and Popes, and euermore | He strowd an *Aue-Mary* after and before' (35.7–9). We need to take Archimago's bedtime stories very seriously. As Plato posited in his account of the birth of the tyrant in the *Republic*, self-regulation depends upon the proper regulation of one's sleep, which in turn requires the careful monitoring of one's behaviour before sleep.[16] In sending Redcrosse to bed thinking of 'Saints and Popes', Archimago attempts to shape the Knight of Holiness's thoughts towards Catholicism—a process that assumes, quite conventionally for the literature of this time, that sleep 'is a site of transformation, of translation

[14] *OED Online*, s.v. 'timely', adj. 1a.

[15] Compare the prelapsarian sleep of Milton's Adam and Eve: 'the *timely* dew of sleep | Now falling with soft slumbrous weight inclines | Our eyelids' (John Milton, *Paradise Lost: A Norton Critical Edition*, ed. Scott Elledge (New York: Norton, 1975), 4.614–16, my emphasis).

[16] See Sullivan, *Sleep, Romance and Human Embodiment*, chap. 2.

from one form of identity to another'.[17] Of course, Archimago's transformative efforts extend far beyond his tales of popes and saints.

C10.P22 Natural philosophy offers a way of thinking about such a transformation. Sleep was routinely defined in terms of the suspension not only of reason but also of perception. The physician Thomas Cogan describes sleep as 'an impotencie' of the senses, while Robert Burton refers to it as the 'rest or binding' of them.[18] And yet, while both the senses and reason sleep, the imagination remains active, and *sensory evidence* provides the necessary ingredients for its operations:

C10.P23 > [T]his facultie of the fantasie is sudden, and so farre from stayednes, that euen in the time of sleep it hardly taketh any rest, but is alwaies occupied in dreaming & doting, yea euen about those things which neuer haue bene, shalbe, or can bee. For it staieth not in that which is shewed vnto it by the sences that serue it, but taketh what pleaseth it, and addeth thereunto or diminisheth, changeth & rechangeth, mingleth and vnmingleth, so that it cutteth asunder and seweth vp againe as it listeth.[19]

C10.P24 The imagination is able to generate 'things which neuer haue bene' because of 'the senses that [have] serue[d] it', feeding it material—like Archimago's tales—that it embellishes, modifies, and embroiders 'in the time of sleep'. Moreover, these 'things which neuer haue bene' have the power, after the sleeper has finally arisen, to inform one's waking life, colouring the operations of both rational judgement and sensory perception.

C10.P25 As we have seen, Redcrosse and Una succumb to the 'sweet slombring deaw' cast upon them by Morpheus's messenger. Crucially, that messenger's soporific agency anticipates and enables that of Archimago himself. More pointedly, Spenser explicitly connects the 'daemonic' sleep that overtakes Redcrosse with the magic of Archimago, that 'heretical Catholic enchanter'.[20] Once his guests are 'all drownd in deadly sleepe', Archimago 'seeks out mighty charmes, to trouble sleepy minds' (1.36.6, 9); the spell first cast by sleep is echoed in these charms, which in turn magnify the initial efficacy of

[17] Sullivan, *Sleep, Romance and Human Embodiment*, 51.
[18] Quoted in ibid., 18.
[19] Pierre de la Primaudaye, *The Second Part of the French Academie* (London, 1605), K6r.
[20] Douglas Brooks-Davies, 'Archimago', in *Spenser Encyclopedia*, gen. ed. A. C. Hamilton (1990; repr., Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), 53–4, 53.

the tales of saints and popes. Through these charms, Archimago conjures '[s]prights…fittest for to forge true-seeming lies' (1.38.2, 7), one of which he sends 'through the world of waters wide and deepe, | To *Morpheus* house' to collect an erotic dream to implant in Redcrosse's mind (39.2–3).[21]

C10.P26 Much has been written about the sprite's descent to the house of Morpheus, the classical god of sleep and dreams. As commentators routinely observe, this descent offers a variation on the Virgilian *katabasis*, while the depiction of the Cave of Morpheus owes a significant debt to the story of Ceyx and Alcyone in book 11 of Ovid's *Metamorphoses*. Comparatively neglected are the implications of Spenser's obvious pun on spirit. While Archimago's 'spright' is a supernatural being conjured up by the evil magus, that figure also evokes the animal spirits, those internal somatic agents that enable sensation and cognition. Spenser exploits the connection between the two meanings of 'spirit' when he alludes to the '[l]egions of Sprights, the which like litle flyes | *Fluttr[ed] about [Archimago's] euerdamned hedd*' (1.38.2–3, my emphasis): the sprite incarnates one of Archimago's thoughts. Indeed, Spenser returns to the fly-as-thought image when he depicts the chamber of Phantastes—a figure for fancy or imagination—in book 2's House of Alma: 'And all the chamber filled was with flyes, | Which buzzed all about…| *All those were idle thoughts and fantasies,* | *Deuices, dreames, opinions vnsound*' (2.9.51.1–7, my emphasis). The 'spright', then, materializes an 'idle thought' that emerges from Archimago's head to do his bidding. In other words, the Spenserian *katabasis* is also a fanciful depiction of Archimago's thought process, whereby the magus's spright generates, as if from his own imagination, 'a fit false dreame, that can delude the sleepers sent [i.e. senses]' (43.9).[22] This last statement would seem paradoxical. How can a *dream* delude the *senses* when they are not operating? As we have seen, though, 'things that haue neuer bene' can deform the senses of the newly roused sleeper. The larger point, however, is that Spenser constructs through Archimago a poetic model of cognition that, because it subsumes into itself 'mighty charms', tales of saints and popes, and the daemonic agency of sleep, we are invited to associate with

[21] In an essay in this volume, Mary Floyd-Wilson discusses diabolic influence on a sleeper's imagination (Chapter 11). This suggests that Spenser's depiction of Archimago owes a debt to period understandings of demonic agency.

[22] Brooks-Davies notes that Archimago's cell evokes 'the *cellula phantastica*, the front ventricle or compartment of the brain which was understood to house the imagination or fantasy' ('Archimago', 53).

Catholicism.[23] Of course, Catholic thought is constituted here in terms not of doctrinal content, but of deviating or being distracted from the true faith.

C10.P27 If the sprite's descent figures in Archimago's thought process, it necessarily raises some puzzling questions. Most importantly, if the *katabasis* is a figure for cognition, how does that figure work when the *waking* Archimago's thoughts extend into the realm of sleep? If the spright's journey evokes the generation of dreams within the sleeper, exactly whose dream is being retrieved? I want to suggest that such questions are inevitable by-products of Spenser's artistic ambition, which is to take seriously and represent imaginatively the process whereby Redcrosse is transformed in his sleep. Central to Spenser's understanding of that process are two things: first, the importance of Archimago's malign agency in shaping the thought of the Knight of Holiness; and, second, Redcrosse's own culpability in that transformation. Whose dream does Archimago's sprite retrieve from the house of Morpheus? Redcrosse's, of course. The arch-villain's cognitive processes not only echo those of Redcrosse, they bleed and blur into them in ways designed to capture the transformation that occurs in the sleeping knight. Moreover, sleep is the figure for that blending and blurring; it smudges the distinction between Archimago's thinking and Redcrosse's, and it distributes their somatic and cognitive processes over a vast geography that encompasses Archimago's cell, Redcrosse's bedchamber, and the subterranean reaches of Morpheus's lair.

C10.P28 Spenser's allegory of knightly cognition might seem pretty straightforward. While sleeping, Redcrosse is susceptible to the 'fit false dreame' (1.1.43.9) Archimago implants in him precisely because the operations of his judging faculty have been suspended, giving his imagination free rein. These thoughts lead Redcrosse to dream 'of loues and lustfull play, | That night his manly heart dide melt away' (47.4–5)—dreams Archimago designs to render Redcrosse susceptible to the false Una's erotic blandishments when he wakens to discover her at his bedside. While obviously in a different discursive register, these dreams are intended to function much as Archimago's tales of saints and popes did; they are designed to shape Redcrosse's thinking about (and away from) the true faith. And shape it these dreams do; they are the immediate precondition for his greatest error,

[23] I refer to this as a 'poetic model' of Catholic cognition to underscore that Spenser is not interested in psychological realism but has instead sought to create an imaginative shorthand for erring thought by way of tales, charms, and daemonic sleep.

his separation from Una, after he credulously believes that he had seen her 'in wanton lust and leud embracement' (2.5.5) with a young squire.[24]

C10.P29 To what extent is this Redcrosse's error, though, rather than the result of Archimago's malevolence? To what degree is the knight complicit in his own transformation? The poet stipulates that, before the 'ydle dreame' is implanted in Redcrosse, 'he slept soundly void of euil thought' (1.46.1, 3). This has been taken to suggest Redcrosse's purity, soon to be sullied through Archimago's machinations. But this view confuses a statement about Redcrosse's cognitive state with one about his character. It is not that Redcrosse is incapable of having any evil thoughts; instead, he has not yet experienced the particular evil thoughts that the dream—his own dream as well as Archimago's—will inspire in him, thoughts prepared by Archimago's earlier tale-telling. Redcrosse has already battled Error, and while he defeated that 'monster vile' (1.13.7), the encounter has set the knight upon the erring path that debouches, after a night of fitful sleeping and sleeplessness, into his abandonment of Una.[25] It is worth recalling that the word *error* is both geographic and subjective, encompassing space, affect, and cognition in its meanings:

C10.P30 Error, n.: I. 1. The action of roaming or wandering; hence a devious or winding course, a roving, winding;

II. 2. Chagrin, fury, vexation; a wandering of the feelings; extravagance of passion. *Obs.* (supposedly obsolete after 1500 or so);

III. 3. a. The condition of erring in opinion; the holding of mistaken notions or beliefs.[26]

C10.P31 All of these meanings, which taken together are practically constitutive of the genre of romance, converge on the slumbering Redcrosse in the form of an 'ydle dreame'.[27]

[24] Donald Cheney observes that Redcrosse 'rejects the direct appeal to his own desire, but is quick to believe a vision of his lady in the arms of another squire, and is soon on the path to Sans Foy and Duessa' ('Spenser's Parody', *Connotations* 12, no. 1 (2002/3), 1–13, 5). I would suggest that his desire increases through the direct appeal that is rejected.

[25] 'At first, Redcrosse's slaying of Error seems allegorically straightforward: Holiness begins his quest by eliminating Error; masculine heroism destroys feminine monstrosity. But, like everything else in *The Faerie Queene*, Redcrosse's triumph over Error is not as simple as it seems. The struggle of Holiness with Error is a constant one, which will not end until the day of Judgment' (Ian Frederick Moulton, *Before Pornography: Erotic Writing in Early Modern England* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 98).

[26] *OED Online*, s.v. 'error'.

[27] See Patricia Parker, *Inescapable Romance: Studies in the Poetics of a Mode* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979). Idle: A. 1. b. 'Void of meaning or sense; foolish, silly,

C10.P32 Which leads to a broader point. If the spright's descent to the house of Morpheus tropes a cognitive process, so does the entire opening of the poem lead up to Redcrosse's separation from Una, the poem's figure for truth. Immediately before encountering the monster Error, Redcrosse, Una, and the Dwarf find themselves in the *condition* of error, which is represented spatially: 'They cannot find that path, which first was showne, | But wander too and fro in waies vnknowne, |…| So many pathes, so many turnings seene, | That which of them to take, in diuerse doubt they been' (1.10.4–9). The uncertainty of their thinking—so many paths, so many turnings—is both captured in and provoked by their passage through 'the wandring wood' (13.6). After the three arrive at an ominous-looking 'hollow caue, | Amid the thickest woods' (11.6–7), Una offers a warning to Redcrosse: 'Be well aware, quoth then that Ladie milde, | Least suddene mischiefe ye too rash prouoke' (12.1–2). The Dwarf, recognizing they are in 'the wandring wood, [at] this *Errours den*' (13.6), urges the party to flee. However, 'full of fire and greedy hardiment, | The youthfull knight could not for ought be staide' (14.1–2). This episode illustrates the lexical range of *error*, encompassing not only the literal wanderings of the three travellers (as well as the wood identified in terms of such meanderings), but also the passionately extravagant and mistaken behaviour of the knight who 'could not for ought be staide'. In other words, the wandering wood subsumes into itself both cognition and affect. It should not be understood as an externalized representation of internal somatic operations, however. Instead, inside and outside, body and environment, exist in reciprocal and generative relation to one another, while we learn later in the canto that error crosses the boundary between waking and sleeping. The landscape of the wandering wood materializes affect and cognition, but it also helps shape them—Redcrosse's 'fire and greedy hardiment' are both provoked and expressed in the wandering wood.[28] Similarly, the Morphean *katabasis* distributes the overlapping thought processes of both Archimago and Redcrosse across a vast geography, covering the distance between the lairs of Archimago and Morpheus.

C10.P33 Thus far, I have been stressing the daemonic nature of sleep—would it not make sense to suggest that *dreams* lead Redcrosse astray? Certainly

incoherent'; 3. a. 'Of things: Serving no useful purpose, useless'; 4.a. 'Of persons: Not engaged in work, doing nothing, unemployed'. *OED Online*, s.v. 'idle'.

[28] See Michael Schoenfeldt's essay in this volume for a discussion of Spenser's 'seductive landscapes' (Chapter 2).

Renaissance theories stressing the supernatural or divine origins of dreams would lend credence to this view. However, this entirely reasonable question depends upon an assumption that Spenser's text does not make in these first two cantos: that sleep and dreams need to be understood as neatly distinguishable phenomena, rather than expressions of a bodily practice that encompasses both of them. In the opening cantos of book 1 of the *Faerie Queene*, sleep and dreams *together* articulate the ways in which both body and subject are different from themselves. Moreover, the significance of the dream lies less in its representational content, which is underdescribed in these cantos, than in its somatic efficacy. What the dream *says* matters less than what it *does* as a part of Redcrosse's sleep, which is to extend his erring ways by 'Bath[ing him] in wanton blis and wicked ioy' (1.47.6). These affective states are simultaneously of internal and external origin—indeed, they traverse great distances on the way to Redcrosse's bedchamber—and they only become ascendant while our hero slumbers.

C10.P34 The association of sleep with what Spenser sees as Catholic error is either extended or assumed throughout the first two-thirds of book 1. For instance, Redcrosse's folly is clearly mirrored in that of Fradubio, the knight-turned-tree whose transformation is inaugurated when Duessa 'drownd [him] in sleepie night'; subsequently, she 'With wicked herbes and ointments did besmeare | [His] bodie all, through charmes and magicke might, | That all [his] senses were bereaued quight' (1.2.42.2, 4–5). In the House of Pride, Redcrosse observes the parade of the seven deadly sins, the first of whom is Idleness: 'of deuotion he had little care, | Still drownd in sleepe, and most of his days ded' (4.19.3–4). Later, Redcrosse drinks from the fountain of spiritual sloth and is subsequently defeated at the hands of the giant Orgoglio, which defeat results in our hero resembling a 'slombred sencelesse corse' who could not 'out of his swowne awake' (7.15.6–7). And, even after his rescue from Orgoglio's castle by Arthur, Redcrosse is susceptible to the appeal of a death that Despaire seductively describes in terms of 'Sleepe after toyle, port after stormie seas', 'eternall rest | And happie ease' (9.40.8, 1–2). Across these examples, Spenser mobilizes a range of sleep's often contradictory cultural associations, many of which I have discussed elsewhere: associations with death; with vegetable life; with sloth; with a respite from care; with the suspension of both rational judgement and sensory activity, as we have already seen; and, paradoxically, with the overindulgence of the senses.[29] Overwriting all of these examples, though, is the

[29] Sullivan, *Sleep, Romance and Human Embodiment*.

connection he trains us to make in the first two cantos—the connection between sleep and the erring, affect-rich cognition of Catholicism.

C10.P35 And yet, Spenser also considers in book 1 the 'timely rest' of self-care. It is there in the opening cantos of the poem, although it is overshadowed by the sleep that descends upon or drowns us. In the final cantos of the poem, Spenser's narrative emphasis changes, and sleep plays a role in Arthur's ecstatic dream of Gloriana, the Faerie Queene; in Redcrosse's vision of the New Jerusalem on the Mount of Contemplation; and also in his conflict with the dragon. In all of these instances, the sleep of self-care serves the imperatives of Spenser's Protestant epic, while sleep's 'daemonism' is either adroitly reframed or banished from the scene.

C10.P36 When Arthur tells Una and Redcrosse the origins of his love, his self-description evokes the terms of Redcrosse's early error. Just as Redcrosse was once 'full of fire and greedy hardiment,… [and] could not for ought be staide' (1.14.1–2), Arthur felt the 'heate of hardiment' as he 'Raung[ed] the forest wide on courser free' (9.12.7). Before his vision of Gloriana, though, Arthur successfully warded off Cupid's darts 'with wary gouernment' (9.10.9)—that is, he subdued passion's 'creeping flames by reason' (9.6). However, a significant change occurs to Arthur in his sleep:

C10.P37 For-wearied with my sports, I did alight
From loftie steed, and downe to sleepe me layd;
The verdant gras my couch did goodly dight,
And pillow was my helmet faire displayd:
Whiles euery sence the humour sweet embayd,
And slombring soft my hart did steale away,
Me seemed, by my side a royall Mayd
Her daintie limbes full softly down did lay:
So faire a creature yet saw neuer sunny day.

C10.P38 (9.13)

C10.P39 In his edition of the *Faerie Queene*, A. C. Hamilton poetically glosses the 'humour sweet' in which Arthur's senses were 'embayd' as the 'dew of sleep'.[30] Hamilton notices here that 'humour sweet' evokes and combines the 'Sweet slombring deaw' and 'sad humour' (1.36.4, 2) that descend upon Una and Redcrosse in canto 1 through the agency of Morpheus. And yet, there are important differences between these moments. Whereas Redcrosse

[30] Hamilton, ed., *The Faerie Qveene*, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2007), 115.

and Una err in seeking shelter in the house of a magus who tells them Catholic bedtime stories, Arthur sleeps on 'verdant gras' with his pillow as his helmet; if his armour is off (as was Redcrosse's when he was attacked by Orgoglio), it is also at hand. Moreover, sleep's daemonic nature is comparatively underdepicted; Arthur is tired, and he lays *himself* down to sleep rather than being overcome by it. And yet, Arthur undergoes a profound alteration: his heart 'steale[s] away' while he sleeps. The 'royall Mayd' of his dreams evokes the insubstantial spright that Archimago ushers into being to deceive Redcrosse. However, if the traces Gloriana leaves behind are to be credited, she is material: 'When I awoke, and found her place deuoyd, | And nought but pressed gras, where she had lyen' (9.15.1–2). The 'pressed gras' has both puzzled and preoccupied critics; what matters, finally, is the physical evidence of Gloriana's (admittedly mysterious) material existence. The 'tender partes' of Archimago's spright-Una are 'fram'd of liquid ayre' (1.15.2); in contrast, the 'royall Mayd' literally leaves an impression.

C10.P40 The crucial question for our purposes would *seem* to be this: what differentiates the slumbering Arthur's transformation from that of Redcrosse? Or, more simply, how can we be sure that the former is a good thing and the latter is a bad one? In fact, the more important question is, what does it say about both Spenser and sleep that we have to work to differentiate the two dreams from each other? In his depiction of Arthur's dream, Spenser deliberately invites comparison with Redcrosse's. There is also raw material for contrasting them: 'liquid ayre' vs. pressed grass; Redcrosse's wrathful neglect of counsel vs. Arthur's wary (but overthrown) self-government; slumbering in the guestroom of a devious magus vs. sleeping on the ground with your armour for a pillow. The distinctions are there to be made. What matters most, though, is that they have to be made in the first place, that the righteous sleep of Arthur is so closely echoed by the daemonic sleep of Redcrosse—or, that the sleep of self-care is haunted by its overpowering other. Spenser harnesses sleep's otherworldliness as well as its association with subjective transformation to explain the origins of Arthur's amatory devotion to the Faerie Queene. To do so, he simultaneously evokes and disavows that devotion's resemblance to Redcrosse's lustful desire for both Duessa and, before her, the false Una.[31]

[31] 'The poem proposes a version of Arthur's act of faith for his readers, a parallel between the knight's experiences and our experiences with our own heroic journey: we cannot really be any more certain than Arthur is of the truth of his vision' (Susanne L. Wofford, '*The Faerie Queene*, Books I–III', in *The Cambridge Companion to Spenser*, ed. Andrew Hadfield (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 106–23, 110).

C10.P41 A similar relationship of evocation and disavowal is apparent when we compare the figures of Contemplation and Morpheus. Contemplation responds to the appearance of Mercy and Redcrosse as follows: '[W]hen these two approching he aspide, | At their first presence grew agrieued sore, | That forst him lay his heauenly thoughts aside' (10.49.1–3). Contemplation's annoyed reluctance to push aside his heavenly thoughts has been anticipated by Morpheus's irritated resistance to being awakened from a dream; when finally roused from his 'fancies weake' by Archimago's spright, the God of Sleep is 'with blame | Halfe angry' (1.42.8, 43.4–5).[32] For Spenser, there is a world of difference between 'heauenly thoughts' and 'fancies weake'—and yet, in establishing this difference, Spenser also smudges it.

C10.P42 If Contemplation evokes Morpheus, he presents Redcrosse not with a 'fit false dreame', but with a true vision of 'The new *Hierusalem*, that God has built | For those to dwell in, that are chosen his' (10.57.2–3). This vision reworks the revelation of Rome's future to Aeneas in the underworld—a revelation that, as we have seen, Renaissance allegorists understood to be part of his larger prophetic dream. In light of these associations, it is striking that *sleep is not a precondition for Redcrosse's vision*, which, indeed, is described neither as dream nor vision, but as a sight upon which he gazes (56.1). Both the Arthur of canto 9 and the Redcrosse of canto 1 have required sleep for their dream visions, whether sacred or profane. In canto 10, Redcrosse observes the New Jerusalem without benefit of slumber.

C10.P43 And yet, that isn't the whole story. When Mercy leads Redcrosse to the Mount of Contemplation, she does so as the culmination of his instruction in religious virtue in the House of Holiness. Crucially, 'kindly rest' is a precondition for that education:

C10.P44 Then said the aged *Caelia*, Deare dame,
And you good Sir, I wote that of your toyle,
And labours long, through which ye hither came,
Ye both forwearied be: therefore a whyle
I read you rest, and to your bowres recoyle.
…

C10.P45 Now when their wearie limbes with kindly rest,
And bodies were refresht with due repast,
Faire *Vna* gan *Fidelia* faire request,

[32] In connecting these two passages, Spenser might have in mind the monastic sin of *acedia*, as spiritual sloth suggests how easily contemplation can blur into depressed lassitude.

To haue her knight into her schoolehouse plaste,
That of her heauenly learning he might tast.

C10.P46 (17.1–18.5)

C10.P47 If Una is the spokesperson for 'timely rest' in canto 1, Redcrosse only achieves it in canto 10. Moreover, the attainment of that rest is bound up in a religious instruction that is the necessary precondition for Redcrosse's later vision of the New Jerusalem.

C10.P48 If we proceed chronologically through the three linked scenes I've discussed so far, we witness, first, the association of sleep with Catholic error in cantos 1 and 2; second, the bending of sleep's daemonism to a distinctly Protestant and nationalist agenda in Arthur's dream in canto 9; and, third, the apparent eradication of daemonic sleep in canto 10. In the House of Holiness, there is nothing but timely rest. While Redcrosse's vision of the New Jerusalem explicitly evokes Aeneas's vision of Rome's future, the sleep-rich environment of the Virgilian underworld finds no echo in this episode. Spenser explores and exploits sleep's daemonism in his opening cantos, but he does so as part of the literary representation of cognitive error—of what it is to perceive and think like a Catholic, passionately in love with falsehood. The Protestantism of book 1 of *The Faerie Queene*, on the other hand, demands timely, or kindly, rest, which in turn enables a commitment to both faith and truth. For Spenser, how Redcrosse thinks, feels, and believes are bound up in how he sleeps.

C10.P49 That being said, Spenser is not entirely able to cleanse Protestant sleep of its daemonic dimensions. This, after all, is the lesson of Arthur's dream, in the representation of which Spenser seeks both to exploit and to manage the externality of sleep (as well as that of the passions). Arthur's alliance with the Faerie Queene is at the nationalist heart of the poem, binding England's heroic past both to Elizabeth's present and to an imagined glorious future; it requires deferred desire for its existence, which in turn demands that Arthur undergo the kind of erotic transformation to which, representationally speaking, daemonic sleep is well suited.[33] When it comes to Redcrosse's education in holiness, daemonic sleep is nowhere to be found, replaced

[33] Love and sleep can both be understood as daemonic phenomena: 'As a long tradition of classical and medieval literature attests, love is experienced as both the most private and voluntary and the most alien and invasive of emotions. . . . [W]hen one does fall in love, it rarely feels like an entirely conscious or voluntary decision' (Melissa Sanchez, *Erotic Subjects: The Sexuality of Politics in Early Modern English Literature* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013)).

with a rest that is timely, kindly, and tailored to contemplation. Nevertheless, Spenser's poem needs daemonic sleep not merely to explain how Redcrosse thinks in error, but also to demonstrate how Arthur is transformed into a Protestant hero devoted to the Faerie Queene.

C10.P50 There is another point to be made here, and it centres on the relationship between daemonic sleep and grace. The sleep that descends upon Redcrosse, which is explicitly associated with Archimago's charms, encodes the sensuality of Catholicism, which in turn informs Redcrosse's bad decision making. Contrastingly, Arthur's oneiric vision of Gloriana emblematizes the promise of grace:[34] the unearned extension of forgiveness to the sinner.[35] In the case of Arthur, his slumbering vision of the Faerie Queene tropes grace's status as a divine gift. This is a gift that Redcrosse is not prepared to receive until after he has conquered Despaire, passed through the House of Holiness, and reached the Mount of Contemplation. And yet, Spenser remains anxious enough about daemonic sleep's association with Catholic error that he grants Redcrosse a vision of the New Jerusalem untainted by slumber.

C10.P51 That being said, that vision does not represent the final word on Redcrosse and sleep. Canto 11 begins with Una exhorting Redcrosse to martial wakefulness: 'The sparke of noble courage now *awake*, | And *striue your excellent self to excell*' (2.6–7, my emphasis). If daemonic sleep has encoded non-self-identicality, the rousing of Redcrosse's courage is associated with self-excelling, a kind of hyperwatchfulness in which our hero's identity is both exceeded and consolidated. He only truly becomes St George after he awakens his noble courage—a rousing that clearly echoes, a few stanzas later, the poet's wished-for wakening of Mars, the god of war (6.8). In canto 12, we learn that Redcrosse's oath to the Faerie Queene necessitates that 'Of ease or rest [he] may not yet deuize' (18.2). This is not to say that, for Redcrosse, sleeping is not allowed; it is to suggest, instead, that fealty to the Faerie Queene is cognate with *timely* rest (certainly not ease), and it leaves little rhetorical room for either idleness or

[34] 'As the telos of Arthur's quest, and the goal of his epic *labor*, the Faery Queen marks a future promise, a prophesied epiphany, but not one that the poem can bring to fruition in the fictional time of human action' (Wofford, '*The Faerie Queene*, Books I–III', 107–8). Wofford also points out that 'Arthur's dream vision of the Faery Queen comes to stand as the paradigm of faith' (109).

[35] Gloriana is alluded to as the 'Mirrour of grace and Maiestie diuine' in the proem (1.4.2). On Spenser's reconciliation of allegorical readings of the *Aeneid* stressing the hero's virtues and the Protestant emphasis on justification by faith alone, see Watkins, *The Specter of Dido*, 90–112.

daemonic sleep. And yet, and as we have seen, daemonic sleep is not easily dispensed with.

C10.P52 In the final cantos of book 1, Spenser has a bit of fun by mobilizing the commonplace association of sleep with death, most obviously in the comic scene in which the common folk anxiously scrutinize the fallen dragon for signs of life or afterlife. (Is it dead, or just sleeping? Will it rise again? (12.10).) More important are the Well and the Tree of Life in canto 11. Twice Redcrosse comes close to death, and twice he is simultaneously *restored* to life and *revealed* to be living, all thanks to the wondrous efficacy of the Tree and Well. What appears to be death, then, emerges as a kind of miraculous, transformative sleep. This is made obvious in Spenser's description of the effects of sap from the Tree of Life: Redcrosse 'lay as in a dreame of deepe delight, | Besmeared with pretious Balme' (50.4). The balm's salvific efficacy—the sleeping dead awaken to a new life—is described in terms that unsettlingly evoke Redcrosse's false, fit (and, presumably, wet) dream. In terms of book 1's allegory, the reason for connecting these two moments is clear: their yoking demonstrates how far we've travelled from a false if delightful dream to a veracious one, from the sleep and dreams of Catholic error to those of Protestant salvation. And yet, that yoking also raises the troubling prospect that error cannot be so easily differentiated from truth; that Arthur's vision of Gloriana might be as deceptive as Redcrosse's of Archimago's spright; and, most disturbingly, that the salvific dream of waking to a new life might prove to be a false, fit one. For all his efforts to tether it to an economy of timely rest, sleep remains for Spenser a repository for profoundly felt anxieties about the slipperiness of religious difference, the alien recalcitrance of the body, and perhaps even the troubling unknowability of what comes after the sleep of death.

C11

11

The Habitation of Airy Nothings in *A Midsummer Night's Dream*

Mary Floyd-Wilson

C11.P1 In *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, when Theseus hears the lovers' story of their night-time adventures, he dismisses their accounts as mere tricks of the imagination, produced by their 'seething brains':

C11.P2
> I never may believe
> These antique fables, nor these fairy toys.
> Lovers and madmen have such seething brains,
> Such shaping fantasies, that apprehend
> More than cool reason ever comprehends.[1]

C11.P3 Theseus fails to acknowledge that he has conflated 'diverse functions of the imagination' in equating the discernment of the lover, lunatic, and poet, and he neglects to recognize the positive role that the imagination played in faculty psychology and in a normative process of perception.[2] However, while Theseus's wholesale denigration of the imagination may have been interpreted as heavy-handed, it is his complete dismissal of the possibility that the lovers had an encounter with mysterious spirits that would have

[1] William Shakespeare, *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, in *The Norton Shakespeare*, 2nd ed., ed. Stephen Greenblatt (New York: Norton, 2008), 5.1.1–6. Hereafter cited parenthetically in text.

[2] See Adam Rzepka, '"How Easy Is a Bush Supposed a Bear?": Differentiating Imaginative Production in *A Midsummer Night's Dream*', *Shakespeare Quarterly* 66, no. 3 (2015): 308–28, 309. In this volume, John Sutton discusses Rzepka's essay at some length in 'Place and Memory: History, Cognition, Phenomenology'. For more on the role of imagination in the play, see the survey of criticism by Dorothea Kehler in *A Midsummer Night's Dream: A Critical Guide*, ed. Regina Buccola (London: Continuum, 2010), 23–5. See in particular R. W. Dent, 'Imagination in *A Midsummer Night's Dream*', *Shakespeare Quarterly* 15, no. 2 (1964): 115–29; and David Schalkwyk, 'The Role of Imagination in "A Midsummer Night's Dream"', *Theoria* 66 (1986): 51–65.

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provoked controversy. If framed by early modern debates over the nature of spirits and how spirits were thought to interact with humans, Theseus's rejection of the lovers' account articulates an unpopular position. Shakespeare's contemporaries would probably cast him as a 'materialist' or 'atheist'. While it was widely accepted that apparitions could be hallucinations, it was also accepted that invisible spirits could produce deceptive illusions. Almost all early modern commentators would have entertained the possibility that the lovers encountered spirits of some kind in the woods. No one in Shakespeare's audience would have doubted the existence of a spirit world. They did disagree, however, on the nature of spirits, their capacities, and the means by which they interacted with the human realm.[3]

C11.P4 Demonologists struggled, in particular, with the very question of 'local habitation', or how spirits, as incorporeal entities, could occupy a physically circumscribed space. Indeed, for John Deacon and John Walker, spirits exist as substances but cannot 'occupie … [a] corporall place'. The very process of describing, they argue, renders spirits and devils as 'more sensible' than they are:

C11.P5 > Alwaies remembring this; that *spirites* and *diuels,* they are in the *scriptures* euermore spoken of, as of *spiritual substances:* howsoeuer, for the onelie helpe of our slender capacities, they be sometimes more groslie expressed by *parables* and *metaphors,* and, in a more *sensible* or corporal manner then otherwaies they are in themselues.[4]

C11.P6 For these authors, as soon as humans attempt to articulate the nature and presence of spiritual substances, they have misrepresented their subtle power. As with all drama, *A Midsummer Night's Dream* invites its spectators

[3] On belief in spirits, see Emma Wilby, *Cunning Folk and Familiar Spirits: Shamanistic Visionary Traditions in Early Modern British Witchcraft and Magic* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2005); and Euan Cameron, 'Angels, Demons, and Everything in Between: Spiritual Beings in Early Modern Europe', in *Angels of Light? Sanctity and the Discernment of Spirits in the Early Modern Period*, ed. Clare Copeland and Jan Machielsen (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 17–52. On the tradition of the discernment of spirits, see Susan E. Schreiner, *Are You Alone Wise? The Search for Certainty in the Early Modern Era* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Moshe Sluhovsky, *Believe Not Every Spirit: Possession, Mysticism, and Discernment in Early Modern Catholicism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007); Nancy Caciola, *Discerning Spirits: Divine and Demonic Possession in the Middle Ages* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003); and Caciola and Sluhovsky, 'Spiritual Physiologies: The Discernment of Spirits in Medieval and Early Modern Europe', in *Preternature: Critical and Historical Studies on the Preternatural* 1, no. 1 (2012): 1–48.

[4] John Deacon and John Walker, *Dialogicall Discourses of Spirits and Divels* (London, 1601), 56, 69.

to imagine scenes, landscapes, and memories that they do not, in actuality, see staged. But unlike most plays, this comedy also appears to lift the veil on an invisible world, giving its audience a staged vision of spiritual substances. The spectators are privileged to see what remains unseen by most of the play's characters. Since the audience receives ocular (though theatrical) proof of the lovers' fairy encounters, they may interpret Theseus's disbelief as a misapprehension of his own world, however fictional or mimetic it may be. Certainly Oberon contradicts Theseus's perspective when he insists to Titania that she has regularly intervened in the Athenian governor's love life:

C11.P7 How canst thou thus for shame, Titania,
Glance at my credit with Hippolyta,
Knowing I know thy love to Theseus?
Didst thou not lead him through the glimmering night
From Perigenia, whom he ravished?
And make him with fair Aegles break his faith,
With Ariadne and Antiopa?
C11.P8 (2.1.74–80)

C11.P9 Oberon does not describe how Titania made Theseus 'break his faith', but Theseus's assertion that he 'never may believe . . . fairy toys' suggests that she directed his affections without his knowledge. He may have been unaware that he was fairy-led through the 'glimmering night' after he 'ravished' Perigenia, perhaps assigning any preternatural impressions to his own imagination. Oberon's report of Titania's love for Theseus hints, too, at the possibility that they have had sexual relations. Audiences are left to wonder if Theseus intentionally fails to mention his own encounters with a fairy, or if he has no memory of these experiences. It may not help Theseus's credibility that he dismisses 'antique fables' when he is, himself, derivative of one.[5]

C11.P10 Theseus's failure to acknowledge, or perhaps to perceive, his own preternatural experiences is more significant, I will suggest, than his articulated scepticism, for it speaks to the play's engagement with pervasive cultural

[5] On this point, see G. K. Hunter, *John Lyly: The Humanist as Courtier* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962), 328; and Alexander Leggatt, *Shakespeare's Comedy of Love* (London: Routledge, 1974), 101. Leggatt notes that is surprising that Theseus fails to recall his 'dealings with the fairies in [his] younger and wilder days'.

anxieties concerned that human faculties are unable to distinguish the presence of a spirit from an illusion or (even more disturbingly) to differentiate enchantment from reality. While Theseus may not celebrate the imaginative faculty's capacity to assist in accurate perception, he also neglects to address the central anxiety raised by the lovers' story: not only do spirits (notoriously) prey on weak imaginations, but the inability to discern the presence or nature of spirits also highlights the troubling deficiencies of human perception. Shakespeare's comedy alludes to pressing debates, taking place in witchcraft pamphlets and demonological discourse, on how an invisible spiritual realm affected humans. Central to these discussions is the relationship between the physical realm and the substance of spirits. If spirits are manifest in the material world, what was the elemental matter of their embodiment? Do intrusive spirits have the power to transform the human body? If spirits are absolutely incorporeal and removed from the physical world, how do they interact with humans? When faced with preternatural illusions or bewitchment, can humans rely on their physical senses to distinguish fantasy from truth?

C11.P11 Shakespeare's play explores these questions and seems to urge, without anxiety, that spectators accept ontological uncertainty not only about their coexistence with invisible entities but also about the hidden and unknown transactions that may occur between their bodies and these spirits. While Theseus feels certain that he knows when a bush is not a bear, his spiritually animated environment challenges this stance. In a similar vein, the lovers and Bottom interpret their spiritual encounters as merely dreams. This perspective contradicts what the theatre audience has witnessed, which Puck also recasts as a dream in his epilogue. But it is, I will argue, Demetrius's still-enchanted status that points to the possibility that Theseus's denial of the spirit world is not only untenable within the confines of the play but also limited in the context of early modern epistemology.

C11.P12 Theseus suggests that it is the poet's idiosyncratic talent to concoct 'The forms of things unknown', turn them to shapes, and give 'to airy nothing | A local habitation and a name' (5.1.12–17). But audiences of *A Midsummer Night's Dream* may entertain a broader interpretation of 'airy nothing' than Theseus's.[6] Rather than restricting the meaning to imagined conceptions, the play, as we have noted, represents an airy spirit world for an audience to behold. Certainly spectators may recall that the play's previous use of the

[6] Dent suggests that 'Shakespeare's entire play implies a contrary view' to Theseus's stance on the imagination ('Imagination', 100).

term *airy* appears when Titania promises to 'purge [Bottom's] mortal grossness' so that he 'shalt like an airy spirit go' (3.1.142–3).

C11.P13 In late sixteenth-century England, the narratives that explained spiritual intrusions were varied and inconsistent. Since no mortal could claim certain knowledge of the spiritual realm, the process of giving 'things unknown' a shape, a name, and a locale proves to be the work of anyone who attempts to characterize the nature of spirits, whether a poet, a playwright, a wise aunt, or a supposedly expert theologian. To identify an unknowable spirit as a fairy, ghost, or demon is to make a determination that speaks to its supposed nature and provenance. Some argued that disembodied spirits could move through the physical world without restrictions, as wind or air, expressed in Puck's claim to 'put a girdle round about the earth | In forty minutes' (2.1.175–6). Many early moderns believed that invisible entities haunted certain places (such as the woods in Athens). When they mingled with humans, these spirits proved eager to trouble their bodies or vex their minds. In the ongoing controversy over possession cases, demonologists asked whether it was ontologically possible for a spirit to occupy a human body: *habitation* not only raised the question of what happened to the human soul during possession but also how a spiritual being without 'fixed dimensions' could be contained by a 'locall-receptical'.[7] Much less controversial, however, were the torments of demonic temptation and obsession, when the devil 'attacks a person "either in outward assaulting and vexing; or in an inward suggesting and tempting"'.[8] Even if a spirit were unable to transpose or possess a person, it could still affect people with diseases and physical afflictions, stir their humors, and trick them with its wiles and false images.[9]

C11.P14 Shakespeare's poetic project gives airy nothings the name of 'fairy' and locates them in a shifting but invisible locale in the woods outside of Athens. In naming these spiritual substances *fairies*, Shakespeare can enter the epistemological debates about how the human world and the spiritual realm may intersect but keep at bay (at least temporarily) the darker fears of sin,

[7] Harman Bhogal, 'The Post-Reformation Challenge to Demonic Possession', in *Demons and Illness from Antiquity to the Early-Modern Period*, ed. Siam Bhayro and Catherine Rider (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 359–75, 369; and Deacon and Walker, *Dialogicall Discourses*, 341.

[8] Bhogal quoting Deacon and Walker, 'The Post-Reformation Challenge', 372. On the distinction between obsession and possession, see David Harley, 'Explaining Salem: Calvinist Psychology and the Diagnosis of Possession', *The American Historical Review* 101, no. 2 (1996): 307–30.

[9] Deacon and Walker, *Dialogicall Discourses*, 61.

damnation, and hellish torment.[10] The long-held critical view of fairies maintains that 'more sophisticated Elizabethans tended to speak as if fairy-beliefs were a thing of the past. Reginald Scot, for example, wrote in 1584 that Robin Goodfellow was no longer as widely feared as he had been a hundred years previously'.[11] Old wives merely perpetuated these fables to keep children in awe.[12] Scholars perceived this supposed decline in belief not only as an effect of Protestant writers' association of fairies with the superstitions of Catholicism but also as evidence of the disenchantment of the world.[13]

C11.P15 Recently historians have attempted to complicate our sense of early modern understandings of fairies in relation to the Protestant Reformation, primarily by noting that those who dismissed the existence of fairies usually reclassified them as demonic spirits.[14] As Peter Marshall observes, many

[10] On the status or nature of the fairies in the play, see Minor White Latham, *The Elizabethan Fairies: The Fairies of Folklore and the Fairies of Shakespeare* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1930); Ernest Schanzer, 'The Moon and the Fairies in *A Midsummer Night's Dream*', *University of Toronto Quarterly* 24, no. 3 (1955): 234–46; K. M. Briggs, *The Anatomy of Puck: An Examination of Fairy Beliefs among Shakespeare's Contemporaries and Successors* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1959), 44–55; Jan Kott, *Shakespeare Our Contemporary* (New York: Norton, 1974), 213–36; David Bevington, '"But We Are Spirits of Another Sort": The Dark Side of Love and Magic in *A Midsummer Night's Dream*', *Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 7 (1975): 80–92; Diane Purkiss, *Troublesome Things: A History of Fairies and Fairy Stories* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2000); and Jesse M. Lander, 'Thinking with Fairies: *A Midsummer Night's Dream* and the Problem of Belief', *Shakespeare Survey* 65 (2012): 42–57.

[11] Keith Thomas, *Religion and the Decline of Magic* (London: Penguin, 1971), 725. From a different perspective on disenchantment, Mary Ellen Lamb's reading of *A Midsummer Night's Dream* argues that references to fairy lore allowed certain communities 'whose interests were least often addressed by hierarchical authority' to enact forms of social resistance to 'unwanted social controls'. See 'Taken by the Fairies: Fairy Practices and the Production of Popular Culture in *A Midsummer Night's Dream*', *Shakespeare Quarterly* 51, no. 3 (2000): 277–312, 279.

[12] Adam Fox, *Oral and Literate Culture in England, 1500–1700* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 187–200. Arguing against the notion that fairies were perceived as 'airy beings', Wendy Wall focuses on how fairy stories were associated with 'serving women and domestic work' in the 'early modern imagination' ('Why does Puck Sweep? Fairylore, Merry Wives, and Social Struggle', *Shakespeare Quarterly* 52, no. 1 (2001): 67–106, 88, 70).

[13] Thomas, *Religion and the Decline*, 729. On the associations between Catholicism and fairies in Shakespeare, see Regina Buccola, *Fairies, Fractious Women, and the Old Faith: Fairy Lore in Early Modern British Drama and Culture* (Selinsgrove, PA: Susquehanna University Press, 2006).

[14] See Peter Marshall, 'Protestants and Fairies in Early-Modern England', in *Living with Religious Diversity in Early-Modern Europe*, ed. C. Scott Dixon, Dagmar Freist, and Mark Greengrass (Farnham: Ashgate, 1988), 139–59. For a wider perspective, see Ronald Hutton, 'The Making of the Early Modern British Fairy Tradition', *Historical Journal* 57, no. 4 (2014): 1135–56. In Darren Oldridge's view, Protestants did not demonize fairies but saw them as part of the 'cobweb of lies in which Satan entangled unwary souls'. See 'Fairies and the Devil in Early Modern England', *Seventeenth Century* 31, no. 1 (2016): 1–15, 12. Lander argues that *A Midsummer Night's Dream* 'entertain[s] a belief in fairies in order to protest against the relentless dichotomizing and strenuous disenchantment that accompanied the Calvinism that

Protestant writers insisted that if fairies 'had any objective reality at all, they could only be demons, subservient to Satan, and bent on the spiritual destruction of mankind'.[15] King James in his *Daemonologie* asserts: 'For doubtleslie they are in effect, but all one kinde of spirites, who for abusing the more of mankinde, takes on these sundrie shapes, and vses diuerse formes of out-ward actiones, as if some were of nature better then other.'[16]

C11.P16 To reconcile the nostalgic cultural experience of fairies as harmless entities with this darker view, some Protestant commentators suggest that these same spirits altered their behaviour when the devil lost his ground in the Reformation. As Miles Coverdale writes in 1564, the

C11.P17 > Devill chiefly desireth hys seat to be in religion. . . . [before the Reformation] was he Robin good fellow: he would doe no hurt. But when he was tumbled out of his throne by preaching of the gospel, then raunged he about as he hath done, but secretly.[17]

C11.P18 In a similar vein, William Fulke observes that when the 'Popishe church' ruled, the devil could afford to play the harmless joker Robin Goodfellow from time to time.[18] It is Satan's own insecurities that compelled the fairies to turn devilish.

C11.P19 Many Reformed writers explained belief in fairies as another instance of the devil's capacity to beguile men into error. Fairy belief signified 'idolatry and superstition' encouraged by Satan.[19] As William Tyndale suggests, such Christians were left to 'wander as in a mist, or (as we say) led by Robin Goodfellow, that they cannot come to the right way' if they ignored the light of scripture.[20] To be 'fairy-led' in this argument is akin to demonic

dominated England's universities and pulpits in the late sixteenth century' ('Thinking with Fairies', 56–7). But as Nathan Johnstone's work has demonstrated, disenchantment does not accompany Calvinism; see *The Devil and Demonism in Early Modern England* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). Kristen Poole has observed that in the study of English literature, we scholars 'have become Theseus, a disbeliever in the midst of enchantment', which has left us 'little room or direction for studying the *experience* of magic and belief' (*Supernatural Environments in Shakespeare's England: Spaces of Demonism, Divinity, and Drama* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 31).

[15] Marshall, 'Protestants and Fairies', 140.

[16] James VI, *Daemonologie* (Edinburgh, 1597), 57.

[17] Coverdale, *Certain most godly, fruitful, and comfortable letters of such true saintes and holy martyrs of God* (London, 1564), 440.

[18] Fulke, *D. Heskins, D. Sanders, and M. Rastel, accounted (among their faction) three pillers and archpatriarches of the popish synagogue* (London, 1579), 295.

[19] Oldridge, 'Fairies and the Devil', 11. [20] Quoted in ibid., 4.

superstition that sends one off the path of righteousness. Robin Goodfellow's identity as a wandering spirit who entices foolish travellers to fall into bogs and mires is reworked to signify the ease with which the devil can trick Christians who waver in their vigilance.

C11.P20 Puck and Oberon allude to the possibility that their invisible world contains more kinds of spirits than just fairies when Puck observes that there are ghosts and 'damned' spirits wandering in the night. Puck notes that at sunrise

C11.P21 ghosts, wand'ring here and there,
Troop home to churchyards; damned spirits all
That in crossways and floods have burial,
Already to their wormy beds are gone,
For fear lest day should look their shames upon.
They willfully themselves exile from light
And must for aye consort with black-browed night.
C11.P22 (3.2.382–8)

C11.P23 In response, Oberon insists that he and Puck 'are spirits of another sort' (389), implying that fairies are more beneficent than these other spirits who exile themselves from light. It remains unclear, however, whether Puck sees a distinction between the ghosts in the churchyards and the apparitions emerging from the crossways. Are both 'damned spirits', as the 'all' would suggest, or are the churchyard-ghosts spirits of a third sort? If they are all 'damned spirits', rather than wanderers from an obsolete purgatory, then Puck may be suggesting that they are demons.

C11.P24 For most Reformed writers, ghosts, like fairies, had to be classified as demons. The Swiss writer Ludwig Lavater contends that ghosts are 'not the souls of dead men…but either good or euill Angels'.[21] But many argued that with the loss of purgatory, the apparent return of human souls after death could only be a trick of the devil. Sir Thomas Browne in *Religio Medici* asserts that 'those apparitions, and ghosts of departed persons are not the wandring souls of men, but the unquiet walks of Devils'.[22] Before the Reformation, it was understood that suicides and executions might generate

[21] Lavater, *Of ghostes and spirites walking by nyght and of strange noyses, crackes, and sundry forewarnynges* (London, 1572), b.ijr.
[22] Browne, *Religio Medici* (London, 1682), 86.

restless spirits, and it was reasoned that a burial at the crossroads, beyond the boundaries of the community, would confuse the ghosts' orientation so that they would not make their way back to haunt their former homes.[23] It was a 'long-standing popular intuition that the souls of the dead lurked for a transitional period near the places where they had been buried'.[24]

C11.P25 After the Reformation, the debate over ghosts focused primarily on whether the devil could reanimate dead bodies or could only produce, instead, through illusory methods, merely the visual appearance of ghosts. Most writers maintained that 'it lyeth not in the power of the dyuell . . . too fetch up the soules agayne', but the devil could feign and counterfeit the presence of a ghost.[25] Puck's account of wandering ghosts may ostensibly function as a way to claim that the *Midsummer* fairies should not be conflated with either souls of the deceased or demonic spirits. But the ghosts' ambiguous status may also remind audiences that fairies, as spirits, provoke similar questions about the interactions between the material and spiritual realms.

C11.P26 The fairies in *A Midsummer Night's Dream* do not take up local habitation in mortal bodies, but they do prove to be spirits that have the capacity to interfere in the physical world as either invisible entities or visible shapes. When Demetrius and Helen enter the woods, Oberon remarks that he is 'invisible; | And . . . will overhear their conference' (2.1.186–7). In her argument with Oberon, Titania suggests that he regularly steals away from fairy land to play human roles, citing an instance in which he took on 'the shape of Corin' to woo Phillida (65–8). Puck confesses that his daily interferences in the human world are often the effects of shape-shifting, when he may appear as a 'fat and bean-fed horse' or a 'roasted crab' apple (45–8). When Puck torments the rude mechanicals, he narrates his capacity to transform into various animal forms and fire with great alacrity, anticipating Ariel's rapid transformations in *The Tempest*:

C11.P27 I'll follow you, I'll lead you about a round,
Through bog, through bush, through brake, through brier:
Sometime a horse I'll be, sometime a hound,

[23] See Michael MacDonald and Terence R. Murphy, eds, *Sleepless Souls: Suicide in Early Modern England* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 47.

[24] Peter Marshall, *Beliefs and the Dead in Reformation England* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 249.

[25] John Veron, *The huntynge of Purgatorye to death* (London, 1561), A3r, 249r.

A hog, a headless bear, sometime a fire;
And neigh, and bark, and grunt, and roar, and burn,
Like horse, hound, hog, bear, fire, at every turn.

C11.P28 (3.1.94–9)

C11.P29 As their narratives suggest, Puck and Oberon's shape-shifting accommodates human perception. As spirits, they do not possess a stable, visible form or a local habitation. While the period's most conservative writers argued that spirits could not breach the boundary between the spiritual and physical realms, most believed that immaterial entities could somehow manifest themselves as physical bodies. The fascination for most writers dwelt in *how* a spiritual entity took on a bodily form. Did spirits enter into pre-existing bodies appropriated for their temporary habitation? Did spirits prefer some bodies over others? Or did a spirit generate the likeness of a body out of air and other elements?[26]

C11.P30 The very phrase 'airy nothing' seems to allude to a puzzle that gripped demonologists: what was the relationship between air and spirit? Were spirits composed of fine air, or did they assume airy bodies?[27] Indeed, the prevailing argument for how a spirit appeared in the physical world is that it could manipulate the natural element that proves 'so neare to that substance himself'.[28] The Jesuit writer Martin Del Rio contends that if demonic spirits are able to simulate 'the softness of flesh, the hardness of bones, the warmth and gentle heat and all the other qualities associated with touch', then it is by condensing the air, and 'mingl[ing] parts of air … [with] earth, water, cloud, vapour, and exhalations'.[29] Pierre le Loyer explains that spirits shape-shift quickly because they can

[26] See Dyan Elliott, *Fallen Bodies: Pollution, Sexuality, and Demonology in the Middle Ages* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), 128–35.

[27] On the scientific status of demonology, see Stuart Clark, *Thinking with Demons: The Idea of Witchcraft in Early Modern Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). For an ecological perspective, see Steve Mentz, 'Airy Spirits: Winds, Bodies, and Ecological Force in Early Modern England', in 'Shakespeare and the Human', ed. Tiffany Werth, special section, *Shakespearean International Yearbook* 15 (2015): 21–38. In Chapter 6 in this volume, Mary Thomas Crane discusses how the fairies function as agents of meteorology.

[28] James VI, *Daemonologie*, 22.

[29] P. G. Maxwell-Stuart, ed. and trans., *Martin Del Rio: Investigations into Magic* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 111–12. Originally published as *Disquisitionum magicarum libri sex* in 1599. See too Jane P. Davidson's discussion of the French demonologist Nicholas Remy in her *Early Modern Supernatural: The Dark Side of European Culture, 1400–1700* (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2012), 40–1.

C11.P31 take vnto them a bodie of the ayre, by thickning the same and forming it of vapors,… turning and mooving it at their pleasure,… [and then] make the same to disappeare and vanish away againe whensoever they will, by reason that it is nothing but a vapor.[30]

C11.P32 When discussing Satan in *An Examen of Witches*, Henry Boguet suggests that the evil one had options: 'Satan does not always create for himself a body out of air, water, or earth, but very often enters into a beast.'[31] Even when spirits 'assume the dead body of a human being or an animal', they 'make it move' by the same 'motion whereby they can stir the air'.[32]

C11.P33 For the few scholars who insisted that spirits could not operate in the physical world, it was unacceptable to conceive of spirits as made of air. As Reginald Scot writes, '[E]verie part of aier is aier.… Neither… can an aierie bodie receive or have either shape or figure'.[33] According to Deacon and Walker, 'if the devil hath an ayrie bodie, then also, his said bodie is subject to corruption, and dissolution'—or symptoms of mortality. These objections, however, do not mean, as Theseus implies, that spirits are merely motions in one's mind. Although spirits are incorporeal, they 'doe daily, assault, tempt, [and] torment… us'.[34]

C11.P34 The sticking point for many writers who sought to understand how a demon could operate as a material body lay in the belief that spirits practised coition with humans.[35] Catholic writer Francesco Guazzo notes that if demons 'assume the bodies of dead men, or make for themselves out of air a palpable body like that of flesh', then they can 'create the appearance of sex' and 'also produce semen which they have brought from elsewhere'.[36] It was not unusual for reports of fairy encounters to involve carnal relations between humans and fairies.[37] Titania's bewitched infatuation with Bottom

[30] Loyer, *A treatise of specters or straunge sights, visions and apparitions appearing sensibly vnto men* (London, 1605), 45.

[31] Boguet, *An Examen of Witches*, ed. Montague Summers (Mineola, NY: Dover, 2009), 20. Originally published as *Discours exècrable des Sorciers* (Lyon, 1602).

[32] Maxwell-Stuart, ed., *Martin Del Rio*, 111.

[33] Scot, 'A discourse of Diuels and spirits', in *The discoverie of witchcraft* (London, 1584), 516. Lander has noted the similarities between Theseus's 'dismissive account' and Reginald Scot's 'hostility towards the spirit world' ('Thinking with Fairies', 55).

[34] Deacon and Walker, *Dialogicall Discourses*, 82, 26.

[35] See Walter Stephens, *Demon Lovers: Witchcraft, Sex, and the Crisis of Belief* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002).

[36] Guazzo, *Compendium Maleficarum: The Montague Summers Edition*, trans. E. A. Ashwin (Mineola, NY: Dover, 1988), 30. Originally published in Latin in 1608.

[37] Wilby, *Cunning Folk*, 105–7.

implies that they engage in a sexual act in her bower. But Titania reverses the puzzle of how a spirit obtains the body necessary for sexual union with a human (or a man-animal hybrid) by suggesting that she will make Bottom more like 'an airy spirit' by purging his 'mortal grossness' (3.1.142–3). In one sixteenth-century account of fairy interaction, Godwin Wharton blamed his sexual impotence on a fairy's nocturnal visitations, for the spirit supposedly 'sucked out the very marrow from his bones' while he slept.[38] Through Titania, Shakespeare constructs a spirit's perspective of human–fairy relations. Rather than adopting a denser form of 'mortal grossness', Titania threatens to transform a human body to better accommodate her airy ways.

C11.P35 Indeed, the question of whether the devil could alter a human body provokes more heated discussion in the period than the question of whether spirits inhabited corpses or assumed bodies of air. If perceived as an actual transformation, Bottom's conversion into a man with an ass's head would have been viewed by most early modern spectators as a feat that exceeded even the devil's abilities. It was the standard view that devils cannot 'create or make bodies, or change one body into another for those things are proper to God'.[39] As Johann Weyer maintains, Satan is unable to 'truly transform things at will, or put upon them another shape'.[40] Of course the joke in Bottom's case is that his transformation is a physical manifestation of his character as lowborn (therefore more animal-like) as well as his role as an ass or a fool. But Shakespeare teases his audience with the question of whether Puck has actually transformed Bottom into a hybrid creature, half beast and half man. Certainly, his physical urges have become more asinine; he is compelled, for example, to scratch his marvellously hairy face, and he yearns to munch dry oats and sweet hay.

C11.P36 It was in discussions of werewolves that the issue of bestial metamorphosis generated the most heat.[41] Even if the devil or demonic spirits were unable to effect real transformations, most agreed that the devil still had a hand in cases of lycanthropy. Many controversialists suggested that the devil

[38] Thomas, *Religion and the Decline*, 732.

[39] George Gifford, *A discourse of the subtill practises of deuilles by vvitches and sorcerers* (London, 1587), E1r.

[40] George Mora, ed., *Witches, Devils, and Doctors in the Renaissance: Johann Weyer, De praestigiis daemonum* (Binghamton, NY: Medieval & Renaissance Texts & Studies, 1991), 87.

[41] On these debates, see Johannes Dillinger, '"Species", "Phantasia", "Raison": Werewolves and Shape-Shifters in Demonological Literature', in *Werewolf Histories*, ed. Willem de Blécourt (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 142–58; and Nicole Jacques-Lefèvre, 'Such an Impure, Cruel, and Savage Beast: Images of the Werewolf in Demonological Works', in *Werewolves, Witches, and Wandering Spirits: Traditional Belief and Folklore in Early Modern Europe*, ed. Kathryn A. Edwards (Kirksville, MO: Truman State University Press, 2002), 181–97.

produced illusions that persuaded both the 'werewolf' and the spectators that a metamorphosis had occurred. Some maintained that humans were put to sleep by the devil, and that the devil himself then circulated as a werewolf. Other times the human was deluded into believing he had become a wolf, so that he behaved as one, but without the physical transformation. Puck explains that he has 'fixed' on Bottom's head 'An ass's nole' (3.2.17), suggesting perhaps that Bottom simply wears a well-attached costume, like the actor who plays the role.[42] Oberon later instructs Puck to 'take off this head' (4.1.62). Although everyone around Bottom believes he has been transmuted, he never seems fully conscious of his ass head, nor does his recollection of his fairy encounter demonstrate knowledge of his former appearance. But even if spirits were unable to change a man into a beast, it was the demonic capacity to generate the belief that a person had been transformed that provoked profound anxiety in early modern culture.

C11.P37 Ultimately, it was the illusionary skills of demonic spirits that prompted anguished speculation about the unreliability of human senses as well as the seeming impossibility of distinguishing between dreams and reality. The devil could insinuate himself into one's imagination, 'whether waking or sleeping, introduc[ing] all sorts of shapes, cleverly stirring up the humours and the spirits in this trickery'. By corrupting the mind with 'empty images' and 'specious appearances', the devil persuaded his victims that false events 'were occurring truly and externally; . . . not only when people sleep but also when they are awake'.[43] Guazzo argues that witches are so duped by the devil that they have 'a conviction of their reality when they awake, as if it were not a dream but an actual experience and an undoubted physical action'.[44] Efforts to deny a witch's power and circumscribe the devil's material influence exacerbated fears about the weakness of human perception. As John Cotta laments,

C11.P38 > If men could not certainely discerne between that which they do really see, and that they falsely imagine in visions, dreames, and fancie, then were the life of man most miserable, there could be no certainty of truth,

[42] See Johann Jacob Wecker, *Eighteen Books of the Secrets of Art & Nature* (London, 1660), for a 'recipe' to create the illusion of an ass head: '*That a Mans Head may appear like an Asses Head*. Take a piece of an Asses fat and anoint a Mans Head with it. *Albertus*' (24).

[43] Johann Weyer, quoted in Stuart Clark, *Vanities of the Eye: Vision in Early Modern European Culture* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 317–18.

[44] Guazzo, *Compendium Maleficarum*, 37.

> no excelling in knowledge or understanding. All men should be a like unable to distinguish, whether we live in dreames only, or in wakefull deed.[45]

C11.P39 That spirits can confuse the boundaries between one's dreams and wakeful life proves central to *A Midsummer Night's Dream*. Shakespeare's play suggests that humans lack the capacity to discern not only between dreams and reality but also between bewitchment and disenchantment. While Cotta qualifies his lament with a conviction that there must be some way to distinguish between 'only illusion and imagination [and] some thing truely and really visible unto the outward sense', *A Midsummer Night's Dream* seems to encourage acceptance of this ontological uncertainty.[46]

C11.P40 In the same way that Theseus does not seem to recall his own encounters with the fairy world, Bottom and the lovers are unable to discern the difference between dreaming and actual experience. It is the trick of the spirits, as Oberon explains, that when their victims awake, they will return to their lives 'think[ing] no more of this night's accidents | But as the fierce vexation of a dream' (4.1.65–6). Although the audience sees the lovers plagued by Puck and Oberon, the lovers imagine the night's experiences as only 'a dream and fruitless vision' (3.2.372).

C11.P41 When Bottom awakes in the woods, he assumes that his fellow players have 'left [him] asleep' and that he has had a 'rare vision' and a 'dream':

> C11.P42 God's my life! Stolen hence, and left me asleep? I have had a most rare vision. I have had a dream, past the wit of man to say what dream it was. Man is but an ass, if he go about t'expound this dream. Methought I was—there is no man can tell what. Methought I was,—and methought I had,—but man is but a patched fool, if he will offer to say what methought I had. The eye of man hath not heard, the ear of man hath not seen, man's hand is not able to taste, his tongue to conceive, nor his heart to report, what my dream was. (4.1.198–207)

C11.P43 In noting that it is 'past the wit of man to say what dream it was', Bottom readily accepts that he will not obtain, in Cotta's words, 'certainty of truth,

[45] Cotta, *The trial of witch-craft shewing the true and right method . . .* (London, 1616), 41–2; quoted in Clark, *Vanities of the Eye*, 320.

[46] Cotta, *The trial of witch-craft*, 37; quoted in Clark, *Vanities of the Eye*, 319.

no excelling in knowledge or understanding'. And while the audience knows that his 'dream' was not a dream, the synaesthesia implied by his garbled rendition of 1 Corinthians 2:9–10 underscores the difficulty mortals face in discerning the spirit world as well as the sensory confusion that spirits are believed to cause. In Desiderius Erasmus's *The Praise of Folly*, the same passage from Corinthians is cited to explain those rare instances in which people have somehow touched the spirit world, leaving them unable to determine whether they are asleep or awake:

C11.P44 > So much better are things spiritual than things corporeal, and things invisible than things visible; which doubtless is that which the prophet promises: 'The eye hath not seen, nor the ear heard, nor has it entered into the heart of man to consider what God has provided for them that love Him.' . . . And when they come to themselves, tell you they know not where they have been, whether in the body or out of the body, or sleeping; nor do they remember what they have heard, seen, spoken, or done, and only know this, as it were in a mist or dream, that they were the most happy while they were so out of their wits.[47]

C11.P45 As this passage indicates, a spiritual encounter leaves people without geographical bearings, unable to know 'where they have been, whether in the body or out of the body, or sleeping'.[48] In this vein, Bottom is unable to discern the reality of his experience and reinterprets it as a dream.

C11.P46 While Bottom was unable to discern a difference between actual experience and dreaming, Demetrius awakes from his adventures in the woods still, unknowingly, charmed. He is currently, and perhaps permanently, under the influence of Oberon's love magic. Notably, it is Demetrius who

[47] Erasmus, *The Praise of Folly*, trans. John Wilson (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1958), 149–50. See Jan Kott, *The Bottom Translation: Marlowe and Shakespeare and the Carnival Tradition* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1987), 41–3. Most critical readings have focused on how Paul's interest in social divisions in the Christian community may be relevant to the play: see Annabel Patterson, *Shakespeare and the Popular Voice* (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1989), 68–9; Louis Montrose, *The Purpose of Playing: Shakespeare and the Cultural Politics of the Elizabethan Theatre* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 192–4; Andrew Barnaby, '"The Botome of Goddes Secretes": 1 Corinthians and *A Midsummer Night's Dream*', *Renaissance Drama* 43, no. 1 (2015): 1–26.

[48] In this volume, Garrett A. Sullivan, Jrexplores how Edmund Spenser associates 'daemonic' sleep with Catholicism in *The Faerie Queene* (Chapter 10).

questions whether the lovers have actually awakened from their sleep in the woods:

[Are you sure
C11.P48 That we are awake?][49] It seems to me
C11.P49 That yet we sleep, we dream. Do not you think
C11.P50 The Duke was here, and bid us follow him?
C11.P51 HERMIA: Yea; and my father.
C11.P52 HELENA: And Hippolyta.
C11.P53 LYSANDER: And he did bid us follow to the temple.
DEMETRIUS: Why, then, we are awake. Let's follow him,
C11.P55 And by the way let us recount our dreams.
C11.P56 (4.1.189–95)

C11.P57 With his eyes still affected by the juice that Puck applied, Demetrius hints that his perception feels hallucinatory. Demetrius may not return to Athens with an ass's head, but he has been transmuted by his encounter with the fairies.

C11.P58 Even if an audience member identifies the fairies as demons, or believes that spirits cannot operate in the physical world, she may still view Demetrius's transformation as a consequence of intrusive spirits. Reginald Scot contends that the Devil does not need 'external terrours' to affect his victims, for he 'flatteringly insinuateth himself into our hearts, to satisfie, please, and serve our humours, enticing us to prosecute our own appetites and pleasures'.[50] As King James asserts, spirits can easily move people's passions. They 'can make men or women to loue or hate other, . . . a subtile spirite, knowes well inough how to perswade the corrupted affection'.[51] It appears that everyone in the period believed that malevolent spirits could stir the humors and alter the affections. And what may make Demetrius's transformation simultaneously familiar and threatening to an early modern audience is that Puck and Oberon deploy a love potion to corrupt the lovers' affections, a mode of enchantment believed to be available to humans, too.

C11.P59 Although *A Midsummer Night's Dream* invites us to imagine that we can see a seemingly separate, invisible, and ultimately unknowable spirit world,

[49] This line is omitted in the Folio.
[50] Leland L. Estes, 'Reginald Scot and His *Discoverie of Witchcraft*: Religion and Science in the Opposition to the European Witch Craze', *Church History* 52, no. 4 (1983): 444–56, 449.
[51] James VI, *Daemonologie*, 45.

the threat posed to humans by spirits rests on the indivisibility of the spirit and human realms, for they share the same natural world. Titania laments that her quarrel with Oberon has affected the seasons, ruined the crops, and spread disease, driving home the point that humans and spirits reside in the same ecological environment. If assisted by demonic spirits, witches were thought to produce the very same 'progeny of evils' that Titania describes: destructive weather, rotting corn, and diseased livestock.[52] Cunning folk claimed to gain their knowledge of cures and charms from fairies, but the ingredients they used came from the same fields, woods, and gardens that spirits supposedly inhabited.[53]

C11.P60 For Reformers, attributing one's magical charms to fairies was either ignorance or mendacity. As William Perkins explains, people who turn to charms and potions to transform the passions of others are unknowingly ensnared by the devil: 'men or women, as vse Charmes and Inchantment for the effecting of any thing vpon a superstitious and erroneous perswasion, . . . not knowing that it is the action of the deuill by those meanes'.[54] For Perkins, the devil can act at a distance: those who use his charms and potions simply function as his surrogates. In 1542, it was made a capital offence to 'provoke any person to unlawful love'. The penalty was made less severe in 1563, but in 1604 the death penalty was reinstated for second offenders. This legislation suggests that the authorities not only believed that such spells would work but also that enough people violated the statutes to compel their regular reinstatement.[55] There are records of poor, middling, and aristocratic folks consulting cunning men and women about love magic.[56]

C11.P61 While Oberon provides a fantastic account of the mythological origins of his love potion, its availability as a flower well known to local maidens underscores that love potions in Athens are indistinguishable from the magic of the fairy world. The same occult qualities in the plants that produce cures or astonishing effects exist in both realms. In observing that young virgins call the flower 'love-in-idleness' (2.1.168), Oberon emphasizes its domestic familiarity. It is a purple pansy, or a violet, and its colour

[52] Davidson, *Early Modern Supernatural*, 129–30.

[53] Wilby, *Cunning Folk*, 67–9, 87–8, 114–15; and Owen Davies, *Cunning-Folk: Popular Magic in English History* (London: Hambledon and London, 2003), 70.

[54] Perkins, *A Discourse of the Damned Art of Witchcraft* (London, 1608), 20.

[55] Thomas, *Religion and the Decline*, 292. The educated took love potions seriously enough that their potentialities were publicly debated at Oxford in 1620, 1637, 1652, and 1699 (269).

[56] Ibid., 277–79.

places it among the venereal plants—or those herbs ruled by Venus.[57] Shakespeare locates this magical property in an everyday ingredient readily available in everyone's garden.

C11.P62 Notably, Hermia's father Egeus, well before the lovers enter the woods, expresses fears that his daughter's affections have been altered by magic. When he comes to complain to Theseus that his daughter Hermia wishes to marry Lysander instead of Demetrius, he contends (much like Brabantio in *Othello*) that Lysander has enchanted Hermia:

C11.P63 This [man] hath bewitched the bosom of my child.
Thou, thou Lysander, thou hast given her rhymes
And interchanged love tokens with my child.
…
C11.P64 And stol'n the impression of her fantasy
With bracelets of thy hair, rings, gauds, conceits,
Knacks, trifles, nosegays, sweetmeats—messengers
Of strong prevailment in unhardened youth.
With cunning hast thou filched my daughter's heart.
C11.P65 (1.1.27–36)

C11.P66 We may suspect Egeus's motives and guess that he blames magic for an unaffected rebellion on his daughter's part. But the complexity of his emotions should not lead us to discount the possibility that audience members in the sixteenth century would accept the viability of his claims. The exchange of gifts—rings, jewels, love tokens—in particular, was often identified as a means of conveying enchantment.[58] Hermia confesses that she does not know by 'what power' she has been made 'bold'. Such language suggests that she is bound to Lysander by forces beyond her will.[59] *A Midsummer Night's Dream* could have inspired its early modern audience to question whether their own affections had been redirected by spirits, or by an illicit love potion, without their knowledge.

C11.P67 In the epilogue, Puck suggests that any offence the play has committed can be 'mended' if the audience attributes their visions to a dream:

C11.P68 If we shadows have offended,
Think but this, and all is mended:
That you have but slumbered here

[57] Dent, 'Imagination', 119.
[58] Wecker, *Eighteen Books of the Secrets*, 35.
[59] Dent, 'Imagination', 120.

While these visions did appear;
And this weak and idle theme,
No more yielding but a dream,
Gentles, do not reprehend.

C11.P69 (5.1.409–15)

C11.P70 Although presented as a reassuring apology, Puck's statement feeds profound cultural anxieties about the fallibility of the senses and the audience's potential inability to distinguish between external phenomena and dreaming visions. Whether awake or asleep, Puck's enchanted victims proved vulnerable to the false visions and distractions produced by airy spirits. When we suppose a bush to be a bear, it could be our overheated imaginations. Or it could be the effects of enchantment. Or it could be a shape-shifting Puck. Cotta described this state of doubt as 'most miserable', for there can 'be no certainty of truth, no excelling in knowledge or understanding'. But the belief in an invisible, intrusive spirit world necessarily shapes how early moderns understood the various and constant transactions between self and place. Some forty years after *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, René Descartes would invoke an evil demon as a thought experiment for building a foundation of knowledge removed from the fallibility of the senses and for producing a self defined by containment and thought alone. In stark contrast, *A Midsummer Night's Dream* unveils an unseen spirit world and suggests that the embodied minds of Demetrius, Bottom, and even Theseus have been unknowingly breached and altered by invisible spirituous entities. Cognition and affect in *A Midsummer Night's Dream* prove to be ecological.[60] However, our understanding of how early moderns perceived this ecology should encompass their belief in nonhuman but conscious agents. The distribution of cognitive and affective processes across 'brain, body, and world' not only extends the human mind into the environment but also extends an animated, and surprisingly motivated, environment through the human brain and body.[61]

[60] See Robert N. Watson, 'The Ecology of Self in *A Midsummer Night's Dream*', in *Ecocritical Shakespeare*, ed. Lynne Bruckner and Dan Brayton (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 33–56.

[61] See John Sutton, 'Place and Memory: History, Cognition, Phenomenology', in this volume (Chapter 5). A couple of paragraphs in this essay appeared previously in Mary Floyd-Wilson, 'Potions, Passion, and Fairy Knowledge in *A Midsummer Night's Dream*', in *Shakespeare in Our Time: A Shakespeare Association of America Collection*, ed. Dympna Callaghan and Suzanne Gossett (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), 184–8.

C12

Afterword

Gail Kern Paster

C12.P1 I begin this afterword by quoting two sentences that I love for their aphoristic ring, scholarly sentences that speak to what motivates those of us who have devoted our professional lives to researching the terms (sometimes familiar, sometimes strange) of early modern embodiment. The first sentence comes from Shigehisa Kuriyama who writes, 'The history of the body is ultimately a history of ways of inhabiting the world.'[1] The second belongs to Steve Mentz: 'a fundamental task of literary narratives is representing how human bodies interact with the natural world'.[2]

C12.P2 Taken together, these sentences beautifully convey the capacious parameters of the eleven essays included in this collection, for each of them—however different in their particular vectors of research—constitutes a response to the call for the sophisticated cultural history articulated above. Each essay begins by assuming certain fundamental, by-now familiar characteristics of early modern embodiment: the body's permeable borders; its dynamic and reciprocal relations with an environment understood to saturate and articulate personhood; its possession of a tripartite organic soul which distributed faculties hierarchically from vegetables to animals to humans; and finally its divinely inscribed place in an enchanted cosmos organized by chains of sympathy and antipathy and filled with spirits that, as Lady Macbeth puts it, 'tend on mortal thoughts' (*Macbeth,* 1.5.37).[3] The complexity of this body's relations with all these defining elements is nicely summarized by Timothy J. Reiss who describes the early modern self as

[1] Kuriyama, *The Expressiveness of the Body and the Divergence of Greek and Chinese Medicine* (New York: Zone, 1999), 237. I have quoted this sentence elsewhere; see, for example, *Humoring the Body: Emotions and the Shakespearean Stage* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 7–8.

[2] Mentz, 'Strange Weather in *King Lear*', *Shakespeare 6*, nos. 1–4 (London: Routledge, 2010), 139.

[3] On antipathies and sympathies, see Mary Floyd-Wilson, *Occult Knowledge, Science, and Gender on the Shakespearean Stage* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 1–14.

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'passible'—its mutability and permeability (both social and biological) in direct contrast with the supreme impassibility of God.[4]

C12.P3 What has led to this expanding differential narrative of early modern embodiment are startling moments of estrangement when reading early modern texts—often but not exclusively in drama—when characters describe an emotion or sensation in language profoundly different from our own modern bodily discourses, even if the emotion or sensation itself may register as powerfully familiar, indeed trans-historical.[5] We moderns do not, for example, ordinarily describe ourselves or others as distempered; we do not think of anger as produced by or causing an excess of bodily choler, as Rosencrantz and Guildenstern clearly do in describing Claudius to Hamlet after the king's hasty departure from the play-within-the play. 'The King, sir', says Guildenstern, 'is marvelous distempered'. 'With drink', asks Hamlet hopefully. 'No, my lord, with choler', comes the reply. Hamlet—clearly an early modern believer in humoral medicine—suggests the bodily relief of purgation: 'Your wisdom should show itself more richer to signify this to the doctor, for me to put him to his purgation would perhaps plunge him into more choler' (*Hamlet,* 3.2.290–8).[6] Though it is not difficult to parse this tense and witty exchange about Claudius' embodied state, we must also acknowledge the period-specificity of its bodily discourses and its almost automatic recourse to humoralism. Who knows what Claudius is telling himself offstage about his emotional state, and in what words? What we do know is what Rosencrantz and Guildenstern say about him to Hamlet. An excess of royal 'choler' here does indeed signify an excess of anger, not metaphorically but literally, as Hamlet's sarcastic reference to calling the doctor to get rid of it makes clear. Humoral theory neither causes nor predetermines Claudius's anger but it does effectively frame it for a humorally minded audience in terms we must acknowledge as historically specific.

[4] Reiss, *Mirages of the Selfe: Patterns of Personhood in Ancient and Early Modern Europe* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 2; Reiss's formulation has been very influential in early modern scholarship. See, for example, Mary Floyd-Wilson and Garrett A. Sullivan, Jr, 'Introduction', in *Environment and Embodiment in Early Modern England* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 1–13.

[5] For a critique of these terms of embodiment, see Brian Cummings and Freya Sierhuis, 'Introduction', in *Passions and Subjectivity in Early Modern Culture*, ed. Brian Cummings and Freya Sierhuis (Farnham and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2013), 5.

[6] For an extended discussion of this scene, see *Humoring the Body*, 50–4.

C12.P4 Early modern scholarship's turn to the body in the 1990s was driven by powerful dissatisfaction with the universal models of autonomous selfhood and trans-historical emotion inherited from traditional historians such as Jacob Burckhardt that endured in the scholarly narratives of powerful early modern male self-fashioning written by new historicists such as Stephen Greenblatt. Such models failed to account for the differential history of embodied subjects produced by feminist and poststructuralist theory and their later avatars of queer, postcolonial, race, and subaltern studies. Idealist criticism certainly did not address those experiences of estrangement and defamiliarization cited above. While it is sometimes difficult—as Katharine Eisaman Maus suggested some years ago—to parse literal and metaphorical locutions about the embodied self, it is undeniable that bodily discourses over the centuries since Shakespeare wrote have become increasingly abstract and immaterial as the humoral facts of life were slowly contradicted but humoral locutions of bodily states endured.[7] Over time, the 'facts' of humoralism were replaced by the empirical truths of modern anatomy and physiology, and human psychology was divorced from human physiology by the followers of Descartes.

C12.P5 The literal language of the humors—the language of 'catching cold', for example, or feeling one's heart burst with anger, or seeing another's decision making clouded by sadness—hung on as metaphor. For example, the first meaning of the word *pregnant*, was not 'with child' but more generally 'full of'—so that our more limited modern meaning is metonymic of the earlier one.[8] As Mary Thomas Crane has pointed out elsewhere, 'For Shakespeare, *pregnant* was a word that named the multiple ways that bodies are penetrated by the external world and produce something—offspring, ideas, language—as a result of that penetration'.[9] Hamlet's description of himself as 'unpregnant of my cause' (2.2.595) is not so much a female trope of reproduction as a more or less literal bemoaning about his sense of emptiness, about lacking the motivation (psychological and physiological) which would be produced by manly heat: 'For it cannot be | But I am pigeon-livered and lack gall | To make oppression bitter' (2.2.603–5). We may well want to

[7] Maus, *Inwardness and Theater in the English Renaissance* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 1214. See also Richard Strier and Carla Mazzio, 'Two Responses to 'Shakespeare and Embodiment: An E-Conversation', *Literary Compass* 3, no. 1 (2005): 16 for Strier's common-sense resistance to early modern paradigms as an explanation for emotion.

[8] This is reflected in citations in the *OED,* which begin with meanings for *pregnant* related to 'Of the mind, language, behaviour, etc'.

[9] Crane, *Shakespeare's Brain: Reading with Cognitive Theory* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001), 159.

regard Hamlet's humoral self-description as metaphorical here, as it certainly is for us, but we make that judgement in peril of anachronistic misunderstanding. For Hamlet, as for his audience, his inability to sweep to his revenge has a cause both psychological and physiological, although the conceptual difference between psychology and physiology is far more available to us than to him at this moment of bitter introspection.[10] As Julian Yates argues in Chapter 10, 'models of the passions in the period offer a discursive trading ground in which concepts migrate between the registers of physiology, humoral psychology, theology, spiritual practice, and social theory'. To that observation, I would add one demur: that such concepts and registers—and the bright lines between them—belong to us more than to the early moderns, especially at a time when what we now call 'science' was considered natural philosophy, because it examined the natural realm rather than the supernatural or even preternatural one.[11]

C12.P6 Cultural histories of the body, especially histories of early modern humoralism, made it possible to recognize early modern bodily discourses as far more literal than metaphorical. It then became necessary to re-examine the bodily truths underlying some of the following moments in Shakespearean drama: why, for example, Petruchio tells Kate that both of them are too hot and dry of disposition to eat roasted meat: 'For it engenders choler, planteth anger' (*Shrew,* 4.1.172–3); why Leontes is glad that Hermione did not nurse Mamillius ('you | Have too much blood in him' [*Winter's Tale*, 2.1.59–60]); and why Desdemona imagines that the African sun under which Othello was born would have drawn the 'humors' of jealousy from him (*Othello*, 3.4.24–9).[12] Examples of the reciprocal interactions of the humoral body and the humors of its affect-filled environment could be multiplied indefinitely. And, even though it is clear in the example drawn from *Taming of the Shrew* that Petruchio is manifestly inventing a reason to tame Kate by starving her, it is nonetheless telling that he resorts to humoral remedies for correcting

[10] For a contrary view of Hamlet's literalism here and elsewhere, see Steven Mullaney, *The Reformation of the Emotions in the Age of Shakespeare* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2015), 56–9.

[11] See *OED*, sub. *natural philosophy:* 'The study of natural bodies and the phenomena connected with them; natural science; (in later use) *spec.* physical science, physics'. On the preternatural, see Stuart Clark, *Thinking with Demons: The Idea of Witchcraft in Early Modern Europe* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1997), 177.

[12] For a discussion of the example from *Taming of the Shrew*, see *Humoring the Body*, 131; from *The Winter's Tale*, see *The Body Embarrassed: Drama and the Disciplines of Shame in Early Modern England* (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 1993), 260–80, esp. 269; for *Othello*, see Mary Floyd-Wilson, *English Ethnicity and Race in Early Modern Drama* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 1–19.

bodily imbalance in order to silence her and justify his behaviour to his Elizabethan onlookers. It is the explanatory force of the humors that causes Shylock to deploy them as a rhetorical dead end when he refuses to show mercy to Antonio when expected to do so by the Venetian Senate:

C12.P7

> You'll ask me why I rather choose to have
> A weight of carrion flesh than to receive
> Three thousand ducats. I'll not answer that;
> But say it is my humor, is it answer'd?
> (*Merchant of Venice*, 4.1.40–3)[13]

C12.P8 The search for those of us trying to discover a differential history of the body was never for a pathologized model of selfhood, but rather for one that conformed more precisely to the period's own gendered preoccupations with involuntary lapses of will and reason in the face of overwhelming passion; to its manifest interest in managing bodily boundaries; and to its unavailing search for emotional and bodily constancy as the sine qua non of masculinity.[14] That foundational recognition of the early modern body's porousness and psycho-physiological instability—phenomenologically, a chief source of the subject's anxieties—led to further recognition, in Michael Schoenfeldt's nice phrase in Chapter 10, of an ecological self in 'osmotic interaction' with its environment. This, in turn, led to the drive towards a vigorous expansion of the terms of embodiment like the one represented so brilliantly in the essays included here. Given the fundamental assumptions I outlined at the opening, the overarching logic of these essays is to refine, with historical nuance and sophistication, the embodied self's complex placement in its inspirited cosmos from the animate ground up—from the sensate, cognitively challenging landscapes of romance (Sullivan, Schoenfeldt) to the fearful sheepfold (Yates), to the passionate, dissolving heavenly spheres (Poole, Crane, Floyd-Wilson), and the many points in between (Sutton, Harris, Traub, Harvey). The geography of embodiment, then, becomes an essential part of a larger effort at historical phenomenology, one poised in the delicate interstices between trans-historical

[13] For a fuller discussion of this speech, see *Humoring the Body*, 204–9.

[14] On strategies for achieving humoral balance, see Michael C. Schoenfeldt, *Bodies and Selves in Early Modern England: Physiology and Inwardness in Spenser, Shakespeare, Herbert, and Milton* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1–39. On early modern preoccupation with knowledge and control, see Susan James, *Passions and Action: The Emotions in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 2.

sameness and manifest difference, recognizing—as John Sutton puts it in this volume—that 'the places we inhabit can partly *constitute* the processes and activities of feeling, remembering, and so on'.

C12.P9 The results of thirty years of scholarship devoted to early modern embodiment find ample affirmation and advancement in the essays gathered here—further evidence of what I have elsewhere called 'the ecology of the passions'.[15] Taken together, these essays do demonstrate the compelling strangeness of the affect-filled early modern cosmos. The geography of embodiment is fundamental to any properly constituted historical phenomenology because it is clear—not only from the argument of these essays but from the many early modern texts they draw upon—that the early moderns accepted as fundamental truth that their bodies and emotions were broadly and literally reflected in the macrocosm. These reflections took the form of meteorology; or the cognitively dangerous, even daemonic power of sleep; or ethically charged, permeable landscapes like sensate gardens, fearful sheepfolds, boundary places memorially embodied, fairy-haunted woods; or geohumorally foreign lands with transformative potential for the permeable self. In this respect, as Elizabeth Harvey argues, reading faces is of a piece with reading the skies—as mimetic reflections of each other, as places where affect is registered.

C12.P10 As Mary Thomas Crane points out in this volume, the early modern cosmos is marked by the vital materialism, the agency of matter, which Jane Bennett has so brilliantly described as characterizing our own modern world.[16] As these essays attest, the early moderns living in their passion-filled, mutable sublunar world would not have been surprised to hear that matter, animate and inanimate, was full of humors, including the humors of the entire globe; that fearful sheep, possessing a sensitive soul and needing the pastoral care of a shepherd to ward off their predators, could properly allegorize their own desire for Christian submission and protection; that the marital quarrel between Titania and Oberon was indeed meteorological, just as storms signified the heavens in passionate disorder, just as anger was cognitively a passionate storm within the microcosmic human body, and just as dreams were fogs in the embodied, humoral mind. Early modern fears of bodily dissolution, permeating the many texts in multiple genres

[15] Gail Kern Paster, 'Becoming the Landscape: The Ecology of the Passions in the Legend of Temperance', in *Environment and Embodiment,* 137–52.

[16] Jane Bennett, *Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2010).

cited by Kristen Poole, were given substance and verification by the tenets of Stoic cosmology, which were not denied by Christian eschatology. It can be no wonder, then, that even succumbing to the everyday unconsciousness of sleep—as Garrett A. Sullivan, Jr makes clear in Chapter 10—could seem fraught with peril to body and soul. This was especially true if the sleep that one required could come in two forms—the restful sleep sought by Protestants and the 'daemonic sleep' of Catholicism that they had reason to fear. But if every environment posed peril to the permeable early modern body, it followed logically for poets like Spenser and Milton that such peril also represented a spiritual opportunity for post-lapsarian humans—like the opportunities to moderate enjoyment and resist captivation which were located in earthly gardens, with their ambiguous offerings of pleasure and pain (see Chapter 2).

C12.P11 Trained in the binary logic of post-Cartesian abstraction, we find it difficult to think of the imagination in material terms as a property of the body, or the creations of the imagination as products of heat. Theseus describes the brains of 'lovers and madmen' as 'seething' (*Midsummer Night's Dream*, 5.1.3) with the liquid heat of hyperactivity. As Mary Floyd-Wilson suggests, his mistake—which is obvious to the audience—is not in describing the overheated brain as 'seething' but in applying that diagnosis to the experiences of the lovers in the fairy-haunted woods, two of whom fall under the spell of Oberon's herbal potion: 'No one in Shakespeare's audience', she argues, 'would have doubted the existence of a spirit world'. Her point is that Elizabethan playgoers, while recognizing Titania and Oberon as Shakespeare's theatrical fictions, would not thereby have disbelieved in possible interactions with supernatural beings even if they disagreed 'on the nature of spirits, their capacities, and the means by which they interacted with the human realm'.[17] It is that belief—or the corollary belief in human interactions with 'literally captivating surroundings' (Chapter 2)—that perhaps most distinguishes the early moderns from our own modern selves. Because the terms of embodiment were geographic, the boundaries of the world that was opening up for the early moderns, East and West, posed an unknowable, challenge-filled expansion of selfhood, a new way—as Kuriyama might phrase it—of 'inhabiting the world'. It was logical to imagine that Father Thomas Stephens's body, after forty years of life in Goa, would have changed in 'its skills, its pleasures, and its relations to the local environment'

[17] For corroboration, see Barbara A. Mowat, 'Prospero's Book', *Shakespeare Quarterly*, 52 (2001), 1–33, esp. 18, for a description of Cardinal Wolsey's attempt in 1529 to conjure spirits.

(see Chapter 3). It was equally logical for cartographers trying to depict the lands and peoples of a rapidly changing globe to impose the comforting binary of Us and Them—'the representational submission of *every* earthly inhabitant'—upon 'what must have seemed a bewildering array of human bodies and cultures' (see Chapter 4). As Traub implicitly suggests, the representational metadata of ways of inhabiting the world as manifested in maps are as telling of differential subjectivity as are the phenomenological data of felt life itself.

C12.P12 Taken together, these essays provide models for cultural historians to look beyond and through straightforward early modern representations of consciousness, bodily sensation, or emotion. These essays show us how to look otherwise and everywhere—in gardens and sheepfolds, in faces and maps, in weather and boundary markers, in sleep and in wake—for culturally embodied ways of inhabiting the world.